Die Stimmung bleibt =?UNKNOWN?Q?d=FCste=3B?= Klaviermusik ausArmenie

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
24. Mai 2005

Schallplatten und Phono;
Die Stimmung bleibt düster; Klaviermusik aus Armenien, vorgestellt in
Erstaufnahmen

Schallplatten und Phono

Der Völkermord an den Armeniern, der vor neunzig Jahren seinen Anfang
nahm, wird bis heute von der Türkei geleugnet. In der an
Grausamkeiten nicht armen Geschichte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts ist
er ein heikles Thema geblieben. Doch lenken die Diskussionen um
Vernichtung und Schuld, die jetzt zum Jahrestag des Genozids neu
aufgeflammt sind, auch die Aufmerksamkeit auf Armenien, die das Land
sonst womöglich nicht erhalten hätte. Seltsam ist es allemal, wie das
Wissen um historisches Geschehen auch den Hörzugriff prägt. Als
Grundton, einem Tinnitus ähnlich, meint man in dieser Erstaufnahme
armenischer Klavierkleinstücke aus acht Jahrzehnten des zwanzigstens
Jahrhunderts hoffnungslose Düsternis zu vernehmen, Wut und
Verzweiflung.

Die Miniaturensammlung, aufgenommen von Sona Shaboyan, die aus Eriwan
stammt und dort ausgebildet wurde, eröffnet fulminant mit drei
Komitas-Tänzen – Bearbeitungen von Volkstänzen durch den Komponisten
Soghomon Soghomonyan, der sich Komitas nannte. Sie entstanden 1916,
ein Jahr nach den Massakern, und begründeten die kammermusikalische
Delikatesse armenischer Klaviermusik: Kleinstformen für Hörer mit
Ohren für Details. Bisweilen begegnet man dem einen oder anderen
dieser Tänze heute als Zugabe eines Konzertpianisten mit Blick auch
auf die Randbezirke des Repertoires.

“Erangi” beginnt mit hüpfenden Figuren, die einander durch beide
Hände verfolgen, doch es ist eher schwerfälliges Stolpern als
graziöses Tänzeln. Perkussive Imitationen bestimmen auch die beiden
anderen Komitas-Stücke, ihre Melodien kreiseln um wenige Töne, die
wie in Trance wiederholt und in winzigen Schritten variiert werden.
Die Stimmung bleibt düster.

Auf Aram Katchachurians gewaltige Toccata folgen Klavierbearbeitungen
armenischer Lieder aus den vierziger und fünfziger Jahren sowie
weitere Komitas-Paraphrasen – auf die Gattung und den Komponisten,
der sich nach ihr benannte, scheinen sich sämtliche Generationen
armenischer Musiker zu beziehen. Nach einer Stunde
schwermütig-virtuoser Vermessung der Tastatur des Klaviers und seines
Resonanzraums folgt eine letzte Verneigung vor Komitas und dem
Schicksal des armenischen Volkes in den 1984 entstandenen Miniaturen
von Ruben Sargsyan. Sie enden mit der Imitation eines grell
scheppernden Glockenspiels.

ANDREAS OBST

Klaviermusik aus Armenien. Werke von Komitas, Aram Katchachurian,
Robert Andreasian, Georgy Saradian, Alexander Arutiunian, Arno
Babachanian, Eduard Mirsoian und Ruben Sargsyan. Sona Shaboyan. Oehms
Classics OC 374.

An exhibition of new works by Sophie Aghajanian in Belfast

Newsletter, UK
May 24, 2005

An exhibition of new works by Sophie Aghajanian is currently on view
at the Mullan Gallery, 239 Lisburn Road, Belfast.

Born in Haifa of Armenian extraction, Sophie moved to London in 1962
to study painting at Ravensbourne College of Art & Design followed by
a post graduate year in printmaking at Brighton School of Art. She
moved to Belfast in 1977 where she still lives and works. Her
paintings have been included in many exhibitions in Ireland and
abroad and are to be found in many public collections including the
Arts Council of Northern Ireland, Bank of Ireland, AIB, Dublin, Bank
Nationale de Paris and the Ulster Museum to name but a few.

She was awarded the Royal Ulster Academy’s Gold Medal in 1983 and was
a prize winner at the Listowel Print Biennale 1982, the Norwegian
International Print Biennale 1983 and Claremorris Open Exhibition, Co
Mayo 1997.

Talking about her work, Sophie says: “I don’t want my work to be
static. I try to paint something that is not necessarily the object,
but goes beyond it and becomes something else. When I stand back from
my painting I sometimes see things emerge that I didn’t know were
there. In the same way it can become whatever the viewer wants it to
become, so that they have a part to play in it as well.” Marie Heany,
writing about the artist, says: “This artist suggests rather than
states, prefers lateral vision to the direct gaze … the tension
between light and dark has been a constant in Sophie Aghajanian’s
work from the beginning. She’s fascinated by light and its ramifying
effects … she talks with equal enthusiasm about the importance of
shadows and how she finds them almost more alive than the actual
objects. In her work the relationship between light and dark is
ambiguous, the balance between them delicately poised and dangerous.”
The exhibition continues until June 4.

