NKR Willing to Return Azerbaijani Captive if Official Baky Wishes

AUTHORITIES OF NAGORNO KARABAKH EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO GIVE UP
AZERBAIJAN CAPTIVE IF OFFICIAL BAKU WISHES

YEREVAN, August 10 (Noyan Tapan). Dweller of Baku Anad Mamedov, a
21-year-old Azeri serviceman, was taken captive by the Nagorno
Karabakh Armed Forces in connection with the violation of the border
on August 6. According to the press service of the NKR Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the NKR authorities reported about it to the ICRC
Stepanakert Office, as well as to the OSCE. Now the republican legal
bodies undertake corresponding measures for the specification of the
reasons and purposes of the violation of the border by the captive.
According to the same source, the NKR authorities gave the
representative of the ICRC Office in Stepanakert an opportunity to
visit the Azerbaijani military prisoner, at the same time expressing
willingness to give him up, if official Baku wishes.

Karabakh military exercises aimed at keeping peace – Armenian DM

Karabakh military exercises aimed at keeping peace – Armenian defence
minister

Arminfo, Yerevan
10 Aug 04

STEPANAKERT

“Our conventional enemy, like us, is obtaining new weapons, continuing
to modernize its troops, and the victor will be whoever makes better
use of their weaponry and equipment and competently fulfils the set
objectives. I am confident that the defence army of the self-styled
Nagornyy Karabakh Republic (NKR) will get more battle-worthy in time
and will repulse those who will attempt to disturb the peace of our
people,” the Armenian defence minister, Serzh Sarkisyan, said today,
as he was watching large-scale military exercises of the defence army
of the NKR.

“It is not the first time that the Armenian defence minister has taken
part in the military exercises in Nagornyy Karabakh. The Armenian
leadership have many times stated that the Armenian army acts as a
guarantor of the security of the population of Nagornyy Karabakh, the
part of Armenianhood living here. This is the position we are
adhering to now,” Serzh Sarkisyan told journalists covering the
exercises. Asked about possible resumption of military hostilities in
the zone of the Karabakh conflict, Serzh Sarkisyan said that there is
no real threat of resumption of military operations in the foreseeable
future. “The leaderships of Nagornyy Karabakh and Armenia have many
times stated that the Armenian side does not intend to renew military
operations.”

He said that the exercises were something like a final stage of the
annual training process, during which the results of the previous
process are identified. Naturally, such exercises are aimed at peace
and preserving the existing balance in the region, which is
predominantly defined by the quality of troops training. “And today we
have been assured that the units involved in the exercises have the
required level of training,” the Armenian defence minister said.

Luc Debieuvre: Turkey’s admission to EU is a matter of grave concern

Gulf News, United Arab Emirates
Aug 6 2004

Luc Debieuvre: Turkey’s admission to EU is a matter of grave concern

The Turkish are very good people” said the Prince of Metternich 150
years ago after the Chio massacres in Greece. “They slaughter the
Greeks and the Greeks behead them. It is a matter of civilisation.”

The question of Turkey joining the European Union (actually, in a
first step which may last up to 15 years, negotiating it) is thus not
a new issue. It officially started 40 years ago and was marked by a
series of successive European Council’s rulings, which never said no
but made believe that a yes could come provided some unclear
conditions allow for it.

The latest one defined a precise deadline, December 2004, when it
should be decided whether Turkey meets the so-called Copenhagen
criteria. These are the respect of the state of law, democracy and
human rights, and the achievement of a modernised economy able to
address open competition. This is how political leaders frenetically
started exchanging “scientific” arguments over the past months.

These cover history and civilisation, democracy, economy and
international relations. A first salve came from those who consider
Turkey is not part of Europe, nor geographically (95 per cent of its
territory in Asia), nor historically.

The former Ottoman Empire in Europe was always linked to invasion,
destruction and economical drawback such as in the Balkans or in
Cyprus. With its civilisation being different, its values would not
be those upon which the EU was built.

Not a Christian club

Turkey hit back at Europe claiming it not to be a “Christian Club”
and the need for it to accept members of other religions (98 per cent
of its 70 million population is Muslim). “Turkey is at the doorstep
of Europe and wants to be part of the family” said Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Erdogan.

How could one dismiss a country which has been part of all the major
treaties regarding Europe? What about the basilicas of Bezants, the
colossus of Rhodes or the temples of Ephesus? “We see the EU as a
union of political values. A place where civilisations can be
harmonised and coexist in peace” added Erdogan, “not a place for a
clashing of civilisations.

Turkey would be a bridge between Asia and Europe. For others, its
heterogeneous population (including Kurdish tribes), the risk to
jeopardise any balance in the EU and the refusal to recognise the
Armenian genocide are enough to prove that Turkey is too far apart.”

Regarding democracy, free elections, neutral army and secularism, the
progress achieved by the Erdogan government is amazing and its march
towards democracy, including the status of women, is emphasised.

Much remains to be done: attitudes of overzealous civil servants,
lack of application decrees for a judicial system which still is not
protective (editors put in jail for opinion offences). So many
reforms made so swiftly cannot be implemented over night. And if the
role of the Turkish army hardly goes with the view one has of a
liberal democracy, it is agreed that it behave more positively than
negatively in recent years.

Positions however sharply contrast as to the place of religion versus
secularism and Turkey may not have played it very smartly. Once it
said the membership was crucial to bridging divide between west and
Muslim worlds or promoted its future role as the only “Muslim
democracy”.

It leant on blackmail if the answer was negative: civil unrest,
disappearance of “moderate Muslims”, expansion of Islamism. Excluding
Turkey would be a terrible mistake in Muslim eyes.

Yet, as long as five schoolgirls are allowed to drown in front of
schoolmates who are not authorised to save them “because they would
have to touch them”, or the only training centre for Orthodox popes
remains closed, there is still a long road to go.

