Category: 2021

01/14/2021 Armenia (International Christian Concern) – The president of Christian Solidarity International (CSI), a Christian human rights organization, has warned that the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia represents a genocide against Armenian Christians. CSI President Dr. John Eibner called the six-week war this past fall “an ongoing process of genocide” rooted in the Armenian Genocide of the early 20th century.

 

According to CSI, the Azerbaijani military is being aided by both the Turkish military and former ISIS fighters from Syria who are working as mercenaries against Armenia. International Christian Concern has also documented these reports of ISIS fighters being utilized by Turkey in the conflict, only adding to the anti-Armenian Christian sentiment of the violence. These fighters are not only targeting Armenian military personnel, but also civilians living in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian: Artsakh) region.

 

Although the conflict has captured the world’s attention in recent months, the religious underpinnings of the violence have largely been underreported. Armenia is the oldest Christian nation in the world, and its current population is more than 90 percent Armenian Apostolic Christians. On the other side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, the two aggressors against Armenia, are both over 95 percent Muslim.

 

The Turkish government has repeatedly perpetuated an attitude of conquest towards Christianity. One example last year was the conversion of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul from a museum into a mosque, a move that was praised at its first Islamic service as a “sign of conquest.” Turkish media has been using similar rhetoric to describe the conflict with Armenia, only providing more evidence of genocidal behavior against Armenian Christians.

https://www.persecution.org/2021/01/14/human-rights-organization-labels-artsakh-conflict-genocide-armenian-christians/

EAT AND DRINK

 

BY JOHN LEHNDORFF •  JANUARY 14, 2021

We all have our passionate pursuits, like birders who keep a lifetime list of all the species they’ve personally see in nature. I’m that way about family-owned bakeries. For decades, I’ve enjoyed discovering new sweet shops in the Denver area that produce the breads and baked goods of various international cultures.

 

Until I stopped into south Denver’s House of Bread—which the Torosyan family opened on South Parker Road in November—I’d never tasted the legendary loaves of Armenia. “My parents are from Armenia originally, and we grew up in California before moving to Denver about 10 years ago. Our family has been baking and cooking at home our whole lives, but we never owned a bakery or restaurant,” says Katerina Torosyan, co-owner of the bakery.

 

 

Torosyan promises to soon supply a much-requested Armenian and Middle Eastern bakery favorite: “We are hoping to start baking lavosh—that’s the paper-thin bread—very soon,” she says.

 

Monday–Friday, 8 a.m. to 7 p.m; Saturday, 9 a.m. to 8 p.m.; Sunday, 8 a.m. to 7 p.m; 2020 S. Parker Road, 720-727-0000

Ani Mejlumyan Jan 14, 2021

More than two months after the fighting stopped, Azerbaijan still holds unknown dozens of Armenian prisoners of war – and the numbers are growing. Their unclear fate has become one of the most sensitive and politically controversial questions in post-war Armenia.

 

The number of prisoners of war that Azerbaijan continues to hold is being kept secret by both sides, and estimates vary. Human rights defenders have appealed to the European Court of Human Rights about roughly 200 prisoners. So far, 54 Armenians, both civilians and soldiers, have returned from Azerbaijani custody as part of exchanges between the two sides.

 

But additional Armenian soldiers were captured following skirmishes in mid-December, after the ceasefire. Azerbaijan says there were 62 captured in the fighting and that it doesn’t consider them to be POWs but members of a “sabotage group” which it intends to try in Azerbaijan on criminal charges.

 

Among the prisoners: a recent Lebanese-Armenian emigrant to Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh, Maral Najaryan, who went missing in the final days of the war. Najaryan’s sister, Ani Najaryan, told the Armenian service of RFE/RL that she was a civilian who had moved to Karabakh after the massive explosion in Beirut. Azerbaijani media have portrayed her Lebanese origins as evidence that she was a “mercenary” fighting for the Armenian side.

 

The Russia-brokered November 10 ceasefire statement calls on the two sides to return prisoners of war and other detainees, and Armenian officials have accused Azerbaijan of effectively keeping the prisoners as hostages.

 

“All of this is being done to cause mental suffering to the families of the captives and to the Armenian society in general, to play with the emotions of the Armenian people, and to keep the atmosphere tense,” wrote Arman Tatoyan, Armenia’s human rights ombudsman, in a January 11 Facebook post.

 

The issue got even hotter following the recent meeting in Moscow between the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The three sides agreed on a new transportation deal but Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was forced to admit that “Unfortunately, we did not solve the issue of prisoners of war today, and it is the most sensitive and painful issue.”

 

Pashinyan’s many political opponents said the failure to do anything about the POWs was a failure of negotiating, and that Azerbaijan got what it wanted – the transport deal – and Armenia didn’t.