Int’l Conf: “Tolerance, Struggle Against Discrimination, Xenophobia”

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “TOLERANCE, STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
AND XENOPHOBIA IN CONTEXT OF STRUGGLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM”
TO BE HELD IN ARMENIA

YEREVAN, May 23. /ARKA/ An international conference themed “Tolerance,
struggle against discrimination, and xenophobia in the context of
struggle against international terrorism (Caucasian dimension)” is to
be held in Yerevan on May 24-25. The public relations and information
department, RA Ombudsman staff, reports that the conference is
supposed to contribute to peace, mutual tolerance and confidence, as
well as to the establishment of dialogue between the countries of the
region in human rights protection. The conference is to be attended by
60 delegates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia,
representatives of international and non-governmental organizations.
The conference has been organized by the RA Institute of Human Rights
Protection under UNESCO’s auspices. P.T. -0–

Russia’s Energy Sector

Global Politician, NY
May 23 2005

Russia’s Energy Sector

Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. – 5/24/2005

The pension fund of the Russian oil giant, Lukoil, a minority
shareholder in TV-6 (owned by a discredited and self-exiled
Yeltsin-era oligarch, Boris Berezovsky), forced, in February 2002,
the closure of this television station on legal grounds. Thus was
fired the opening shot in the re-politicization of the lucrative (and
economically pivotal) energy sector in Russia.

Gazprom (Russia’s natural gas monopoly) has done the same to another
television station, NTV, in 2001 (and then proceeded to expropriate
it from its owner, Vladimir Gusinsky).

Gazprom is forced to sell natural gas to Russian consumers at 10% the
world price and to turn a blind eye to debts owed it by Kremlin
favorites.

But the sector is still in flux, reflecting the shifting fortunes of
oligarchs and bureaucrats in Putin’s Byzantine court.

On May 15, 2005 Gazprom surprisingly announced that it is calling off
a Kremiln-supported proposed merger between itself and another
Russian oil giant, Rosneft.

The fate of Yuganskneftegaz, the prime subsidiary of the now
bankrupted Yukos, is also still undecided – though technically, it
was purchased by Rosneft in a pretend “auction”.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, erstwhile oil magnate and largest
shareholder-cum-CEO of Yukos, is largely out of the picture, his
punishment for having dared to challenge President Putin, however
obliquely. But members of President Putin’s St. Petersburgh “clan”
(clique and camerilla), Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller and Rosneft CEO
Sergei Bogdanchikov, are at each others’ throats.

It is, therefore, clear that Lukoil and Gazprom are used by the
Kremlin as instruments of domestic policy – and by political
factions, both pro and anti-Putin as pawns on an ever-shifting
chessboard.

But Russian energy companies are also used as instruments of foreign
policy.

A few examples:

Russia has resumed oil drilling and exploration in war-ravaged
Chechnya. About 230 million rubles have been transferred to the
federal Ministry of Energy. A new refinery is in the works.

Three years ago, Russia signed a production agreement to develop
oilfields in central Sudan in return for Sudanese arms purchases.

Armenia owes Itera, a Florida based, Gazprom related, oil concern,
$35 million. Originally, Itera has agreed to postpone its planned
reduction in gas supplies to the struggling republic to February 11,
2002. Then it became a rather permanent arrangement, at the Kremlin’s
behest.

In January 2002, President Putin called for the establishment of a
“Eurasian alliance of gas producers” – probably to counter growing
American presence, both economic and military, in Central Asia and
the much disputed oil rich Caspian basin. The countries of Central
Asia have done their best to construct alternative oil pipelines
(through China, Turkey, or Iran) in order to reduce their dependence
on Russian oil transportation infrastructure. These efforts largely
failed (though a new $4 billion pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Black
Sea through Russian territory is in the works, having been
inaugurated in early 2002). Russia is now on a charm offensive.

Its PR efforts are characteristically coupled with extortion. Gazprom
owns the pipelines. Russia exports 7 trillion cubic feet of gas a
year – six times the combined output of all other regional producers
put together. Gazprom actually competes with its own clients, the
pipelines’ users, in export markets. It is owed money by all these
countries and is not above leveraging it to political or economic
gain.

Lukoil is heavily invested in exploration for new oil fields in Iraq,
Algeria, Sudan, and Libya.

Russian debts to the Czech Republic, worth $2.5 billion in face
value, have been bought in 2002 by UES, the Russian electricity
monopoly, for a fraction of their value and through an offshore
intermediary. UES then transferred the notes to the Russian
government against the writing off of $1.35 billion in UES debts to
the federal budget. The Russians claim that Paris Club strictures
have ruled out a direct transaction between Russia (a member of the
Club) and the Czech Republic (not a member).

In the last decade, Russia has been transformed from an industrial
and military power into a developing country with an overwhelming
dependence on a single category of commodities: energy products.
Russia’s energy monopolies – whether state owned or private – serve
as potent long arms of the Kremlin and the security services and
implement their policies faithfully.

The Kremlin (and, indirectly, the security services, the siloviki)
maintain a tight grip over the energy sector by selectively applying
Russia’s tangle of hopelessly arcane laws. This strategy first saw
light in January-February 2002, when the Prosecutor General’s office
charged the president and vice president of Sibur (a Gazprom
subsidiary) with embezzlement. They have been detained for “abuse of
office”.

Another oil giant, Yukos, long before its systematic looting
commenced, was forced to disclose documents regarding its (real)
ownership structure and activities to the State Property Fund in
connection with an investigation regarding asset stripping through a
series of offshore entities and a Siberian subsidiary.

