Category: 2023

Meet the lobbyists fronting for Azerbaijan in Washington

Meline Chalian
Dec 14 2023
REPORTING | WASHINGTON POLITICS

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) recently sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging him to get tougher on Azerbaijan for its “brazen campaign of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

This follows an earlier statement from Cardin, shortly after Azerbaijan’s September “lightning offensive” against Nagorno-Karabakh, that called for the U.S. to “halt security assistance to Azerbaijan,” and increase humanitarian support for the 100,000 ethnic Armenians who fled en masse from Nagorno-Karabakh.

As of this writing, neither of those things has occurred and the Biden administration has done little to address Azerbaijan’s military aggression. While there are undoubtedly myriad reasons for the U.S. government’s lukewarm response, one possible explanation is one of Washington’s oldest pastimes: lobbying. For years, the Azerbaijan government has been financing a well connected lobbying and influence operation in the U.S. that has worked diligently to keep U.S. military assistance flowing and to ensure that policymakers turn a blind-eye to the country’s consistent human rights violations.

As documented in a just released Quincy Institute brief, The Lobbying Battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, the government of Azerbaijan has spent millions of dollars on registered lobbyists and much more on illicit influence operations that have helped foster and maintain support for Baku across Europe and the U.S.

“The United States will not countenance any action or effort – short-term or long-term – to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh,” was an assurance from then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Yuri Kim in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 14.

Just five days later, the U.S. did exactly what Kim said it would not, standing idly by on September 19 as Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist” operation against what remained of Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 of its residents as they fled to the neighboring Republic of Armenia.

The territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh — the mountainous breakaway region internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but self-governed by Armenians — now appears over as the de facto officials announced that all institutions will be dissolved on January 1, 2024. These developments followed what had been a year of Azerbaijani escalation against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper, including an Azerbaijani blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh which lasted almost 10 months and saw the territory’s food, medical, and energy supplies all but run out. When Baku launched its military assault, Washington and Brussels were only able to muster strongly worded statements, but no meaningful reaction.

Don’t count out Azerbaijan’s influence operations in Washington for helping to thwart what should have been a stronger response on Capitol Hill and in the White House. The government of Azerbaijan has spent over $7 million on lobbying and public relations firms registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) since 2015, according to OpenSecrets. Chief among the Azerbaijan lobby’s hired guns is BGR Government Affairs, one of Washington’s top lobbying firms, which is contracted to serve as a liaison for the Azerbaijan Embassy in the U.S.

FARA filings reveal that the firm contacted congressional offices more than 1,000 times on Azerbaijan’s behalf in just the first half of 2023, and that their work included efforts “to ensure there were no negative Azerbaijan amendments on the National Defense Authorization Act” and “fair language for Azerbaijan” in the appropriations process. More generally, BGR “educated policymakers in Congress about the important role Azerbaijan plays as a key security partner of the United States.”

In 2018, BGR signed an agreement with another lobbying firm — Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, and Berkowitz — to aid its efforts on behalf of the Azerbaijan Embassy. An analysis of that firm’s FARA filings shows that they’ve been laser focused on the State, Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, which is responsible for, among many other issues, determining how much U.S. military assistance flows to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Overall, it would seem both firms have been successful at allowing Azerbaijan to dodge criticism and continue to receive millions of dollars in security assistance every year.

Most notably in 2023,the Azerbaijan Embassy hired The Friedlander Group, whose namesake Ezra Friedlander has been a prominent American-Israeli lobbyist for years, rubbing shoulders with a number of top policymakers, including former President Donald Trump. When he was hired by Azerbaijan he immediately put his connections to work, according to his firm’s FARA filing, securing meetings with dozens of congressional offices, including even a face-to-face meeting with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.).

This is just the tip of the iceberg for Azerbaijan’s influence operations in the U.S. As documented by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the Azerbaijan government has a history of laundering its influence in Europe and the U.S. The “Azerbaijani Laundromat,” as described by the OCCRP, was “a complex money-laundering operation and slush fund that handled $2.9 billion over a two-year period through four shell companies.” This 2012-2014 scheme which involved funneling government funds through shell companies, included payments to several pro-Azeri Americans, one of whom later pleaded guilty to concealing the fact that a congressional trip to Azerbaijan he’d helped organize was secretly funded by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).

