Անթույլատրելի է ողբերգությամբ ավարտված կենցաղային վեճը վերածել ազգամիջյան խնդրի

  • 08.01.2019
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  • Հայաստան
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2019 թվականի հունվարի 8-ին կայացել է ԱԽ քարտուղար Արմեն Գրիգորյանի հեռախոսազրույցը Ղազախստանի Հանրապետության նախագահի օգնական – ԱԽ քարտուղար Գաբիթ Բայժանովի հետ:

Հեռախոսազրույցի ընթացքում կողմերը մտքեր են փոխանակել Կարագանդայում ստեղծված իրավիճակի շուրջ: 
ՀՀ ԱԽ քարտուղարն իր խորին ցավակցություններն է փոխանցել սպանված Ժանսեիտ Բակըտժանուլի հարազատներին և մերձավորներին:


Երկուստեք ընդգծվել է կենցաղային հողի վրա ծագած վեճի արդյունքում տեղի ունեցած ողբերգության` ազգամիջյան խնդրի վերածելու անթույլատրելիությունը:  Երկու երկրների ԱԽ քարտուղարներն առանձնահատուկ կարևորել են բազմակողմանի և թափանցիկ քննության և հանցագործության բոլոր մեղավորներին բացառապես օրենքի և արդարադատության շրջանակներում պատասխանատվության ենթարկելու անհրաժեշտությունը:


Միաժամանակ կարևորվել է երկու երկրների համապատասխան գերատեսչությունների միջև անմիջական կապի շարունակականության ապահովման կարևորությունը:

Christmas mass at Armenian Church of St. Sarkis in Damascus

Public Radio of Armenia
Jan 7 2019


Christmas mass at Armenian Church of St. Sarkis in Damascus

2019-01-07 11:44:58 

                           

A mass was held on Sunday at St. Sarkis Armenian Church in Damascus on the occasion of Christmas, which Armenians celebrate on January 6, the Syrian News Agency reports.  

Bishop Armash Nalbandian, primate of the Armenian Church of Damascus, delivered the Christmas sermon, in which he highlighted the high meanings of Christmas, calling for love, peace, and justice to prevail among all people.

Armen Petrossian : "Le caviar est un petit peu une drogue"

Europe 1
6 janv 2019
Armen Petrossian : "Le caviar est un petit peu une drogue"
INTERVIEW

Un peu plus de 300 tonnes de caviar d'élevage sont produites dans le monde par an. La maison Petrossian représente à elle seule 15% de ce marché de luxe. Dimanche, Armen Petrossian, qui a pris la suite de son père et de son oncle, est parti en balade avec Frédéric Taddéï.

Celui qui a inventé la boîte de 10 kilos – et qui en est "très fier" – a donné rendez-vous au 19, boulevard de la Tour-Maubourg, magasin historique de la marque. Le lieu est reconnaissable à sa devanture aux lettres rouges sur fond vert et à ses boîtes de caviar bleu au logo de bateau. L'extérieur, comme l'intérieur fait de boiseries, n'a pas changé depuis 1920.

Devanture de l'avenue de la Tour-Maubourg. Crédit : capture d'écran YouTube.

Armenia acting PM: Gas talks with Russia continue

News.am, Armenia
Jan 7 2019
Armenia acting PM: Gas talks with Russia continue Armenia acting PM: Gas talks with Russia continue

19:19, 07.01.2019

YEREVAN. – Gas talks with Russia continue, and we will do our best to defend our national interests, acting PM Nikol Pashinyan told reporters.

He commented on the question whether the present talks can be considered as a defeat for the Armenian authorities.

“We will continue talks and we will do our best to defend our national interests. Is it a defeat?”

As to the possible supplies of the Iranian natural gas, acting PM said the issue has been discussed and will be discussed, until a favorable solution is found.

Book Review: How Gulbenkian made himself the world’s richest man

The Sunday Telegraph (London)
January 6, 2019
How Gulbenkian made himself the world's richest man
 
by LEWIS JONES
 
 
BOOK: MR FIVE PER CENT by Jonathan Conlin 416PP, PROFILE, £25, EBOOK £15.83 …..
 
When Calouste Gulbenkian died, in 1955 aged 86, he was the world's richest man. In a magisterial new biography, published to mark the 150th anniversary of his birth, Jonathan Conlin gives a rough estimate of Gulbenkian's fortune, at 2015 prices, as £19.4billion, which he had acquired over more than half a century as "a back-room fixer, an intermediary between the worlds of business, diplomacy and high finance", and, above all, in oil.
 
The ultimate citizen of nowhere, "always a visitor, never at home", Gulbenkian was born in Istanbul in 1869, to a family of rich Armenian merchants, trading from Marseille and Manchester to Beirut and Baghdad, and came of age in the Ottoman Empire, which he saw torn apart by war and genocide. A British subject from 1902, he held three other passports, and was an accredited diplomat of the Ottoman and Persian empires.
 
