Category: 2023

Dec 19 2023

• CONFLICT AND PEACE
• SOUTH CAUCASUS

"Despite hopes, Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023", writes Benyamin Poghosyan in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. "However, since the text of the document seems to be, by and large, already agreed, there are hopes that an agreement may be signed in the first half of 2024. Otherwise, the EU and US election cycles in the Summer and Autumn of 2024 may push the South Caucasus out of the West's radar. If this happens, Russia may resume its leading role as a negotiation platform between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pushing the two sides to sign a peace agreement in Moscow by the end of 2024", he argues. 

2023 started with mixed feelings in Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations. It seemed that the October 2022 Prague statement, where the Armenian government recognized Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, paved the way for the signature of an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Many perceived the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the fate of the Armenian population as the primary obstacle to the peace process. Meanwhile, the blockade of the Lachin corridor, imposed by Azerbaijan in mid–December 2022, added tensions in bilateral relations.

The negotiation process resumed in February 2023, as Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, a summit facilitated by the US Secretary of State. This meeting opened the way for months of intensive negotiations. The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met twice in Washington in May and June 2023 to discuss a peace agreement, while Pashinyan and Aliyev met twice in Brussels in May and July 2023. In the meantime, the two leaders also met in Chisinau on June 1, 2023, on the margins of the second European Political Community summit, accompanied by the President of the European Council, the President of France, and the German Chancellor. The sides registered significant progress in elaborating the peace agreement, claiming that at least 70 percent of the text was agreed.

On the other hand, the continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade impacted the process negatively. On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan established a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, and since mid-June, banned all transportation in and out of the region, with rare exceptions of medical evacuations done by the International Red Cross. Azerbaijan pushed for the usage of the Aghdam road to supply Nagorno Karabakh, while Armenians rejected this option, fearing that it would be another step towards "reintegration into Azerbaijan." Armenia applied to the International Court of Justice, but Azerbaijan de facto refused to implement the court's decision. Upon Armenia's request, the UN Security Council discussed the situation on August 16, but the gathering ended without any statements or resolutions.

Despite the ongoing tensions around the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, negotiations on the peace agreement continued, and on September 11, Azerbaijan provided its latest version of the text to Armenia. However, Azerbaijan decided to use force to "close the Karabakh chapter" and launched a large-scale military offensive on September 19. Armenian government decided not to intervene militarily, and Russian peacekeepers took the same approach. Without any external support, the authorities of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic were forced to capitulate and sign a decree on the dissolution of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by the end of 2023. Within ten days, all Armenians left Nagorno-Narabakh, and on October 15, President Aliyev reviewed a military parade in Stepanakert with practically no Armenians remaining in the town.

Some hoped that the "destruction of Nagorno Karabakh" would facilitate the peace process. The EU put significant hope on the scheduled Granada meeting between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan on the margins of the third European Political Community summit. The Secretary of the Armenian Security Council and Foreign policy advisor to President Aliyev met in Brussels on September 26, and everything indicated the sides were ready to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023. Then, suddenly, Azerbaijan pulled away from negotiations. President Aliyev canceled his visit to Granada, citing France's decision to sell weapons to Armenia and the discussions at the European Parliament about Nagorno-Karabakh as the main reasons. Arguably, he demanded participation at the Granada meeting of President Erdogan, an offer rejected by France and Germany. Then President Aliyev rejected the EU offer to hold a leaders' summit in Brussels by the end of October 2023 in the "original Brussels format" and also canceled the meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers scheduled for November 20, citing the anti-Azerbaijan statements by the US State Department officials during November 15 hearings in the US Congress. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan hinted at its readiness to resume negotiations in Moscow, within the 3+2 platform, or at the bilateral level. On November 30, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Commission on delimitation and demarcation met on the Armenia – Azerbaijan border and agreed on its charter. On December 7, 2023, Armenia and Azerbaijan made a significant step forward by adopting a bilateral statement on pushing forward the peace process, exchange of POWs, and also Armenia's support to Azerbaijan to host the COP 29 conference in Baku in 2024.

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Meanwhile, the US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, James O'Brien, visited Baku and met with Azerbaijani President Aliyev on December 6. According to different sources, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to hold a foreign ministers meeting in January 2024 in Washington, while bilateral negotiations will probably continue. On February 7, 2024, Azerbaijan will hold snap Presidential elections, and a landslide victory of President Aliyev seems assured.

Thus, despite hopes, Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023. However, since the text of the document seems to be, by and large, already agreed, there are hopes that an agreement may be signed in the first half of 2024. Otherwise, the EU and US election cycles in the Summer and Autumn of 2024 may push the South Caucasus out of the West's radar. If this happens, Russia may resume its leading role as a negotiation platform between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pushing the two sides to sign a peace agreement in Moscow by the end of 2024.      

 

https://www.commonspace.eu/node/12498

Dec 20 2023

Dec 21 2023

On September 19th, Azerbaijan launched an intense military offensive in the contested Nagorno – Karabakh region, which killed over 200 ethnic Armenians and dozens of Azerbaijanis. After just 24 hours of fighting, a ceasefire was agreed upon between Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, separatist authorities announced that the break-away region would officially be incorporated into Azerbaijan on January 1st, 2024. After decades of Armenian defiance, the hopes for an independent Republic of Artsakh have finally ended. According to the BCC, approximately 100,000 Armenians have fled the region since the military operation and subsequent capitulation. While Baku has maintained that Armenians would be treated as equal citizens, the mass exodus indicates fears of ethnic cleansing. 

Although Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic tensions have persisted for centuries, the current Nagorno – Karabakh dispute is a relic of Soviet occupation. In 1923, the Soviet Union established that Nagorno – Karabakh should be an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, despite the population being roughly 95 percent Armenian at the time. Whether intentional or not, Stalin’s odd land distribution increased the potential for ethnic violence following Armenian and Azerbaijani independence. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, the Republic of Artsakh was declared following a referendum in the region in 1991, which ultimately led to a three year war. After the death of roughly 30,000 people, a bilateral ceasefire was signed in 1994 and officially remained in effect until 2020. Despite international recognition of Nagorno – Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Artsakh remained a breakaway region for several decades due to the military and economic support of both Armenia and Russia. 

While Armenia initially gained territory in the 1991 conflict, the tide turned in Azerbaijan’s favor in the following decades. This was mainly driven by Azerbaijan’s superior alliances, largely created by their vast reserves of petroleum and liquified natural gas. One of Azerbaijan’s most important allies is Turkey, which has provided significant military and diplomatic support to the country. Azerbaijan’s supply of petroleum alongside their shared Turkic identity has solidified Turkey’s support for Baku. According to Reuters, 80 percent of Azerbaijan’s oil exports flow through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to Turkey, which strategically circumvents Armenia by passing through Georgia. Furthermore, Armenia and Turkey were already geopolitical rivals due to Ankara’s denial of the Armenian genocide in 1915. Many European countries, alongside the United States and Israel, have benefitted from Azerbaijan’s exports as well, effectively isolating Armenia from the world. 

Armenia’s main allies are limited to Russia and Iran, which both lack significant geopolitical clout at the moment. According to TRT World, Russia’s support for Armenia is derived from their shared Orthodox-Christian identity and Slavic heritage. Without Russia’s military and economic support, Armenia was unlikely to win the war in 1991. Armenia’s alliance with Iran is mainly derived from Tehran’s tensions with its Azerbaijani minority. Iran is home to over 12 million Azerbaijani’s, more than the population of Azerbaijan itself. Tehran does not want its own separatist movement, which is why it seeks to undermine Baku to decrease the probability of a unification movement of all Azerbaijani people. One way to do this is to support Armenia so that Baku’s attention is fixated on another matter. According to Modern Diplomacy, Iran has supplied Armenia with extensive weaponry, including 500 units of anti-tank missile systems. While these allies have been helpful to Armenia in the past, Russia and Iran have been more concerned with their own internal matters in recent years. 