Azerbaijan’s often illicit influence operations in Europe have dubbed it “caviar diplomacy,” given the country’s repeated attempts to bribe European officials with all manner of luxury goods, including caviar. At least one investigation resulted in FBI agents raiding the home of the co-chair of the Congressional Azerbaijan Caucus, Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), in January 2022.

Armenians have also sought to influence the U.S. public debate surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this has been done at a significantly smaller scale than their Azerbaijani counterparts, and the main actors of Armenian lobbying efforts in the U.S. have been the estimated one to two million diaspora Armenians in the U.S.

In the early 1990s, during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. achieved its first major political victory via Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which explicitly prohibited the vast majority of U.S. assistance from the Act to post-Soviet Azerbaijan until Baku “cease[es] all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”

However, in 2002, as the “Global War on Terror” was heating up, Azerbaijan was granted a waiver for Section 907 that has allowed over $160 million of U.S. security assistance to flow to the country ever since.

Nevertheless, during the war in 2020, Armenians boycotted lobbying and PR firms working for Azerbaijan and, in 2021, President Joe Biden recognized the systemic mass killings of Armenians during World War I as genocide, a long-standing priority of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. More recently the Senate unanimously passed the “Armenian Protection Act,” that would cut off aid to Azerbaijan for at least two years.

For Armenians, these developments are viewed as too little too late, however, as Azerbaijan has already achieved what it wanted in Nagorno-Karabakh with little international pushback. This result is likely due in no small part to Azerbaijan’s concerted influence operations in the U.S. For years, the lobbyists on Azerbaijan's payroll have worked to keep U.S. military assistance flowing to the country and to tip the scales of U.S. support in their favor.

While they may not have “won” this influence battle they have no doubt done enough to keep the U.S. on the sidelines of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.


Editor's Note: Artin Dersimonian was an intern at the Armenian Embassy in Washington in 2018. The Terjenian-Thomas Assembly Internship Program at the Armenian Assembly — which is mentioned in the QI brief on which this article is based — facilitated Dersimonian's internship with the embassy.

Armenian Foreign Minister Discusses Prisoner Return Conditions Amid Ongoing Diplomacy

Hovsep Chakrian
bnn
HongKong
Dec 15 2023

By: Momen Zellmi

In an unfolding diplomatic saga, Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, has asserted that the conditions governing the return of detainees remain unchanged. This revelation comes in the wake of a dialogue with ‘Azatutyun’ (Freedom), wherein questions regarding the repatriation of captives were raised.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his wife, Anna Hakobyan, recently met with the kin of war prisoners from the Shirak region. These individuals have recently been repatriated to Armenia. Pashinyan extended his gratitude towards the relatives for their patience and assured that every possible measure would be implemented to help the returned prisoners reintegrate into normal life. In response, the relatives expressed their appreciation for the government’s sustained efforts.

The exchange involved 31 RA servicemen, captured between 2020 and 2023, along with one serviceman from Nagorno-Karabakh, detained in September 2023. All have successfully traversed the Azerbaijani-Armenian border and are currently in the Republic of Armenia. This exchange was facilitated as a part of an agreement encapsulated in a rare joint statement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Interestingly, the deal also entails Armenia relinquishing its veto of Azerbaijan hosting the COP29 UN Climate Change Conference next year.

Armenia has expressed its readiness to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan before the close of this year, indicating a desire for diplomatic resolution. The Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia, Alen Simonyan, voiced a similar sentiment to journalists. However, he also suggested that Azerbaijan is seemingly complicating the peace treaty process. Amid these developments, expectations for the implementation of the ‘second component’, as referenced by Foreign Minister Mirzoyan, are now on the horizon, though the details of this component remain undisclosed. The return of the remaining 32 Armenian prisoners of war from Azerbaijani captivity is expected soon, underscoring the ongoing international diplomacy and negotiations revolving around the issue of detainees.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are Finally Talking Directly. Is Peace Next?

Emil Lazarian
The National Interest
Dec 15 2023

Armenia and Azerbaijan's willingness to engage directly may suggest that the region is finally on the cusp of being ready for geopolitical prime time.

by Damjan Krnjević Mišković

Earlier this week, Azerbaijan was elected unanimously by UN member states to serve as the host country for COP29—the world’s premier climate change summit or “conference of the parties”—which will take place in late 2024. This makes Azerbaijan the first former Soviet republic and only the second state belonging to the Eastern European Group (one of five UN “regional groups” that rotate the distribution of various top posts and the chairmanship of various bodies within the UN system) to be granted this responsibility.