Westerners turned to him as a source of intelligence on the Middle East, while Easterners – from Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1900 to Ibn Saud and the Shah of Iran four decades later – sought to learn from him the plans of the Great Powers and their oil companies. He had a remarkable "talent for evading attribution to this or that side". At one point the French thought he was in cahoots with the Americans, while the British thought he was in cahoots with the French.
 
His deals were innumerable, manifold, and "fiendishly" complicated. In 1910, for example, he was "negotiating for the Ottoman government, the Quai d'Orsay, NBT [the National Bank of Turkey], Crédit Mobilier and himself, all at the same time". He always insisted that his negotiations were based on "fixed moral principles", but was careful never to explain what they were, which was just as well. He made his first fortune in London in the 1890s, in a "racy corner" of the Stock Exchange trading in volatile South African mining companies, in league with the notorious crooks Horatio Bottomley and Whitaker Wright. By 1898 he had assets equivalent to £12million, most of which he cashed in "before it all came tumbling down".
 
His role in securing agreement to oil concessions from the Persian and Iraqi parliaments certainly entailed bribery on a massive scale, and although he was terrified of socialism and abhorred all taxes he was happy to deal with Bolshevik Russia from 1921 to 1932, helping it to export petroleum from Grozny, gold from Lake Baikal, lead and zinc from Siberia, and art from the Hermitage, some of it to his own magnificent collection. From 1924 he acquired a monopoly on the export of Russian caviar, but the relevant Soviet agency decided to hold back enough caviar to undercut the Armenian merchant he was bankrolling, landing Gulbenkian with two tons he could not sell. His family ate as much as they could, then gave a pound or two to everyone they met.
 
His greatest coup was the Red Line Agreement, drawn up at Ostend on July 31 1928, by which the companies now known as BP, ExxonMobil, Total and Royal Dutch-Shell agreed to collaborate in the "Ottoman Empire in Asia" as it had been in 1914 – by then the British and French mandates and protectorates now known as Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia – in a joint venture, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which Gulbenkian had established in 1912.
 
The assembled oilmen disagreed vehemently on where the Ottoman Empire in Asia had been in 1914.
 
("Oilmen are like cats," Gulbenkian once observed, "one never knows when listening to them whether they are fighting or making love.") Eventually, according to Ralph Hewins's 1957 biography, Gulbenkian "took a thick red pencil and slowly drew a red line", thereby establishing his claim to 5 per cent of TPC's oil.
 
Conlin dismisses this story as a myth invented by Gulbenkian's son Nubar, noting that the agreement took four years to reach, and that Gulbenkian was not present at Ostend on July 31. But the 5 per cent was real enough and, subsequently vested in his company, Partex, continues to apply today. And thanks to his "orderly development of a fragmented oil industry through vertical integration and international cartels", Conlin assures us, "the web woven by Gulbenkian is with us still".
 
Gulbenkian was a "complex and evasive individual" and, unlike the publicity-hungry Nubar, he was obsessively private, and modest. He declined a knighthood and the Légion d'honneur, and after renting a couple of yachts concluded that "the appeal of yachting is snobbery … it is an enormous waste, without any rewards, moral or physical". He liked to relax by going over his children's household expenses, and towards the end of his life he fretted about whether he could afford a "Big Ben" alarm clock from WH Smith. But he did spend huge sums on jewellery by René Lalique, although apparently Nevarte, his poor socialite wife, was never permitted to wear any of it. And he built "a fabulous palace" in Paris, where he gave Nevarte "no authority to deal with the smallest item", so she had to hold her cocktail parties on a bench in the street outside.
 
Gulbenkian filled his palace with his art collection, and worked and dined there, alone, and showered there – or was showered, by his valet with a pressurised hose, as he stood in a niche lined with silver leaf – but always slept in his suite at the Ritz. He worried about his health, and followed a strict diet of fruit and raw vegetables, curds, malt extract and unrefined sugar, while his valet was burdened with pills, oils, powders, salts, creams, lotions and gargles. There were 44 doctors in his address book, and by way of a rejuvenating tonic one of them insisted he have regular sex with young women, which he did in his hotel suite.
 
In 1936 he began to consider donating his art collection to the National Gallery in London. He liked its director, Kenneth Clark, who recalled him as "short and dense like a mole, but one did not think of him as either small or fat, because one's eyes were concentrated on his magnificent head". During the war he found refuge in neutral Lisbon, where he took five suites at the Hotel Aviz, and where the chief curator of the National Gallery in Washington spent years wooing him for his collection, offering to send a US warship to carry his paintings across the Atlantic. Anxious, as always, about the tax implications, and mistaking Salazar's Portugal for a tax haven on the lines of Panama or Liechtenstein, he decided to give it to Lisbon, where it was comprehensively clobbered.
 
"Surely Gulbenkian," argues Conlin, "has something important to tell us at this moment in history", when free enterprise and movement are under attack from both Left and Right. It is hard to see what that might be, but his story is a fascinating one.
 
His valet showered him with a pressure hose as he stood in a niche lined with silver
 
 
 
GRAPHIC: Calouste Gulbenkian by Charles Joseph Walker, 1912, left; Ghirlandaio's Young Woman, c1490, bought by Gulbenkian in 1929, above; Degas's Henri Michel-Lévy c1878, bought in 1919, far left

Kuwait Amir’s representative attends Armenian Christmas Mass

Public Radio of Armenia
Jan 7 2019
Kuwait Amir's representative attends Armenian Christmas Mass

2019-01-07 10:39:08

Representative of His Highness the Amir Sheikh Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Deputy Amiri Diwan Minister Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah Al-Mubarak Al-Sabah attended Christmas Mass at the Armenian Church, Kuwait News Agency reports. 

On January 6, the Armenian Apostolic Church celebrates the Feast of the Holy Nativity and Theophany of Our Lord Jesus Christ, which is the commemoration of the Birth and Baptism of Jesus Christ. God was incarnated and appeared to the people.

Bright Armenia urges Foreign Ministry to summon Kazakhstan envoy

News.am, Armenia
Jan 7 2019


Bright Armenia urges Foreign Ministry to summon Kazakhstan envoy Bright Armenia urges Foreign Ministry to summon Kazakhstan envoy

12:18, 07.01.2019
                  

YEREVAN. – Bright Armenia party leader Edmon Marukyan urged the Armenian Foreign Ministry to summon the ambassador of Kazakhstan to ask for explanations regarding the incident in the city of Karaganda.

Hundreds of Kazakhs took part in a protest in Karaganda, after the murder of a 23-year-old Kazakh in this city. Three local Armenians are suspects in the murder.

“After the murder on New Year’s Eve in Kazakhstan's Karaganda, the situation is gradually becoming uncontrollable and explosive, keeping our compatriots alarmed and threatening their safety and security. Preliminary observations show that the Azerbaijanis have succeeded in provoking this dispute by turning it into an anti-Armenian action,” Marukyan said in a statement.

An investigation on suspicion of inciting ethnic and religious hatred has been launched.

“In this situation we call on the Armenian Foreign Ministry to summon the ambassador of Kazakhstan to ask for explanations regarding the recent developments in Karaganda and get assurances that official Astana is doing its best to protect the rights, safety and property of our compatriots and to prevent the threats,” Marukyan added.

Dalle albicocche ai khachkars i simboli della tradizione dell’Armenia: da Noè all’Ararat l’orgoglio di un popolo

TurismoItaliaNews.it– Italia
05 Gennaio 2019
Dalle albicocche ai khachkars i simboli della tradizione dell’Armenia: da Noè all’Ararat l’orgoglio di un popolo

                  

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turismo   italia   news   turismoitalianews   Unesco   patrimonio   viaggi   Armenia   Ararat   Arca di Noè   simboli   albicocche   duduk   khachkars  

Giovanni Bosi, Yerevan / Armenia

Simboli che parlano di storia, tradizioni, cultura, arte, perfino gusto e sapori. Ogni Paese ne ha, lo sappiamo bene noi italiani. A questo non sfugge neppure l’Armenia dove albicocche, duduk, vigneti e khachkars (le artistiche croci di pietra) sono autentici patrimoni che contraddistinguono nel mondo questo Paese nel Caucaso meridionale.

 

(TurismoItaliaNews) Gli armeni ci tengono a ricordare come il loro sia il Paese delle albicocche. In effetti la storia del frutto riconduce direttamente ad Alessandro Magno: è stato proprio lui nel quarto secolo avanti Cristo ad “esportarlo” dall’Armenia in Grecia e da qui fino a Roma, contribuendo alla sua diffusione in Europa. “L’indicazione delle albicocche come ‘mele armene’ (nome scientifico Mela armeniaca, Pomum armeniacum) nelle opere di Plinio, Dioscorida e Columella, confermano ulteriormente questa teoria – ci spiegano allo State Museum of Armenian History – è innegabile che le nostre albicocche, a causa delle condizioni climatiche del Paese, hanno un sapore unico pieno di sole e venti della valle dell’Ararat”. Ancora oggi l’origine armena delle albicocche è ricordata dai botanici che hanno designato il frutto “Armeniaca”.

Dalla natura all’artigianato. E sì, perché l’albero dell’albicocco, con il suo legno, fornisce il materiale più adatto – anzi, esclusivamente questo – più adatto per la produzione del più amato e famoso strumento musicale armeno: il duduk. “Lo strumento è stato inventato prima della nostra era, durante i giorni del regno di Urartu – ci dicono alla National Art Gallery of Armenia – il nome armeno originale dello strumento è tsiranapokh ed è realizzato esclusivamente con legno di albicocco, poiché assicura una sonorità speciale. Come nessun altro strumento, il duduk è in grado di esprimere l’anima della nazione armena: il suo suono consente un’esperienza spirituale elevata che a volte può condurti fino alle lacrime”. Provare per credere.

