Armenia’s Pashinyan: Border positioning taking place in Syunik Province

News.am, Armenia
Dec 24 2020
 
 
 
14:02, 24.12.2020
 
 
YEREVAN. – Border positioning works are taking place in Syunik Province, this positioning has some nuances and difficulties, but we are convinced that this work must take place and it is necessary from the point of view of ensuring the security of Syunik and Armenia. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated this at Thursday’s Cabinet meeting of the government.
 
"We are increasing the security guarantees of Syunik and the security guarantees of Armenia, and we are forming a new security system of Syunik and Armenia. [But] we have two settlements in connection with which certain issues may arise; one is about Vorotan [village], the second is about Shurnukh [village], where there are certain border issues around which daily work is done," the Prime Minister said.
 
Pashinyan added that these issues can lead to certain "painful" situations, but assured that the government will provide adequate compensation, and the interests of the affected Armenian citizens will be fully protected. "There has not been and cannot be a word about a single millimeter of concession from the internationally accepted, recognized territory [of Armenia], but this does not mean that these processes should be considered a demarcation of borders and a delimitation of borders. A positioning of border points is taking place with the aim of ensuring security [of Armenia]," the PM said.
 
Pashinyan noted that the government will fully compensate the affected people for their possible property damage.
 
 

​What has Armenia done to return Artsakh to normal life?

News.am, Armenia
Dec 24 2020
 
 
 
What has Armenia done to return Artsakh to normal life?
14:23, 24.12.2020
 
YEREVAN. – At Thursday’s Cabinet meeting of the government of Armenia, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan summed up the measures that the country has taken to restore the normal life in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh).
 
"The first is the program of assistance to the citizens registered in Artsakh, which [the program] is used by about 87 thousand beneficiaries. For this purpose, the government has allocated 6.4 billion drams.
 
The next measure is the program of assistance to the residents of the communities [now] outside the control of Artsakh. We have more than 2,000 beneficiaries here. The government has allocated more than 600 million drams.
 
We have allocated about 900 million drams to the Artsakh government to pay December pensions and benefits in Artsakh. We have allocated about 3.1 billion drams to the Artsakh government to pay the December salaries of state employees in Artsakh.
 
We have allocated about 1 billion drams for the full gratuitous compensation for the last three months of utility payments of the population of Artsakh.
 
All these decisions are related to the roadmap I published on November 18," said the Prime Minister.
 
He noted that in addition, the Armenian government had approved eight more measures that are underway and are also within the framework of the aforesaid roadmap.
 
 
 
 
 

​Armenia Police: 69 demonstrators apprehended

News.am, Armenia
Dec 24 2020
 
 
 
Armenia Police: 69 demonstrators apprehended
14:49, 24.12.2020
 
YEREVAN. – Sixty-nine demonstrators who joined the Homeland Salvation Movement initiative gathered near the government building were brought to the police. The information department of the Police of Armenia informed Armenian News-NEWS.am about this.
 
To note, the participants of this demonstration had blocked the entrances of the main government building since Thursday morning, during which the citizens were apprehended.
 
But as a result of the disproportionate actions of the police, one woman had fainted, and another woman had sustained a severe blow to the head.
 
 
 
 

​Armenian Ombudsman in Moscow discussing issue of returning prisoners from Azerbaijan

News.am, Armenia
Dec 24 2020
 
 
Armenian Ombudsman in Moscow discussing issue of returning prisoners from Azerbaijan
15:40, 24.12.2020
 
Armenian Ombudsman in Moscow discusses the issue of returning prisoners from Azerbaijan.
 
"I am on a working visit to Moscow," Arman Tatoyan wrote on his Facebook. "The main purpose of the visit is to facilitate the return of our prisoners on the Azerbaijani side."
 
"Given the specifics of the topic, the details of the visit and meetings will not be published," the Ombudsman noted.
 