Of even greater significance is the fact that this unexpected outcome was one of two concrete results of the first-ever, directly negotiated written agreement between Baku and Yerevan, not only regarding each other’s leadership in interstate bodies and organizations but also on the ongoing peace process that began in the wake of the Second Karabakh War (September 27, 2020–December 10, 2020).

The December 7, 2023, joint statement announcing this breakthrough consists of two basic elements. The first declared the withdrawal of Armenia’s candidacy to host COP29 and its unconditional support of Azerbaijan’s bid, while also calling on other countries to support the latter. In return, Azerbaijan agreed to support Armenia’s bid to become one of eleven members of the COP Bureau—a subsidiary body that mainly assists the COP presidency in process management matters. The background here is that Yerevan had sought to host COP29 once it became clear that Russia would break the necessary consensus on any EU or NATO member state belonging to the UN’s Eastern European Group to host the world’s annual climate summit (in this case, Bulgaria) due to diplomatic tensions with the West arising from the conflict over Ukraine. Yerevan’s candidacy—announced last year—had prompted Baku to do the same this past summer, which had further complicated matters.

Azerbaijan’s successful election to host COP29 reinforces my contention that Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev teaches a longstanding masterclass in statecraft and that his classroom is located in one of the world’s toughest, most unforgiving neighborhoods. It also lends further credence to my argument that Azerbaijan has become an indispensable country for the advancement of Western and Turkish strategic connectivity (and energy security) ambitions in Eurasia, or what I have argued should better be described as the “Silk Road region.”

My assessment of the growing importance of Azerbaijan builds on one of the most striking judgments made by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, in which he called Azerbaijan the “cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.” Two recent underappreciated events speak to the growing salience of this point: the first-ever participation of Azerbaijan’s president in the September 2023 Dushanbe summit of the Central Asian heads of state and the first-ever summit of the heads of state of countries belonging to something called the UN Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA). The latter was held in Baku, where Aliyev stated that “Azerbaijan and Central Asia represent a single historical, cultural and geopolitical space, with increasing strategic significance.” A few days later, at a major conference attended by sixty think-tank experts from thirty countries organized by ADA University and the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center), Aliyev had added that “now, with this [high-level] political interaction and concrete projects, we can create a synergy. We are doing that, and we talk about the political interaction.”

Indeed, the scale and scope of the plans now being laid (largely away from public view) may call to mind some of the initial arrangements that had been undertaken in other geographies in decades past, including the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations, the Nordic Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and, going back much further in time, the Hanseatic League. One of many recent pieces of evidence in this regard is the June 2023 agreement between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan that should amount to a logistics and regulatory compact. In this context, it may be useful to recall that the focus of the original European Economic Community was on fostering economic interdependence—without sacrificing political sovereignty—through a reduction of trade barriers, the establishment of an embryonic customs union, and common arrangements regarding agriculture, transport, and the like.

This strategic possibility should not be as surprising as it may appear at first blush. Together with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan belongs to the troika of the Silk Road region’s middle powers or “keystone states” (the term was coined by Nikolas Gvosdev in 2015 and refined in 2020). The next logical step would be trilateral summits between the heads of state of those three countries, building on the achievements of the inaugural trilateral meeting held between the ministers of economy and energy of those same three states in Baku on November 14, 2023. Should peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan be reached, this critical region would find itself one step closer to becoming—in the next decade or so—an autonomous subject of international order rather than remaining an object of major power rivalry.

To make this case properly is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is sufficient for present purposes to note that, for the first time in centuries, the strategic reality of the Silk Road region is one of “geopolitical heterogeneity,” as Vasif Huseynov put it in mid-2020. This, in turn, suggests that outside power agenda-setting in the Silk Road region may be on the way out—with implications for the future course of somewhat competing flagship projects like the EU’s Middle Corridor and Global Gateway, on the one hand, and the China-led Belt and Road Initiative, on the other.

The key here is to take seriously the qualitative distinction between a transport corridor and an economic corridor: the former conception relegates the Silk Road region to the status of a multimodal thoroughfare while the latter envisions the region as contributing substantially to the value chain of goods and services that would thus not merely traverse from east to west and vice versa, but also be produced or assembled in part in the region itself. There is obviously much work to be done in this context, but a recent World Bank report—which had been preceded by one issued by the EBRD—suggests recognition by major political and financial players that the latter option is the one now in play. The fulfillment of the potential of unique bodies like the Alat Free Economic Zone and the Astana International Financial Centre would also advance this proposition.