Quando si parla di Armenia il pensiero non può non correre all’Ararat. Anche se oggi questa montagna alta ben 5.137 metri appartiene territorialmente alla Turchia, nelle immediate vicinanze del confine con Armenia, Azerbaijan ed Iran, la sua storia è indissolubilmente legata agli armeni. Secondo la Bibbia, l'Arca di Noè si arenò su questo monte, che divenne in tal modo il luogo di origine del popolo armeno. Ecco perché l’Ararat è considerato una montagna santa, complice forse anche la sua bellezza straordinaria che l’ha portato a simboleggiare la madrepatria per ogni armeno. E il simbolo culturale e nazionale più riconoscibile dell’Armenia può di fatto essere visto ovunque, a partire dall’emblema dello stato e fino ai loghi nazionali. Incluso il famoso omonimo brandy.

L’argomento brandy conduce a parlare di un altro simbolo: l’uva. E pure qui la storia parte da lontano: Noè piantò una vite portata dal giardino dell’Eden quando scese dall’arca. “Si ritiene che da allora le uve siano cresciute sul suolo armeno, simboleggiando ricchezza e abbondanza” sottolineano allo State Museum of Armenian History. E nemmeno a dirlo uno dei piatti più deliziosi della cucina nazionale armena, il dolma, viene preparato utilizzando foglie di vite. Peraltro sin dalla prima vendemmia, Noè è stato in grado di produrre vino.

“Tenendo conto delle tradizioni bibliche e dei fatti scientifici, l'Armenia si può considerare la culla della vinificazione – dicono ancora allo State Museum of Armenian History – in particolare nelle grotte di Areni gli scavi archeologici hanno consentito di individuare la primissima azienda vinicola del mondo, antica di oltre 6.000 anni”. E come culla della vinificazione, l’Armenia considera il vino come uno dei simboli nazionali. Rimanendo fedele alle tradizioni, il primo sabato di ottobre di ogni anno, l'Armenia organizza l'annuale festival del vino pan-armeno: l’Areni Wine Festival, con una mostra e una degustazione di vini. Come diceva Charles Aznavour “il buon vino armeno contiene tutto ciò che puoi sentire, ma non può essere espresso in parole…”.

Infine i khachkars, ovvero le croci di pietra: sono tipicamente armene e identificano la cultura cristiana in Armenia. L’arte del khachkar costituisce il contributo più originale del popolo armeno al patrimonio della cultura mondiale: fondata sull’arte monumentale di antica di tradizione, la produzione di questi simboli si è sviluppata nei primi anni del cristianesimo e ha raggiunto il suo apice nel medioevo. C’è un luogo particolare dove ammirarle tantissime: il cimitero di Noratus – nella regione di Gegharkunik, sulla sponda destra del fiume Gavaraget – è la seconda area più vasta dopo quella di Jugha (Nakhichevan) con i suoi innumerevoli khachkar (più di 2.700), alcuni dei quali si trovano nel cortile di Echmiazin. Tuttavia dal 1998 al 2005 i khachkar di Jugha sono stati sistematicamente distrutti dall’Azerbaigian e dunque Noratus è diventato il primo e più grande museo all’aperto di khachkar al mondo.

Come primo stato ad adottare il cristianesimo (all’inizio del IV secolo) in Armenia, nell’epoca in cui questa fede ha iniziato a diffondersi qui, ha cominciato ad emergere una nuova natura dell’espressione religiosa, che ha lentamente ma inesorabilmente integrato l’identità nazionale. Invece di templi e altari nel Paese hanno iniziato a spuntare croci di legno, poi sostituite (per la loro breve durata) a partire dal nono secolo da croci incise sulle pietre (khach – cross, kar – stone). Oggi sono simboli unici per la cultura armena e considerati di grande valore architettonico. Dal 2010 i khachkar sono inclusi nell’elenco Unesco dei beni culturali immateriali. A Noratus ci sono splendidi esempi di ogni periodo della loro formazione. Le origini dell’arte del khachkar riconducono al periodo prescristiano, quando venivano scolpiti i vishap (drago), pietre monumentali di culto a forma di steli collocate vicino alle fonti d’acqua.

“È sorprendente scoprire come ognuno dei simboli nazionali dell’Armenia sia diventato e si siano influenzato a vicenda nel processo di sviluppo storico” sottolineano dallo State Tourism Committee dell’Armenia.

Per saperne di più

 

Turkey Turns On Its Christians

Middle East Forum
Jan 6 2019

by Anne-Christine Hoff
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2018

While Christians make up less than half a percent of Turkey's population, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Reconciliation Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) depict them as a grave threat to the stability of the nation. With Erdoğan's jihadist rhetoric often stereotyping Christian Turkish citizens as not real Turks but rather as Western stooges and collaborators, many Turks seem to be tilting toward an "eliminationist anti-Christian mentality," to use historian Daniel Goldhagen's term. Small wonder that the recent launch of an official online genealogy service allowing Turks to trace their ancestry has kindled a tidal xenophobic wave on the social media welcoming the fresh possibility to expose "Crypto-Armenians, Greeks, and Jews" mascarading as true Turks. [1]

"The Mosques Are Our Barracks"

Persecution of Turkey's Christian minority has long predated Erdoğan and the AKP. As it stood on the verge of extinction, the Ottoman Empire engaged in mass deportations and massacres that culminated in the Armenian genocide. The end of World War I saw the expulsion of more than a million Greeks,[2] and the position of the dwindling Christian community only somewhat improved in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's secularist republic. Yet while Kemalist Turkey paid lip service to the equality of its non-Muslim minorities, the AKP unabashedly excludes these groups from Turkey's increasingly Islamist national ethos.[3]

An ominous indication of what lay in store for the religious minorities was afforded as early as December 1998 when Erdoğan, then mayor of Istanbul and an opposition politician, announced that the "mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers," quoting a line from a poem by the nineteenth-century nationalist poet Ziya Gökalp underscoring the Islamist foundation of Turkish identity. And while this recitation landed Erdoğan in prison for inciting religion-based hatred,[4] once at the helm, he steadily realized this vision, systematically undoing Atatürk's secularist legacy and Islamizing Turkey's public space through such means as the government-operated Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet), which pays the salaries of the country's 110,000 imams and controls the content of their Friday sermons.

Things came to a head during the July 15, 2016 abortive coup when the regime ordered the imams to go to their mosques and urge the faithful to take to the streets to quash the attempted revolt.[5] Not surprisingly, this Islamist-nationalist reassertion was accompanied by numerous Christophobic manifestations (in Ayyan Hirsi Ali's words),[6] notably attacks on churches throughout the country.[7] In Malatya, for example, a gang chanting "Allahu Akbar" broke the glass panels of the front door of a Protestant church while, in the Black Sea city of Trabzon, rioters smashed the windows of the Santa Maria Catholic church. Witnesses said the attackers used hammers to break down the door of the church before Muslim neighbors drove them away.[8] As Istanbul pastor Yüce Kabakçı lamented:

The reality is that Turkey is neither a democracy nor a secular republic. There is no division between government affairs and religious affairs. There's no doubt that the government uses the mosques to get its message across to its grassroots supporters. There is an atmosphere in Turkey right now that anyone who isn't Sunni is a threat to the stability of the nation. Even the educated classes here don't associate personally with Jews or Christians. It's more than suspicion. It's a case of let's get rid of anyone who isn't Sunni.[9]

Anti-Christmas Campaigns

Anti-Christian incitement continued apace after the coup. In February 2017, Turkey's Association of Protestant Churches released its annual "Rights Violation Report," which claimed that anti-Christian hate speech had increased in Turkey in both social and conventional media, reaching extreme levels during the 2016 Christmas season. Churches in particular faced serious terror threats with the government doing little to stop these open Christophobic displays.[10]

On December 28, 2016, for example, in the western province of Aydin, the ultra-nationalist Islamist group Alperen Hearths staged a forced conversion of Santa Claus to Islam, putting a gun to the head of an actor dressed as Santa Claus. A representative of the group explained the staging of the conversion this way:

Our purpose is for people to go back to their roots. We are the Muslim Turkish people who have been leading Islam for thousands of years. We will not celebrate Christian traditions and disregard our own traditions like Hıdrellez, Nevruz, and other religious national holidays.[11]

In the city of Van, a billboard read: "Have you ever seen a Christian celebrating Eid al-Adha? Why are we celebrating their festivals?" A group of students at Istanbul Technical University held up signs that read: "Do not be tempted by Satan. Do not celebrate New Year"; "There is no Christmas in Islam"; and "In Muslim lands, people are trying to stay alive; in their lands, it is all about festivities."[12]

It is easy to dismiss such events as mere talk. However, in Muslim-majority states, notably Egypt, Christmas and New Year's Eve celebrations often form the scene of murderous attacks.[13] So it was in Turkey on December 31, 2016, when an ISIS-affiliated terrorist wearing a Santa hat sprayed gunfire at a mixed group of foreigners and Turks enjoying their 2017 New Year's celebration at an Istanbul nightclub, killing 39 people and wounding another 69.[14] In an editorial in The Guardian on January 3, 2017, Turkish novelist Elif Shafak described the rising anti-Western fanaticism as unnerving:

Those who question the party line are labeled "betrayers" and "pawns" of Western powers. Young people are told that we are a country surrounded by water on three sides and enemies on all four. As paranoia, distrust, and fear intensify, the culture of coexistence dissolves.