Intermittently, questions are raised about the curious relationship
between Gazprom’s directors and Itera, upon which they shower
contracts with Gazprom and what amounts to multi-million dollar gifts
(in the from of ridiculously priced Gazprom assets) incessantly.

Gazprom is now run by a Putin political appointee, its former
chairman, the oligarch Vyakhirev, ousted in a Kremlin-instigated
boardroom coup. But Miller’s relationship with Putin is under strain.
Miller’s natural (and rapacious) competitors are all Russian – his
potential investors and clients all Western. This alignment runs
counter to Putin’s emphasis on autarky and the unprofitable
leveraging of economic assets for political and global purposes.

Gazprom defied Putin, for instance, by brawling over natural gas
contracts with Turkmenistan, one of the only remaining Central Asian
allies of a geopolitically-dilapidated Russia. With 1.45 million bpd
(barrels-per-day) in combined output, Rosneft is emerging as a more
reliable – and equally weighty – policy tool.

Media stories to the contrary notwithstanding, foreign (including
portfolio) investors seem to be happy. Putin’s pervasive
micromanagement of the energy titans assures them of (relative)
stability and predictability and of a reformist, businesslike,
mindset. Following a phase of shameless robbery by their new owners,
Russian oil firms now seem to be leading Russia – albeit haltingly –
into a new age of good governance, respect for property rights,
efficacious management, and access to Western capital markets.
Khodorkovskyu, the robber-baron, many whisper, had it coming.

The patently dubious UES foray into sovereign debt speculation, for
instance, drew surprisingly little criticism from foreign
shareholders and board members. “Capital Group”, an international
portfolio manager, is rumored to have invested close to $700 million
in accumulating 10% of Lukoil, probably for some of its clients.
Sibneft has successfully floated a $250 million Eurobond (redeemable
in 2007 with a lenient coupon of 11.5%). The issue was
oversubscribed.

The (probably temporary) cooling of Russia’s relationship with the
USA is counter-balanced by Russia’s acceptance (however belated and
reluctant) of its technological and financial dependence on the West.
All said and done, the Russian market is an attractive target.

Commercial activity is more focused and often channeled through
American diplomatic missions. The watershed year was, again, 2002.

The U.S. Consul General in Vladivostok and the Senior Commercial
Officer in Moscow have announced in 2002 that they will “lead an oil
and gas equipment and services and related construction sectors trade
mission to Sakhalin, Russia from March 11-13, 2002.” The oil and gas
fields in Sakhalin attract 25% of all FDI in Russia and more than $35
billion in additional investments is expected.

Other regions of interest are the Arctic and Eastern Siberia.
Americans compete here with Japanese, Korean, Royal Dutch/Shell,
French, and Canadian firms, among others. Even oil multinationals
scorched in Russia’s pre-Putin incarnation – like British Petroleum
which lost $200 million in Sidanco in 11 months in 1997-8 – are back.

Despite Putin’s newly-discovered nationalist “Great Peter” streak,
takeovers of major Russian players (with their proven reserves) by
foreign oil firms have not abated. Russian firms are seriously
undervalued – their shares being priced at one third to one tenth
their Western counterparts’.

Some Russian oil firms (like Yukos and Sibneft) have growth rates
among the highest and production costs among the lowest in the
industry. The boards of the likes of Lukoil are packed with American
fund managers and British investment bankers. The forthcoming
liberalization of the natural gas market (the outcome of an
oft-heralded and much needed Gazprom divestiture) is a major
opportunity for new – possibly foreign – players.

This gold rush is the result of Russia’s prominence as an oil
producer, second only to Saudi Arabia. Russia dumps on the world
markets c. 4.5 million barrels daily (about 10% of the global trade
in oil). It is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas (and has
the largest known natural gas reserves). It is also the world’s
second largest energy consumer. In 1992, it produced 8 million bpd
and consumed half as much. In 2001, it produced 7 million bpd and
consumed 2 million bpd.

Russia has c. 50 billion oil barrels in proven reserves but decrepit
exploration and extraction equipment. Its crumbling oil transport
infrastructure is in need of total replacement. More than 5% of the
oil produced in Russia is stolen by tapping the leaking pipelines. An
unknown quantity is lost in oil spills and leakage.

Transneft, the state’s oil pipelines monopoly, is committed to an
ambitious plan to construct new export pipelines to the Baltic and to
China. The market potential for Western equipment manufacturers,
building contractors, and oil firms is evidently there.

But this serendipity may be a curse in disguise. Russia is
chronically suffering from an oil glut induced by over-production,
excess refining capacity, and subsidized domestic prices (oil sold
inside Russia costs one third to one half the world price). Russian
oil companies are planning to increase production even further.
Rosneft plans to double its crude output. Yukos (Russia’s second
largest oil firm) was planning to increase output by 20% a year when
it was decimated and devoured by Rosneft. Surgut will raise its
production by 14%.

In early 2002, Russia halved export duties on fuel oil. Export duties
on lighter energy products, including gas, were cut in January 2002.
As opposed to previous years, no new export quotas were set since
then. Clearly, Russia is worried about its surplus and wishes to
amortize it through enhanced exports.

Russia also squandered its oil windfall and used it to postpone the
much needed restructuring of other sectors in the economy – notably
the wasteful industrial sector and the corrupt and archaic financial
system. Even the much vaunted plans to break apart the venal and
inefficient natural gas and electricity monopolies and to come up
with a new production sharing regime have gone nowhere (though some
pipeline capacity has been made available to Gazprom’s competitors).

