THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A COMMON FUTURE?
Zaur SHIRIYEV
Hurriyet
April 29 2010
Turkey
Religious leaders from Armenia and Azerbaijan made a call in Baku for
a peaceful resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. The head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholicos
Garegin II, stated that problems between states should be solved in
accordance with international law and the rights of the nations and
emphasized his faith in the common future of the South Caucasus.
Clearly, the current situation in the region – the "frozen"
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, Russia’s decision on the acceptance of
independence of Georgian rebel regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
since 2008, the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and, more
dramatically, Washington’s "double-standards" toward Azerbaijan –
raises a crucial question: "Is there a common future for the south
Caucasus states?"
Obviously, the region’s current political systems and practices emerged
in the turmoil of a collapsing superpower and have been deeply affected
by this. Furthermore, if in the Baltic countries, home to another
troika of former Soviet republics, the history, proximity to friendly
neighbor nations and the generally accepted notion of European identity
helped to mitigate the negative consequences of the post-Soviet
transition to sustainable independence, the externalities in the
south Caucasus acted to make the transition significantly harder.
Contrary to some existing stereotypes, there seems to be little
that inherently divides the peoples of the south Caucasus. Even if
the most recent historic example of integration was the short-lived
"Trans-Caucasian Federation" of 1917-18, it is, at least, a symbolic
recognition of the regional identity and an attempt to establish
and maintain a separate regional political entity. Especially, the
Caucasus gathering under one roof, the formulas concerning economic
or political integration have been raised. The formulas of The Common
House of Caucasus, United States of Caucasus, the Caucasus Stability
Pact, etc. are intended to put an end to the main source of the
fragmented structure of instability in the region.
The contemporary example of strong regional partnership between
Azerbaijan and Georgia, two nations with very different dominant ethnic
and religious groups, shows that not only a cooperative arrangement
within the south Caucasus is possible, but also that it is, clearly,
in the interest of its participants. Moreover, the Azerbaijani-Georgian
cooperation has had a strong impact on the wider region, among other
things, the largest infrastructure project, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan,
or BTC, pipeline, and by having served as the core for the GUAM,
the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.
Such cooperation is not based on history, but rather on the ability
of both Baku and Tbilisi to overcome existing obstacles for a vision
of a common future of the Caucasus. For the south Caucasus’ common
future to be fully realized, however, Armenia must be a part.
Presently, Armenia stands largely separate from its two Caucasian
neighbors and, unable to develop relations with Turkey, generally,
acts more as an observer rather than a participant in the emerging
partnerships in the region. It seems that if Azerbaijan and Georgia
are fixated on the regional future, the Armenian thinking is still
preoccupied by its past. Thus, not much room is left for thinking
about the present; perhaps, a common trend for transitional periods.
As the regional projects expand and develop further, Armenian
non-participation increasingly turns into a limitation for integration
in the south Caucasus as a whole and destructive isolation for Armenia
itself. Should the current tendency of entrenching positions both in
Baku and Yerevan continue, with time it might be even more difficult
to bridge the differences and help Armenia to become a fully integrated
member of the south Caucasus region.
Comprehensive integration in the south Caucasus, thus, can be achieved
through the formulation and acceptance of a common political identity
based on the interests of the Caucasian states and their citizens.
However imperfect, Azerbaijani-Georgian relations provide evidence
for the feasibility of such integration and a model of recognition
through the accommodation of both the interests of the individual
states and of the entire region.
Another important element of the partnership between Baku and Tbilisi
is the ability to overcome mutual historic and more recent emotional
grievances as well as an understanding that all unresolved issues
could be addressed through bilateral negotiations. Arguably, only
such accommodation can serve as the basis for sustainable regional
identity. One psychological factor that seems to underpin any
such identity is the appreciation of the Caucasus being a common
neighborhood for all of its citizens. Without an appreciation of
this commonality, a regional cooperative arrangement is not likely
to be effective.
Finally, the recent developments in the region since the events
of 9/11 and particularly since the August 2008 conflict between
Russian and Georgian forces have demonstrated once again that the
geopolitical realignment of the region has not yet ended and the
rivalry of outsiders over the region’s future still continues.