 

“The Armenian side wanted one thing from the meeting – an agreement on the speedy return of the prisoners of war, but that didn’t happen,” said Edmon Marukyan, the leader of the opposition Bright Armenia party, who is challenging Pashinyan’s leadership, the day after the Moscow meeting.

 

“Today, [Pashinyan] signed a deal that benefits Turkey and Azerbaijan and not Armenia. The most crucial issue for Armenia is bringing the POWs home and he failed to solve it,” said Gevorg Kostanyan, a member of the opposition Republican Party and a former Armenian representative at the ECHR, told the news website 168.am. “Nobody is negotiating with Pashinyan – they are presenting him a document and he is signing it.”

 

Pashinyan’s allies defended his negotiating, saying that the issue will be resolved quickly. “The president of Russia has in principle supported the Armenian position,” said Ruben Rubinyan, a member of parliament from Pashinyan’s My Step faction, in an interview with RFE/RL. “That specific issue [the return of POWs] in the ceasefire agreement must be implemented. The solution has been identified, it needs to be carried out as soon as possible.”

 

Armenia also reportedly holds some Azerbaijani soldiers. Azerbaijani media, citing Armenian Telegram channels, have said that there are three Azerbaijani prisoners remaining in Armenian custody. And Ismayil Akhundov, of Azerbaijan’s State Commission on Captives, Missing Persons, and Hostages, said at a January 5 press conference that Armenia holds two Azerbaijani civilians.  Fourteen other prisoners were returned in a December 14 exchange.

 

 

 

With additional reporting from Ulkar Natiqqizi

 

Ani Mejlumyan is a reporter based in Yerevan.

Amelia Atalay and Nader Habibi

Jan 14 2021 10:27 Gmt+3

The 44-day Nagorno-Karabakh war, which ended with a Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement on Nov. 9, has had one loser and three victors – the undisputed loser is Armenia and the victors are Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia.

 

Azerbaijan managed to liberate a sizable amount of its territory that had been under Armenian control for more than 30 years. Turkey shared this victory as Azerbaijan’s main ally and military supporter. Russia reasserted its influence in the South Caucasus by successfully determining the faith of the conflict and positioning itself as the main enforcer of the ceasefire agreement, along with a limited role for Turkey.

 

Now, all involved parties are assessing the geopolitical and strategic consequences of this war and their best course of action moving forward. As several observers in recent weeks have remarked, the terms of the peace agreement and Azerbaijan’s substantial territorial gains have created unique opportunities for Turkey to expand its diplomatic and economic relations with the region. Chiefly, to revitalise its gradual rapprochement policies with Armenia, which had suffered a significant setback for more than three decades because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

 

At the same time, since the terms of this agreement limited Armenia’s losses, it might be less opposed to the reduction of hostilities with Turkey. While Azerbaijan enjoyed a sufficient military advantage to capture the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region and even enter into Armenia’s mainland, the ceasefire agreement left 30 percent of the territory, known as the Republic of Artsakh by Armenians, under Armenian control.

 

It also provided Armenia with access to the Lachin Corridor, a 60-kilometre passage corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, under Russian protection. This outcome makes it politically feasible for Armenia to eventually overcome the trauma of this loss and move toward a rapprochement with Turkey and maintenance of the new status quo with Azerbaijan.

 

The deal will also make it easier for Turkey to resume the rapprochement initiatives that were undertaken between 2007-2015, for several reasons.

 

First, the circumstances of this major victory allow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to facilitate dialogues and cultural exchanges concerning Armenia’s demand for addressing and acknowledging the Armenian casualties of World War I from a position of strength and national confidence. In recent decades, the external pressures on Turkey from the United States and the European Union to recognise these casualties as genocide and offer an apology have resulted in a nationalist resistance.

 

The Karabakh victory, however, will allow Erdoğan to address this issue from a position of post-victory generosity, which is likely to face far less political resistance from Turkish nationalists, particularly Erdoğan’s coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The MHP, which stands on a basis of Turkish nationalism and pan-Turkism, has traditionally been opposed to normalising relations with Armenia. However, they are likely placated by this victory for the time being and, if they raise any objection, Erdoğan can emphasise the legacy of MHP founder Alparslan Türkeş, who understood the necessity of a relationship with Armenia and was proactive in initiating a diplomatic dialogue with the country.

 

Second, Azerbaijan’s victory and the critical role of Turkish support in this outcome is likely to reduce Azerbaijan’s opposition to Turkey-Armenia rapprochement. In the past two decades, Azerbaijan has emerged as a major trade and investment partner for Turkey and, as a result, has been able to influence Turkey’s relations with Armenia. After this victory, not only is Azerbaijan less incentivised to oppose better relations between Turkey and Armenia, but it even has an interest in seeing these relations improve.