The concept of secularism means everybody is free to practice its
religion: this can hardly be respected when 98 per cent of the local
clerics are on the state’s payroll.

Economic arguments are not persuasive, even though the living
standards in Turkey are 25 per cent of those in the EU. The risk of
workers migrations is remote when low costs in Turkey may open new
job opportunities (as with former eastern blocs).

The Turkish economy has probably more trumps than figures show and
still 10-15 years to run before subsidies enjoyed by European farmers
fully apply to it. The well-known deficiencies (high inflation
notably) may be more than compensated by the qualities of a hard
working population, whose number will be equal to the German one in
2015, as well as by prospects linked to oil transportation (Ceyhan
pipe) and water availability.

On the international field, the debate was spoilt by the way America
behaved (any “savoir-faire” being considered by this administration
as a sign of weakness).

Its overwhelming support in favour of Turkey, when everybody knows of
the good Bush wishes Europe, was enough to raise doubts; hence
President Chirac’s comments “The US would not want to hear France’s
views on its relations with Mexico”.

Staunchest ally

Turkey, a staunch ally of Israel, never maintained such friendly
links with other Arab states. But a fact remains that Turkey has been
an ally since 1952; its belonging to the EU would be a stabilising
element in the region as well as a peace strengthening element.

And the need for the EU to reinforce its links with its other
partners of the Mediterranean area surely does not oppose the joining
of Turkey. Considering such contradictions, it is not surprising that
some rushed enthusiastically to German opposition leader Angela
Merkel’s proposal for a ‘privileged partnership’, a way to maintain
links with Turkey whilst avoiding the risk of its joining
transforming the EU into an international organisation only.

The idea is bright but came too late because the EU has already
become something which has little to do with what the founding
members hoped for. The original concept of Europe is now dead.

What could not be achieved at 12 with a strong Franco-German axis
will not be achievable at 27 or 32 and the political vision where
cohesion was necessary to an efficient powerful Europe with an
autonomous strategy doesn’t exist any more.

The only way to part away from an open single market under the
commending of the US is to start working on ‘reinforced co
operations’ in some fields with those states which are prepared to
move further ahead together.

But for the time being, as Philip Stephens said in the Financial
Times, “there are risks, of course, in giving Turkey its route map
into modern Europe-serious ones. But the dangers of raising the
drawbridge are infinitely greater” whereas in the meantime,
negotiations will allow to keep pressure on Turkey for it to go on
reforming.

Luc Debieuvre is a French political analyst and writer on economic
issues and is also a board member of IRIS (Institut de Relations
Internationales et Stratégiques)

Gymnast earns five gold medals

Akron Beacon Journal , OH
Aug 5 2004

Gymnast earns five gold medals

Falls resident Flohr, 13, leads USA team to title

Bianca Flohr, a 13-year-old gymnast from Cuyahoga Falls, won five
gold medals and was part of a USA team that won the team championship
for the entire event as well at the recent International Children’s
Games competition in Cleveland.

Flohr participated in the 12-15 age bracket in the event, which was
held at John Carroll University.

Besides the team award, she captured the all-around (score of 37.9),
vault (9.55), uneven bars (9.875) and balance beam (9.575), as well
as floor exercise (9.8).

Coach Terry Gray, owner of the Flytz Gymnastics Club in Cuyahoga
Falls and also the coach, said the USA team was made up of four girls
from around the country, including Flohr.

Armenia took the silver medal in the team competition, and Mexico won
the bronze. Gray said there were at least five country teams entered,
and more than 40 gymnasts competed.

Gray, who is the USA National team coach for juniors (ages 15 and
under), said Flohr holds the No. 6 ranking in the nation in her age
group.

He said Flohr, who has been home schooled, plans to attend Woodridge
Middle School this fall.

Los cristianos, objetivo del terror iraqui

El Mundo
August 2, 2004

IMPRESIONES.
Los cristianos, objetivo del terror iraqui.

IMPRESIONES. Irak. Atentados contra iglesias cristianas

Cinco templos cristianos fueron ayer objeto de atentados en Irak. Se
trata de la primera oleada de ataques organizados contra esta
comunidad desde que acabo la guerra, si bien la violencia de
fanaticos musulmanes contra los cristianos habia crecido en los
ultimos meses del regimen de Sadam. Desde que termino la guerra,
varios lideres cristianos han expresado publica y repetidamente su
preocupacion por el riesgo de que Irak se convierta en un Estado
islamico siguiendo el modelo irani y no en uno laico y democratico.
Esta advertencia, unida a la calificacion que reciben por parte de
los lideres musulmanes de infieles y cruzados, ha terminado por
colocar a los cristianos en el punto de mira de los terroristas.
Mientras los musulmanes han presentado a los cristianos como los
representantes de los gobiernos occidentales en Irak, esta minoria no
ha recibido ninguna proteccion especial por parte de los distintos
administradores de EEUU que han pasado por el pais y menos aun por
parte del actual Gobierno. Son, por tanto, un objetivo facil, aunque
cada vez mas escaso. La comunidad cristiana, integrada principalmente
por catolicos y ortodoxos, ha pasado en las ultimas dos decadas de
ser el 10% de la poblacion a apenas el 2% actual y el exodo continua.
Desde que Sadam fue derrocado son muchos, especialmente cristianos
armenios, los que han abandonado el pais, temerosos de que las cosas
pudieran ir a peor para ellos. Tras los atentados de este domingo,
parece que no estaban equivocados.

2,936 Armenian Refugees Naturalized in ROA in First Half of 2004

2,936 ARMENIAN REFUGEES WERE NATURALIZED IN REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN
FIRST HALF OF 2004

YEREVAN, JULY 30. ARMINFO. In the first half of 2004, 2,936 Armenian
refugees were naturalized in the Republic of Armenia, testify the data
of the Department for Migration and Refugees attached to the Armenian
Government.

According to these data, majority of the refugees, 1,099 who received
passports in the first half of 2004, reside in Yerevan, then goes
Ararat 609 people, Kotayk 323 people, Syunik 265 people, Gegharkunik
218 people, Armavir 133, Lori 119 people, Tavush 81, Aragatsotn 44,
Vayots Dzor 27 and Shirak 18 people. It should be noted that the
greatest number of applications for citizenship were made in February,
2004, (1,301 people were naturalized) and the smallest number was
registered in May (255).

Roger Smith article on Genocide

Chronicle of Higher Education
July 30, 2004

1.htm

American Self-Interest and the Response to Genocide
By ROGER W. SMITH

For 20 years, I taught a course on genocide: What is “genocide,” why
does it happen, who is responsible for it, and how could this ultimate
crime be prevented? I told students that genocide — intentional acts to

eliminate in whole, or in substantial part, a specific human population
— had claimed the lives of some 60 million people in the 20th century,
16 million of them since 1945, when the watchword was “Never again.”
Genocide has, in fact, been so frequent, the number of victims so
extensive, and serious attempts to prevent it so few, that many scholars

have described the 20th century as “the age of genocide.” Some have
wondered if genocide is not itself a product of modernity, the dark
energy of civilization.

But what my students wanted to know was: Why had the nations of the
world, and particularly the United States, which they thought of as both

powerful and just, not prevented the killing of millions of innocent
people? Where was American power and moral commitment when a million
Armenians were being slaughtered in Turkey in 1915, six million
Ukrainians starved to death by Stalin in 1932-33, two million Bengalis
murdered by Pakistan in 1971? What was America doing when still more
millions were killed in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, not because of
what they had done, but because of who they were? And, of course, there
was the much-discussed question of whether more could have been done to
prevent the Holocaust.

My students also wanted to know why it had taken the United States 40
years to ratify the Genocide Convention, which the United Nations
endorsed unanimously in 1948, with strong U.S. support. The convention
defined genocide and declared it a crime against international law. Why,

as soon as the United States finally did ratify the convention, in 1988,

did it support Saddam Hussein’s regime despite evidence that the
dictator had committed genocide against the Kurds in Iraq in 1987-88?

Today we continue to hear about genocide. As before, however, few
Americans pay much attention. What is happening in Sudan? In Congo? With

indigenous peoples in many other regions? Can you tell me? My students’
questions — and my own — are increasingly important to all of us, both

morally and politically.

Unfortunately they are not easy to answer. Sometimes the response hinges

on factual information, but more often on judgment, an assessment of
competing responsibilities, and context. At the outset we can reject
claims that relieve all bystanders, whether states, organizations, or
individuals, of responsibility for attempting to prevent or mitigate
genocide. One argument, coming from perpetrators, is that victims of
genocide (although the term is avoided) bear responsibility for their
own destruction, having brought it upon themselves through provocation.
Genocide is strictly an internal matter, this argument goes. Outside
powers should mind their own business. Two immediate objections arise:
First, provocations, when they exist at all, stem from a minority of the

group of victims. Most of those who will be killed are innocent. Second,

genocide is seldom without international consequences, ranging from a
vast outpouring of refugees, with the need for large amounts of
humanitarian aid, to regional instability and war.

A recent article in the Journal of Genocide Research provides a chilling

variation on the argument about the responsibility of victims. In
“Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front,”
Alan J. Kuperman states: “In most cases of mass killing since World War
II — unlike the Holocaust — the victim group has triggered its own
demise by violently challenging the authority of the state.” Kuperman
adds that he does not use provocation to excuse genocide. Nor does he
deny that there is an international responsibility to prevent genocide.
But the obligation takes a bizarre turn: Intervention by third parties
should not be directed against those we perceive as perpetrators; they,
after all, are only defending themselves. Rather, intervention should be

aimed at changing the behavior of the victims. In other words, in the
Rwandan genocide of 1994, the international community should have
ignored the Hutu preparations for genocide and focused, instead, on the
intended Tutsi victims. The upshot of that Alice in Wonderland argument
is that the victims become the perpetrators.

Claims are also made that genocides are inevitable, the result of
ancient hatreds, conflict over scarce resources, or the advance of
progress. A version of the inevitability thesis that found favor with
some international planners in the 1960s was that genocide is simply a
byproduct of development, and benefits to the surviving group outweigh
the costs to the group that is decimated, or perhaps eliminated. Over
the years that argument has been applied not only to the elimination of
indigenous peoples (the Yanomami in Brazil, the Chittagong Hills
tribesmen in Bangladesh), but also to the destruction of the Armenians
in Turkey, which, we are told by some historians, paved the way for a
more unified and stronger nation, one allied with the United States
during the cold war.

Genocide, however, is never inevitable: It is always the result of
choice. And surely lives are not interchangeable.

Another argument is that genocides should be allowed to run their
course: It is best to let the violence complete itself, reducing the
chance for further violence and, hence, any need for intervention. That
proposition, devoid of even animal pity, was advanced to me by a student

in international relations after I mentioned that Rwanda had had
recurrent genocides. Had the killers not been restrained, he asserted,
unity and peace would have been established. When I asked him if he
would maintain his position if he were a member of the group slated for
victimization, he replied that he lived in the United States, and that
therefore the question wasn’t relevant. That was shortly before
September 11.

The field of genocide studies itself is relatively new, dating to the
late 1970s. Several factors were involved: a growing emphasis on the
protection of human rights, the frequency of genocide in the 1960s
(Rwanda, Indonesia) and 1970s (Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia), a
rediscovery of the Armenian genocide and a new awareness of how it had
been denied. Not last: a disenchantment with the emphasis in the social
sciences on methodology at the expense of substance.

One of the best works is still Leo Kuper’s 1982 Genocide: Its Political
Use in the Twentieth Century, which discusses the nature and history of
genocide, its treatment under international law, the conditions that
promote it, and the inability of the United Nations to suppress it. But
since the book’s publication, new genocides have been committed,
extensive research on genocide has been conducted, and explanations of
why genocides occur have taken on new sophistication. Three recent books

provide essential, updated information about genocide in the 20th
century.

The first, The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of
Intervention, edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner, is perhaps the
narrowest, yet the most contemporary, focusing on four cases of
genocide: Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and East Timor. Most of the essays
are by journalists, some of whom were present as genocide was taking
place around them. Their accounts, mostly descriptive and personal,
provide a wealth of information. The New Killing Fields also includes
two essays, by Michael Walzer and Samantha Power, that suggest how we
can begin to evaluate international responses to genocide. When, where,
how, and at what cost should outside states intervene? More on that
later.

Eric D. Weitz’s A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation also
concentrates on four cases of genocide in the 20th century: the Soviet
Union, Nazi Germany, Cambodia, and Bosnia/Kosovo. Systematic in his
comparisons, Weitz concludes that those genocides were the result of
“ideologies of race and nation, revolutionary regimes with vast utopian
ambitions, moments of crisis generated by war and domestic upheaval.”
What is distinctive about his thesis is that he maintains that genocide
has a dual character: It is organized by states but is possible on a
vast scale, as in the 20th century, only with widespread participation
by the population. The book is also strong in its emphasis on the
rituals of degradation and cruelty that occur in genocide. Its weakness
is that it omits the Rwandan genocide altogether, and its concentration
on the Soviet Union gets bogged down in party purges and political
repression, which Weitz admits are not examples of genocide. (Many of
those sent to the gulag were released, and Soviet officials often
thought they were pursuing “reform” rather than annihilation, he notes.)

On the other hand, the Stalin-induced famine in the Ukraine in 1932-33,
intended to destroy the kulaks as a class, end Ukrainian nationalism,
and force peasants into collective farms, receives virtually no
attention, though most scholars regard it as genocide.

If the other books are selective in the cases of genocide they focus
upon, The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective,
edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, strives to be comprehensive.

It discusses the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and genocides against

indigenous peoples in Africa, North America, and Australia, and is
particularly strong on its coverage of genocides in the post-1945
period: Indonesia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Bosnia, Rwanda, East Timor, and
Guatemala. The cumulative impact of the book is to demonstrate just how
prevalent state-sponsored mass murder has been in the 20th century.
Rather than an aberration, genocide has been commonplace, occurring in
most parts of the world. Oddly, however, at least two major examples are

omitted: the mass killing in East Pakistan, and Saddam Hussein’s gassing

of the Kurds. Those are important in their own right, but also, as we
shall see, in terms of the U.S. response to them.

Almost from the beginning, the field of genocide studies has been
concerned with two questions: Not just, Why does genocide take place?,
but also, How can it be prevented? One early idea seemed to offer great
promise: a “genocide early-warning system.” Comparative analysis would
provide indicators to predict where imminent threats of genocide
existed; intervention could follow immediately. Naïvely, scholars
assumed that individual states or international organizations would act
on evidence of when and where genocide was likely to occur. It didn’t
take long to realize that the problem wasn’t about knowing, but about
doing. It was a matter of political will.

Inaction and political will became the major topics of discussion in
genocide studies as of the mid-’80s. But as often happens in academic
life, we were talking mainly to each other. There was little attempt to
engage either policy makers or the public in a dialogue. Nor was there
an effort to provide a comprehensive account of American policy toward
genocide over the course of the 20th century. Some of us thought about
doing such a study, but the idea seemed so huge that it was shelved.
Then in 2002, the book did appear and, significantly, addressed not so
much the academy as the public and the political establishment.

Samantha Power’s “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide
won a Pulitzer Prize for its thorough documentation of the dark history
of the American inaction to stop genocide in the 20th century and its
explanation of why the United States had failed to act. Only rarely did
the U.S. government even condemn the killing as it was taking place. For

Power, “What is most shocking is that U.S. policy makers did almost
nothing to deter the crime.” Of course, there were individuals, both in
government and in society, who sought to change policy, but, Power
notes, their efforts failed. The United States, on the other hand, has
been both generous and effective in providing humanitarian aid after a
people has been decimated.

It is not just a question of inaction. Power tells us that on several
occasions, the United States “directly or indirectly aided those
committing genocide.” We provided $500-million in agricultural and
manufacturing credits to Iraq as that country was destroying thousands
of Kurdish villages and gassing Kurds. After Vietnam had ousted
Cambodia’s Pol Pot regime, the United States, in an effort to deny
Vietnam influence in that country, took the lead in the United Nations
in recognizing the genocidal Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of

Cambodia. The United States also led the arms embargo against the
Bosnian Muslims, even though it was clear that doing so would prevent
them from defending themselves. And it did everything in its power to
remove U.N. peacekeepers from Rwanda and prevent their return. Some
800,000 persons died as a result; the violence also spilled over into
neighboring countries, setting off local and regional wars. Other
examples pile up.

How can we explain the U.S. response to genocide? Those who made the
decisions not to act typically argued that they didn’t know what was
going on, that the facts were unclear, that any effort to stop the
killing would have been futile, that the United States lacked the means
to do so, that intervention would have made the situation even worse.
Power rejects such claims: “Simply put, American leaders did not act
because they did not want to. They believed that genocide was wrong, but

they were not prepared to invest the military, financial, diplomatic, or

domestic political capital needed to stop it.” On the other hand, when
it seemed to be in the national interest, those same policy makers could

collaborate in genocide either by giving permission (East Timor) or by
active support (Indonesia, Guatemala).

For the most part, genocide in the 20th century seemed to be something
that happened to other people, in other parts of the world, with little
effect on American interests, narrowly defined. It was seldom a subject
of public debate. There has been, Power says, a mutual failure in the
democratic process: An uninformed public makes no demands for the
suppression of genocide, and politicians, having done what they can to
silence the public, cite the lack of public demand as a basis for
inaction as genocide claims its victims.

There has always been, however, a problem about how public opinion is
related to public policy. I would argue that relatively small,
well-organized lobbying groups are more likely to be effective in moving

policy makers to act against genocide than broad, but somewhat
amorphous, public opinion. Public opinion may be reported, but it
doesn’t get direct access to policy makers the way human-rights
lobbyists sometimes can. Moreover, human-rights groups have the
expertise to be persuasive and the commitment to stay with the issue as
public opinion — easily manipulated by those with power and an
ideological agenda — waxes and wanes.

But the reverse is also true: Farm and manufacturing interests were able

to defeat the legislation that would have prohibited credits to Iraq
after the gassing of the Kurds. Nearly 25 percent of American rice
production annually went to Iraq, along with a million tons of wheat,
insecticides, fertilizers, tractors, and so on. Agricultural lobbyists
argued that Iraq was not an enemy, but an opportunity. Suspending
credits would not punish Iraq — other countries would supply Saddam
Hussein. American businesses would be the real victims. The Reagan
administration, also claiming that “engagement” with Iraq would allow a
gentler dictator to emerge, seconded those arguments.

We can see the impact of public opinion, and its limitations, in Peter
Balakian’s important book, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and

America’s Response. There are several interrelated themes and narratives

in The Burning Tigris. First, there are the detailed, heart-wrenching
accounts of the Turkish massacres of some 200,000 Armenians in the
1890s, and of the genocide, beginning in 1915, that claimed the lives of

at least a million Armenians. At the same time, the author describes the

dedication and courage of American diplomats, who tried, with little
support from the State Department, to end the carnage. But there is also

the story of a broadly based American humanitarian movement that sought
to provide relief to the Armenians in their desperate condition, and
that demanded that the U.S. government protect them from further
violence. Balakian, however, shows that by the beginning of the 1920s
there was a growing conflict between public opinion, which strongly
supported an independent Armenia, and a Congress and White House that
had other interests. In his final chapter, he documents Turkey’s
continuing denial of the Armenian genocide and its efforts, largely
successful, to enlist the White House and State Department in defeating
Congressional resolutions that would publicly recognize the genocide.

But the point to emphasize here is that while public support was crucial

for the relief efforts and helped save many lives, it was not able to
carry the day politically. The United States did not declare war on
Turkey in World War I, even though Turkey and Germany were allies. An
influential group of missionaries and their supporters argued that their

colleges and schools would be seized by Turkey, and that relief supplies

would not be allowed in the country. After World War I, although the
public strongly supported an American mandate to protect the fragile
Armenian state, a growing isolationism in Congress put an end to the
project. From 1920 on, where Armenia was concerned, it was through the
voice not of the people, but of big oil. As one Senate critic summarized

the Harding administration’s attitude: “Show this administration an oil
well, and it will show you a foreign policy.” Shades of the past
continue. Did Iraqi oil help blunt criticism of what was happening to
the Kurds?

Whether the issue is about taxes or human rights, elites and their
interest groups tend to prevail. In part that is because most
human-rights organizations in the United States have small budgets. And
in part because the major humanitarian organizations have differing
agendas: Amnesty International focuses on individuals, Human Rights
Watch on policy and institutions. Other groups focus on humanitarian aid

once the slaughter has commenced. As a result resources and efforts are
scattered. What recent scholarship helps us see is that those who want
the United States to take a more active stance against genocide have no
choice but to create organizations that can lobby more effectively than
they have in the past.

In addition, it is crucial that policy makers redefine “national
interest” to include the prevention of genocide abroad. How such a
conceptual revolution can come about is problematic, but without it, we
can expect only more of the same: the deaths of hundreds of thousands of

people while Uncle Sam takes a hike. The case for an expanded
understanding of the national interest is not new. It has had a
prominent place in scholarly discussions for at least the past 20 years,

but it has either been ignored or viewed with skepticism by most in
power.

The argument rests on two elements. The first is moral: Genocide is a
crime committed upon a particular people, but by its very nature, it is
also a crime against humankind, permanently diminishing the biological
and cultural possibilities of human existence. It is an outrage to our
sense of justice. Since when can we support, allow, defend the mass
killing of the innocent? The second reason: Genocide leads to war,
regional and international instability, disruption of trade, an enormous

outflow of refugees, and if not stopped, sends a message to would-be
perpetrators that they can go ahead with impunity. Further still, as
Power reminds us, survivors of genocide may become a threat in the
future, harboring a thirst for vengeance and having learned that
violence is an acceptable way to “solve” social and political problems.
In that sense, the case for the prevention of genocide is rooted in
enlightened self-interest.

A major barrier to an expanded notion of national interest or, more
generally, a willingness to prevent or mitigate genocide, is that
“intervention” is widely thought to mean solely military intervention.
That is, in fact, how the political theorist Michael Walzer understands
the term in his essay in The New Killing Fields. He would limit military

intervention to cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing; other violations

of human rights, however egregious, would be left to the local
population. Whether he would approve of Britain’s recent military
intervention in Sierra Leone is uncertain.

Moreover, Walzer insists that the task of intervention is limited: “Once

the massacres and ethnic cleansing are really over and the people in
command are committed to avoiding their return, the intervention is
finished.” He notes that “when intervention is understood in this
minimalist fashion, it may be a little easier to see it through.” But in

his new book, Arguing About War, Walzer supports intervening countries’
staying for the long term: “Humanitarian intervention radically shifts
the argument about endings, because now the war is from the beginning an

effort to change the regime that is responsible for inhumanity.” That
position may be logical, but it also suggests the difficulties that make

countries and international organizations unwilling to commit
themselves.

