COVID-19: Armenian CDC reports lowest daily death toll in 4 months – 12/24/2021

COVID-19: Armenian CDC reports lowest daily death toll in 4 months

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 11:19, 24 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. 3 people died from COVID-19 in the last 24 hours, the lowest daily death toll in 4 months, the Armenian National Center for Disease Control and Prevention said Friday.

The total death toll reached 7939.

135 new cases were confirmed, bringing the cumulative total number of confirmed cases to 344,261.

407 patients recovered, raising the total recoveries to 329,983.

6236 tests were administered (total 2,522,916).

As of December 24 the number of active cases stood at 4843.

Nagorno Karabakh war has never been a religious war – Armenian President tells ArabNews

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 11:52, 24 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. President of Armenia Armen Sarkissian gave an exclusive interview to ArabNews.

Armenpress presents the part of the interview relating to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

-I have several questions about Azerbaijan, but one more question about the perceptions and the reality. Maybe people here are not talking much about it, but there is a perception in the Middle East, which, maybe, is spread by Turks or Azerbaijanis, that this is a religious war.

-It was never, never a religious war. Armenia has wonderful relations with a lot of states where Islam is a major religion. The Azeri side sometimes liked to use that in order to accumulate support from Islamic world. But Armenia, Armenian side never tried to use or get support from Christian states because this is a Christian war. Not at all, it was never.

-As it stands internationally Karabakh is considered Azerbaijan. So what can we do, probably the OIC, the Gulf region, everybody has an interest to bring peace. So what position do you expect from the GCC or the OIC to help end this conflict?

-Basically, I think, I would expect all of our friends, be that in the Gulf, in the Middle East or in Europe, to help to bring a logical end to this conflict.

-What would the logical end look like?

-As I said, 26 years ago Armenia was victorious and we failed somehow to use the position of being in a victory to converting that into peace. Of course, taking into account the rights of these people that live in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenians with their history of more than thousands of years. I think for the moment the war has just finished and there are so many emotions, wounds, unresolved issues, be that starting on the borders, demarcation and all of that stuff, and of course the future of Nagorno Karabakh and people there. There is an internationally agreed institution which is the OSCE Minsk Group and the Co-Chairs. There are still voices that I think we should go back and allow these negotiations to happen. There is a new reality where there is huge influence of the Russian Federation into the region because they were the once they brought the ceasefire, they are the ones who are offering to help both Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border demarcation and other issues related to that. Of course, there is the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh today. So, I would not say that the issue is resolved finally. Where we will get and how, what will be the final resolution, I think, time will show. But my advice will be, let’s try to help, that any solution that we will get the final solution, will be logical. A solution that will be acceptable by both sides. Any solution which is forced will not last forever.

Russian Foreign Ministry wishes “peace and patience” to Armenia and Azerbaijan

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 14:49, 24 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is one of the most complex, prolonged and bloody conflicts, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said at a press briefing.

She wished peace and patience to Armenia and Azerbaijan in settling the conflict.

“I wish patience to Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as to all those experts who are working, including from the Russian side, to those who are directly controlling the situation”, Zakharova said.

The Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman expressed hope that everything will be solved if all sides make maximum efforts.

She said that the Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan agreements of 2020 November 9 have been overall implemented in the passing year.

Informal meeting of CIS leaders to take place in St. Petersburg Dec 28

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 16:23, 24 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. The traditional informal meeting of the leaders of the CIS participating states will take place in St. Petersburg on December 28 at the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin press service reports.

The meeting will be attended by Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, first President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

Moscow describes EU-mediated meeting of Pashinyan and Aliyev as “development of trilateral agreements” of Sochi

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 16:30, 24 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. The EU-mediated meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Brussels further develops the November 26 Sochi trilateral agreements, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said at a press conference.

She said that substantial discussions of these agreements continue in the trilateral task force co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan.

“The entire complex of issues relating to the unblocking of transport and economic connections in South Caucasus, including the restoration of both railway and road connection is being discussed within the framework of this mechanism,” Zakharova said.

She added that work is underway to create the commission for the delimitation and demarcation of the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with consultative support from Russia.

“Moscow welcomes international efforts aimed at the normalization of bilateral relations. But in this case it is very important to take into account regional realities, and consent of Yerevan and Baku,” Zakharova said.

The Lost Armenians of Gaziantep: New Lines

Dec 24 2021

Ümit Kurt, a historian of the modern Middle East and Polonsky Fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, wrote a feature article titled ‘The Lost Armenians of Gaziantep’ for New Lines Magazine that was published on Thursday. In it, Kurt recalls his surprise as a young man to learn his hometown of Gaziantep, formerly known as Aintab, was once populated by Armenians. “I was a bit naïve – an ignorant, 22-year-old university graduate unaware of the existence of Armenians in my hometown,” Kurt wrote. His article then deals with the history of Armenian dispossession in the aftermath of the Turkish-French War in the early 1920s.

“The entire Armenian dispossession produced the homogeneous Turkish city where I grew up,” he wrote. “The fortunes of wealthy families today were built by robbing the Armenians and often murdering their neighbors. Sealed in stone as well as blood, it was a criminal bargain that constituted the wobbly foundations of Turkish society.”

Kurt’s entire article is reprinted below. The original can be found here:

 

A citizen of the Republic of Turkey, I was born to a Kurdish mother and an Arab father in the southeastern city of Gaziantep, formerly known as Aintab (35 miles to the west of the Euphrates and 28 miles to the north of today’s Turkish-Syrian border). Growing up in a multilingual household but being taught only Turkish, I was a living manifestation of the national pattern of the oppressor, which continued over the course of my entire education.

After my graduation from Middle East Technical University in Ankara, I found myself again at my parents’ house in my hometown, where I escaped the stifling heat and passed the days dozing on the sofa.

One day I was woken up from my nap by a call from an old friend: “Ümit, where have you been? It’s been ages! I know a great place in Kayacık where we can catch up.” Though I was born and raised in Aintab and hadn’t left the city until college, the word “Kayacık” did not mean anything to me. It was just another district in the city, a neighborhood I had never visited, of which I knew nothing.

She said she would wait for me at Papirüs Café and gave me directions. I took a bus to the Kayacık neighborhood and upon arrival found myself dazed by the charming atmosphere, letting myself get lost in the side streets, leaving my poor friend waiting. Transfixed, I found myself asking: “Where am I? What is this place?”

I was on a narrow street with beautifully constructed stone houses lining each side, taking me back to a simpler time. Tucked away among the high-rise concrete apartment buildings of “modernized” Gaziantep, this neighborhood, with its traditional architecture, was like a mirage. I felt nostalgic for a past that was never mine.

Eventually, I found Papirüs Café, which turned out to be located in one of those traditional houses. Like most of the houses on the street, it had been converted into a café as part of the process of “restoring” the city. When I entered, a few letters carved at the top of the majestic gate caught my eye. Not recognizing the script, I assumed these were Ottoman characters.

Inside, I was once again left speechless. A spacious courtyard with staircases on either side leading up to two large rooms welcomed me. The rooms were filled with antique furnishings, and the high ceilings were adorned with frescos and engravings similar to Florentine cathedrals. The experience was a kind of historical voyeurism, like stepping into a living museum.

Feeling a surge of pride in my hometown and ancestors, I decided to talk to the owner to learn something of the house’s history. I approached him, intending to begin by complimenting his establishment. But before I could stop myself, I asked: “I was just wondering, from whom did you get this place? Who was here before you?”

He warily explained that he inherited the building from his grandfather. It must have been especially strong coffee they were serving that day, as I was emboldened to press further. “And how about your grandfather? From whom did he buy this place?” The man hesitated before murmuring softly to the ground, “There were Armenians here.” Confused, I blurted out a series of questions: “What Armenians? What are you talking about? Were there Armenians in Gaziantep?” He nodded, but I was getting annoyed with the opacity of his answers. “So, what happened to them? Where did they go?” He retorted indifferently: “They left.”