 

One of the most important benefits of the ceasefire agreement is the creation of the land transport passage between Azerbaijan and its landlocked exclave, Nakhjivan, through Armenia. Azerbaijan has already pledged to link its railway system to this passage for trade with Turkey and Europe. Improved ties between Turkey and Armenia would reduce the latter’s incentive to obstruct the creation and successful operation of this passage.

 

Third, economic incentives might make Armenia more receptive to Turkish rapprochement initiatives. Armenia is nearly isolated, open to only two short borders with Georgia and Iran since 1993. Opening the border between Turkey and Armenia would lead to greater opportunities for Armenia to end its isolation and gain land access to Europe. It can also benefit from direct trade with Turkey. Despite closed borders and lack of diplomatic relations Armenia imported $2.3 billion worth of Turkish goods during 2010-2020 indirectly through Georgia. Improved relations with Turkey can facilitate more trade and attract foreign trade to Armenia.

 

Despite all the challenges that lie ahead, normalising relations with Armenia will have several important benefits for Turkey. The direct benefits include an end to the adverse effect of ongoing Armenian historical grievances on Turkey’s international image, which it cannot afford to ignore as a country that depends heavily on global trade and investment for its economic prosperity. Although Armenia is a small country of only three million, trade and investment relations will be beneficial for Turkey, which already enjoys a large trade surplus with the country.

 

Furthermore, the indirect benefits of normalisation might be even more important for Turkey.  Turkey’s tensions with Armenia have cast a shadow on its relations with the United States and many European countries. The Armenian diaspora lobbies are highly influential in both regions, particularly in the U.S. Congress, and they have had some successes in the past in affecting the United States and EU relations with Turkey. A rapprochement with Armenia will mitigate the anti-Turkish campaigns of these lobbies.

 

Since Turkey made its first bid to join the EU nineteen years ago, the bloc has repeatedly stressed the necessity of Turkey addressing the Armenian grievances such as the Armenian Genocide, as a prerequisite for EU accession. Although the prospects of joining the EU look grim, Turkey still stands to benefit from improved EU perceptions that will result from better relations with Armenia.

 

Normalising relations with Armenia can also strengthen Turkey’s hand in its complex relationship with Russia. Turkey and Russia have developed a cooperation-competition relationship in the Middle East and Eurasia, two regions in which they have intervened in multiple conflicts.

 

As substantial as Turkey’s gains were in the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia gained even more. Not only did it manage to dictate the terms of the ceasefire and limit Turkey’s peacekeeping role, but Russia has emerged as the dominant powerbroker between the two sides. Armenia is now even more dependent on Russia for its security and stability and as such, Russia can exploit the Turkish-Armenian hostilities as a bargaining chip in its region-wide relations with Turkey. By normalising its relations with Armenia, Turkey can reduce Armenia’s isolation and, hence, dependence on Russia.

 

Any effort toward revitalising the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement will have to overcome the negative public opinion in both countries. According to a 2019 study on the public perceptions of Turkish foreign policy, over 60 percent of respondents named Armenia as one of the countries that poses the largest threat to Turkey. The anti-Turkish sentiments in Armenia have also reached an all-time high after the latest round of fighting.

 

The Armenian government imposed a ban on Turkish products effective January 2021 which enjoys popular support. Despite these strong negative sentiments, the current circumstances of Azerbaijan’s victory have created a window of opportunity for Turkey to initiate a rapprochement with Armenia, the effects of which will allow for regional cooperation and enhanced opportunities for both countries and Azerbaijan. This will require a bold diplomatic move by President Erdoğan.

 

(The opinions expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Ahval.)

Work is underway to reconstruct another 450 buildings

MOSCOW, January 14. /TASS/. Over 300 buildings in the Nagorno-Karabakh region have been reconstructed using materials provided by Russia, the Russian Emergencies Ministry said in a statement on Thursday.

 

"Over 300 buildings have been reconstructed using construction materials provided by Russia as part of humanitarian aid. Work is underway to reconstruct another 450 buildings," the statement reads.

 

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

On November 9, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on a complete ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh starting from November 10. The Russian leader said that Azerbaijan and Armenia would maintain the positions that they had held and Russian peacekeepers would be deployed to the region. In addition, the Agdam, Kalbajar and Lachin districts were handed back over to Azerbaijan. According to the statement, parts of the Martuni, Martakert and Askeran districts, the city of Shushi and almost the entire Hadrut district, which used to be part of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region in the Soviet era, were also handed over to Azerbaijan.

 

Public Radio of Armenia

Jan 14 2021

Public Radio of Armenia

Jan 14 2021

Amnesty International said Thursday Azerbaijan and Armenia must immediately probe the use of "inaccurate and indiscriminate weapons" in heavily populated civilian areas during the recent fighting over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory.