Category: 2021

A serious call to order by Russian President Vladimir Putin ended harsh hostilities in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict just over a year ago. The bloody war between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops over the mountainous enclave had already claimed thousands of lives. 44 days of combat in which Turkey – an ally of Baku and the support that helped tip the balance definitively in favor of Azerbaijan – was gaining too much relevance. So Putin worked hard on a somewhat uncomfortable agreement with the two countries with which, in addition, he strengthens his influence in the southern Caucasus and guarantees dependence on Armenia. And with the pact came the so-called Russian “peacekeepers”, who already patrol the enclave, internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. The one in Nagorno Karabakh was the only one of the conflicts bequeathed by the Soviet Union – such as that in Moldova or Georgia – in which there was no Russian military presence. Up to now.

Russia has not issued a peace resolution. The conflict remains as a “latent volcano”, indicates Anna Karapetyan, director of the think- tank Armenian Insight Analytical Center, as evidenced by the outbreak of a trickle of deadly skirmishes. In addition, there are still very important fringes: such as Azerbaijan returning dozens of soldiers captured during the war, says the expert. The trilateral agreement ended a quarter century of Armenian military control over Nagorno Karbaj, a touchstone for Armenian national identity and inhabited mostly by Armenian people. Azerbaijan had lost most of control of the remote, mountainous region in the war of the 1990s. But this dominance has been regained after last year’s war.

Although somewhat volatile, the agreement has been a “significant diplomatic and geostrategic victory” for Putin, highlights Oleg Ivanov, head of the Center for Social Conflict Resolution. Moscow, an ally of Baku and Yerevan, two former Soviet republics with which it has substantial historical and economic ties – and it sells arms to both – had neglected that part of the tumultuous South Caucasus, a region wedged between Russia, Iran and Turkey. And the latter country (a member of NATO), an increasingly assertive player, was gaining momentum. This scheme did not fit in with Putin’s foreign policy, who works hard and with different strategies to maintain influence in his backyard. The freezing of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has allowed him to play another of his favorite roles and fundamental to his playbook as a global superpower: that of mediator.

Moscow wants a permanent and comprehensive redesign of the security map of the South Caucasus, from where it wants to remove any NATO presence, as well as the entire post-Soviet space. This is what he has demanded of the Military Alliance at a time of high tension due to the concentration of troops along the borders with Ukraine. For now, the Kremlin has guaranteed itself a very important dependence on Armenia, remarks Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucaus Institut in Yerevan. Also, the involvement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, who came to power in 2018 after mass protests against political elites and who was initially viewed with suspicion from Moscow, but who with the signing of the agreement has ended up convincing the Kremlin of which is not wayward. “Russia provides security, not only with soldiers, but also politically. Armenia looks towards Moscow looking for this factor, while when it looks at the EU it sees a benchmark in the model of development and democracy, ”says veteran political scientist Iskandaryan in his bright office in the Armenian capital.

In Armenia, with a significant diaspora in North America and Europe – especially in France – but also in Russia, there are no parties that clearly advocate breaking ties with Moscow, which controls most of the strategic resources and is joined by agreements. of association and defense. The Russian has lost a lot of territory among the population, especially among young people, who now travel more to EU countries and the US than to Russia. But although there are those who believe that Moscow allowed the conflict to go too far, a good part of the population believes that without Moscow the war would have resulted in the total loss of control of the enclave. This is helped by Russian public relations policy, which shows its combat engineers clearing munitions on the ground or escorting buses in which some Armenian refugees have returned to Stepanakert, the region’s capital.

The risk for Armenia is that this dependence on Russia is excessive and even “dangerous”, explains analyst Richard Giragosián, director of the Regional Studies Center. “The peacekeeping mission can be imitated, but there is an increase in the Russian military presence in the area, because it is Moscow that will control all regional trade and transport and also the Armenian border,” says Giragosián. This expert points out that, unlike other conflicts, Moscow now wants the involvement of the West as a formula to legitimize its diplomatic drive. The Kremlin would like a peace deal, says the analyst, that would allow that temporary group of peacemakers to become permanent and even expand with international forces.