Shafak recounted other recent incidents that have distressed Christians and other religious minorities in Turkey. For example, in a Friday sermon broadcast to mosques throughout the country, the Diyanet called New Year's celebrations "illegitimate." For weeks prior to New Year's Eve, ultra-nationalist and Islamist groups distributed flyers on the streets claiming, "Muslims do not celebrate Christian festivals." [15]

A State-sponsored Conspiracy Theory

The post-coup anti-Christian rhetoric has tended to follow a familiar pattern, namely that Christian Turkish citizens are not real Turks but are instead loyal to the West. The rhetoric conflates many different streams of Western thought: The secular reveler who embraces the New Year's tradition and the pious Christian who celebrates Christmas are equally suspect. Such rhetoric would not be quite so dangerous if the Turkish media offered a counterargument, but with the government's mass incarceration of all those remotely critical of the AKP and Erdoğan, it is unlikely that any viable alternative will be presented to the Turkish public.

According to Voice of America News, in the months following the coup, many pro-government media outlets and some government officials directly accused the West, Christians, and Jews of having played a role in it. For example, at a pro-government "Democracy and Martyrs" rally in August, attended by more than a million people, speakers linked religious minorities to the coup plotters, calling them "seeds of Byzantium," "crusaders," and a "flock of infidels."[16] Human rights lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz said pro-government media have:

embraced an alarming narrative of scapegoating Turkey's religious minority and connecting the coup plot to them … Particularly pro-government media outlets have taken an anti-U.S. and anti-EU attitude, which I can call a xenophobic attitude, in which they attempt to demonize the West and accuse it of the coup attempt. And this narrative targets and harms non-Muslims in Turkey.[17]

The Islamization of Turkish Institutions

While the idea that Christian Turks are collaborators with the West is nothing new, the uncritical mass acceptance of such a narrative has exacerbated the coup's effect on Turkey's Christian minority. According to American anthropologist Jenny White, the educational system in Turkey has for years promoted a distrustful view of Christian Turks and the predominantly Christian West. This perception of Christian Turks as the "other" can best be understood by reviewing the curriculum of security courses that were mandatory for all high school students from 1926 until January 2012. Taught by active or retired military officers appointed by the local military base, such courses articulated the idea that Turkey has no friends and that no country in the world wants it to be strong. Security textbooks often presented non-Sunni citizens as divisive, internal elements supported by Turkey's enemies.[18] A similarly stark picture is painted by anthropologist Ayşe Gül Altınay. Having observed classrooms around the country, Altınay found almost no discussion of peace, coexistence, dialogue, or nonviolence. Instead, students were taught to fear differences and to treat their non-Muslim friends as decidedly the "other."[19]

Turkey's school system has been used as a political arm of the state ever since Atatürk founded the Turkish republic in the 1920s, and the AKP has gradually shifted the system away from its secularist roots. In July 2017, for example, Education Minister Ismet Yılmaz declared that Turkish public schools would no longer teach Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. Instead, the concept of jihad would be added to the religious teaching curriculum beginning with the 2017-18 academic year, and schools would be required to teach the concept as patriotic in spirit. As Yılmaz told reporters:

It is our duty to fix what has been perceived as wrong. This is why the Islamic law class and basic fundamental religion class will include [lessons on] jihad. Loving your nation is the real meaning of jihad.[20]

According to White, not only the education system but also government organizations and the military perceive Christians as a threat to Turkish unity. For example, until recently, both the official website of the army chief of staff and the Diyanet listed missionary activity as one of the main threats facing Turkey. In 2001, the National Security Council identified Protestant missionaries as the third-largest threat facing the nation. Three years later a report by the Turkish armed forces accused Protestant missionaries of planning to pass out a million Bibles and to convert 10 percent of the Turkish population by 2020, and urged cooperation among governors, mayors, and security and education personnel to counter the danger. In a 2005 article in its monthly magazine, the Diyanet warned that while missionary activities appeared innocent, their object was to divide the country, undermine its unity, and make Turkish citizens tools of their dark ambitions.[21]

In a further indication of this trend, the Syrian Christian co-mayor of Mardin was asked to step down from her post by the Turkish government in November 2017. Likewise, the Turkish authorities removed an Assyrian sculpture from a public square in front of the local council building in Diyarbakir. No explanation was given for the removal of either the sculpture or the co-mayor, who was replaced by an official appointed by the government.[22]

In reality, the alleged threat that Turkey could become a Christian nation is readily belied by the country's demographics, especially when looking at changes in domestic religious affiliation over the past century. According to the Ottoman census, Turkey's Christian minority was just under 20 percent of the population in 1914. By 1927—a mere thirteen years later—Christians made up less than 2.5 percent of the population. Today Christians make up less than 0.2 percent of Turkey's population of 80 million. (Included in that number are an estimated 45,000 Christian refugees fleeing ISIS persecution in Iraq and Syria.[23]) In fact, even the puny 0.2 percent estimate may be a little high. The official census puts Islam at 99.8 percent of the adopted religion of Turks and 0.2 percent as "other" (mostly Christians and Jews).[24]

