Category: 2020
What has Armenia done to return Artsakh to normal life?
Armenia Police: 69 demonstrators apprehended
Armenian Ombudsman in Moscow discussing issue of returning prisoners from Azerbaijan
The Second Karabakh War & the Information Warfare in Georgian-Armenian Relations
Op-Ed
It may seem unbelievable to some, but the citizens of neighboring countries, whose states have a centuries-old history of coexistence, know each other only by stereotypes and other oral traditions. This fact often leads them to irrational and sometimes even rational fears about each other. These forms of fear are not mutually exclusive, because you are naturally afraid of what is next to you, but you do not know what it is or what it wants. I’m very sorry to use such an introduction to this article on the information warfare in the Georgian-Armenian relations. My subjective opinion is that in case of intention, after the Georgia-Turkey issue, unleashing an “information war” between Georgia and Armenia is the easiest thing to do. As for me, this sad reality has deep psychological, historical and cultural roots, where truth and lie are intertwined. I also think that some “third party” contributed to this, and today we look at each other with fear and resentment.
Georgians are fairly offended when:
• Nobody can speak Georgian in Akhalkalaki or Ninotsminda;
• Famous Armenian politicians speak seriously about Javakheti’s accession;
• The leaders of the separatist ideology organization in Javakheti are cherished in Yerevan;
• Texts about “Great Armenia” are accompanied by maps showing the territories of Georgia;
• They recall the secret negotiations between the Dashnaks and Turks about the return of the disputed territories;
• They recall the Russian military bases in Armenia, despite my deep conviction that these bases should frighten the Armenians more than the Georgians.
Add to this the fact the atrocities committed by the Bagramian Battalion in Abkhazia are perceived among Georgians as a crime committed by the Armenian people;
In turn, there are Armenian images of perceiving and understanding Georgians and “Armenian narratives” describing these images. We have to look for its roots in the history. Some of these narratives include:
• Accusing Georgians of betraying Armenians in 1918 in connection with the Turkish armed aggression;
• Accusing the then Georgian government of inhumane treatment of Armenian refugees;
• Talking about the economic and communication blockade imposed by Georgia against Armenia;
There are also allegations of occupation of “indigenous Armenian lands” by the Georgian Armed Forces.
If we look at our modern history, we will find a new list of accusations, but here we will see one interesting reality: Georgian-Armenian relations go beyond “Tbilisi-Yerevan” relations; ethnic Armenians living in Georgia have also added diversity to the images and narratives of perceiving and understanding Georgians, and there appeared new accusations, namely:
• Getting an education in the Armenian language in Javakheti;
• Discrimination in the political or economic sphere;
• Legal prohibition of citizenship;
• Problems and complaints regarding the ownership of cultural heritage.
In short, as I said above, truth and lie are intertwined here as well, and someone must be very happy with this fact. These attitudes towards each other are naturally compounded by the foreign policy choices of both states. Official Tbilisi sees and estimates Yerevan more in terms of its relations with Moscow. In case of another Russian aggression in Georgia, Tbilisi sees Yerevan as neither an ally nor a neighbor with a neutral position. To the contrary: it is perceived as a potential threat. Nevertheless, the governments of both countries are still prudent and unwavering in implementing and firmly supporting the policy of cooperation and good relations. Georgians and Armenians were caught in such a difficult situation by the Second Karabakh War. It would be naive to think that this war would not affect Georgia in any way. Some experts predicted even worse scenarios. This time, we survived the worst.
During the Karabakh war, the Information Defense Legion, a group of volunteers I represent, revealed a key message that sought to discredit Georgia's position during the war and to blacken Georgians in the eyes of Armenians. This message was: “A Christian country that helps the enemy (Muslims)!“
This message was accompanied by supportive communication activities that were supposed to build the trust of the target audience:
1. A video was spread on the internet showing the Georgian police allegedly escorting the Turkish military cargo to Azerbaijan. This story was even covered by the Kremlin mouthpiece, соловьёв Live Show. The story was based on the inscription “Bayraktar” on one of the trucks that appeared in the video. In fact, the inscription on the truck had nothing to do with military production or the existing conflict” “Bayraktar” is a Turkish logistics (carrier) company.
2. A video on Tik-Tok by Armenian citizen Hamsik Eidyan went viral. He and his friend cursed the Georgian government and Georgians in the Russian language. The reason for this had something to do with the decision of the Georgian government not to allow the ethnic Armenians of Javakheti to export second-hand tires from Javakheti to Karabakh.
3. More anti-Georgian misinformation. Vladimir Khomeriki, President of the Foundation for the Unity of the Russian and Georgian People, and online media “Eadaily,” registered in the Russian Federation, were involved in it. They deliberately spread false information claiming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia had barred the transit of medical and humanitarian aid from Russia to Armenia.
It is difficult to convey the communication effect of the above-mentioned false information on the population of the two countries, but the complexity of the situation is also proven by the fact that the Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Georgia even had to make am extraordinary statement on October 2. The Information Defense Legion finally became convinced of the gravity of the situation when the Georgian organization asked us to dispel the myths for their Armenian partner organization. They tried to convince their partners that the information that Georgia had obstructed the flow of fuel and humanitarian aid to Armenia was untrue.
It should be noted that the Kremlin is not the only party interested in the deterioration of Georgian-Armenian relations. For years, we have been watching various online media outlets that are actively trying to “cover” the population of Georgia. For example, Kavkazplus is actively trying to stir up anti-Armenian sentiments in Georgian society. In general, Twitter accounts associated with Azerbaijan are constantly active and engaged in anti-Armenian campaigns in Georgia. They clearly redoubled their efforts during the Karabakh War in various directions, namely by generalizing the atrocities committed by the Bagramian Battalion to the Armenian nation.
Even a superficial analysis of the relations between the two countries shows that the flow of information against Georgia, unfortunately, will not disappear without a trace. The narrative about “traitorous Georgians” was revived once again 100 years later and poisoned the minds of many Armenian citizens. This circumstance will not be an insignificant story for Georgia. I do not know how Official Yerevan views this story, but it would be better for the Georgian authorities to make effective use of strategic communications to improve the information space and to neutralize these anti-Georgian narratives that have emerged “thanks” to fake news.
I believe the promotion of good neighborliness and mutual respect should also be the pragmatic policy of Yerevan. Otherwise, we will remain hostages to our stereotypes and irrational fears, which will put a negative strain on the state and inter-ethnic relations between the two countries. It is noteworthy that the Caucasus is the home to peoples who, due to purely human relations, can also cause serious geopolitical shifts in the region. But, again, due to the peculiarities of the people living in this region, it is not necessary to consider the words I use, “serious” and “shifts,” only as words with a positive connotation.
By Giorgi Molodini, founder, Georgian Center for Strategic Communications
Image source: IDFI.ge
Azerbaijan’s difficult road to reconciliation after victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war
CivilNet: Azerbaijan Threatens Italian Journalist for Criticizing Its Human Rights Policies
CivilNet: Fate of Two Syunik Villages Remains Uncertain
✓Government proposes to change the amount of the "1,000+" Insurance Foundation for Servicemen.
✓The Goris Mayor Arush Arushanyan, has been released from jail.
✓Artak Beglaryan, former Artsakh Human Rights Defender,, is appointed Chief of Staff of the President of Artsakh.
CivilNet: Azerbaijan Adds Billions to Defense Budget
Azerbaijan’s 2021 national budget intends to allocate more than $4 billion to the country's defense, national security, judiciary, and law enforcement agencies, which is a 16.3% increase from the 2020 budget, reports Turan news agency.
$2.7 billion of the total $4 billion will be allocated to the defense and security of the nation, which is 20.5% more than in 2020.
The total allocated funds in 2021 for these sectors will account for 23.4% of total expenditures, which is 2.5% more than in 2020.
The 2021 national budget intends to allocate an additional $1.23 billion towards strengthening the core of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Turkey, Ukraine forging strategic depth in the Black Sea
Asia Times [Turkey and Ukraine are deepening technological cooperation with strategic implications for Russia, EU and the wider region] By MK Bhadrakumar December 24, 2020 Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been variously accused of “neo-Ottomanism,” revanchism or radical Islamism. But the meeting of the foreign and defense ministers of Turkey and Ukraine in the “2+2” format in Kiev on December 18 did not fit into any of these narratives. The event throws light on the moorings of Turkish regional policies that seldom get discussed. The “2+2” format is generally regarded as a level of diplomatic and political interaction by two countries that have vital stakes in the relationship. The Turkish-Ukrainian relationship has gained gravitas since 2014 following the pro-Western regime change in Kiev, and palpably so after Volodymyr Zelensky became president in May last year. More recently, Azerbaijan’s dramatic success in recovering lost territory in Nagorno-Karabakh, thanks to Turkey’s robust support, captivated the Ukrainian elite. Zelensky’s visit to Turkey on October 16 turned out to be a turning point in bilateral relations. During Zelensky’s visit, a framework agreement on military cooperation was signed. Zelensky was much impressed by Erdogan’s affirmation that Turkey considers Ukraine to be “the key to the establishment of stability, security, peace and prosperity in the region” and his reiteration that “Turkey has not recognized Crimea’s illegal annexation [by Russia] and it never will.” Zelensky later announced the construction of two naval bases “for the protection of the Black Sea region” and emphasized his intention to develop an army that will not allow the loss of national territory. Ukraine has emerged as Turkey’s main partner in a number of military technologies such as turboprop and diesel engines, avionics, drones, anti-ship and cruise missiles, radar and surveillance systems, space and satellite technologies and active and passive robotic systems. It’s a match made in heaven, as Ukraine also has a strong base for the defense industry dating back to the Soviet era. Thus Turkey is funding the research and development work in Ukraine to develop advanced engine technologies; Turkish companies have acquired a quarter of the shares of Ukrainian engine manufacturer Motor Sich, along with terms related to the transfer of know-how; Turkey is open to co-production of its famed combat drones in Ukraine. Ukraine has agreed to transfer know-how to Turkey to boost its fledgling space agency and a satellite R&D laboratory in Roketsan, Turkey’s leading manufacturer of rocket and missile engines and satellites, and will give assistance for the development of jet engines in Turkey’s TFX fighter project, and the two countries will jointly develop and produce military satellites. The technology that Turkey is offering ranges from the Bayraktar TB2 surveillance and combat drones and Atmaca anti-ship missiles (with a range of 200 kilometers) to advanced corvettes. All in all, the two countries are now working on 50 joint defense projects. Analysts speculate that Ukraine might repeat the Karabakh example to win back territories it lost to Russia-backed separatists in 2014 in Donbas and could use drones to undertake surveillance over Crimea and the Kerch Strait linking the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. During a visit to Turkey on December 2, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba Dmytro openly voiced the hope, while invoking the heritage of the Ottoman Empire until the 18th century, that Ankara would assume a “leadership role” on the Crimean question. Indeed, the joint statement issued after last Friday’s “2+2” meeting “noted the existence of threats and their implications for the stability and security of the broader Black Sea region that needs to be strengthened on the basis of international law and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states within their internationally recognized borders.” It flagged Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s “integration with European and trans-Atlantic structures, including the EU and NATO,” as well as its “sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.” After the 2+2 meeting, Foreign Minister Kuleba estimated at a joint press conference that the format “will become an important driving force not only for Ukraine-Turkey relations, but also for the development of the situation in our region in general” and will be “useful for Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.” Compared with such hype, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu responded that the impasse in the Donbas “should be solved within the territorial integrity and we are happy that the ceasefire continues, despite some small breaches.” Çavuşoğlu said Turkey does not recognize the “unlawful annexation of Crimea” and it is a known position voiced at the United Nations. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also told the press conference that Ankara is aware of the importance of peace and stability in the Black Sea region, adding: “We would like everyone to know that we are very cautious and sensitive about this. We are taking all measures not to let any provocations, tension [in the region].” Akar also flagged that Turkey is seeking a broad-based relationship with Ukraine. Surely, the Turkish ministers cautioned against over-interpretation. The Crimean Tatars form an important lobby in Turkey’s domestic politics, and Ankara has also been pursuing a pan-Turkic agenda regionally. However, the deepening technological cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine has far-reaching implications for the power dynamic in the Black Sea basin where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now establishing a presence to rival Russia. The big question is about Turkey’s intentions. Does it aim to counterbalance Russian supremacy in the Black Sea? Some analysts estimate that this is Ankara’s way of pressuring Moscow in its own back yard as retaliation for Russian efforts undermining Turkey’s agenda in Libya and Syria. Some Russian experts have also expressed apprehension that the Ukrainian generals might copy the Azeri tactics in Karabakh to launch a military operation in Donbas. There has been a buildup on the Donbas front recently with Ukraine deploying tanks, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft systems and rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkish TB2 drones could easily hit pro-Russian separatist positions. But Erdogan is a hardcore realist who knows that Moscow wouldn’t tolerate a Ukrainian military offensive in Donbas, and that neither NATO nor the US and the European Union wants a war. Erdogan has no reason to confront Russia, either. Moscow has gone the extra mile to accommodate Ankara’s interests in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. To be sure, Erdogan is conscious of the West’s machinations to create a rift between Turkey and Russia. The entente with Russia creates space for Turkey to negotiate more optimally with the EU and the US, while it is in Russia’s interest, too, to create such space for Turkey. Arguably, it is a variant of the new type of inter-state relationship that exists between Russia and China. Turkey instantaneously reacted to the recent US sanctions by reaffirming that there is no going back on the S-400 missile deal with Russia. Defense Minister Akar’s reaction was that Turkey will turn to “other nations” (read Russia) to source its weaponry. Surely, Erdogan’s independent foreign policies won’t be sustainable without a resilient “Russia option.” President Vladimir Putin appreciates that, as evident from Moscow’s willingness to have an equal relationship with Turkey based on mutual respect and mutual interest, be it in Nagorno-Karabakh or in Syria. (Libya falls in an altogether different category.) On the contrary, Turkey’s strained relations with the EU stem from substantial and opposing interests that are virtually impossible to reconcile any time soon. Equally, Turkey’s tensions with the US go far beyond its acquisition of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. US President Donald Trump kept tensions with Turkey under check, but Erdogan can expect a more adverse situation in the Joe Biden presidency. As vice-president, Biden witnessed the failed coup attempt of July 2016 against Erdogan in which the latter narrowly escaped assassination. More important, the United States’ dalliance with Syrian Kurdish groups (affiliated with the terrorist group PKK) dates back to 2014 during Barack Obama’s presidency. It is no coincidence that Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu has pointedly reverted to Ankara’s demand for the extradition of Islamist preacher Fetullah Gulen as a necessary condition for the improvement of relations with Washington. Turkey suspects that Gulen is a CIA “asset” and the 2016 coup attempt aimed at a Gulenist takeover with US backing. Turkey faces a phalanx of hostile regional states; the EU and the US are in adversarial mode; and NATO is of no help. Suffice to say, Turkey’s efforts to create “strategic depth” in the Black Sea must be put in perspective. * M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.