Both Russia’s tax revenues and its export proceeds (and hence its
foreign exchange reserves and its ability to service its monstrous
and oft-rescheduled $158 billion in foreign debt) are heavily
dependent on income from the sale of energy products in global
markets.

More than 40% of all its tax intake is energy-related (compared to
double this figure in Saudi Arabia). Gazprom alone accounts for 25%
of all federal tax revenues. Almost 40% of Russia’s exports are
energy products as are 13% of its GDP. Domestically refined oil is
also smuggled and otherwise sold unofficially, “off the books”.

But, as opposed to Saudi Arabia’s or Venezuela’s, Russia’s budget is
always based on a far more realistic price range ($14-18 per barrel
in fiscal year 2002/3, for instance). Hence Russia’s frequent clashes
with OPEC (of which it is not a member) and its decision to cut oil
production by only 150,000 bpd in the first quarter of 2002 (having
increased it by more than 400,000 bpd in 2001). It cannot afford a
larger cut and it can increase its production to compensate for
almost any price drop.

Russia’s energy minister told the Federation Council, Russia’s upper
house of parliament, that Russia “should switch from cutting oil
output to boosting it considerably to dominate world markets and push
out Arab competitors”. The Prime Minister told the US-Russia Business
Council that Russia should “increase oil production and its presence
in the international marketplace”.

It may even be that Russia is spoiling for a bloodbath which it hopes
to survive as a near monopoly in the energy markets. Russia already
supplies more than 25% of all natural gas consumed by Europe and is
building or considering to construct pipelines to Turkey, China, and
Ukraine. Russia also has sizable coal and electricity exports, mainly
to CIS and NIS countries. Should it succeed in its quest to
dramatically increase its market share, it will be in the position to
tackle the USA and the EU as an equal, a major foreign policy
priority of both Putin and all his predecessors alike.

Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. is the author of Malignant Self Love – Narcissism
Revisited and After the Rain – How the West Lost the East. He served
as a columnist for Central Europe Review, PopMatters, Bellaonline,
and eBookWeb, a United Press International (UPI) Senior Business
Correspondent, and the editor of mental health and Central East
Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101.

Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government
of Macedonia. Sam Vaknin’s Web site is at

http://samvak.tripod.com

The conflict Orinatz Yerkir – Ministry of Justice goes on

THE CONFLICT ORINATS YERKIR – MINISTRY OF JUSTICE GOES ON

A1plus
| 15:23:57 | 20-05-2005 | Politics |

The conflict between the Orinats Yerkir Party and the Ministry
of Justice which started yesterday in the Parliament continued
today. First, in the morning when it was possible to secure quorum,
the issues discussed yesterday were put to voting. All the drafts
were adopted except the draft amendment to the “Administrative Code”
about the state auto inspection. It was represented yesterday by the
Minister of Justice and it caused heated discussions. As they had
promised, the Orinats Yerkir did not take part in the voting as a
result of which the draft was not adopted with the relation of votes
63 against, 0 for, and 0 abstaining from voting.

Today David Haroutyunyan continued to answer the questions of
the deputies referring to the draft law on “Criminal Realization
Inspection” which he represented yesterday. According to him, the
Inspection will have 7 members who will control the situation in the
Criminal Realization structures.

According to David Haroutyunyan, this is a mechanism reducing
corruption risks. The representatives of OYP said there was no need
to create another Inspection at the expense of the budget, but the
Minister informed that the Inspection will not be a burden for the
budget, and the workers will be chosen from the field of Criminal
Realization.

By the way, only the OYP had questions to the Minister, and there was
an impression that it was not a Parliamentary discussion but a duel
between the OYP and David Haroutyunyan. It was obvious that the OYP was
angry at the decision of the Minister to control the Administration,
and the fact that the head of the new-created inspection would obey
not the Administration head but directly to the Minister.

The participants of the discussion were under the impression hat the
OYP tried to soothe the anti-corruption wishes of the Minister.

Implications of the new Forest Code

AZG Armenian Daily #090, 20/05/2005

Armenian forests

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW FOREST CODE

Part One: Protect Our Forests

Note: this is the first of three columns focusing on key points of the new
draft forest code and its implications for Armenia’s threatened forests.

Armenia’s endangered forests

Last week a series of discussions began in Yerevan focusing on the draft new
forest code. These discussions, organized by Armenian Forests NGO with the
support of Open Society Institute public policy formation grant, seek to
engage key NGOs and others in the realization of this proposed Code and
related implementation. These discussions are timed to prepare for the
expected introduction of the draft code to Parliament later this spring.

For those who may not be aware, the destruction of the forests in Armenia is
reaching tragic levels. Although forests historically covered approximately
40-45% of current territory of Armenia and even the early 20th century it
was 25%, forests now only cover about 8-9% of the Republic of Armenia. Loss
of forests brings problems of soil erosion, landslides, loss of springs and
rivers, loss of fruits and other forest products, greater weather damage,
loss of productive soil, loss of biodiversity, loss of sensitive animal
habitat and additional problems. Although some of the greatest loss occurred
during the energy crisis, the cutting and devastation still continue at
alarming rates. According to expert estimates, at current rates of
destruction Armenian forests could be destroyed within 20 years.

