Author: Zhanna Nahapetian

In 1994, Armenian forces celebrated a triumphant victory, establishing a separatist state, called Arshak in Armenian, within Azerbaijani territory while etching a populist narrative of robust Armenian nationalism. But, in 2020, this triumph was transformed into a defeat that left behind a landscape marked by scorched aspirations and shattered illusions. Meanwhile, the First Karabakh War left Azerbaijan at the nadir of its national identity and pride. The war displaced more than 700,000 people, left between 20,000 and 30,000 dead, destroyed cities and their infrastructure, and stunned the Azerbaijani people. The trauma, often referred to as the “Karabakh Wound”, triggered not only a desire for revenge but also for national rehabilitation. Meanwhile, Armenians could not fathom the impact that the Karabakh Wound had left on Azerbaijanis. The trauma was felt not just by those who were displaced or were grieving for the dead but also by ordinary Azerbaijanis at all levels of society and in all walks of life. The Azerbaijani state coordinated its message about collective trauma and a nation’s profound sense of victimhood, reinforcing it and making this collective psyche resilient in the nation’s schools and popular media.

Conversely, the Armenian experience of military triumph not only bolstered newfound self-confidence but also bred a deep disregard for Azerbaijanis, whom the Armenians unjustly framed as “genocidal Turks” who were finally being punished for the events of 1915. Armenia saw its victory as confirming its nationalistic identity as superior to the weak and divided nation of Azerbaijani Turks. Unsurprisingly, Armenia’s bluster and intransigence served to intensify the Azerbaijani resolve for retribution. Armenia squandered the fruits of its military victory, never realizing how they could have capitalized on defining terms for a lasting peace in the region. It was Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian Prime Minister, who ended any hope of diplomatic settlement by declaring that “Karabakh is Armenia” in 2019. Azerbaijan has no option but to search for a non-diplomatic solution to restore its territorial integrity. Thus, it was inevitable that there would be a Second Karabakh War.

In 2020, Azerbaijan captured most of the territories and controlled the key passages between Armenia and Karabakh. Azerbaijan emerged fortified and resolute during the Second Karabakh War. Meanwhile, several factors paved the path for Armenian’s military defeat that was just as tragic and humiliating as what Azerbaijan experienced. Karabakh Armenians, who have relied on Russian peacekeepers who were deployed following the Moscow-brokered ceasefire of 2020, found themselves vulnerable to surprise attacks. During the Ukrainian War, Russia prioritized winning in Ukraine above everything else. Even the Caucasus, which was strategically important, could be disregarded to ensure victory in Ukraine. The war forced Russia to establish ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey to mitigate sanctions and create new trade routes to the south. Armenia faced additional challenges as its previous military dominance gradually diminished. The country became complacent, neglecting the valuable lessons learned from the first war. Military spending stagnated, equipment became outdated, and training routines became less rigorous. This erosion of military preparedness compounded Armenia’s difficulties during this period. 

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, buoyed by an oil boom and strategic alliances that filled the public coffers, built a formidable war apparatus, investing in advanced technologies such as drones, precision airpower, and cyber warfare capabilities. The balance of power tilted decisively, shredding the once-mighty Armenian Karabakh fortresses into powerless bastions unfit to confront or neutralize its now more technologically advanced adversary. The Armenian exodus, marked by the march of defeated, exhausted refugees, shattered the long-held belief of invincibility. It was now Armenia’s turn to experience profound national humiliation with grief, self-doubt, and questions about a nation’s will to exist.

In 2024, Armenia is at a critical juncture in its history. Presently, Armenia’s external borders are guaranteed by Russia, which also houses a major military base in the country. Additionally, a significant portion of Armenia’s major infrastructure is owned by Russia. As a result of the Second Karabakh War, Armenian-Russian relations have been radically changed. The alliance turned into a liability for Russia’s dealings with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Ukrainian War increased the strategic costs associated with maintaining this alliance.  Russia cannot shift military resources due to the prolonged Ukrainian war and Moscow is mindful of its constructive relationships with Azerbaijan and Turkey. During the Second Karabakh War, Russia opted to remain passive, even as the negotiated ceasefire unraveled. The Kremlin chose not to intervene, a significant move given its past commitments to regional alliances. Moreover, Turkey, under Erdogan’s leadership, decided to support Azerbaijan, diplomatically and militarily. It was the Turkish high command who ran the war. Yet, President Aliyev had prepared the military for the war’s critical moment and also developed closer ties with Moscow.

There could be an opportunity, even a potential of rebirth, in the defeat. With Russia uncoupling from the Karabakh issue, the Armenian state could seize the opportunity and free itself of the chains of being a protectorate and reaffirm its sovereignty. Turkey and Azerbaijan should address Armenia’s real or imagined threat perceptions to provide larger maneuvering room for the Pashinyan government to distance itself from Russia. It is more or less up to Turkey and Azerbaijan to shape the future of a stable and peaceful Armenia by addressing Armenia’s historic fears, a win-win proposition for all three nations. The repercussions of this “majestic defeat” continue to resonate in Armenia, with the loss of Karabakh, a historical and cultural hub. The financial impact is evident, with disrupted trade routes and a severe lack of infrastructure resources exacerbating an already overwhelmed economy. Politically, Armenian society grapples with divisions, recriminations and a quest for new paradigms. Yet, there are glimmers of hope. The recent prisoner exchange between Armenia and Azerbaijan, achieved without external intervention, presents a fragile but viable opportunity for reconciliation. Both nations now face a critical choice: cling to the ghosts of past aggressions or forge a path for mutual understanding and prosperity.

One of the negative factors for the durable peace is the Armenian diaspora which invests more in writing the past than building the future of Armenia. The Armenians of Karabakh fled within a few days of the war’s outbreak. Although the European Parliament said the exodus amounted to ethnic cleansing, a United Nations fact-finding report did not find any evidence of forced deportation. Yet, the Armenian diaspora attempts to frame the history of this exodus as ethnic cleansing and even genocide. The defeat represents a collective trauma that would likely expand the historical genocide narrative. That is, the Armenians will situate Karabakh within the framework of the genocide narrative of 1915. This will reinforce the image of the “terrible and genocidal Turks,” especially among the Armenian diaspora, and anchor a narrative of victimhood that could fuel a resurgence of revanchist Armenian nationalism.

To prevent the revanchist nationalism there is a constructive alternative. Azerbaijan and Turkey should work with Armenia to foster closer ties, and economic cooperation, and repair relations so that the psychic cycles that led to both wars are broken for good. Ankara should make overtures to Armenia by opening the border and by formally recognizing and apologizing for the sufferings of the Armenian people during World War One. Ankara’s actions could move past the lingering incriminations and accusations of genocide that have persisted for more than a century. Moreover, the Pashinyan government’s handling of the conflict, military strategy, and diplomatic efforts are more likely to contribute to growing dissatisfaction and domestic discontent. The psychological impact of perceived failures may intensify a profound loss of confidence in political leadership, prompting a collective demand for accountability. Unfortunately, the weakness of political opposition in Armenia has ensured Pashinyan’s re-election and efforts to consolidate his power, without the political will to make substantial changes on the domestic front.

The humanitarian crisis resulting from the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Armenians has intensified emotional strain while also fostering a sense of solidarity. Witnessing the suffering of fellow citizens and grappling with the need to address the needs of internally displaced persons create an emotional burden that goes beyond geopolitical considerations. The U.S., the European Union, and regional neighbors should provide economic assistance to the resettlement of refugees. Likewise, changes in regional power dynamics contribute to a collective sense of urgency and the need for a strong, unified response to safeguard national interests.

Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is imperative for securing their respective futures. Despite Armenia being excluded from key regional economic projects, such as oil and gas pipelines, the Middle Corridor Project initiated by China holds the potential to engage the region with new trade routes and interdependent relations. In 2024, the Caucasus could thrive economically and politically, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Iran, and Russia acting upon a mutual vision for a peaceful, integrated region.

Azerbaijan is strategically advocating for a “framework agreement” as a stepping stone towards a more comprehensive treaty, intending to address persisting issues with Armenia. Crucial challenges, including the intricate delimitation of mountainous borders, are on the horizon, requiring several years for resolution. Notably, the demarcation of the Azerbaijani-Georgian border has remained unresolved since 1991. Azerbaijan is proposing to delineate borders based on the current de facto situation, recognizing the imperative to consider present conditions. The inevitable exchange of enclaves between both nations and the lengthy process of border demarcation along rugged mountains further underline the complexity of the situation. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has urged Armenia to amend its constitution’s preamble, shifting the narrative away from the goal of unification with Karabakh as the national objective. While some Armenian and European scholars interpret these actions as attempts by Azerbaijan to perpetuate regional tensions and secure Russia’s presence while deflecting attention from domestic issues, Azerbaijan maintains its sincere commitment to fostering a stable, peaceful region.