As I rode the bus back home, I pondered why the Armenians — why anyone — would just leave and hand over such an exquisite property to someone. I was a bit naïve — an ignorant, 22-year-old university graduate unaware of the existence of Armenians in my hometown.

A few years later, I would find out that the house belonged to Nazar Nazaretian, honorary consul to Iran, who was a member of Aintab’s wealthiest and most prominent family, and that he, his children and his grandchildren used to live in the house. Those letters above the gate were not Ottoman but Armenian, spelling out the surname of Kara Nazar Agha, the person who built the house. Years later, I would also have the chance to meet the youngest member of the family, Shusan, whose grandmother was deported at the age of 1 during the 1915 Armenian genocide. Shusan kindly spoke Turkish to me in the Aintab dialect.

That building is no longer Papirüs Café for me. For me, it is the house of Kara Nazar Agha, the Nazaretians’ home, the house where the grandmother of Shusan was born.

In Turkish, there is a saying: “Mal sahibi, mülk sahibi, hani bunun ilk sahibi?” Roughly translated, it means, “Landlord, property owner, where is the original owner?” Armenians of Aintab were torn away from their homes, neighborhoods and the city where they were born and raised. Their material and spatial wealth changed hands and was transformed. The entire Armenian dispossession produced the homogeneous Turkish city where I grew up. The fortunes of wealthy families today were built by robbing the Armenians and often murdering their neighbors. Sealed in stone as well as blood, it was a criminal bargain that constituted the wobbly foundations of Turkish society.

In the aftermath of the Turkish-French War in 1921-22 (known as Antep Harbi), there was a town crier who walked around town, inviting those who had participated in the war to come to Tuz Hanı (The Salt Caravansary). Many locals of Aintab, including Ali Beşe (a prominent member of the Aintab gentry), headed over. A man told them to line up in twos, as they would let people in two at a time. When it was Beşe’s turn, he went in and saw some keys placed on a rug. “Each person takes two,” the man in charge commanded. There were also medallions lying on the rug. After a quick glance, Beşe said, “So, that’s what we saved Aintab for? For two keys and a piece of tin? Thanks,” he said. And he left, seemingly of the view that he deserved a greater reward for his efforts. The keys on the rug belonged to the Armenians whose homes now stood vacant.

Beşe played a pivotal role in the deportation of Armenians and liquidation of their properties. Trusted by Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Beşe had close ties with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), then the Ottoman government, and political elites in Istanbul. He wielded influence in the post-war and republican periods and took charge of helping the fledgling nation-state raise a group of entrepreneurs in Gaziantep.

From 1922 to 1928, some of the houses that belonged to Armenians were used for charitable purposes, distributed at no charge by the state and the Aintab municipal authority to Muslim families who had lost their own dwellings during the Turkish-French War. According to a local, these impoverished Muslim families were given small or neglected Armenian houses. This was the fate, in 1922, of the house owned by the father of Harutyun Nazarian, who was forced to leave Aintab and settle in Aleppo along with the rest of his family when he was 15. In a memoir, Nazarian recalled the event:

“Before we left the house, a state official accompanied by two women came into our yard early in the morning. Then the official said, ‘As you are leaving Aintab and the houses of these two women were demolished due to the battle and bombardments, and in addition to that, since the state and local government have authorized you to leave Aintab, your house along with other empty houses will be occupied by others.’ He also asked these two women how many rooms there were in their wrecked houses. In this manner, our house was registered onto the list of other occupied houses.”

The remaining properties were also distributed among newly resettled immigrants. Several years after the war, Armenians’ abandoned houses and estates were still being used to settle immigrants and muhajirs (refugees). A telegram on Aug. 17, 1924, sent by the Ministry of Population Exchange, Development and Settlement (Mübâdele, İmar ve İskân Vekâleti İskân Şubesi) to Gaziantep province reported that there had been 19,500 Armenians in the province, whose houses and estates, following their departure, could accommodate a large number of muhajirs, and directed that these muhajir families be settled on these properties according to their needs. As late as 1928, the distribution of Armenians’ land and housing to Muslim immigrants in Gaziantep continued. For example, on Nov. 3, 1925, the Ministry of Interior approved an application submitted by Hasan Effendi, an immigrant from Kars, to settle in Gaziantep. On Nov. 7, the provincial government was instructed to provide housing for Hasan Effendi and his family from the stock of abandoned properties.

In the immediate aftermath of the Turkish-French War, prominent and affluent local elites looted large, Armenian-owned houses with impunity. Ali Api obtained Garuc Karamanougian’s mansion in 1924. After changing hands a few times, Hasan Süzer, a businessperson from Aintab, bought and restored the building in 1985. It was then donated to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism on the condition that it would serve as Hasan Süzer Etnografya Müzesi (Hasan Süzer Ethnography Museum).

Individuals with connections to state organs were also well placed to take advantage of the situation. Ahmed Hurşid Bey and Nuri Patpatzâde, both members of Aintab Central Committee and financiers of local forces (kuva-yı milliye), seized Armenian estates. Ahmed Hurşid Bey claimed Pirenian’s large house in 1922 and later paid a symbolic price for it at an auction. Meanwhile Patpatzâde usurped the houses of Hagop Bezjian and Harutyun Aghian in 1923.

Starting in the 1920s, the state organized auctions through the Gaziantep Municipality and Gaziantep Internal Revenue Office to complete property transactions. The auctions, however, were largely symbolic; they facilitated the embezzlement of the spoils while lending an air of officiality to the process. From 1930 to 1935, these so-called transactions were even announced in the local newspaper, the Gaziantep Gazetesi, the notices of which detailed the quantity, date, time, approximate location, type, value in liras and — most important — previous owners of properties. However, information on the buyers was not provided. To illustrate, a parcel of land owned by Hanna Kurkchuian, valued at 250 liras, was auctioned for 30 liras in 1934; a parcel of land owned by Avedis Nacarian, valued at 60 liras, was sold for 10 liras in the same year; Zenop Bezjian’s shop, valued at 216 liras, was auctioned for 150 liras in 1935; and around the same time, Abraham Babikian’s vineyard was sold for 15 liras, far below its actual value.

Some notable locals collaborated to decrease the price of the abandoned properties, allowing many of today’s prominent families to enlarge their fortunes by purchasing these assets for a pittance. Among the buyers of these auctioned properties, Daizâde Mahmut is of particular interest. As a member of a leading wealthy Aintab family, he served as the chair of the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce from 1921 to 1924. In 1923, he purchased Garabed Nazaretian’s house, which was put up for sale by the Gaziantep Municipality. By this time Garabed Nazaretian was deceased, but his daughters, who held Iranian citizenship, submitted a formal objection to this sale through the Iranian Embassy. Thereupon, the embassy sent an oral notice to the Istanbul Office of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on Feb. 5, 1923, requesting a halt to the sale of the property. The sale procedure, the Iranian Embassy added, was illegal, and the property in question had to be returned to its rightful owners. This oral notice was later presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but to no avail. Despite this protest, the sale transaction was finalized.

A former employee of the Nazaretian family, Daizâde Mahmut became an affluent merchant and lived in the mansion until it was donated to the military to be used as a gendarmerie station in 1965. After the departure of military forces in 1967, the Daizâde family sold the house to its current owner Abdülkadir Kimiazâde (today known as Kimya), a wholesaler and real estate agent. The building was used as a residential house, warehouse and drying room until the 1980s. The Kimya family rented the dilapidated house in the 1990s. Until its restoration in the mid-2000s, it was used as a dormitory. Today, with its eight owners from the Kimya family, it is the Papyrus Café. Both the Daizâde and Kimiazâde families actively supported and participated in the deportations in return for Armenian properties.

Additionally, Daizâde Mahmut bought Nazaretian’s other estates in Aintab. For example, the Kara Nazar Inn, later called Büyük Pasaj (Grand Bazaar, still standing at the city center, replete with a myriad of shops), was transferred to the Gaziantep Internal Revenue Office as a national estate and sold to Mahmut Daizâde for a nominal price. A few years later, at a 1934 auction, his son İhsan Dai purchased the house of the prominent Armenian Sarkis Krajian.

A house belonging to Dr. Avedis Jebejian was acquired by the Konukoğlu family, the wealthiest industrialist family of Gaziantep. In 2011, the family donated the house to the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality. Two years later, the municipality opened it to the public as Gaziantep Atatürk Anı Müzesi (Atatürk Memorial Museum of Gaziantep). In 1989, one of the Nazaretian houses was converted for use by the Konukoğlu Vakfı (Konukoğlu Foundation). One of the houses that belonged to Hagop Aslanian’s family before their deportation in 1915 is now being used as a hotel, the Anatolian Houses Boutique Hotel.

In another example, the buildings of the Atenagan School and Surp Bedross Yegeghetsi (Second Catholic Church) were passed on to the National Estate after Armenians were forced to vacate the city. Later, in 1933, these buildings were turned into Veliç İplik ve Dokuma (thread and weaving factory) and given to Cemil Alevli, then a young native of Aintab, by special order of Atatürk, as part of the effort to create a class of entrepreneurs and capitalists in the city.

With a Western education as his “social capital” and with Atatürk acting as his “venture capitalist,” Alevli became the biggest textile supplier of Aintab in the Turkish Republic. He admitted that he had learned the textile business from Aintab’s Armenians. “Since my childhood,” Alevli said, “I used to watch how Armenians in my neighborhood worked on their textile looms for hours as I headed back and forth to school. I was amazed to follow how Armenian weavers created beautiful fabrics by combining various tones of red, yellow, green, blue and white thread cones.”

Known as the “founding father of the textile industry” in Gaziantep, Alevli later became a member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and served as the president of its Gaziantep bureau from 1941 to 1946. Additionally, he served as a CHP deputy in Parliament from 1946 to 1950. His factory was officially named as Ömer Ersoy Kültür Merkezi (Cultural Center) after its restoration in 2008. After acquiring the buildings left behind by the Armenians, brothers Ömer and Mahmut Ersoy also established a yarn factory under the name of “Yüzbaşızâdeler Mahmut and Ömer Mensucat (textiles)” and began production in the formerly Armenian populated Tepebaşı neighborhood in 1927.

As a native son of Gaziantep who has explored the city’s history, I have become aware of the consequences of Armenians’ physical and material destruction at the hands of their former Muslim neighbors. Aside from offering insight into local history, my account also contributes to the broader story of the Armenian genocide.

Unseen in the archived letters, telegrams and property lists are the trauma and suffering of Armenian survivors repeatedly subjected to attacks on their lives, culture, assets and social status. The base motives of their former neighbors left some of the most indelible wounds, which more than a century later remain unhealed.

 

Why "Operation Baku" Failed

Dec 26 2021

The promise of wealth brings Iran and Azerbaijan together after Armenia tensions

Dec 26 2021

The promise of wealth brings Iran and Azerbaijan together after Armenia tensions

Iran's shifting policy in South Caucasus can be summed up as both running with the hare and hunting with the hounds

By 

MEE correspondent

 in 

Tehran
Published date:  09:33 UTC 

Iran and Azerbaijan were quick to escalate their rhetoric when a heated war of words broke out between the two countries on the first anniversary of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Tehran accused Baku of offering its territory to Israel to spy on Iran and of deploying Syrian mercenaries in the 44-day war against Armenia. Baku accused Tehran of "briefly invading" parts of southern Azerbaijan during the war and allying with Armenia for organised drug trafficking to Europe.

As the rhetorical war continued between these two countries, which together share the highest percentage population of Shia people globally, their military show of power was also in full swing at the Iran-Azerbaijan border and the Caucasus.

Iran-Azerbaijan tensions are all about Israel and geopolitics

Read More »

In mid-September, Azerbaijan launched a joint drill with Turkey and Pakistan. Two weeks later, the Iranian official army's ground forces deployed a large number of troops at the border with Azerbaijan and held a war game. Azerbaijan took its turn a few days later and participated in another joint drill with Iran's regional rival Turkey, this time in Georgia.

However, when the dust of the war games settled, a different image of the two neighbouring countries' relationships emerged in the media.

On 28 November, the Azeri and Iranian presidents met in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, and spoke of friendship and brotherhood, shaking hands and taking photos before the cameras.

Something had changed between the two countries.

Iran, which was previously closer to Armenia, has more recently leaned towards Azerbaijan, no longer stressing its reservations about Israel-Azerbaijan ties.

Moreover, President Ebrahim Raisi's conservative government had approached Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to sign a three-way gas-swap deal.

The deal was widely hailed by Farsi media as an outstanding economic achievement, a successful move to restore relations with Azerbaijan and a hard blow to the United States' maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which started in 2018 after then-president Donald Trump violated the 2015 nuclear agreement.

"At this point, all we can say about the gas-swap deal is that it's a not-smartly-crafted performance by a new government that needs to prove itself," an energy expert at the Tehran Stock Market told Middle East Eye, on condition of anonymity.

The only official detail about the swap contract was disclosed by Iran's oil minister, Javad Oji. He said that Iran would receive between 1.5 and two billion cubic metres of gas from Turkmenistan at the Sarakhs border crossing and deliver the same amount to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan at Iran's Astara border.

'Instead of having a well-founded foreign policy in the South Caucasus, we now run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'

– Iranian diplomat

"For how long will this contract be valid? No one knows. It is only said to be a long-term contract. But not any long-term contract is necessarily a good contract," the energy expert said 

"And what is the quality of the gas we receive from Turkmenistan, compared to what we deliver to Azerbaijan?

"More importantly, what is the percentage of Iran's take from this amount of gas for delivering it to Azerbaijan?"

So far, Iran's official media have provided conflicting numbers for the percentage of the share that Iran would take from the transferred gas.

The state-run Young Journalist Club wrote that between 20 and 25 percent of the delivered gas would be allocated to Iran. Conversely, the ISNA news agency put the number as low as five percent.

"I won't be surprised if the actual number is even less than five percent. Firstly, because it was Iran that approached Turkmenistan for the deal, and secondly, due to the sanctions, we can only deal in the global market with prices much lower than actual prices," the expert stressed. 

Iran has previously applied the same tactic by offering significant discounts to its oil customers to get around the US sanctions.

"I think this contract only has political importance for the establishment. This is the price that Iran must pay to keep Azerbaijan happy," the expert concluded.

However, other sources MEE spoke to believed that influencing neighbouring countries was not Tehran's only goal for signing the gas-swap contract with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. 

The contract was signed only a few days before the resumption of negotiations in Vienna for a potential revival of the 2015 nuclear agreement following a five-month pause.

It was the first time since Raisi's victory in the June presidential election that Iran's new hardliner delegation was sitting at the negotiations table with the signatories of the nuclear deal, which was originally signed under former reformist president Hassan Rouhani.

"The hardliners, who now lead the nuclear talks, did not want to arrive empty-handed at the negotiating table," an Iranian diplomat, who worked at Iran's foreign ministry between 2005 and 2013, told MEE. 

The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media, said that, while the new negotiating team drafted the two proposals Iran presented in November during the talks, other offices at the foreign ministry attempted to improve Tehran's political relations with neighbouring countries and regional powers.

"I'm not saying that's been a successful strategy. But that's how Iran's new foreign policy will work for, at least, the next four years," he said.

The diplomat explained that Iran had lost the opportunity to maintain its influence in the Caucasus during Rouhani's administration, as Tehran was focused on negotiating with the US and improving ties with European powers.

"Through the channels we had with the foreign ministry, we warned [former foreign minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif and Rouhani over Iran's political passivity in the Caucasus, but they were overwhelmed by the talks with the West," he said. 

"And, as a result, instead of having a well-founded foreign policy in the South Caucasus, we now run with the hare and hunt with the hounds."

Nevertheless, the diplomat stressed that, since the early 1990s, the only matter that has remained intact in Iran's diplomacy in the Caucasus is its strong objection to the opening of the Zangezur transport corridor that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan.

The opening of the 21km corridor, which Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has persistently demanded following the 2020 war, would effectively cut off Iran's access to the Caucasus through Armenia. 

Despite solid opposition by Iran and Armenia to the Zangezur passageway, experts believe that if Turkey and Russia decide to permit Azerbaijan to use the corridor, neither Iran nor Armenia has the power to go against it.

'Nowadays, we can't fool Azerbaijan by offering them a gas-swap deal. Indeed, they are using our weaknesses for their benefit, and the gas deal was clear evidence for that'

– Retired Iranian diplomat

A retired Iranian diplomat, who served in Iran's foreign ministry during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988-94), told MEE that Tehran is aware of its limited influence over the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict.

"Azerbaijan counts on Turkish and Israeli military and political support," the diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, said.

"On the other side, Armenia follows what Russia decides upon, so there is not much space left for Iran to play a role. If tomorrow Russia orders Armenia to withdraw its troops from the Zangezur corridor and hand it over to the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia will do that. As they did in Karabakh to end last year's war." 

According to the veteran diplomat, even during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iran was not the most influential country in the region, and its efforts to broker a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia were unsuccessful. However, at that time Tehran could at least host the fighting neighbours for peace talks. 

"Iran's power in the Caucasus has declined gradually, since our politicians and the commanders of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps were busy exerting influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen," he said.

"Nowadays, we can't fool Azerbaijan by offering them a gas-swap deal. Indeed, they are using our weaknesses for their benefit, and the gas deal was clear evidence for that."
 

PM Nikol Pashinyan says reactions to his interview “at least puzzling”

Public Radio of Armenia
Dec 26 2021

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said some of the responses to his December 24 interview are “at least puzzling” for several reasons. The Prime Minister took to Facebook to list the reasons:

  1. In that interview, I spoke about the content of the negotiations formed before I became Prime Minister in 2018, therefore, I could not have any influence on their formation.
  2. In response to a question, I denied Serzh Sargsyan’s assertion at the RPA Congress that the content of the negotiations left by them guaranteed that Nagorno Karabakh would be Armenian. I denied it because the right of Azerbaijanis living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to participate in the decision on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a resident of Nagorno-Karabakh was enshrined in that content of the negotiations. Therefore, if they are residents of Nagorno-Karabakh according to the content of the negotiations, then they had to live in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenian side never objected to this content before the 2018 revolution. And if we take into account that according to the content of the negotiations formed before I became Prime Minister, the referendum on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh could take place 100 years later, it is predictable what changes in the demographic picture of Artsakh would be under the mentioned conditions.
  3. As for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh before the potential referendum on status, I said in an interview that in 2016 the mediators had presented three negotiation packages (one before the April war, two after), where, unlike the 2011 Kazan document, the wording “Nagorno Karabakh gets an intermediate status” was missing. The third of these three packages, presented in August 2016, contains a provision stating that the decision on the legal and practical mechanisms for the organization of life in Nagorno-Karabakh will be made by the UN Security Council in consultation with the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. This is what I considered to be a catastrophe in the negotiation process, because it is obvious that the UN Security Council would make all the decisions following the logic of its own resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Nagorno-Karabakh was recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
  4. Taking into account these and several other important negotiation issues, I have insisted from the Parliament tribune that under the negotiation content and realities existing before I became Prime Minister in 2018, Artsakh had lost both theoretical and practical opportunities not to be part of Azerbaijan.
  5. Becoming Prime Minister, I did not accept this, but fought against it. And this is one of the reasons why the war started.
  6. People saying that I should not negotiate on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh have been criticizing me since 2018 for saying that I do not have a mandate to negotiate on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh.
  7. I understand that many respectable people are now protesting against the negotiation content that is the cause and consequence of the 2016 war. At that time they either did not know or did not have the right to complain. I also complain against that content and I did everything possible to neutralize that content. I am sorry I can not hide the truth.

The comments come in the wake of Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan’s statement, in which he said the full recognition of the right of the Armenians of Artsakh to self-determination is not subject to reservation and concession. Therefore, he said, only the authorities of the Artsakh Republic are authorized to speak on behalf of the people of Artsakh.