In Soviet times and since then, Armenia’s forests have had protective status
in that there is no legal cutting except sanitary cutting intended only to
cover getting the dead trees out of the forests and care cutting (select
thinning) to improve the health of the forest. However, under the guise of
“sanitary cutting” mass cutting is carried out mostly by illegal business
operations supplying wood for internal fuel needs, furniture, construction
and sending the best, most valuable trees to other countries.

During Soviet times, the government planted up to 7,000 hectares of forests
each year and imported wood (from Russia and other places) to meet needs
within Armenia. Unfortunately, there has been almost no reforestation since
1991 and there is very little import of wood while the cutting has increased
dramatically.

Why a new forest code?

The current code is not bad, but needs some updating to reflect the current
situation and it was significant enough that it made more sense to develop a
whole new code. This has been a long process managed by FISP (Forest
Institutional Support Program), a group funded by the Swedish SIDA, under
the World Bank Natural Resources Management and Poverty Reduction Program.
Nazeli Vardanyan, an environmental attorney and director of Armenian Forests
NGO has been one of the lead people in facilitating this in-depth process
and developing the code with other local and foreign experts over the last
18 months.

The forests should remain under the ownership of Armenia’s people

Among one of the key provisions that should remain in the code through the
Parliamentary process is the provision of ownership. Armenia’s forests are
here for the benefit of current and future generations. To that end,
Armenia’s forests have been and should always remain the property of the
state as guardians for the people and never be privatized. The Minister of
Agriculture, David Lokyan, who is the lead minister for this code and the
World Bank, which is responsible for the project that has developed this
draft code, are adamant that privatization of Armenia’s forests should not
be allowed; however, there are others who would love to buy forest land, cut
the trees, build their mansions, fence it off for their own use.

We have only to look at other examples of countries that have gone this
route to the destruction of their forests to see what a disaster this would
be for Armenia. Upon analyzing the impact of privatization in Central and
Eastern European countries, an FAO report (Issues and Opportunities in the
Evolution of Private Forestry and Forestry Extension in Several Countries
with Economies in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe) sites extensive
problems with management of private forest areas and recommends against this
direction for CEE countries.

Armenia’s forests are in a precarious position; hopefully this series of
workshops and media coverage of these issues will help encourage people to
be more engaged in the protection of the forest resources of Armenia. If we
expect the forests to be here for the next generation of Armenia’s children,
Parliament should maintain the provision that maintains forests as state
property.

Part Two: What Will Our Grandchildren Say?

“We have inherited the nature from our ancestors to preserve and pass on to
our future generations.”

–Armenian proverb

Is this the framework by which Armenia is treating its forests?

When the illegal business operation cuts 80-100 year old trees and leaves
bare hillsides behind to erode, like so many areas in Armenia, are they
acting in the best interest of their grandchildren’s generation, or even
their son’s and daughter’s? Hardly.

This column will briefly explore two key aspects of the draft forest code
and related laws; namely sustainable management and the flow of trees across
our borders.

Managing the forests, ensuring a future

Armenia’s forests are suffering from shortsightedness. This is not to blame
people for cutting trees to keep their family from freezing in the
winter-any of us would do so if needed. However, those who have choices
(such as those running and profiting from the illegal cutting operations)
are doing what may seem to be in their short-term interest, but at the
expense of not only everyone else but their own long-term interests. We
cannot, as the saying goes, see the forests for the trees. In the attempt by
a few rich people to further fill their pockets today, the forests,
biodiversity, habitat and not least Armenia’s people are suffering-and will
continue to do so for generations.

Armenia must immediately move to practices of sustainable forest management
as well as mass reforestation to begin to stem the tide of destruction. We
are hopeful that this code, if properly enacted and enforced, will help
support such a change; but the leadership and citizens alike must make it
so.

Is it possible for Armenia to have productive-cutting for commercial uses
like construction and furniture-forests while restoring the forests? The
answer remains to be seen, but it certainly is the case in other countries.
To do so requires proper management. It is clear that the forests have not
been managed well, barely at all, since Soviet times. It is theoretically
possible to identify and allow proper, controlled, sustainable cutting the
less sensitive areas of forests where harvesting will cause minimal
disruption while prohibiting cutting in the most sensitive areas such as
those where the slope is very steep (prone to erosion) or particularly
delicate biodiversity areas.

Parallel mass reforestation must be made a high priority in order to begin
to repair the damage done by over a decade of abuse, mismanagement,
corruption and need-based cutting. Nurseries must be established,
cultivation of high quality trees must be undertaken, forests planted and
cared for, dry or eroded land must be reclaimed to reverse the trend of
desertification as has impoverished so much land in Armenia.

Exporting our valuable forests

Another example of shortsightedness and pure greed in the forest sector is
the situation of mass export of large, valuable trees to other countries. In
Soviet times (and technically still on paper, though not in practice)
Armenia forests were considered under “protective” status and there was no
productive cutting for internal uses let alone external uses. That has all
changed; now not only are people over-cutting Armenia’s forests to meet
internal demand and make furniture for export, but a few wealthy people
taking advantage of the corrupt, non-existent enforcement of laws to again
fill their pockets by cutting and selling Armenia’s most valuable trees as
whole logs to Iran, Spain, Italy, Germany and even Turkey.

One may rationalize destruction of forests for internal needs based on a
poor economic situation and the lack of affordable alternative fuels, but
such destruction purely for the gain of a few is inexcusable. These people
are in essence stealing our grandchildren’s property.