 

The Second Karabakh War & the Information Warfare in Georgian-Armenian Relations

Georgia Today
Dec 24 2020

Op-Ed

It may seem unbelievable to some, but the citizens of neighboring countries, whose states have a centuries-old history of coexistence, know each other only by stereotypes and other oral traditions. This fact often leads them to irrational and sometimes even rational fears about each other. These forms of fear are not mutually exclusive, because you are naturally afraid of what is next to you, but you do not know what it is or what it wants. I’m very sorry to use such an introduction to this article on the information warfare in the Georgian-Armenian relations. My subjective opinion is that in case of intention, after the Georgia-Turkey issue, unleashing an “information war” between Georgia and Armenia is the easiest thing to do. As for me, this sad reality has deep psychological, historical and cultural roots, where truth and lie are intertwined. I also think that some “third party” contributed to this, and today we look at each other with fear and resentment.

Georgians are fairly offended when:

• Nobody can speak Georgian in Akhalkalaki or Ninotsminda;

• Famous Armenian politicians speak seriously about Javakheti’s accession;

• The leaders of the separatist ideology organization in Javakheti are cherished in Yerevan;

• Texts about “Great Armenia” are accompanied by maps showing the territories of Georgia;

• They recall the secret negotiations between the Dashnaks and Turks about the return of the disputed territories;

• They recall the Russian military bases in Armenia, despite my deep conviction that these bases should frighten the Armenians more than the Georgians.

Add to this the fact the atrocities committed by the Bagramian Battalion in Abkhazia are perceived among Georgians as a crime committed by the Armenian people;

In turn, there are Armenian images of perceiving and understanding Georgians and “Armenian narratives” describing these images. We have to look for its roots in the history. Some of these narratives include:

• Accusing Georgians of betraying Armenians in 1918 in connection with the Turkish armed aggression;

• Accusing the then Georgian government of inhumane treatment of Armenian refugees;

• Talking about the economic and communication blockade imposed by Georgia against Armenia;

There are also allegations of occupation of “indigenous Armenian lands” by the Georgian Armed Forces.

If we look at our modern history, we will find a new list of accusations, but here we will see one interesting reality: Georgian-Armenian relations go beyond “Tbilisi-Yerevan” relations; ethnic Armenians living in Georgia have also added diversity to the images and narratives of perceiving and understanding Georgians, and there appeared new accusations, namely:

• Getting an education in the Armenian language in Javakheti;

• Discrimination in the political or economic sphere;

• Legal prohibition of citizenship;

• Problems and complaints regarding the ownership of cultural heritage.

In short, as I said above, truth and lie are intertwined here as well, and someone must be very happy with this fact. These attitudes towards each other are naturally compounded by the foreign policy choices of both states. Official Tbilisi sees and estimates Yerevan more in terms of its relations with Moscow. In case of another Russian aggression in Georgia, Tbilisi sees Yerevan as neither an ally nor a neighbor with a neutral position. To the contrary: it is perceived as a potential threat. Nevertheless, the governments of both countries are still prudent and unwavering in implementing and firmly supporting the policy of cooperation and good relations. Georgians and Armenians were caught in such a difficult situation by the Second Karabakh War. It would be naive to think that this war would not affect Georgia in any way. Some experts predicted even worse scenarios. This time, we survived the worst.

During the Karabakh war, the Information Defense Legion, a group of volunteers I represent, revealed a key message that sought to discredit Georgia's position during the war and to blacken Georgians in the eyes of Armenians. This message was: “A Christian country that helps the enemy (Muslims)!“

This message was accompanied by supportive communication activities that were supposed to build the trust of the target audience:

1. A video was spread on the internet showing the Georgian police allegedly escorting the Turkish military cargo to Azerbaijan. This story was even covered by the Kremlin mouthpiece, соловьёв Live Show. The story was based on the inscription “Bayraktar” on one of the trucks that appeared in the video. In fact, the inscription on the truck had nothing to do with military production or the existing conflict” “Bayraktar” is a Turkish logistics (carrier) company.

2. A video on Tik-Tok by Armenian citizen Hamsik Eidyan went viral. He and his friend cursed the Georgian government and Georgians in the Russian language. The reason for this had something to do with the decision of the Georgian government not to allow the ethnic Armenians of Javakheti to export second-hand tires from Javakheti to Karabakh.