There are other ways of thinking about intervention. Actual military
intervention may sometimes be necessary to stop a continuing genocide,
as it was in East Pakistan in 1971 and East Timor in 1999. In some cases

intervention may prevent genocide: Gen. Roméo Dallaire, the U.N.
commander in Rwanda, thought that 5,000 troops would have been adequate
to thwart the impending genocide. But nations can also respond to
genocide, or the likelihood of genocide, short of military intervention,

with all of its human and political risks. The options are not confined
to either doing nothing or waging full battle with the genocidal regime.

Part of the problem is to identify in advance the countries most likely
to commit genocide and take steps to mediate conflicts; to transform, as

much as possible, the conditions that give rise to genocide; and to use
a variety of incentives and threats to affect decisions in the
potentially genocidal regime. Once genocide begins, there are also steps

that intervening nations or groups can take. Samantha Power provides a
compelling list of such actions. She urges countries to “respond to
genocide with a sense of urgency, publicly identifying and threatening
the perpetrators with prosecution, demanding the expulsion of
representatives of genocidal regimes from international institutions
such as the United Nations, closing the perpetrators’ embassies in the
United States, and calling upon countries aligned with the perpetrators
to ask them to use their influence.” Other actions might include
economic sanctions, freezing financial assets, and, to prevent
incitement of genocide, jamming radio and televisions channels that spew

out messages of hate. Ultimately, military intervention may nevertheless

be necessary, although that would not have to be undertaken by just one
nation.

Multilateral intervention provides greater legitimacy, reducing the
perception that action has more to do with self-interest than with
humanitarianism, and thus helps to securely establish the right to
intervene to stop mass killing. It also distributes the burden of
intervention. But intervention by a single state may be justified, as
when India used force in adjacent East Pakistan in 1971.

Yet, if the U.S. government has a dismal record on responding to
genocide, there have been signs in the past 10 years of possible change.

After a very late start a U.S.-led NATO force intervened in Bosnia,
first with air power, then with the orchestration of the Dayton Accords;

that was followed by military intervention in Kosovo. Then in 1999, the
United States supported U.N. intervention in East Timor to protect the
right to self-determination and what was left of a people still under
assault by militias and the Indonesian army. For several years a joint
CIA-State Department genocide early-warning system has been in place.

At present the State Department is discussing whether the mass killing,
razing of villages, and burning of crops in the Darfur region of Sudan,
by government-supported Arab militias against non-Arabs who live in the
region, constitutes genocide. (However, possible sanctions mentioned
publicly, like freezing the killers’ assets in the United States, are
more symbolic than likely to have a real impact.)

But there have also been countersigns: the steadfast refusal to
recognize the International Criminal Court that could try, as a last
resort, persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. Moreover, the war against terrorism is taking center stage,
once more helping to push genocide to the back of our consciousness.

Even if the political will to prevent genocide suddenly appears, another

problem exists. Most genocide scholars and human-rights advocates
believe that, unless the United States takes the lead, other countries
will stay on the sidelines, as they have in the past. But American power

is not enough. To enlist others in the effort to prevent genocide, moral

authority is required. Therein lies the issue: What is left of America’s

moral credibility after Iraq?

Roger W. Smith is a professor emeritus of government at the College of
William & Mary and a former president of the Association of Genocide
Scholars.

KEY WORKS DISCUSSED IN THIS ESSAY

Arguing About War, by Michael Walzer (Yale University Press, 2004).

The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response, by
Peter Balakian (HarperCollins, 2003).

A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Raceand Nation, by Eric D. Weitz
(Princeton University Press, 2003).

Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, by Leo Kuper (Yale

University Press, 1982).

The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention,
edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (Basic Books, 2002).

“A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, by Samantha
Power (Basic Books, 2002).

“Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front,”
by Alan J. Kuperman, in the Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 6, No. 1,

March 2004:61-84.

The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, edited
by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Section: The Chronicle Review
Volume 50, Issue 47, Page B6

http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i47/47b0060
http://chronicle.com

Les raisons de refuser la candidature d’Ankara

Le Figaro
26 Juillet 2004

Les raisons de refuser la candidature d’Ankara

PAR ALEXANDRE DEL VALLE *

Au lendemain de la visite à Paris du premier ministre turc Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, dans le but de convaincre les sceptiques qu’Ankara
est désormais prête à intégrer l’Europe, le débat sur l’entrée de la
Turquie dans l’Union et sur les frontières de l’Union européenne
mérite d’être poursuivi. Aussi est-il nécessaire tout d’abord de
répondre aux principaux arguments des partisans de la candidature
turque, puis d’expliquer quelles seraient les conséquences
géopolitiques de l’adhésion d’Ankara.

Dire que la Turquie est historiquement européenne est aussi vrai que
de dire que la France, en tant qu’ex-puissance coloniale, est
africaine. La Turquie n’est pas plus européenne par sa géographie
(excepté Istanbul et la Thrace) que par ses moeurs ou sa conscience
civilisationnelle. Les Turcs se définissent comme un peuple asiatique
dont l’Age d’Or est l’apogée de l’Empire ottoman, et si une faible
minorité kémaliste ou issue des quartiers privilégiés d’Istanbul se
sent européenne, les habitants des favelas d’Istanbul et des
campagnes de l’Anatolie se reconnaissent plus dans le voisin irakien
que dans les Européens du Nord ou même dans les Grecs chrétiens. La
récente nomination d’un citoyen turc à la tête de l’Organisation de
la conférence islamique (OCI, prosaoudienne), puis les propos
irrédentistes inquiétants d’Erdogan accusant la Grèce de «persécuter
les Turcs musulmans» de Thrace (1), ou encore la politique panturque
d’Ankara en Asie centrale et dans le Caucase, montrent bien que la
Turquie demeure ce pays «dreaming west and moving east».

Invoquer l’«irréversibilité» de la candidature turque sous prétexte
qu’Ankara a signé un accord d’association en 1963, est membre de
l’Otan et du Conseil de l’Europe, ou au titre d’une «promesse», ne
tient pas. L’Otan et le Conseil de l’Europe ne sont pas des sas
d’entrée dans l’Union. En réponse à la demande officielle d’adhésion
d’Ankara (1987), qui fut rejetée, le Parlement européen avait voté
une résolution – occultée aujourd’hui – exigeant en vain comme
préalable la reconnaissance du génocide arménien, l’amélioration du
sort des minorités, puis le retrait de Chypre. C’est donc Ankara qui
n’a pas rempli ses obligations, et non l’inverse. Loin d’être un dû,
le processus d’intégration de la Turquie peut être interrompu à tout
moment sur décision d’un Conseil européen, d’un rapport négatif de
Bruxelles ou par le veto d’un Etat membre.

– Dire qu’il «faut» intégrer la Turquie afin de démontrer que
l’Europe n’est pas un «club chrétien» et ne «rejette» pas un candidat
islamique est absurde : demande-t-on à la Ligue arabe d’intégrer
Israël ou l’Inde pour prouver qu’elle n’est pas un «club musulman» ?
Ce mauvais procès renverse les rôles, car c’est à la Turquie de
prouver qu’elle n’est pas un «club musulman» : il y a plus de Turcs
de confession musulmane à Paris que de chrétiens dans toute la
Turquie (100 000), pays musulman à 99%.

– Dire que la Turquie demeure une «exception laïque» et un allié
naturel contre l’islamisme, grce à l’héritage d’Atatürk, est faux :
la Turquie nouvelle autorise et réclame tout ce que rejetait Kémal :
le voile, les partis islamiques, les confréries, les cours de
religion obligatoires. Ses lois contre le blasphème condamneraient
Atatürk lui-même ! Le kémalisme a connu un coup d’arrêt dès les
années 50-60, avec les gouvernements Menderes et Demirel, et il est
politiquement mort sous Turgut Ozal, ce grand artisan de la
réislamisation qui abolit l’article 163 interdisant les partis
islamistes. Comment peut-on soutenir qu’un pays dont 70% des femmes
sont voilées, dont l’Etat entretient 90 000 imams et des milliers de
mosquées, mentionne les religions sur les cartes d’identité, interdit
la haute fonction publique et militaire aux non-musulmans, et qui est
dirigé par un parti (l’AKP) issu d’un courant islamiste victorieux
aux élections depuis le début des années 90, est encore un pays
laïque ?

– On nous explique que les islamistes turcs au pouvoir sont des
«modérés» et des pro-occidentaux qui maintiendront les liens avec
l’Otan et Israël. C’est oublier les propos du ministre des Affaires
étrangères, Abdullah Gül, justifiant la polygamie devant un auditoire
du SPD allemand, expliquant que «la démocratie n’est pas un but mais
un moyen»(2). Les alliés américains savent eux aussi depuis la guerre
d’Irak que la Turquie réislamisée ne coopérera plus jamais comme
avant. D’autant qu’Erdogan a reproché à George Bush, lors du sommet
de l’Otan de juin, sa politique «prokurde» en Irak (3), Ankara
revendiquant une partie de ce pays au nom la même «politique des
minorités» qu’elle invoque à Chypre ou en Thrace…

– L’intégration de la Turquie permettrait à celle-ci de «poursuivre
sa démocratisation», nous dit-on. L’Union européenne est certes un
espace de paix et de démocratie, mais elle est située du point de vue
civilisationnel, donc naturellement «réservée» aux peuples de culture
judéo-chrétienne marqués par la pensée gréco-latine et situés en
Europe, ce qui fait déjà beaucoup de monde à démocratiser avant la
Turquie, l’Ukraine, la Biélorussie et la Russie étant infiniment plus
européennes. Toute entité géopolitique doit avoir des limites
claires, faute de quoi nous avons affaire à un phénomène néo-impérial
ayant vocation à s’étendre à l’infini.

– Nos dirigeants ont-ils seulement conscience que la Turquie dans
l’Europe deviendra l’Etat prépondérant de l’Union : dès 2020, Ankara
disposera de 100 députés turcs majoritairement islamistes au
Parlement européen (contre 72 pour la France et 98 pour l’Allemagne)
; sera la première puissance militaire et démographique de l’Union
(bientôt 100 millions d’habitants et 850 000 soldats) ?

L’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union ouvrira la boîte de Pandore de
l’élargissement. Pourquoi refuser ensuite les 200 millions de
turcophones du Caucase et d’Asie centrale ou les Etats du Maghreb ?
L’UE héritera de tous les contentieux géopolitiques (eau, frontières,
minorités, etc.) que la Turquie entretient avec ses voisins. Sans
oublier les trafics de drogue, d’armes et d’immigrés clandestins dont
elle est une des plaques tournantes majeures. L’Union aura comme
voisins directs l’Iran des mollahs et la Syrie, parraines du
Hezbollah ; l’Irak du djihad anti-occidental d’al-Qaida ;
l’Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie, points de passage des islamo-terroristes
du djihad tchétchène…

Malgré cela, les partisans de la candidature turque affirment que son
intégration à l’UE nous permettra de conjurer le choc des
civilisations et de combattre la menace islamiste !

L’Europe serait une chance pour la démocratie turque, nous dit-on.
Elle sera surtout une chance pour les islamistes turcs, jusque-là
condamnés à édulcorer leur programme et à subir l’alliance avec
l’Amérique et Israël tant que les militaires contrôlent le pays. Ne
serait-ce que pour préserver l’exception kémaliste tant invoquée par
les turco-euphoriques, les dirigeants européens devront réfléchir à
deux fois avant de déclencher un processus qu’ils ne maîtriseront
plus.