Unfortunately besides the corruption and greed, there is a policy that
supports such destruction. Namely that for import of wood-something that
Armenia needs to protect the remaining forests-there are both taxes and
customs fees making it prohibitively more expensive. Adding to the
imbalance, exports of wood are charged neither taxes nor customs fees. This
unfortunately increases the incentive to cut more forests for export. At the
very least, this must be reversed to allow more incentives for import and
disincentives for export.

Armenian Forests NGO among organizations seeks to include such an amendment
to the tax law and customs code as part of the forest code package.

If Armenia really does have sufficient forest resources to allow for export,
one related positive step that could be taken is to develop properly managed
“certified” forests. In this way the products could be “certified” by a
recognized third party as harvested in a sustainable manner. This would
thereby not only support the protection of our forests, but enable Armenia’s
trees to command much higher prices on the world market.

Another way to look at it is to see that the forests belong not to us but to
our grandchildren and their grandchildren. Forests are the cornerstones of
our ecosystem and support fragile biodiversity and animal habitat, and
moderate the microclimate, protect the soil, and clean the air. We must be
thinking, feeling and most importantly, acting with a view to the future. As
much trouble as it may seem to stop the mass destruction of the forests, it
is much more costly to try to repair the damage later.

Armenia must immediately implement an effective process of sustainable
management and restoration of its forests. Armenia should not be exporting
its scare, valuable forest wood to countries that have richer forests than
Armenia; at a minimum, Armenia should establish incentives for import and
disincentives for export of wood. These measures should be adopted by
Parliament and enacted by law, but will take the concerted will and effort
of all levels of society to carry them out. From the President to
Parliament, to marzpets and village mayors, to villagers and Yerevan
residents; the commitment must be borne by everyone.

Part Three: Making it Real; Making it Work, Now

Mass deforestation in Armenia is being driven by a combination of factors
including poverty, lack of affordable alternative energy, corruption and
shortsighted mentality. These are significant issues that feed on each other
and exacerbate the destruction of forests. However, gains in these areas due
to other efforts (such as improving the economy, implementing the rule of
law and cracking down on corruption) will also have payoffs for the forest
sector.

In this context, the new forest code has been drafted and will be submitted
to the Parliament later this spring or in the fall. Although it is not a
“silver bullet” it could be an effective tool to bring about positive
changes for the dwindling forests of Armenia.

Parliament’s responsibility

A tremendous amount of work has gone into developing the current new draft
forest code (and related legislation on exports and imports of wood) aimed
at helping improve the forests of Armenia. However, the best draft code will
not have a chance of bringing any positive change to forest problems unless
its provisions are maintained through the Parliamentary process and signed
into law.

There are likely to be pressures within the Parliament to gut or change
certain key provisions of the code before it becomes law. The important next
steps must include local citizens, NGO’s, international organizations, and
donor organizations (not the least of which are the World Bank and Swedish
SIDA who are funding the project dealing with this new code). We must convey
to members of Parliament and the President the need to pass this new code
and related legislation intact. We hope they will take this responsibility
seriously and do the right thing for current and future generations.

The critical details

The current forest code, which is still in force until a new one replaces
it, is not so bad. However, although it was passed in 1994, the vast
majority of the regulations (also referred to here as “bylaws”) were never
adopted. Unfortunately, regulations-which describe how the law will be
carried out and by whom-are required to implement the law. Without them,
there are no directions to for the bodies to be able to enforce the law. It
is like a car that has a destination but no driver and no road to get there.

Once the new code is adopted as law, the regulations must be finalized and
also adopted as quickly as reasonably possible. We should not accept excuses
that aim to needlessly delay this critical step.

Enforcement is the key

Many officials point to the poor economic situation of villagers and try to
pretend that the villagers are the ones to blame for cutting the forests. In
fact, villagers pulling branches and small trees from the forest by hand or
donkey (although certainly a factor) are a fairly small fraction of the
whole problem. In this case, the real villains are the businessmen who are
bribing local officials to look the other way while they take out the large,
valuable trees by the truckloads for sale in and out of Armenia. In some
cases they are even making new roads to access the more remote forests.

It is no secret that Armenia’s laws are not generally well enforced, but
steps must be taken to immediately curb the corruption and rampant theft of
forests if we expect forests to remain for our grandchildren.

The other thing some officials say to disguise the truth of this ongoing
destruction is to talk about the past with phrases like “Armenia experienced
extensive over-cutting of forests during the energy crisis in the early
90’s.” The reality is that although some of the greatest loss occurred
during the energy crisis, the cutting and devastation still continue at
alarming rates. In fact, the cutting that occurred at that point, although
it was significant, was purely need-based. Now, unfortunately, a few are
making a big business of cutting forests for their personal gain.

The single most important aspect of all of this is that THERE MUST BE PROPER
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW. Without proper enforcement the forests will continue
to be destroyed.

For proper enforcement to happen several factors must be in place. First
there must be the political will among officials at all levels to make sure
the law is followed. Second, the public, NGO’s, international organizations,
media, and others must be engaged and help create the political will for
enforcement to take place. Steps must be taken to develop effective means of
enforcement and to weed out corruption. The regulations should make it easy
to do the right thing and difficult to do the wrong thing-not the other way
around.

It will not be an easy road, but the new code and related regulations once
adopted, MUST BE ENFORCED-PERIOD.

In conclusion, Armenia’s forests are at a critical juncture. Forests now
cover only 8-9 percent of the country and the forests that remain are in
relatively poor condition. As a result, great areas of Armenia are beginning
to suffer due to erosion, drying of springs and rivers, loss of
biodiversity, loss of animal habitat, desertification and other problems.
Given the fragile state of the forests here and the immense destruction that
is currently underway, this situation demands to be resolved.

The new forest code and related regulations could be an effective tool to
protect and restore the forests, but the commitment to follow and enforce
the law must be there. This is a commitment that must be borne by all
sectors of society from the local villagers, to NGO’s, to businesses, to
local officials, to the highest levels of government. We must act quickly
and with firm resolve to get this new code enacted, adopt effective
regulations and to make sure it is effectively enforced. Only then will our
grandchildren have a chance of inheriting any forests.

For more information or to get a electronic copy of the draft code and
related documents, please email Armenian Forests NGO at
[email protected].

By Jeffrey Tufenkian, co-founder and president of Armenian Forests NGO
focusing on actions to restore and protect Armenia’s forests for current and
future generations. See He also is co-founder of
Kanach Foundation, publisher of the Adventure Armenia: Hiking and Rock
Climbing book ().

www.ArmenianForests.am.
www.kanach.org

BAKU: Kocharian least reliable leader in S Caucasus, poll says

Kocharian least reliable leader in S Caucasus, poll says

May 19, 2005

Armenian President Robert Kocharian is the least trusted leader in
South Caucasus, says a public opinion poll.

The survey conducted in April by Gallup International, a worldwide
research organization, among a thousand Azerbaijanis, Georgians and
Armenians of different social groups, questioned respondents on their
attitude toward several countries and their leaders.

The poll indicated that 19% of respondents in Georgia and 63% in
Armenia trust Kocharian. The figure in Azerbaijan was 0%.

77% of Azerbaijanis, 38% of Georgians and 2% of Armenians trust
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

45% of respondents in Azerbaijan, 26% in Armenia and 72% in Georgia
said they trust Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili.

The poll suggested that 51% of Azeris, 15% of Georgians and 87% of
Armenians confide in Russian President Vladimir Putin. US President
George Bush is trusted by 45% of Georgians, 32% of Azerbaijanis and
Armenians. 64% of Georgians, 34% of Azerbaijanis and 27% of Armenians
trust Ukrainian President Viktor Yushshenko.

22% of Azeris, 15% of Georgians and 40% of Armenians trust Belarusian
President Aleksander Lukashenko.

38% of the respondents said revolutions are likely to take place in
Russia, 26% – in Armenia and 17% in Azerbaijan. Most of the respondents
predicted no revolution in Azerbaijan and Armenia in the near future.

The fact that Putin is trusted by 51% of the respondents, while Bush
by 32% indicates that the United States should step up efforts to
improve its rating in Azerbaijan. On the other hand, this is related
to the fact that Azerbaijani citizens have close economic and trade
ties with Russia and pressures on Azerbaijanis residing in Russia
have relatively decreased after Putin was elected President. Putin’s
respect to Azerbaijan, its people and President as well as his gestures
aimed at ensuring equality of rights have been noticeable.

Putin’s attention to the problems faced by Azerbaijanis is by far
more noticeable than that of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.

A similar situation was indicated in the Soros Foundation public
opinion polls held in Azerbaijan, which also pointed out the ‘defeat’
of the United States’ by Russia.

This also shows that the difference in the attitudes towards the
United States and Russia is not based on the perception of democracy.

Russia does not urge Azerbaijan to follow democratic principles,
unlike Washington, which is more active in this area. It seems
that geographical proximity, familiar language and culture and most
importantly, close economic and trade relations, set priorities for
Azerbaijani citizens.

http://www.azernews.net/view.php?d=6443

NY ASA: David Grigorian Follow up PR

New York Armenian Students’ Association
333 Atlantic Avenue
Warwick, RI 02888
(401) 461-6114
[email protected]

PRESS RELEASE

May 18, 2005

Contact: New York ASA: [email protected]

NY ASA Co-Hosts Lecture Featuring Dr. David A. Grigorian at Columbia’s
School of International and Public Affairs

by Anahid Ugurlayan and Alec Gevorkyan

On May 4, 2005, the New York Armenian Students’ Association, along
with the Columbia University Armenian Club, Armenian Network and
Armenian National Committee of New York, presented a lecture entitled
“Armenia’s Economic Paradigm: Challenges and Prospects for the Future”
by Dr. David A. Grigorian, an economist at the International Monetary
Fund and co-chair of the Armenian International Policy Research Group
(AIPRG), a Washington-based network specializing in Armenia-related
public policy issues. Dr. Grigorian was introduced by Alec Gevorkyan,
chair of the ASA Central Executive Committee. Mr. Gevorkyan also
provided background information on, and explained the work of,
the AIPRG.

Dr. Grigorian commenced with an overview of Armenia’s economic
performance in the early 1990s, following the independence, namely
the collapse of its production and tax base, loss of export and
import links, as well as hyperinflation, compounded by Armenia’s war
with Azerbaijan and the ongoing Azerbaijani and Turkish blockade.
He contrasted this picture with Armenia’s markedly improved
macroeconomic situation in the late 1990s, when it experienced solid
economic growth, single-digit inflation, and declining budgetary
and current account deficits. Dr. Grigorian noted that, in relative
terms, Armenia’s economy is more diversified than other CIS countries,
particularly Azerbaijan whose economy is heavily based on oil exports.

Following the discussion on Armenia’s recent macroeconomic
performance, Dr. Grigorian went on to discuss the key policy
challenges facing Armenia, in particular those pertaining to (1)
sources of growth, (2) sustainability of growth, and (3) distribution
of income. Talking about the first item, the speaker identified two
main sources of current economic growth in Armenia in recent years,
namely foreign-financed public construction projects and exports of
jewelry (in particular, the diamonds) industry. The weak performance
of exports, including those of diamonds, however, that the overall
growth is not export-driven, which calls for effort to enhance
productivity to strengthen competitiveness. Addressing the issue of
sustainability of growth, Dr. Grigorian pointed out the following
concerns: (a) highly concentrated structure of the economy, leading
to large deadweight losses and monopoly profits; (b) existence of
high barriers of entry for potential businesses; (c) weak government
revenue record, and, as a result, low level of spending on public
investment and social projects, and (d) inability of the financial
sector to actively mobilize the savings of the population. Related
to the third policy challenge – income distribution – the speaker
mentioned the issues of persistent steady rural poverty in Armenia
(no improvements since 1996), despite some reduction in poverty in
Yerevan and other urban locations; weak trickle-down effect (i.e.,
low elasticity of Armenia’s poverty to macroeconomic growth); and,
again in this context, the inability/unwillingness of the government
to raise sufficient amount of revenues to finance social programs. It
was mentioned that Armenia, whose tax to GDP ratio was approximately 14
percent in 2004, lagged behind its CIS neighbors, which, on average,
collect over 25 percent of their respective GDPs, compared to over
30 percent of GDP in tax revenues in Baltic countries.

Looking forward, Dr. Grigorian recommended that Armenia should explore
a number of channels which could help mitigate the potential impact
of the above problems on the future growth and reduce the social
disparities. These were identified as follows: (a) human and financial
capital of the (old and new) Diaspora; (b) improvements in the business
environment by strengthening the political will to implement reforms;
(c) closer regional integration (especially with Georgia); and (d)
more in-depth and fruitful public policy discussions.

An engaging question and answer session followed Dr. Grigorian’s
presentation, touching on many of the issues raised earlier,
particularly the costs of delayed reforms, new areas of economic
growth and the potential for a more active Diaspora involvement. A
wine and cheese reception followed.

The Armenian Students’ Association is a nationwide membership
organization that promotes Armenian culture and education by providing
Armenian communities with social, academic, and educational events.
All funds raised by the regional branches contribute to the ASA’s
scholarship fund for Armenian students studying in the United States.

The Armenian Students’ Association would like to thank St. Vartan
Armenian Cathedral of New York, the Armenian General Benevolent
Union, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Armen Garo Gomideh,
the Columbia University Armenian Club, Armenian Network and Armenian
National Committee of New York and the New York University Armenian
Hokee Club for their unconditional support in planning this event.

For more information about the NY ASA, please visit
For more information about the
Armenian International Policy Research Group, please visit

http://www.asainc.org
www.armpolicyresearch.org

Council of Europe head says Karabakh affects Turkish-Armenian ties

Council of Europe head says Karabakh affects Turkish-Armenian ties

Arminfo
17 May 05

Yerevan, 17 May: The normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations
depends on whether Armenia and Azerbaijan can reach a consensus over
the Karabakh issue, Council of Europe Secretary-General Terry Davis
has told an Arminfo correspondent.

Asked about Turkey blocking the Armenian border, Terry Davis said it
would be right to ask this question of Turkey itself.

“I think this issue will be resolved after Armenia and Azerbaijan
reach a consensus on settling the Karabakh conflict and determining
the status of Nagornyy Karabakh, because problems between Armenia
and Turkey take root in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations,” the
secretary-general said.

He said the Karabakh conflict had been the most important issue in the
South Caucasus for the last 15 years. Davis added that the solution
to the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict would not only change the situation
in the South Caucasus but also Armenian-Turkish relations.

FM Presents Latest Developments of Armenian-Turkish Reln’s to PACE

RA FOREIGN MINISTER PRESENTS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF ARMENIAN-TURKISH
RELATIONS TO PACE MONITORING COMMITTE’S RAPPORTEURS

YEREVAN, MAY 13, NOYAN TAPAN. Issues concerning constitutional reforms
in Armenia were discussed at the May 12 meeting of Vartan Oskanian,
the RA Foreign Minister, with Jersy Jaskiernia and Georges Colombier,
the rapporteurs on the Armenia’s issue of the PACE Monitoring
Committe. In that sense, Minister Oskanian attached importance to
holding of the referendum to take place in Armenia this year. Last
obstacles will be liquidated by it, and Armenia will fulfill its
obligations in front of the Council of Europe till the end of the
year, the Minister mentioned. As Noyan Tapan was informed from the RA
Foreign Ministry’s Press and Information Department, in the sense of
deepening Democratic processes in Armenia and the Eurointegration, the
Minister attached importance to Armenia’s involvement in the “New
Neighbourhood” program of the European Union as well. Then, at the
guests’ request, Minister Oskanian presented in details the present
stage of negotiations on the Karabakh problem, Armenia’s veiwpoints on
the settlement. He also touched upon the latest developments of
Armenia-Turkey relations as well.