Following the 1994 ceasefire, the state of Nagorno – Karabakh remained fairly stable with infrequent clashes occurring over the subsequent decades. However, emboldened by significant weapon imports from Turkey, Israel, and Belarus, Azerbaijan has become increasingly aggressive in the last decade. According to the Center for Eastern Studies, Azerbaijan launched a military operation known as the four days war in 2016, in which Baku enjoyed miniscule territorial gains. In September 2020, fighting once again broke out along the Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh border, which saw the most intense violence since 1994. Lasting roughly six weeks, the Second Nagorno Karabakh war claimed thousands of lives before a peace deal was finally brokered by Russia on November 9th. Azerbaijan reclaimed the majority of its lost territory and Armenia only retained a small portion of the Karabakh region. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the peace deal established the Lachin corridor, which was a designated passage protected by Russian peacekeepers connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh. 

In December 2022, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of using the Lachin Corridor to supply weapons to Nagorno Karabakh and subsequently blocked the transit line. Armenia denied the allegations and accused Azerbaijan of isolating the region for its own agenda. Whether the Armenians supplied weapons or not, the Lachin Corridor was a vital route for supplying essential resources such as food and medicine. According to the BBC, residents reported severe food shortages and human rights violations were thrown at Baku. However, Azerbaijan maintains that any supply shortages were the fault of the Armenians as they refused to accept Azerbaijani aid when offered. In any case, Nagorno Karabakh’s isolation combined with a weakened Russian ally meant the break-away region had little means of defending itself in the recent military operation. 

Samvel Shahramanyan, the president of Nagorno-Karabakh, signed a decree to dissolve the Republic of Artsakh and all of its institutions on January 1st, 2024. While this specific territorial dispute seems to be resolved for now, it remains to be seen what these developments mean for the Armenian diaspora and Armenian – Azerbaijani relations. According to the AP, Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, reaffirmed that all ethnic Armenians will be guaranteed full rights and freedoms. While these statements cannot be confirmed, the reality of the situation will become more apparent in the coming weeks. According to Aljazeera, a UN team of approximately a dozen people recently arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the majority of its citizens have already fled the region, this team will be able to assess the claims of the Azerbaijani government. 

While it is too early to assess the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, should the Azerbaijani government pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing there are various actions the international community could take. First, while Azerbaijan’s oil reserves gives it diplomatic leverage, it also makes its economy very dependent on exports. Should the international community want to retaliate against the Azerbaijani government for any reason, decreasing imports of Azerbaijan oil would greatly undermine Baku’s economy. Also, Azerbaijan relies completely on weapons imports from a few countries. This allows for significant leverage over the state should grave human rights atrocities be committed. 

Dec 21 2023

Defense News December 2023 Global Security army industry

Armenia is presently in the process of modernizing its military, partly due to the conflict it experienced with Azerbaijan in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. For instance, Armenia has acquired from France Bastion 4×4 APCs, three Thales Ground Master 200 radars, a Mistral short-range air defense system, and night vision goggles from Safran. Armenia's other acquisitions from India encompass MArG 155 wheeled self-propelled howitzers, Pinaka MLRS, ATAGS 155mm towed guns, anti-tank missiles, and ZADS anti-drone systems. Furthermore, there have been sightings of a Chinese WM-80 MLRS within the Armenian Armed Forces.

The Akash air defense system, developed by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is a short-range surface-to-air missile system primarily designed to safeguard vulnerable areas and critical installations against potential aerial threats. It is currently in active service with the Indian Armed Forces, with a total of 48 systems deployed as of 2022.

One of its notable features is its capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously in either Group Mode or Autonomous Mode. The system is equipped with Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) capabilities, enabling it to counteract electronic deception systems that adversaries might employ.

The Akash missile system comprises various components, including launchers, missiles, a control center, an integrated mission guidance system, and C4I (command, control, communication, and intelligence) centers. Each missile battery is accompanied by a radar system known as Rajendra. The system is reported to be 96 percent indigenized, with an enhanced version offering a smaller footprint, 360° engagement capability, and advanced seekers.