3. More anti-Georgian misinformation. Vladimir Khomeriki, President of the Foundation for the Unity of the Russian and Georgian People, and online media “Eadaily,” registered in the Russian Federation, were involved in it. They deliberately spread false information claiming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia had barred the transit of medical and humanitarian aid from Russia to Armenia.

It is difficult to convey the communication effect of the above-mentioned false information on the population of the two countries, but the complexity of the situation is also proven by the fact that the Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Georgia even had to make am extraordinary statement on October 2. The Information Defense Legion finally became convinced of the gravity of the situation when the Georgian organization asked us to dispel the myths for their Armenian partner organization. They tried to convince their partners that the information that Georgia had obstructed the flow of fuel and humanitarian aid to Armenia was untrue.

It should be noted that the Kremlin is not the only party interested in the deterioration of Georgian-Armenian relations. For years, we have been watching various online media outlets that are actively trying to “cover” the population of Georgia. For example, Kavkazplus is actively trying to stir up anti-Armenian sentiments in Georgian society. In general, Twitter accounts associated with Azerbaijan are constantly active and engaged in anti-Armenian campaigns in Georgia. They clearly redoubled their efforts during the Karabakh War in various directions, namely by generalizing the atrocities committed by the Bagramian Battalion to the Armenian nation.

Even a superficial analysis of the relations between the two countries shows that the flow of information against Georgia, unfortunately, will not disappear without a trace. The narrative about “traitorous Georgians” was revived once again 100 years later and poisoned the minds of many Armenian citizens. This circumstance will not be an insignificant story for Georgia. I do not know how Official Yerevan views this story, but it would be better for the Georgian authorities to make effective use of strategic communications to improve the information space and to neutralize these anti-Georgian narratives that have emerged “thanks” to fake news.

I believe the promotion of good neighborliness and mutual respect should also be the pragmatic policy of Yerevan. Otherwise, we will remain hostages to our stereotypes and irrational fears, which will put a negative strain on the state and inter-ethnic relations between the two countries. It is noteworthy that the Caucasus is the home to peoples who, due to purely human relations, can also cause serious geopolitical shifts in the region. But, again, due to the peculiarities of the people living in this region, it is not necessary to consider the words I use, “serious” and “shifts,” only as words with a positive connotation.

By Giorgi Molodini, founder, Georgian Center for Strategic Communications

Image source: IDFI.ge

Azerbaijan’s difficult road to reconciliation after victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war

New Statesman
Dec 24 2020

How nationalist euphoria in the country could rapidly tip into disillusionment. 

CivilNet: Azerbaijan Threatens Italian Journalist for Criticizing Its Human Rights Policies

CIVILNET.AM

24 December, 2020 19:15

Simone Zoppellaro is an Italian independent journalist. He knows the Caucasus very well and specializes on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. His recent criticism of Azerbaijan’s human rights policies and the conflict with Armenia has put him in hot waters. The Azerbaijani government has threatened him with retribution. Mr. Zoppellaro, who now lives in Germany,  talks with CivilNet’s Ani Paitjan about the economic relations between Italy, Azerbaijan and Turkey that led Italy to choose profit instead of addressing human rights issues. 

CivilNet: Fate of Two Syunik Villages Remains Uncertain

CIVILNET.AM

24 December, 2020 21:23

✓Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that the demarcation process could result in “painful situations” for two Syunik villages.
✓Government proposes to change the amount of the "1,000+" Insurance Foundation for Servicemen.
✓The Goris Mayor Arush Arushanyan, has been released from jail.
✓Artak Beglaryan, former Artsakh Human Rights Defender,, is appointed Chief of Staff of the President of Artsakh.

CivilNet: Azerbaijan Adds Billions to Defense Budget

CIVILNET.AM

24 December, 2020 22:47

Azerbaijan’s 2021 national budget intends to allocate more than $4 billion to the country's defense, national security, judiciary, and law enforcement agencies, which is a 16.3% increase from the 2020 budget, reports Turan news agency.

$2.7 billion of the total $4 billion will be allocated to the defense and security of the nation, which is 20.5% more than in 2020.