Meanwhile, the Russian deployment – which already had a small and fairly old base in Armenia – has relegated Ankara to a secondary role. Although Turkey, which in a certain way considers itself the winner of the resulting post-war scenario, is also working to increase its influence in the southern Caucasus and has even declared that it wants to “normalize” relations with Armenia that have been broken for decades and also very damaged by the Turkish lack of recognition of the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century.

The Russian “peacekeeping” contingent is relatively modest on paper: some 1,960 personnel with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers and another 380 motor vehicles. They have 27 checkpoints, most far from the front, along the main transportation arteries in the Armenian-populated areas of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor, a narrow, hilly eight-kilometer highway that connects the region with Armenia. . Although it lacks a detailed mandate, it analyzes in a report Olesya Vartanya of the ISPI, and that is a vulnerability if, over time, one of the parties (or both) begins to blame the Russian soldiers for not protecting enough or too much.

The military teams will remain in Nagorno Karabakh for five years, according to the treaty; extendable for another five. And so on if Baku or Yerevan do not demand their withdrawal. And this window raises the doubts of analysts, who recall the example of other conflicts, such as that of the separatist region of Moldova in Transnistria, where there are Russian troops of “peacekeepers” since the war of the 1990s, or the secessionist territories. Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Moscow carried out a military intervention and there are also Russian bases, which the Kremlin operates as dials of pressure and destabilization in a country that wants to join NATO and the EU. “We see that the Russians arrive, but then they don’t leave,” says Giragosián.

Jora Pogosián, 78, and her family are among the more than 35,000 Armenians displaced by the conflict. They believe that if it had not been for the Kremlin, Armenia would have lost control of the entire region, which is seeking self-determination under the name of Artsakh and whose authorities are now analyzing making Russian the second official language. “As long as the Russian peacekeepers are there there will be no major escalations. If it had not been for the intervention of Moscow, the destruction would have been abysmal and the number of Armenian victims infinite, ”says Jora Pogosián very seriously. “Make no mistake, this has shown us that in the end we can only turn to Russia,” says this veteran of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war.

By Ali Mammadov*

The 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in the liberation of occupied territories by Azerbaijan and put an end to a three-decade-long conflict. The war had significant effects on the economies of both countries and is expected to continue to have several long-term impacts for years. The armed conflict was costly for both sides, but it was especially costly for Armenia which had a smaller economy. Apparently, Azerbaijan is now at an advantageous position benefitting from the lands and the natural resources and energy sources they contain, while Armenia became deprived of that ability. Undoubtedly, the economic benefits of the liberation of the occupied territories for Azerbaijan are almost countless. However, it can be said that the resolution of the conflict and improvement in relationships can eventually benefit almost everyone in the region, including Armenia. 

Since investors usually prefer a stable environment, the conclusion of the three-decades-long conflict may help both sides attract more foreign investment in the long run. Eventually, GDPs of both countries can potentially rise moderately as a result of increased FDI.  The stability is also likely to rise the credit ratings of both countries over time and thereby lower the interest rates for both countries. However, investors will not be the only ones to perceive Armenia as more attractive. The absence of conflict may also attract more tourists from all around the world. As a result of higher foreign investments in the region, the number of business-related travels may increase as well.

Also, it is known that peace and stability generally promote economic growth. The absence of threat may lead to a reduction in military spending and allow Armenia to spend more funds on other areas, such as public projects and human capital, and strengthen its economy.

Furthermore, the funds that were supposed to be spent on the occupied territories, especially the Karabakh region, can now be spent on other projects. According to Berlin Economics, Armenia could save up to 3% of GDP annually by not distributing funds and loans to support the economy of the Karabakh region. (1) It should be noted that the loans were rarely profitable for Armenia. Usually, the receiving side of the interstate loans would have difficulties in paying the debt and cause problems for the country. Also, despite the high costs associated with supporting the region, Armenia was never able to make full use of the occupied territory since it had a scarce population to inhabit the region and underdeveloped infrastructure to fully exploit the natural resources. The maintenance of the region could sometimes be excessively costly for such a small economy.