In terms of specifications, the Akash Weapon System (AWS) has an operational range spanning from 4.5 kilometers to 25 kilometers and can engage targets at altitudes ranging from 100 meters up to 20 kilometers. It is designed for swift response, from target detection to neutralization.

The Akash Weapon System is characterized by its open system architecture, which allows for adaptability to various Air Defense environments. It is also known for its resistance to active and passive jamming, ensuring its effectiveness in challenging conditions. Additionally, the system features a secure mode of communication between combat elements and is self-sufficient in terms of electrical power, thanks to its built-in power sources. Its transportability by road and rail allows for rapid mobilization and deployment, further enhancing its operational flexibility. The system incorporates built-in safety features, including an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, contributing to its overall reliability and effectiveness in air defense.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/defense_news_december_2023_global_security_army_industry/armenia_to_purchase_indian_akash_air_defense_systems_in_$720_mn_deal.html

Dec 21 2023

• Armenia has been ordering more weapons, turning to France and India for air-defense systems.
• Armenia is a longtime ally of Russia, but it has leaned away from Moscow in recent years.
• With its focus on Ukraine, Russia has offered Armenia little help in its conflicts with Azerbaijan.

In recent weeks, Armenia has ordered air-defense systems and radars from France and was reported to have ordered anti-drone systems from India.

Those orders come amid heightened tensions with neighboring Azerbaijan, with which Armenia has fought several conflicts, including a short clash in September that ended with Azerbaijan conquering the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, causing its 120,000 ethnic-Armenian residents to flee.

The acquisitions are notable not only for their timing but also because they show Armenia is taking tangible steps to lessen its dependency on military hardware from Russia, a longtime ally that has offered Yerevan little support against mounting pressure from Azerbaijan.

Armenia's six-week war with Azerbaijan in 2020 captured worldwide attention for Azerbaijan's use of aerial drones. At a press conference to announce the sale in October, France's defense minister said air defenses were "absolutely key" and that Paris was aiding Yerevan with sales of three Thales GM 200 radars and an agreement on the future delivery of short-range Mistral air-defense missiles.

"Armenia's choice to order air-defense systems from France is a significant one," James Rogers, an expert on drones and precision warfare, told Business Insider. "Not only does it highlight to Russia that Armenia has options when it comes to defense cooperation, but it marks a major leap forward in Armenia's attempts to modernize its military."

Reports in early November indicated Yerevan was also buying more weaponry from India, including Zen anti-drone systems, which are designed to detect and bring down enemy drones. Armenia previously bought four Indian-made Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers in 2022, the first foreign order of that system.

Nicholas Heras, the senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told Business Insider that Armenia was advancing its foreign and national security policies on two tracks.

"One track is to build defense alliances with more powerful outside actors in Eurasia, and the second track is to improve the Armenian military's ability to defend against Azeri airpower in tactical engagements," Heras said. "India, in particular, is a prized defense partner with Armenia because India has a large defense industry that can also arm and improve Russian weapons platforms which Armenia deploys."

Armenia's military arsenal has long been predominantly Russian, but Yerevan has attempted to change that as its relations with Moscow have soured, especially after its devastating defeat in the 2020 war, during which Azerbaijan used Israeli- and Turkish-made weapons.

Russia has failed to aid Armenia despite Yereven's membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. In addition to being tied down by the war in Ukraine, Russia is most likely irked by Armenia moving closer to Washington and the West under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has long questioned the value of CSTO membership.

"Armenia's partnership with Russia is at a low ebb, and Pashinyan is pushing forward, slowly but surely, to bring Armenia closer to NATO, including the prospect of normalizing Armenia's relations with Turkey," Heras said.

Heras added that over the past two years, the US had been sending "a strong signal" that it "would like to test out the prospect for a more strategic US-Armenian security relationship."

Washington and Yerevan seemed to demonstrate mutual interest in closer defense relations in September when Armenia hosted a bilateral exercise focused on training for peacekeeping operations.

Eighty-five US troops trained alongside 175 Armenia personnel during the drill, which was "a testament to our longstanding partnership with Armenia and builds upon decades of successful peacekeeping and security cooperation," the US Embassy in Armenia said in a statement.

Russia, predictably, opposed the exercise, and Yerevan has kept its distance since then. Pashinyan skipped the organization's summit in mid-November, a move Russia accused the West of orchestrating.

Armenia under Pashinyan has tried to move away from Russia "by building a web of strategic partnerships," Heras said. "Fundamentally, Pashinyan does not want to depend on Russia to ensure Armenia's territorial integrity and security, and his effort to build the relationship with the United States works toward this goal."

Acquiring weaponry from other countries serves a similar purpose, but Armenia's recent purchases also reflect the sensitivity of its international position.

The Mistral missile has a relatively short range of 4 miles, suggesting the sale is meant to bolster Armenia's arsenal but was made with potential political backlash in mind. Turkey has criticized French arms sales to Yerevan. (Azerbaijan has also criticized the recent French and Indian arms sales to Armenia.)

Rogers said that "range is important in war" and that it enabled strikes on a wider set of targets. "In order not to destabilize the region or risk an outbreak of hostilities, therefore, Armenia and France have agreed to these short-range yet effective air-defense systems."

Heras said that the main quandary facing Armenian foreign policy was it could not afford to sever ties with Russia despite recent tensions, but it also could not trust Russia to intervene on its side if there's another war with Azerbaijan. The need to strike a balance between Russia and new partners while bolstering its small military with limited resources complicates Armenia's task.

"Armenia needs to purchase weapons that improve its ability to pursue a 'porcupine strategy,'" making itself a more threatening target for Azerbaijan if the two countries go to war again, Heras said.

Buying French and Indian short-range air-defense weapons that could be used by small infantry units is "a potentially cost-effective way to impose higher costs on Azerbaijan's drone airpower," Heras added.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

Dec 21 2023

On December 15, Armenia and Russia signed a contract on modernizing and extending the lifespan of Armenia's Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) until 2036. 

The renovations will be carried out by Rustatom Service JSC, a subsidiary of Russia's state nuclear energy company Rosatom, and will cost the Armenian government $65 million.

The deal is another reminder of the vast extent of Russia's influence over Armenia's infrastructure and economy amid Yerevan's efforts to politically distance itself from Moscow. 

Metsamor plays a significant role in Armenia's energy landscape, contributing an average of 31 percent of the country's yearly electricity output.

It is the only nuclear power plant in the South Caucasus, located about 30 kilometers west of Yerevan. It consists of two units, Metsamor-1 and Metsamor-2, activated in 1976 and 1980, respectively. In 1989, the plant was shut down due to safety concerns after the devastating earthquake in Spitak in December 1988. In 1995, Unit 2 was reactivated due to energy shortages in Armenia, and since then has been the only nuclear unit in operation.

In 2021, Rosatom repaired and upgraded the NPP to operate until 2026. The modernization was implemented under a loan agreement signed between Armenia and Russia in 2015. 

Under the new agreement, Rosatom will help to extend the lifespan of Unit-2 until 2036, after which it will be decommissioned. 

The upgrading operations will be financed in the form of a "budgetary loan" provided by the Armenian government to the state-owned plant's management, which will subsequently enter into a contract with Rosatom. In 2023-2026, Rosatom will modernize Metsamor NPP in close cooperation with Armenian specialists.

As the reactor will be decommissioned in 2036, the Armenian government intends to build a new nuclear unit at Metsamor. Different estimates assert that the construction of a new nuclear power plant or unit will take 6-10 years, which means that construction works must be started in the next couple years.

It appears those construction works will be implemented by Rosatom, judging by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk's remark on December 15 that negotiations were underway regarding new nuclear power units. 

Overwhelming energy dependence on Russia 

The new Metsamor deal comes at a complicated time in Armenian-Russian relations. Resentment against Russia is high in Armenia Azerbaijan's military takeover – apparently with Moscow's blessing – of Nagorno-Karabakh in September.

Despite persistent efforts to diversify its political alliances and build closer ties with the West, Armenia's economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on Russia. Russia is Armenia's largest trade partner, and Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 

And then there's energy dependence.

Russia supplies 87.5 percent of Armenia's gas (the rest comes from Iran), and Gazprom Armenia, the local subsidiary of the Russian state gas company, owns all of the country's gas distribution infrastructure. 

Armenia says it generates 98 percent of the electricity it needs but that claim hides even more dependence. 

That electricity is generated by hydropower and thermal plants and by the Metsamor NPP. Metsamor is entirely fueled by uranium imported from Russia while thermal power plants depend on (largely Russian) natural gas. 

"Our self-sufficiency depends on the countries from which we import the gas and the uranium that operate our thermal and nuclear power plants. And when our government officials speak about our self-sufficiency, why do they forget to say how we maintain it?" energy expert Armen Manvelyan told the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), stressing that over 70 percent of Armenia's electricity depends on Russia.

And Armenia's energy demands keep growing. In 2022, Armenia's imports of Russian natural gas increased by 6.1 percent from the previous year, reaching 2.6 billion cubic meters. 

Iran's ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, recently mused about the possibility of tripling or quadrupling Tehran's gas exports to Armenia. But such a move would require Russia's consent and facilitation, as Gazprom controls the gas pipeline to Iran.

Armenia is exploring the possibility of obtaining small modular nuclear reactors from the United States, France, and South Korea as part of its efforts to diversify its energy sector. But so far concrete progress on this front remains elusive.

Dec 21 2023

Armenia lost Nagorno-Karabakh, but the regional ambitions of Azerbaijan supported by Turkey may mean that the worst is not over for Yerevan.

Following the one-day war fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan on September 19, Turkey and Azerbaijan are now in full control of geopolitics in the South Caucasus. The focus of the emerging axis between Ankara and Baku had been to once and for all resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Following 35 years of intermittent warfare, that objective has now been achieved, at the great expense of Armenia – and of Russia.

The self-styled Republic of Artsakh will soon cease to exist. Unilaterally established by ethnic Armenians in the autonomous Azeri province of Nagorno-Karabakh, it was the linchpin of Russian hegemony in the region. Playing both sides, the Kremlin ensured that it had the final say in regional developments. The one-day war produced two important results: all ethnic Armenians residing in Artsakh were forced to flee, and Azerbaijan is now in full control of its own, internationally recognized territory.

This fundamentally alters the security architecture in the geopolitically important South Caucasus region. As the scope for outside mediation will now be defined by Ankara and Baku, there will be no more outside “peace plans.”

Following the cease-fire agreement in 1994, Armenia assumed the role of protector for the Republic of Artsakh, and it retained control of those Azeri territories between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper that it had seized by military force. Although Artsakh was not formally recognized even by Yerevan, it represented a substantial de facto enlargement of the territory of Armenia.

Backed by Turkey, Azerbaijan executed its counteroffensive in three stages. The 44-day war in the fall of 2020 resulted in Baku regaining control over a large part of Nagorno-Karabakh and in a rout of the bulk of the Armenian forces from the surrounding areas. Russian intervention prevented a total collapse of the Armenian side, and 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to ensure continued free passage between Artsakh and Armenia. The second stage was a blockade that made life for the remaining Armenians inside Artsakh very difficult. The third and final stage was the assault on September 19, which ended in swift capitulation by the Armenian forces.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are the unequivocal winners. They will now be able to dictate the conditions for what will follow. The biggest loser in the short term is Armenia. With a population of 2.8 million, it has been forced to accept 100,000 refugees and it lives under the threat of an Azeri invasion. Although both sides have offered to recognize the territorial integrity of the other side, Baku maintains strategic ambiguity by referring to remaining Azeri exclaves inside Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan.”