Five obstacles hinder the realization of reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the potential for a prosperous Caucasus:

1. External Guarantors and Intervention: Azerbaijan’s aspirations for a peace treaty face resistance from Armenia, notably in seeking the involvement of European Union members as guarantors. However, Azerbaijan, along with Russia, opposes external intervention. Trust deficits persist, but both sides already have exchanged seven drafts of a peace treaty without third-party involvement, which indicates a promising potential.
2. Enclaves and Territory Swap: Azerbaijani and Armenian enclaves within each other’s territories pose a significant hurdle. There are eight Azerbaijani enclaves inside Armenia and one major enclave of Armenians inside Azerbaijan. The need for a swap raises questions about feasibility and terms, and disagreements persist on handling Azerbaijani enclaves, which are located along major highways connecting Iran, Armenia, and Georgia.
3. Location for Signing the Agreement: Disagreements have arisen over the preferred location for signing the peace treaty. Armenia insists on a European or U.S. venue, while Azerbaijan favors a location on its border with Armenia or in Georgia, which reflects underlying geopolitical considerations.
4. The Karabakh Issue:  Armenian nationalists around the world insist that Pashinyan include the Karabakh issue in treaty terms. The Azerbaijani government refused to include anything about the Karabakh Armenians in the treaty, as it considers Karabakh as properly within Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction of domestic affairs.  So far, the Pashinyan government has agreed to leave Karabakh outside the treaty and instead develop better relations with neighboring states.  
5. Reparations and Compensation: This matter concerns Armenians who once lived in Azerbaijan and those Azerbaijanis who once lived in Armenia. Armenian institutions throughout the diaspora have explored legal avenues to claim Karabakh Armenian property from Azerbaijan. However, Armenia’s reluctance to bring reparation issues to the forefront reflects concerns about potential demands for higher compensation due to the displacement and destruction during the First Karabakh War. But, for prospects of stable relations between the two countries, the property issues on both sides must be addressed. 

In conclusion, neither defeat nor military victory is permanent. The Armenian experience in Karabakh is a cautionary tale. It highlights that military victories, however glorious they might be, come with a hard expiration date. Lasting security is found not in the spoils of war but instead through the pursuit of enduring peace that is grounded in mutual respect, compromise, and a willingness to confront historical challenges. The Karabakh conflict, a tragic narrative of territorial disputes and ethnic tensions that have been recycled respectively by both nations, showcases the multifaceted epiphanies arising from military victory and defeat. As both nations aim to develop their regional identity, addressing multidimensional, intersecting issues is essential for achieving sustainable peace. Navigating territorial disputes, the impact of external players’ involvement and embedded nationalist sentiments requires humble and magnanimous diplomacy paired with sincere commitments to regional stability. The potential for a prosperous Caucasus hinges on overcoming these obstacles and forging a path toward reconciliation and cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Following the latest escalation on the border with Azerbaijan on February 12-13 that resulted in the deaths of four Armenian soldiers, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said he believes Baku is laying the groundwork for an invasion. 

Referring to Azerbaijan's rejection of Armenia's latest proposals on border delimitation/demarcation, he said:  "Our analysis shows that there can only be one reason for this, and the reasons could be their intentions to launch military operations in some areas of the border with the aim of turning it into a large-scale war against the Republic of Armenia."

"This intention can be read in all statements and actions by Baku," he added in his remarks to a cabinet meeting on February 15. 

The latest incident saw Azerbaijan claim that its troops had come under fire from an Armenian army position in the southern Syunik region on February 12, resulting in the wounding of one Azerbaijani soldier. Armenia denied the accusation.

The following day Azerbaijan launched what it called a "revenge operation," subjecting the same Armenian post to intensive fire for four hours and killing four soldiers and wounding another.

Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry was quick to respond to Pashinyan's remark. It reminded Pashinyan of "Armenia's territorial claims on Azerbaijan." This was a reference to Armenia's Constitution, which – through referring to other documents – calls for the unification of the formerly Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia. The process of changing the Armenian constitution has become a heated topic in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.  

Azerbaijan's demand that Armenia change its constitution has complicated the years-long process aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace deal between the archrival neighboring states. 

A central issue in those talks is the delimitation and demarcation of the state border, particularly since Azerbaijan's full seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh last September took the fate of that region's Armenian population off the table. 

Azerbaijan demands the return of enclaves controlled by Armenia since the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s while Armenia demands the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the Armenian territories it occupied between May 2021 and September 2022. Azerbaijan justifies its troops' presence in the area due to the lack of demarcation and refuses to pull back. 

To deescalate the situation, Armenia proposed withdrawing troops from the border areas and establishing a demilitarized zone while the demarcation takes place. The West, including the European Union and the United States, supported Pashinyan's proposal for demilitarizing the borders. 

Unarmed EU monitors patrol the Armenian side of the border at Yerevan's invitation. Azerbaijan accuses them of pro-Armenian bias. 

In his speech on February 15th, Pashinyan suggested conducting the delimitation process province by province. He also stated that Baku opposed this idea and that Azerbaijan has not changed its policy of military coercion. It's a sharp contrast to two months ago, when the Armenian PM believed that Baku and Yerevan had agreed on the principles of a peace treaty and were close to signing it. 

Since then disagreements have continued regarding who should mediate. Armenia tends to prefer Western facilitation while Azerbaijan would rather see Russia and Turkey in that role. 

Despite the disagreements, Yerevan and Baku agreed – with no formal external mediation – on a prisoner exchange in January. 

Speaking on February 14 while being inaugurated to his fifth term as Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliyev said there should be no mediators in the peace talks

"I think that the process of normalisation of Azerbaijan-Armenia relations should be dropped from the international agenda. Because everyone seems to want to deal with this issue. Mind your own business!" Aliyev said.

In the same speech, he doubled down on his demand that Armenia change its constitution:

"Armenia and those supporting it militarily should understand that nothing can stop us. If territorial claims against us are not abandoned, if Armenia does not bring its legislation into order, of course, there will be no peace treaty. This once again suggests that building an army and strengthening military potential is the primary objective."

The border violence and the escalating Azerbaijani rhetoric have exacerbated existing fears in Armenia of an Azerbaijani invasion. Specifically, there is apprehension that Baku will seek to use force to realize its demand for an extraterritorial corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan exclave.

Ani Avetisyan is a journalist based in Armenia

https://eurasianet.org/armenian-pm-says-azerbaijan-gearing-up-for-full-scale-war

Hayk Marutyan, the ex-mayor of Yerevan who was defeated in his bid to return to that post in last September's city council election, was ousted from his city council seat on February 5. 

Later that day he announced his intent to seek the premiership in the next parliamentary election. 

“If there are no snap elections, we will participate in the 2026 parliamentary elections. And since I will be the head of the party, I will naturally be a candidate," Marutyan said. The ex-mayor currently leads a small party called National Progress but has mooted the possibility of starting another one. 

Marutyan and two of his allies were ejected from the council on the basis of a regulation that allows for the removal of members who fail to show up for more than half of votes or sessions. The removal proceedings were initiated by the ruling Civil Contract party, which holds a plurality of seats on the council. Marutyan and his allies have boycotted all 42 votes held by the current convocation of the council. They demand the resignation of incumbent member and Civil Contract member Tigran Avinyan, who they say was elected unfairly. 

Marutyan called the expulsion "politically motivated" and claimed that he should not be deprived of his seat as he is performing his duties outside of the sessions. 

Marutyan’s career in politics was initiated and backed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who founded Civil Contract. 

Marutyan won election to the council and the mayoralty (the council chooses the mayor from among its members) by a landslide in December 2018. At the time he was a well-known comedian with no political experience. After his election, he became one of the ruling team's most prominent and popular faces.

He fell out with Pashinyan and the ruling party in late 2020, after Armenia's defeat to Azerbaijan in the Second Karabakh War. 

Ruling party council members removed him a year later, after he delivered a litany of accusations against the ruling elite, including misappropriating funds and issuing illegal construction permits.

After he left office, he returned to comedy, performing a stand-up routine titled "The Mayor" about his experience in power and his problems with the ruling team. 

He launched his return to politics ahead of last September's council election. For a while during the campaign, he seemed to pose a serious challenge to Civil Contract's domination of top elected posts in the country and was clearly seen as a threat by the ruling party.

Now, in his quest to become premier, he could have the advantage of being seen as a "third force" in Armenian politics – an alternative to both the government of Prime Minister Pashinyan and the discredited mainstream opposition. The authorities are tainted by the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and their appeasement strategy towards Azerbaijan while the largest opposition parties carry the stink of corruption from when many of its leading figures were in power (1998-2018).