Category: 2021

Asia Times


By M.K. Bhadrakumar
Jan. 17, 2021

A meeting of the leaderships of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the
Kremlin on January 11, exactly two months after the ceasefire in the
44-day Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, can be seen as a robust push by
Moscow to consolidate its diplomatic achievement.

The ceasefire has gained traction and this is the opportune moment for
Russia to flesh out other aspects that were agreed by the three
countries on November 10 in Moscow.

A statement issued after Monday’s meeting underscored an agreement to
establish a tripartite Working Group of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan
at the deputy-prime-minister level, assisted by sub-groups of experts,
on the following lines:

“The Working Group, by March 1, 2021, will submit for approval at the
highest level by the Parties a list and a schedule for the
implementation of measures involving the restoration and construction
of new transport infrastructure facilities necessary for the
organization, implementation and security of international traffic
carried out through the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of
Armenia, as well as transportations carried out by the Republic of
Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, which require crossing the
territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of
Armenia.”


From subsequent remarks by the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev,
his country would have a rail link with Nakhchivan, the Azerbaijani
exclave that borders Turkey and Iran, for the first time in more than
three decades, and landlocked Armenia would get rail links with Russia
and Iran.

From available details, the focus is on a road corridor from mainland
Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through the 42-kilometer strip that the
Armenian district of Zengezur forms between them. For years, Azeri
mainlanders have been forced to travel to Nakhchivan via Iran and to
Turkey via Georgia.

Armenia, on the other hand, would stand to gain from an all-weather
land route to Russia via Azerbaijan.

The revival of the old rail networks dating back to the late 19th
century – the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano – and the 1921 Treaty of Kars
between Russia and Turkey is also being mentioned.

In principle, a reopening of the 877km Kars-Baku rail link running
through Nakhchivan and Armenia and connecting Russia’s North Caucasus
is possible, which could also be extended southward to the Iranian
city of Tabriz. Turkey fancies all this as a “a strategic corridor”
that would give it direct access to the gas and oil-rich Caspian basin
and Central Asia – and further beyond to China.

Evidently, Russia calculates that “any economic and infrastructure
agreements take on a political nature. If it is about transport
corridors, it means security and some sort of cooperation between the
Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic groups,” Andrei Kortunov,
director-general of the Russian Council on International Affairs, put
it.

Kortunov estimated that although Monday’s agreements did not address
the core issue, namely, Nagorno-Karabakh’s status as such, which is
“hanging in the air,” the sides are moving in the right direction.

To quote the influential Moscow-based think-tanker, “Even the limited
agreements that have been reached make it possible to say that the
meeting [on Monday] was successful. Transport was taken as a neutral,
technical aspect of relations. With the first step made, the second
and thirds steps are to follow. So the opening of transport
communications should be followed by issues of the exchange of
prisoners, return of refugees, and co-living of two ethnic groups.”

But things are not going to be velvet-smooth. According to Kortunov,
Turkey’s absence from (non-participation in) the Moscow dialogue is
quite demonstrative. He explains tactfully, “It means that Turkey is
an important neighbor that cannot be absolutely excluded from what is
currently going on in the South Caucasus, but the Russian leadership
has once again demonstrated that the key role in this settlement and
post-settlement steps will be played by Moscow.”

For the present, there is a plausible explanation for keeping Turkey
out and looking in, while Moscow assembles the peace blocks. Turkey is
not liking it but is being pragmatic. But if Ankara succeeds in
establishing diplomatic relations with Yerevan, the calculus changes
overnight.

Equally, there are two other critical variables – the political future
of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and, second, Aliyev’s
dalliance with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Again, Iran cannot be liking its exclusion either. The fact of the
matter is that in the disjointed regional tapestry of the past three
decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan have had no choice but to use Iranian
territory for transit, and Tehran is reluctant to give up that
geopolitical trump card.

Above all, while as of now, the Western powers remain passive, the
attitude of the incoming US administration of Joe Biden remains the X
factor.

Last month, the US Congress legislated that “not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
a written assessment regarding tensions between the governments of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, including with respect to the status of the
Nagorno Karabakh region.”

Congress has specifically directed the DNI to provide assessment on
the following lines:

    An identification of the strategic interests of the United States
and its partners in the Armenia-Azerbaijan region;
    A description of all significant uses of force in and around the
Nagorno-Karabakh region and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan
during calendar year 2020, including a description of each significant
use of force and an assessment of who initiated the use of such force;
    An assessment of the effect of US military assistance to
Azerbaijan and Armenia on the regional balance of power and the
likelihood of further use of military force; and,
    An assessment of the likelihood of any further uses of force or
potentially destabilizing activities in the region in the near to
medium term.

Clearly, Washington is gearing up for a geopolitical struggle in the
Caucasus. Moscow probably senses this. And that would explain the
haste with which it is pushing infrastructure development in the South
Caucasus to create equities, while the Biden administration is still
in its infancy.

Russia is pursuing a trajectory to strengthen its position while
keeping the eventuality of having to engage with the Western powers at
some point within the framework of the Minsk Group.

President Vladimir Putin touches base with his French counterpart
Emmanuel Macron every now and then, the two countries being co-chairs
(along with the US) of the Minsk Group. Conceivably, Russia may be
open to working with the West on Nagorno-Karabakh but safeguarding its
legitimate interests. The big question is whether in the present
security environment, that is a realistic expectation.

Meanwhile, US analysts have lately been highlighting China’s growing
involvement in the South Caucasus. In the World Bank’s estimation,
since 2005, Chinese trade turnover with Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia increased by around 2,070%, 380% and 1,885% respectively.

Chinese investments are also increasing, given the Belt and Road
Initiative’s seamless potential to generate business. With the recent
completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, China’s footprint will
rise further, and such economic presence will eventually translate as
political influence.

The geographical location of the South Caucasus countries makes them
viable transit routes for Chinese and European goods. One Chinese
scholar even described Azerbaijan recently as a “pivotal country” in
the BRI’s China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. China is
developing a trade route via Kazakhstan that crosses the Caspian from
the Kazakh port of Aktau to Baku, which it visualizes as a BRI hub.

For the US, on the other hand, the Caucasus is vital turf for lighting
fires on Russia’s periphery, for navigating the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s expansion eastward, for establishing itself in the
oil-rich Caspian, for controlling one of China’s main trade arteries
to the European market, and for curbing Iran’s influence in the
region.

What should worry Washington most is that there is sufficient
convergence between Russia and China to keep the Caucasus out of the
US geopolitical orbit, especially as NATO is consolidating in the
Black Sea region.

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M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.