Having long believed it was protected by Russia, Armenia has started currying favor with the West. It has not only reneged on a pledge to host drills of the Russian-led Common Security Treaty Organization. On October 3, it crossed the Rubicon by opting to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. That means that if President Vladimir Putin were to visit Armenia, he would risk being arrested. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov branded this move as “extremely hostile” and threatened there would be the “most negative consequences.” But the only consequence to date has been that Russian customs is making trouble for imports of Armenian brandy.

These moves indicate how much Russia has lost. Its peacekeepers are getting ready to leave Azerbaijan. They were subjected to intermittent shelling of their bases that destroyed equipment and the killing of several Russian soldiers, including a senior Russian commander. No escalation followed. The Kremlin is so dependent on its transport route to Iran that it was forced to accept this humiliation, or risk antagonizing Azerbaijan.

Russia has been informed that once its peacekeepers have left Azeri territory, they will not be welcome in Armenia, and it is likely that in addition it will be asked to vacate its remaining bases on Armenian territory.

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Armenia was home to around 10,000 Russian troops. About half were stationed at the 102nd military base at Gyumri, the second-largest city in Armenia. Located near Turkey, it was the largest Russian military base abroad. Additional garrisons have been at Zvartnots airport and at Erebuni military base. Russian border guards have also patrolled the borders with Turkey and Iran. Given that many of these troops have been sent to the “meat grinder” in Ukraine, it is not clear how many are left. Yet, being called on to leave completely would be a major setback.

The immediate future will be marked by efforts to finalize a formal peace treaty. This process has long been pursued along two tracks, one with Russia and the other with the European Union and the United States. Now it is up to Azerbaijan to decide both the terms of a treaty and where it is to be signed. Given that the Armenian population has been displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, and that both sides have offered to recognize the territorial integrity of the other, there is not much left to talk about. Yet, the outcome is shrouded in uncertainty.

On October 5, the two sides were to meet at Granada, Spain, together with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Council President Charles Michel. Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan did show up, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev did not. In a clear snub to France, and to aspiring Western mediators, he hinted at dissatisfaction with President Macron’s pro-Armenian statements and talk about French arms sales.

A few days later, the two sides were to meet at a summit meeting of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), held in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. This time President Aliyev showed up, but in a clear snub to Russia, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not.

The likely venue is Georgia. In late 2021, it refused to take part in a 3+3 format, where the three regional powers Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were to meet with the three outside powers Iran, Russia and Turkey. Tbilisi argued that negotiations should be left to the three regional powers. On October 8, 2023, President Aliyev held a meeting in Tbilisi with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. On October 26, 2023, at the 4th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in Tbilisi, prime ministers from regional powers Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, also in Tbilisi, met and Prime Minister Pashinyan proclaimed a peace deal would be signed “in the coming months.”

Given that Turkey is now emerging as a regional hegemon, the future will be shaped by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strategic priorities in positioning Turkey as a regional energy hub and in securing its access to markets in Central Asia without passing through Iran. Both highlight relations with Azerbaijan, which in turn means that opening the Zangezur corridor to link Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhichevan exclave, crossing Armenian territory, becomes a Turkish priority.

President Erdogan has played a deliberately opaque game. First, he wanted a seamless corridor that would be beyond Armenian sovereignty. Next, he suggested that Armenian checkpoints would be accepted, and the latest is that a corridor may be drawn to Nakhchivan via Iran (pandering to Tehran’s strong objections to a pan-Turkic corridor). In mid-October, he suggested that “If Armenia honors its commitments, especially the opening of the Zangezur corridor, then Turkey will step-by-step normalize relations.”

What is quite clear is that Russia will have no further role to play. According to the trilateral agreement that was signed in 2020, envisioning an opening of Zangezur, it was stipulated that Russian border guards would be in control. In a recent statement, however, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that “no third power should have control over any territory of Armenia.”

Georgia in contrast will play a vital role. Apart from being a possible venue for peace talks, it is of great strategic relevance to Russia. As the Ukrainian armed forces are pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of its bases on Crimea, the Kremlin needs to find an alternative. Given that its port at Novorossiysk is too small, it is looking at a port in Abkhazia, which is a de facto Russian vassal state. While Georgia cries foul in public, the current government may play along.

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