* Essayiste. Vient de publier aux éditions des Syrtes : LaTurquie
dans l’Europe, uncheval de Troie islamiste? (1) Agence Anadolou, 17
juin 2004. (2) Gérard Croc dans la «Revue des Deux mondes», avril
2003. (3) AFP, juin 2004.

Francia-Turchia: Per Erdogan si’ in UE, Chirac vende 36 Airbus

ANSA Notiziario Generale in Italiano
July 22, 2004

FRANCIA-TURCHIA:PER ERDOGAN SI’ IN UE,CHIRAC VENDE 36 AIRBUS ;
POSITIVI PER ENTRAMBI I PAESI I 3 GIORNI DI COLLOQUI DIPLOMATICI

PARIGI

(ANSA) – PARIGI, 22 LUG – Si sono conclusi positivamente i
colloqui tra Francia e Turchia: i due paesi si stringono la mano
e portano a casa una vittoria a testa. Parigi promette il si
all’entrata turca nell’Unione europea e Ankara compra 36 Airbus
francesi.

Il primo Ministro, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, dopo una visita di
tre giorni nella capitale d’oltralpe, rientra vittorioso in
patria: il presidente della Repubblica, Jacques Chirac, ha
dichiarato che “l’integrazione della Turchia nell’Ue e
auspicabile”.

L’incontro tra i due paesi si e’ rivelato positivo anche per
la Francia che guadagna una grossa vendita: la Turkish Airlines
ha comprato 36 Airbus per un valore superiore a due miliardi di
dollari.

La compagnia turca di bandiera, che verra’ presto
privatizzata, si sta preparando a una grande rinascita generale:
50 il numero di nuovi aerei in ordine per il rinnovamento della
flotta. Ma non e’ tutto, i turchi non si rivolgono solo al
costruttore europeo Airbus: presto un ordine di 15 Boeing
735/800 verra’ accordato con il rivale americano.

Erdogan, contento del suo soggiorno parigino, ringrazia la
Francia “per il suo evidente approccio costruttivo” e “il suo
atteggiamento positivo”.

In realta’ pero’ non tutti i partiti francesi si sono
dimostrati d’accordo con la disponibilita’ del presidente Chirac
ad accogliere a braccia aperte Ankara in Europa. Sia il centro
destra che il centro sinistra riconfermano la loro posizione di
diffidenza.

Francois Hollande, leader del partito socialista d’oltralpe,
in occasione dell’incontro con Erdogan, ha ribadito la
“necessita’ che la Turchia riconosca il genocidio armeno”.

“Questa richiesta non rientra nei criteri stabiliti per
l’adesione. La parola – chiude il discorso il presidente turco –
la lascio agli storici”. (ANSA).

Champions League results/draw

FOX Sports

Champions League results/draw

>From correspondents in London
July 22, 2004

EUROPEAN Champions League first qualifying round, second leg matches played
overnight:

In Baku: Neftchi Baku (Azerbaijan) 1 Siroki Brijeg (Bosnia) 0
First leg: 1-2; Aggregate 2-2; Neftchi Baku win on away goal
rule
– –
In Yerevan: Pyunik (Armenia) 1 Pobeda Prilep (Macedonia) 1
First leg: 3-1; Pyunik win 4-2 on aggregate
– –
In Helsinki: HJK Helsinki (Finland) 1 Linfield (Northern Ireland) 0
First leg: 1-0; HJK Helsinki win 2-0 on aggregate
– –
In Luxembourg: Jeunesse Esch (Luxembourg) 1 Sheriff Tiraspol (Moldova) 0
First leg 0-2; Sheriff Tiraspol win 2-1 on aggregate
– –
In Nova Gorica: Nova Gorica (Slovenia) 3 Flora Tallinn (Estonia) 1
First leg: 4-2; Nova Gorica win 7-3 on aggregate.
– –
In Kaunas: Kaunas (Lithuania) 4 Sliema Wanderers (Malta) 1
First leg: 2-0; Kaunas win 6-1 on aggregate.
– –
In Tirana: SK Tirana (Albania) 0 Gomel (Belarus) 1
First leg: 2-0; Tirana win 2-1 on aggregate.
– –
In Torshavn: HB Torshavn (Faroe Islands) 3 WIT Georgia
Tbilisi (Georgia) 0
– –
In Rhyl: Rhyl (Wales) 1 Skonto Riga (Latvia) 3
First leg: 0-4; Skonto win 7-1 on aggregate.
– –
In Shelbourne: Shelbourne (Ireland) 0 KR Reykjavik (Iceland) 0
First leg: 2-2; Shelbourne win on away goals rule.

Revised draw for the second qualifying round:

Pyunik (Armenia) v Shakhtar Donetsk (Ukraine)
APOEL Nicosia (Cyprus) v Sparta Prague (Czech Republic)
Rosenborg Trondheim (Norway) v Sheriff Tiraspol (Moldova)
Young Boys (Switzerland) v Red Star Belgrade (Serbia & Montenegro)
Nova Gorica (Slovenia) v FC Copenhagen (Denmark)
Neftchi Baku (Azerbaijan) v CSKA Moscow (Russia)
Zilina (Slovakia) v Dinamo Bucharest (Romania)
HJK Helsinki (Finland) v Maccabi Tel Aviv (Israel)
Skonto Riga (Latvia) v Trabzonspor (Turkey)
Club Bruges (Belgium) v Lokomotiv Plovdiv (Bulgaria)
SK Tirana (Albania) v Ferencvaros (Hungary)
Hajduk Split (Croatia) v Shelbourne (Ireland)
Djurgarden (Sweden) v Kaunas (Lithuania)
WIT Georgia Tbilisi (Georgia) v Wisla Krakow (Poland)

First legs – July 28
Second legs – August 4

Agence France-Presse

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