New Obstacles to Worship

Like other Islamic-majority states, the rights of Christians in Turkey have never been the same as those of the Muslim majority—not in the Ottoman Empire and not today. Modern-day laws remain biased in favor of Muslims. Church buildings are not allowed to be taller than certain heights while enormous mosques are built on the highest hilltops. Christian worship services are only permitted in "buildings created for the purpose." Turks who openly discuss Christianity face harassment, threats, and imprisonment. Most churches are surrounded by high walls and protected by 24-hour guards.[25]

Even so, Turkish Christians and other minorities noted a qualitative change in the tenor of the Sunni majority's attitude toward them after the 2016 coup. According to Ian Sherwood, the chaplain of the British consulate and the priest of the Crimean Memorial Church:

There is a rising undercurrent of intolerance toward Christians and other non-Muslims in Turkey and this goes further than boys standing on the walls of [the] churchyard shouting "Allahu Akbar." We Anglicans have been here since 1582 and yet we're not able to build churches except for a short period in the nineteenth century. And now it's very rare that you hear of a Christian community being able to build a church.[26]

Added to such obstacles is the threat of Islamist extremists targeting churches, which increased dramatically after the coup attempt. According to Umut Şahin, secretary general of the Union of Protestant Churches and a pastor in Izmir, "Some people sent death threats to the mobile phones of 15 pastors. They used the same terms and arguments as ISIS in their text messages. They sent the pastors propaganda videos of ISIS."[27] Protestant church leader Ihsan Ozbek revealed that some churches have canceled Sunday services because of fear of an ISIS attack. "This has created deep fear and panic in our community," he said.[28]

In some cases, the government or local town councils have appropriated the church property of Christian Turks. In April 2016 for example, the authorities seized all the churches in the majority Kurdish southeastern city of Diyarbakir. The historic Armenian Surp Giragos Church, a 1,700-year old church and one of the largest Armenian churches in the Middle East, was seized by the government.[29] And while the government justified the move by the need to rebuild and restore the city's historic center after ten months of bitter fighting against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), many within the Christian community were skeptical of the explanation. The Diyarbakir Bar Association, representing Christians worshipping at one of the churches, filed an appeal over the action.[30]

The Turkish government also recently seized multiple properties in the southeastern city of Mardin belonging to Assyrian (Syrian) Christians and transferred them to public institutions: Dozens of churches and monasteries were reassigned to the Diyanet; cemeteries were transferred to the metropolitan municipality.[31] This seizure of church property is one of many indications that the government does not view Christians as part of the broader Turkish community.

A New Genocide?

For some religious minorities, these confiscations bring back bitter memories. A little over a century ago, in 1915, the Ottoman Empire's Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) passed legislation authorizing the deportation of "persons judged to be a threat to national security." Deportees, many of whom were Armenian Christians, were instructed not to sell their assets but rather to provide a detailed list of what they owned:

Leave all your belongings—your furniture, your beddings, your artifacts. Close your shops and businesses with everything inside. Your doors will be sealed with special stamps. On your return, you will get everything you left behind. Do not sell property or any expensive item. Buyers and sellers alike will be liable for legal action. …You have ten days to comply with this ultimatum.[32]

The exact extent of confiscated properties during this period of mass extermination of Armenian Christians is unknown. But according to the private documents of Talaat Pasha, the Ottoman interior minister and chief architect of the confiscation legislation, a total of 20,545 buildings and 267,536 acres of land were confiscated by the government as well as agricultural land: 76,942 acres of vineyards; 703,941 acres of olive groves; and 4,573 acres of mulberry gardens.[33] During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, an Armenian delegation estimated the worth of material losses suffered by the Armenian Church at $3.7 billion (about $51 billion today).[34]

A century later, Turkey's civil codes still give the executive far-reaching powers to confiscate property on the basis of protecting "the national unity" of the Turkish republic.[35]

Conclusion

Under Erdoğan's leadership, especially after the 2016 coup, Turkey's religious minorities find themselves marginalized and isolated from the Sunni majority. Anti-Western and anti-EU rhetoric often morphs into rabid anti-Christian incitement with the clear message that the country's Christian citizens are not true Turks, a message that the state-controlled media and government officials have either actively promoted or refused to denounce. Exacerbated by government policies such as the addition of jihad teaching to the school curriculum, these measures place Turkey's non-Muslim minorities in an increasingly precarious situation.

Anne-Christine Hoff is an assistant professor of English at Jarvis Christian College in Hawkins, Texas.

Notes

[1] Fehim Taştekin, "Turkish genealogy database fascinates, frightens Turks," al-Monitor (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 2018.

[2] Renée Hirschon, ed., Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey (Oxford: Berghan, 2003), p. 6.

[3] John Eibner, "Turkey's Christians under Siege," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2011, pp. 41-52; Daniel Pipes, "Dhimmis No More: Christians' Trauma in the Middle East," danielpipes.org, Jan. 2018.

[4] Deborah Sontag. "The Erdogan Experiment." The New York Times Magazine, May 11, 2003.

[5] The New York Times, July 17, 2016; al-Monitor, July 25, 2016.

[6] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, "The Global War on Christians in the Muslim World," Newsweek, Feb. 6, 2012.