Additionally, the absence of conflict may improve Armenia’s relationships with Azerbaijan and Turkey, the two countries that have imposed blockade on Armenia and closed borders with it since the beginning of the three-decades-long conflict. The blockade had two major negative consequences for Armenia: undiversified transportation routes and the opportunity cost of not having trade relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Except for the two countries, Armenia has only Georgia and Iran as its neighbors. Most of Armenia’s exports to Europe are still being transported through Georgia. Exports pass through two routes in Georgia: The Port of Poti and the Upper Lars transport corridors. Neither of the routes provides ease for Armenia because Poti causes the loss of too much time and is costly, while Upper Lars is uncomfortable and risky. (2) Undiversified trade routes also meant that if Georgia stopped passing Armenian goods deliberately or unintentionally Armenia would face serious problems.

For example, in 2008, a rail bridge was destroyed in Georgia, and this caused difficulties in the transportation of goods from Armenia. The situation eventually increased gas prices. (3) Therefore, it is in Armenia’s best interest to add more transportation links to mitigate the risks associated with relying heavily on one country for transportation and to lower the costs of transportation. In addition to the exports to Europe, Armenia can also transport goods to Asian countries, such as Kazakhstan, more efficiently through Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea ports eventually as a result of improved relationships. 

Armenia’s exports have been generally low. Trade volume can be improved by having a better relationship with Turkey and Azerbaijan and having open borders. Though Armenia has been able to import from Turkey, the blockade has prohibited it from exporting to the country.  In fact, if the borders open and trade relations normalize Turkey can potentially become one of the major trade partners of Armenia.  In addition, Armenia may start buying gas from Azerbaijan, one of the biggest gas suppliers in the region, and diversify the list of countries it purchases gas from, which includes Russia and Iran only.  This would allow Armenia to diversify away the risks and find better terms when purchasing gas. 

In short, although the war had significant negative impacts on the economy of Armenia, it still has the chance to benefit from stability and peace by cooperating with its neighbors. In order to develop a sustainable economy, Armenia must not lose the chance to improve its ties with its neighbors and must contribute to the maintenance of peace in the region. 

*Ali Mammadov is a Master of Arts in International Relations student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has earned a Bachelor of Science Degree from George Washington University. Currently, he is a visiting researcher at Economics Research Institute and writes blog posts on his Medium blog.

References:

De Waal, T. (2021). In the South Caucasus, Can New Trade Routes Help Overcome a History of Conflict? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/11/08/in-south-caucasus-can-new-trade-routes-help-overcome-history-of-conflict-pub-85729

Killough, A. (2008). Armenia in Need of an Alternative Export-Import Route. The Jamestown Foundation.  https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-in-need-of-an-alternative-export-import-route/

Saha, D., Giucci R., Lücke, M., Kirchner, R., Movchan, V., Zachmann, G. (2018). The Economic Effect of a Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Berlin Economics.  https://www.ifw-kiel.de/experts/ifw/matthias-luecke/the-economic-effect-of-a-resolution-of-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-on-armenia-and-azerbaijan/

Notes:

1.  Saha, D., Giucci R., Lücke, M., Kirchner, R., Movchan, V., Zachmann, G. (2018). The Economic Effect of a Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Berlin Economics.  
2.  De Waal, T. (2021). In the South Caucasus, Can New Trade Routes Help Overcome a History of Conflict? Carnegie Europe.
3.  Killough, A. (2008). Armenia in Need of an Alternative Export-Import Route. The Jamestown Foundation.  

Christmas is a time when we pray for light and hope to emerge in areas affected by violence and hardship.

In the small Armenian territory of Nagorno Karabakh (known as Artsakh to its Armenian residents) there exists a wonderful symbol of life and hope that has emerged from the destruction of two brutal wars that took place there in 1988-1994 and in 2020.

HART's partner in Nagorno Karabakh, the Lady Cox Rehabilitation Centre

During the Nagorno Karabakh war of 1988-1994, it is estimated that about 50,000 people were wounded. Both soldiers and civilians were left disabled and lacked even the most basic medication for pain relief. In 1998, a bomb-damaged building in the capital of Nagorno Karabakh, Stepanakert, was reconstructed as the region's first and only rehabilitation facility for people with disabilities. Specialist courses for local nurses were held and in 2005, the Rehabilitation facility was re-named the Lady Cox Rehabilitation Centre.

Since then, a state of the art hydrotherapy pool has been installed, a day care centre for young children with mental and physical disabilities has opened, and a specialised sub-centre for the treatment of children with autism and cerebral palsy have been added.

These have helped secure the institution's reputation as a 'Centre of Excellence', providing physical therapy, speech therapy, hydrotherapy and psychologist sessions, that are unique to the region.

By 2021, the centre had 73 staff including 25 nurse specialists who treated 160 inpatients and almost 400 outpatients, including home visits throughout the region.

The centre's inspirational Director and Founder, Vardan Tadevosyan, told us: "For decades, I, my staff and patients have suffered the consequences of conflict in our homeland.

"But the Lady Cox Rehabilitation Centre represents the courage, resilience and spirit of our people and is a symbol of light and hope for the people of Nagorno Karabakh and the whole region.

"Throughout the pandemic and at the start of the 2020 conflict, the centre continued to provide the best possible care for their disabled patients, until the scale of the conflict forced the centre's temporary evacuation."

Vardan has proved innovative in breaking many of the entrenched Soviet stigmas surrounding disability. While children with physical or mental handicaps have often been segregated, his nursery embraces children with and without disabilities who serve as path-breaking examples of integration.

He has also broken the Soviet prejudice against the employment of people with disabilities, initially employing, for example, a blind psychologist for telephone counselling.

He says: "We are proud to have transformed the lives of people with disabilities, who would otherwise have been isolated and neglected, both those paralysed and injured by war, and those with inherited or accidental disabilities."

The Karabakh Conflict of 2020

Between 27 September and 9 November 2020, a second brutal war took place in Nagorno Karabakh.

As Vardan says: "We were subject to constant military offensives by tanks, helicopters, cluster munitions and Smerch rockets.

"These caused mass displacement with over 100,000 civilians forced to flee their homes and over 14,000 civilian structures destroyed or damaged."

Advanced drone technology and superior Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces, assisted by several thousand Syrian jihadist militants imported by Turkey, played a significant role in leading to Armenia's defeat.

After the capture of the key strategic town of Shushi, which overlooks Nagorno Karabakh's capital, Stepanakert, Artsakh was forced to accept a Russian-brokered ceasefire and a 'peace' deal that resulted in the handover of 70 per cent of Artsakh's territory, including hundreds of Armenian religious and historical sites, back to Azeri control.

During the war, over 5,000 lives were lost on both sides and thousands lost their homes.

The social, psychological and emotional impact of this on the Armenian population of Artsakh cannot be overstated. And the scale of anti-Armenian, anti-Christian rhetoric; the denial and obliteration of Armenian heritage; and the refusal by Azerbaijan to release Armenian prisoners of war only heightens the residents' continued fear for the future.

Hope emerges from the ashes of destruction

Despite the severe and ongoing hardships of the recent conflict, the rehabilitation centre continues to flourish. It has reopened and expanded its work to accommodate injured soldiers. Needs have multiplied and the number of patients treated each year is expected to double to more than 2,000, with patients receiving physiotherapy, hydrotherapy, speech therapy and psychological treatment.

Vardan told us recently: "Despite all that has happened and the continuing uncertainty, we still mark celebrations when patients and staff come together to share fun and laughter. Patients feel valued and prioritised. Our work is centred on compassion and determination and despite all the suffering, it goes from strength to strength.

"I am very happy with the patients' progress and they love the staff and friendly environment. This year we will have 1,300 people visiting the centre. The home visit programme is three times bigger than before and we continue the kindergarten and autism centre. As for the soldiers, we don't want to put them on a waiting list. They are seen as soon as they apply. This is why my staff are working much more intensively."

Whatever the politics of war, it is always the innocent who suffer and in many places, provision for the wounded and disabled is, at best, inadequate. But for all the suffering and uncertainty in Nagorno Karabakh, the spirit of compassion and courage continues, and in the face of all odds, light and hope continue to emerge from the ashes of destruction.

Rev Dr Andrew Ashdown is Advocacy Development Manager at Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART). To support the work of HART, including its support of Nagorno Karabakh's Disability Rehabilitation Centre, visit www.hart-uk.org/donate

The Nagorno Karabakh conflict has also become a subject of study for Russian analysts. Voyennaya Mysl [Military Thought] journal published an analysis of military activities in the armed conflicts of the 20th and 21st century, within the scope of developments in strategy, operations, and tactics, trying to forecast the trends in the future conflicts. A study by P.A. Dul'nev, S.A. Sychev and A.V. Garvardt is particularly interesting, as it covers the land elements tactics in the Karabakh conflict1.

Conflict Profile

Discussing the conflict, the authors indicate the unique nature of tactics adopted by the Azeri army who radically departed from the tactics used initially, with classic front strikes carried out by company and battalion tactical groups. The aforesaid tactics were moderately successful in the field, for instance in the Cəbrayıl district – south part of the frontline, along the Araks River. The Azeri side suffered from quantifiable losses in equipment, due to the ambushes or anti-tank squad operating in front of the front line of defence.

As several analogies emerge here, the situation may be compared to the WWI western front – where attacks against points of resistance generated significant losses, with minor, often temporary, territorial gains. The Azeri forces referred to the tactics that had been quite successfully used by the German assault elements of the infantry (Stosstruppen), starting from 1916. This set of tactics assumed mass use of small infantry elements infiltrating the adversary, creating confusion in his defensive effort. The mobile groups and raid elements (MG-RO, Rus. mobil'nyye gruppy, and reydovyye otryady) of varying sizes, from a squad to an infantry battalion, were based on broad employment of almost all SOF elements remaining at disposal of the command of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan.

The GM-RO tactics of elements equipped with firearms, light mortars, ATGMs and MANPADS made optimal use of the mountainous areas that were hard to access, along with the passive defence tactics of the Armenian units – single points of resistance and local counter-attacks, in case of enemy penetration. The reactivity of the Artsakh made it possible for a deep infiltration, effective disorganizing and blocking of the activities, with the use of ambushes, artillery, and UAVs, as well as provision of effective support and reinforcements. Ultimately, the isolated points of resistance had to surrender to armoured-mechanized tactical elements, with aggressive involvement of GM-RO, attacking the Armenians from other directions.

The Russians indicated that apart from the MG-RO, the Azeri forces also broadly employed UAVs – aerial reconnaissance-strike complexes (Rus. razvedyvatel'no-udarnyye [razvedyvatel'no-ognevyye] kompleksy, RUK [ROK]), based on mixed flights of UAVs (strike, reconnaissance, EW). The mass employment of TB2, Orbiter UAVs, and Sky Stryker, Harop, and Orbiter-1K loitering munitions led to the destruction of virtually all air defence assets and inflicted major losses to armoured and mechanized units, and the artillery. The impunity of the UAVs supported by the MG-RO led to effective tactical isolation of defensive perimeters and points of resistance of the Artsakh defensive elements. The Armenian manoeuvring elements – armoured and mechanized units deployed up to 15 kilometres from the frontline, could not have reached the front to effectively begin an organized and timely counterattack, to efficiently support the defensive effort. Attempts to carry out counterattacks were made by the Artsakh MBT elements near Cəbrayıl (10th–11th October) and Zəngilan (20th–21st October) – resulting in major losses among the counterattacking forces, loss of territorial gain, without any major impact on, or hampering of the Azeri offensive.

The Russian assessment suggests that the employment of UCAVs also made it possible to limit the use of conventional tactical aviation assets. This also led to a major increase in the effectiveness of artillery shelling – tube and rocket artillery assets that could have acted against the enemy through joint fires, across a short timeframe, remaining out of reach for the Armenian side2.

The Russians also point to the fact that the Armenians disregarded some of the experiences gained throughout the last decade:

a. Points of resistance were arranged in a way that did not take into account the capabilities of modern strike and reconnaissance assets; b. The available camouflage was being used routinely, or were ignored entirely in some cases; c. The points of resistance frequently had no covered and fortified firing positions and trenches that would prevent aerial strikes and observation; d. minefields were not dense and deep enough; e. several potential paths leading towards the defended area were not subjected to any engineering barrier-work.

Conclusion

Generally, the Russian expert examination of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict did confirm the importance of the already known, and identified new trends in land tactics, and made it possible to issue recommendations on the enhancement of combat methods employed in joint forces setting.

• The tactical solutions applied by the Azeri side do follow the tendency observed by the Russians, to spatially expand the battlefield and extend the combat environment. The experts suggest that this would bear a key relevance for further development of land tactics since battles would be further dispersed and volumetric in the future. This trend has been confirmed by the broad use of GM-RO by Azerbaijan, with those elements being able to operate semi-autonomously, away from their forces, but in close cooperation with forces and assets of other branches of the military.
• The involvement of UAVs, artillery, EW, and information warfare in tactical activities of the infantry made it possible to penetrate the enemy lines deeply and has brought a multi-domain character to the joint forces setting.
• The Russians came to a conclusion that systems should be put in place in the Russian military that would make it possible to reshape the forces and assets used for the given mission into an actual, synergy-driven joint forces system, regardless of the structural denomination, subordination, or levels of training.
• Even though not all of the experiences gathered during the second war of Nagorno Karabakh are universal, as some refer just to highland warfare, the Russians emphasize the trend of departure from linear, to spatially dispersed combat elements. The said trend was evident in Karabakh, as both sides were driven to make all elements maximally autonomous, through the establishment of autonomous tactical groups.

Based on the Nagorno Karabakh experience, the Russian authors provided a force structure proposal, with the following elements:

a. Assault echelon (position-based) (Rus. shturmovoy (pozitsionnyy) eshelon), that is tasked with taking over the key facilities (hence, position-based), decisive for disintegrating the enemy defence; b. Strike-maneuver echelon (Rus. udarno-manevrennyy eshelon), tasked with deployment and successful activities behind the enemy lined (raids, ambushes), covering of the flanks, manoeuvre-based defence, and as a counter-landing asset; c. Joint Operations echelon  (Rus. eshelon kompleksnogo vozdeystviya), working on force integration, aimed at reduction of enemy potential to the level allowing completion of tasks assigned, minimizing the casualties and loss of equipment/armament; d. Support echelon (Rus. eshelon obespecheniya), providing support in combat and securing the operations; e. Airborne echelon (Rus. vozdushnyy eshelon), tasked with strike and recon missions, supporting the tactical groups of the land echelons.

The Russians suggest that division as above, based on the tasking, makes it possible to effectively arm ad equip the tactical squads of the echelons listed and development of operational methodology and proper training activities.

The aforementioned modular combat deployment concept defined by the Russian analysts, considers the following tactical domains to be the most important ones, for further development of the Russian land tactics:

a. Examination and implementation of methods for preparing and using the autonomous tactical elements in combat, along with methods for synchronizing these activities, within the framework of an established plan of the land operation; b. Establishment of organization and introduction of aerial unmanned strike-reconnaissance complexes [RUK-ROK], of varied structure, making it possible to act against enemy targets across his lines, also deep behind them; c. Development of methods for force and assets integration, as those forces are involved in activities targeting the enemy (multi-domain impact); d. Development of a comprehensive air/missile/space defence system, and effective methods for defending own forces from airstrikes, which is relevant when in war with an enemy who has a strong air component at his disposal, also involving UAVs, and – in the future – cruise missiles.

The detailed outline suggested that the development of forms and methods adopted for tactical operations in the Russian land component should be focused on gaining the following capabilities:

a. Rapid disorganization of the enemy defence, achieved through neutralization of critical targets, defeating of the main forces briefly via synchronized land operational activities (assault, raids, recon) and airstrikes, as well as tactical landing operations across the dispersed battlespace, with the use of high tech assets; b. Organization of effective air defence systems, and tactical camouflage, ensuring effective protection of own forces from an airstrike. c. Effective implementation of a recon-strike cycle (Rus.  razvedka— porazheniye); d. Gaining a high level of situational awareness of own elements; e. Organization and cooperation between heterogeneous forces, and assets, and maintaining their resilience in adverse tactical conditions; f. Complementing the capabilities of land forces with the use of robotic systems (Rus. robototekhnicheskiye kompleksy, RTK), be it land-based, or aerial ones, of different purpose, especially when engaged in high loss level operations; g. Establishment of new elements of own forces with particular attention paid to specific tactical circumstances providing a capacity to redistribute tasks between them during the combat operations, in real-time, based on real-time data on the status of every element, mission status – for completed and assigned objectives, and taking into the account the results of operational modelling for combat development; h. Increasing survivability of the individual weapons systems achieved thanks to information transfer capability regarding data on the adversary, within elements, in the event of fault or neutralization of any subsystems (command communications, navigation, targeting, etc.); i. Organizing an effective system for multidimensional support of the land operations.

Summary

The Russian lessons, learned from the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh conflict show a comprehensive and modern approach towards joint operations in a modern setting. Although operations in Nagorno-Karabakh were nothing new, tactics-wise (infiltration), a well-thought-over implementation of legacy tactical solutions and adaptation to the terrain, fused with the use of modern weapons systems, does prove the innovation when it comes to Azeri tactics.

Implementation of the organizational and tactical solutions suggested by the authors, and embedding them within the training curriculum would be another element of modernization in the Russian Armed Forces. One shall assume that, as a result of those changes, the Russian land forces would be better suited to work on a dispersed battlefield, increasing their efficiency in completing the assigned tasks, departing from conventional forms of operations so characteristic for the previous era.

Even though the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was taking place in a mountainous area primarily, Poland shall conduct an in-depth analysis of infiltration tactics and capacity available to the adversary, when fighting a Polish defensive formation in the Kaliningrad area for instance. One should also pay attention to the modular force model proposed by the specialists of the Moscow Armed Forces Academy, especially when it comes to the use of unmanned systems in air and ground support.

Paweł Makowiec, PhD, Territorial Defence Department of the University of Land Forces, Wrocław. The opinions in the present article do not constitute the official stance of the University, they are private views of the author.

[1] P.A. Dul'nev, S.A. Sychov, A.V. Garvardt, Osnovnyye napravleniya razvitiya taktiki Sukhoputnykh voysk (po opytu vooruzhennogo konflikta v Nagornom Karabakhe) [Eng. Main Directions for Development of Tactics for the Land Forces (based on experiences of the armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh)], Voyennaya Mysl’, No.11, Moscow 2021.; the authors belong to the academic cadre of the Military Scientific-Training Centre for the Land Forces of the “General Military Armed Forces Academy” in Moscow – a counterpart of the Polish University of Land Forces [AWL]. 

[2] The Azeri have grouped all of their Dana M-1 howitzers (36 examples) to form a brigade-level artillery element used to conduct concentrated shelling against the attacked structures.