The total allocated funds in 2021 for these sectors will account for 23.4% of total expenditures, which is 2.5% more than in 2020. 

The 2021 national budget intends to allocate an additional $1.23 billion towards strengthening the core of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

Turkey, Ukraine forging strategic depth in the Black Sea

Asia Times



[Turkey and Ukraine are deepening technological cooperation with
strategic implications for Russia, EU and the wider region]

By MK Bhadrakumar
December 24, 2020

Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been variously accused
of “neo-Ottomanism,” revanchism or radical Islamism. But the meeting
of the foreign and defense ministers of Turkey and Ukraine in the
“2+2” format in Kiev on December 18 did not fit into any of these
narratives.

The event throws light on the moorings of Turkish regional policies
that seldom get discussed. The “2+2” format is generally regarded as a
level of diplomatic and political interaction by two countries that
have vital stakes in the relationship.

The Turkish-Ukrainian relationship has gained gravitas since 2014
following the pro-Western regime change in Kiev, and palpably so after
Volodymyr Zelensky became president in May last year.

More recently, Azerbaijan’s dramatic success in recovering lost
territory in Nagorno-Karabakh, thanks to Turkey’s robust support,
captivated the Ukrainian elite. Zelensky’s visit to Turkey on October
16 turned out to be a turning point in bilateral relations. During
Zelensky’s visit, a framework agreement on military cooperation was
signed.

Zelensky was much impressed by Erdogan’s affirmation that Turkey
considers Ukraine to be “the key to the establishment of stability,
security, peace and prosperity in the region” and his reiteration that
“Turkey has not recognized Crimea’s illegal annexation [by Russia] and
it never will.”

Zelensky later announced the construction of two naval bases “for the
protection of the Black Sea region” and emphasized his intention to
develop an army that will not allow the loss of national territory.

Ukraine has emerged as Turkey’s main partner in a number of military
technologies such as turboprop and diesel engines, avionics, drones,
anti-ship and cruise missiles, radar and surveillance systems, space
and satellite technologies and active and passive robotic systems.
It’s a match made in heaven, as Ukraine also has a strong base for the
defense industry dating back to the Soviet era.

Thus Turkey is funding the research and development work in Ukraine to
develop advanced engine technologies; Turkish companies have acquired
a quarter of the shares of Ukrainian engine manufacturer Motor Sich,
along with terms related to the transfer of know-how; Turkey is open
to co-production of its famed combat drones in Ukraine.


Ukraine has agreed to transfer know-how to Turkey to boost its
fledgling space agency and a satellite R&D laboratory in Roketsan,
Turkey’s leading manufacturer of rocket and missile engines and
satellites, and will give assistance for the development of jet
engines in Turkey’s TFX fighter project, and the two countries will
jointly develop and produce military satellites.

The technology that Turkey is offering ranges from the Bayraktar TB2
surveillance and combat drones and Atmaca anti-ship missiles (with a
range of 200 kilometers) to advanced corvettes. All in all, the two
countries are now working on 50 joint defense projects.

Analysts speculate that Ukraine might repeat the Karabakh example to
win back territories it lost to Russia-backed separatists in 2014 in
Donbas and could use drones to undertake surveillance over Crimea and
the Kerch Strait linking the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

During a visit to Turkey on December 2, Ukrainian Foreign Minister
Kuleba Dmytro openly voiced the hope, while invoking the heritage of
the Ottoman Empire until the 18th century, that Ankara would assume a
“leadership role” on the Crimean question.

Indeed, the joint statement issued after last Friday’s “2+2” meeting
“noted the existence of threats and their implications for the
stability and security of the broader Black Sea region that needs to
be strengthened on the basis of international law and respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty of states within their
internationally recognized borders.”

It flagged Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s “integration with European
and trans-Atlantic structures, including the EU and NATO,” as well as
its “sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally
recognized borders including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol.”

After the 2+2 meeting, Foreign Minister Kuleba estimated at a joint
press conference that the format “will become an important driving
force not only for Ukraine-Turkey relations, but also for the
development of the situation in our region in general” and will be
“useful for Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”

Compared with such hype, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu
responded that the impasse in the Donbas “should be solved within the
territorial integrity and we are happy that the ceasefire continues,
despite some small breaches.” Çavuşoğlu said Turkey does not recognize
the “unlawful annexation of Crimea” and it is a known position voiced
at the United Nations.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also told the press conference
that Ankara is aware of the importance of peace and stability in the
Black Sea region, adding: “We would like everyone to know that we are
very cautious and sensitive about this. We are taking all measures not
to let any provocations, tension [in the region].” Akar also flagged
that Turkey is seeking a broad-based relationship with Ukraine.

Surely, the Turkish ministers cautioned against over-interpretation.
The Crimean Tatars form an important lobby in Turkey’s domestic
politics, and Ankara has also been pursuing a pan-Turkic agenda
regionally.

However, the deepening technological cooperation between Turkey and
Ukraine has far-reaching implications for the power dynamic in the
Black Sea basin where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is
now establishing a presence to rival Russia. The big question is about
Turkey’s intentions.

Does it aim to counterbalance Russian supremacy in the Black Sea? Some
analysts estimate that this is Ankara’s way of pressuring Moscow in
its own back yard as retaliation for Russian efforts undermining
Turkey’s agenda in Libya and Syria.

Some Russian experts have also expressed apprehension that the
Ukrainian generals might copy the Azeri tactics in Karabakh to launch
a military operation in Donbas. There has been a buildup on the Donbas
front recently with Ukraine deploying tanks, armored vehicles,
anti-aircraft systems and rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkish TB2
drones could easily hit pro-Russian separatist positions.

But Erdogan is a hardcore realist who knows that Moscow wouldn’t
tolerate a Ukrainian military offensive in Donbas, and that neither
NATO nor the US and the European Union wants a war. Erdogan has no
reason to confront Russia, either. Moscow has gone the extra mile to
accommodate Ankara’s interests in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.

To be sure, Erdogan is conscious of the West’s machinations to create
a rift between Turkey and Russia. The entente with Russia creates
space for Turkey to negotiate more optimally with the EU and the US,
while it is in Russia’s interest, too, to create such space for
Turkey. Arguably, it is a variant of the new type of inter-state
relationship that exists between Russia and China.

Turkey instantaneously reacted to the recent US sanctions by
reaffirming that there is no going back on the S-400 missile deal with
Russia. Defense Minister Akar’s reaction was that Turkey will turn to
“other nations” (read Russia) to source its weaponry.

Surely, Erdogan’s independent foreign policies won’t be sustainable
without a resilient “Russia option.” President Vladimir Putin
appreciates that, as evident from Moscow’s willingness to have an
equal relationship with Turkey based on mutual respect and mutual
interest, be it in Nagorno-Karabakh or in Syria. (Libya falls in an
altogether different category.)

On the contrary, Turkey’s strained relations with the EU stem from
substantial and opposing interests that are virtually impossible to
reconcile any time soon. Equally, Turkey’s tensions with the US go far
beyond its acquisition of the S-400 missile defense system from
Russia.

US President Donald Trump kept tensions with Turkey under check, but
Erdogan can expect a more adverse situation in the Joe Biden
presidency. As vice-president, Biden witnessed the failed coup attempt
of July 2016 against Erdogan in which the latter narrowly escaped
assassination.

More important, the United States’ dalliance with Syrian Kurdish
groups (affiliated with the terrorist group PKK) dates back to 2014
during Barack Obama’s presidency.

It is no coincidence that  Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu has pointedly
reverted to Ankara’s demand for the extradition of Islamist preacher
Fetullah Gulen as a necessary condition for the improvement of
relations with Washington. Turkey suspects that Gulen is a CIA “asset”
and the 2016 coup attempt aimed at a Gulenist takeover with US
backing.

Turkey faces a phalanx of hostile regional states; the EU and the US
are in adversarial mode; and NATO is of no help. Suffice to say,
Turkey’s efforts to create “strategic depth” in the Black Sea must be
put in perspective.

*

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.