[7] The New York Times, Apr. 23, 2016; World Watch Monitor (London), Feb. 7, 2018

[8] The Express (London), Apr. 22, 2016.

[9] Ibid., Aug. 1, 2016.

[10] Turkish Association of Protestant Churches Human Rights Violations Report, 2016, South Hadley, Mass.

[11] Hürriyet Daily News (Istanbul), Dec. 29, 2016.

[12] Elif Shafak, "The Reina atrocity shows how deeply fanaticism has taken hold in Turkey," The Guardian, Jan. 3, 2017.

[13] See, for example, "A Gruesome Christmas under Islam," ryamondibrahim.com, Jan. 18, 2016; "Death and Destruction on Christmas: Muslim Persecution of Christians, December 2016," raymondibrahim.com, Mar. 13, 2017.

[14] The Guardian, Jan. 1, 2017.

[15] Shafak, "The Reina atrocity shows how deeply fanaticism has taken hold in Turkey."

[16] The National Herald (New York), Sept. 28, 2016.

[17] Voice of America News, Sept. 25, 2016.

[18] Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 80-101.

[19] Ayşe Gül Altınay, "Human Rights or Militarist Ideals? Teaching National Security in High Schools," in Gürol Irzik, Deniz Tarba Ceylan, and Ismet Akça, eds., Human Rights Issues in Textbooks: The Turkish Case (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2004), pp. 76-90

[20] The Independent (London), July 18, 2017.

[21] White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, pp. 80-101

[22] Uzay Bulut, "Turkey Uncensored: The Fate of Assyrian Christian Churches and Monasteries," The Philos Project, New York, July 13, 2017.

[23] "Attacks hint that Christians may fare worse in post-coup Turkey," Iraqi Christian Relief Council, Glenview, Ill. Aug. 23, 2016.

[24] "Turkey, People and Society," CIA World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: CIA Office of Public Affairs, Mar. 16, 2018).

[25] "Is Ataturk's dream of a secular Turkey lost?" Belief Net News (Virginia Beach), accessed Mar. 3, 2018.

[26] Alec Marsh, "The war on Christians is extending into Turkey," The Spectator, July 19, 2016.

[27] Burak Bekdil, "Red Alert! Protestant Couple 'Security Threat' to Turkey!" The Gatestone Institute, New York, Oct. 22, 2016.

[28] Voice of America News, Sept. 25, 2016.

[29] The New York Times, Apr. 23, 2016.

[30] The Express, Apr. 22, 2016.

[31] Agos (Istanbul), June 23, 2017.

[32] Uğur Umit Ungör and Mehmet Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), p. 69.

[33] Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), p. 86.

[34] Vahagn Avedian, "State Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide," European Journal of International Law, 2013, no. 3, pp. 797-820.

[35] Mehmet Polatel, Beyannamesi: Istanbul Ermeni Vakıflarının el konan mulkeri (Istanbul: Uluslararası Hrant Dink Vakfı Yayınlari, 2012), p. 69.

A Clermont-Ferrand, les Arméniens fêtent la Nativité et l’Epiphanie

Franceinfo
6 janv 2019


Les Arméniens ont gardé la date initiale de la naissance de Jésus Christ, le 6 janvier, pour fêter Noël. / © F3 Auvergne/ C.Fallas

A Clermont-Ferrand, la communauté Arménienne a fêté la Nativité et l’Epiphanie. Ces chrétiens apostoliques sont restés attachés à la date du 6 janvier où les Rois mages arrivent pour apporter des cadeaux à l’enfant Jésus.
 

Par BC avec A.RozgaPublié le 06/01/2019 à 18:45

A Clermont Ferrand, une association rassemble la communauté Arménienne qui célèbre Noël et l’Epiphanie le même jour, le 6 janvier.

Ensemble, ils dansent le Cotchari, symbole d'un peuple uni par-delà l'exil : " C'est une danse ancienne qui vient de nos grands parents. On se tient les mains très très fort" raconte Suzanna Kirakossyan, membre de l’association clermontoise Rencontres et Culture Arménienne.

Autour d’un buffet, une soixantaine d'Arméniens et Français d'origine Arménienne se sont retrouvés pour un Noël à la fois festif et nostalgique. A défaut du traditionnel poisson pêché dans le lac Sevan en Arménie, les convives compensent avec une coutume de générosité : "Comme dans toutes les traditions méditerranéennes, il faut le mezze et une table bien remplie. On doit offrir plus que ce que l’on possède" raconte Jacky Chahbazian. 

Même à Noël, les Arméniens de France n'oublient ni Aznavour, ni la mémoire de leur passé. Parmi eux, des descendants des premiers apatrides chassés par le génocide : "Cette douleur existera toujours tant que la Turquie ne reconnaîtra pas le génocide arménien" confie Claudine Khatchadourian, présidente de l'association clermontoise. 
 
Dans le Puy-de-Dôme, la communauté Arménienne compte environ 200 familles.