All this indicates that something of truly geostrategic importance is taking place in the Silk Road region. The cumulation of these and other developments, which are unlikely to bear fruit in the short term, may very well require the major outside powers—Western and non-Western alike—to no longer harbor aspirations of domination, primacy, sphere of interest, or anything similar. What I wrote in these pages in May 2023 still may be true today: “the South Caucasus [is] the sole geopolitical theater in which the White House and the Kremlin are presently not in overt opposition, which suggests a tacit realization by each that their respective interests in this part of the world are not entirely incompatible.” The fact that an “off-diary meeting” between U.S., EU, and Russian envoys to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process took place in Istanbul on September 17, 2023 speaks to this point, even if its outcome was reported to be unsuccessful.

That is the strategic context within which we can now turn to the second element of the December 7, 2023, joint Armenian-Azerbaijani statement, which speaks directly to the peace process itself. I refer to a very concrete confidence-building step, namely the exchange of military servicemen by the two sides (thirty-two Armenians for two Azerbaijanis). The text implies that this prisoner release on December 13, 2023, is but the first of “tangible steps towards building confidence between two countries,” including future meetings, with concrete results, of two “state commissions” (one on the delimitation of the state border and another on border security). There also could be talks on unblocking road and rail links between the countries, including what Baku calls the “Zangezur corridor,” while stating explicitly that Armenia and Azerbaijan “will continue their discussions regarding the implementation of more confidence-building measures, effective in the near future, and call on the international community to support their efforts that will contribute to building mutual trust between two countries and will positively impact the entire South Caucasus region.”

This last passage can be interpreted to mean that Baku and Yerevan now see an advantage to continuing peace talks directly, without foreign intermediaries—that is to say, without Russia as a “mediator,” the EU as a “facilitator,” and the United States as a “supporter,” as they style themselves, respectively.

I believe this is due at least in part to Yerevan coming to terms with the deleterious consequences of the West’s (and particularly France’s) rather quixotic flirtation with Armenia—a country that remains locked in an unhappy marriage with Russia with no short-term perspective whatsoever for separation, much less divorce, given the country’s geopolitical and geoeconomics realities. Azerbaijan is unwilling to participate in a negotiating process involving third parties it sees as violating the basic precondition of an intermediary, i.e., neutrality (Aliyev rather directly articulated this position during the aforementioned ADA University-AIRCenter conference, a full transcript of which is available here). The same passage from the December 7, 2023, joint statement may also suggest that Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize both the political and practical limits of the 2+3 format for talks (the 3 here are Iran, Russia, and Turkey), which was made manifest most recently on October 23, 2023 at a meeting hosted by Iran.

However, the foregoing does not necessarily mean that Baku and Yerevan have shut out foreign intermediaries from the peace process for good (except for France, whose exclusion from the normalization process Aliyev has explicitly indicated). As the text of the aforementioned joint statement indicates, this appears to be going in the right direction: “[we] share the view that there is a historical chance to achieve a long-awaited peace in the region. The two countries reconfirm their intention to normalize relations and to reach a peace treaty on the basis of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Rather, what it does suggest is that both Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to have reached a level of mutual trust and understanding whereby substantive progress on a treaty text is not predicated on the direct involvement of one or more outsiders, who, after all, can be expected to have distinct interests from those of the two sides themselves.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/armenia-and-azerbaijan-are-finally-talking-directly-peace-next-207984

Armenia singer Ara Martirosyan cause of death reason, biography, age, wife, songs, net worth

Paul Hambardsumian
Dec 16 2023
  • Vanshika Sharma
On , the world bid farewell to a musical legend as Armenian singer Ara Martirosyan passed away at the age of 46.

The news of the untimely death of Ara Martirosyan due to cardiac arrest sent shockwaves through the music industry and triggered an outpouring of tributes from fans and fellow artists alike.

Ara Martirosyan was born on June 3, 1976, in Yerevan, Armenia. His musical journey began at a young age when he developed a passion for music, learning to play the piano and guitar. He later joined the choir at an Armenian Apostolic Church before graduating from the Yerevan State Conservatory with a degree in music theory and composition.

In 2002, Ara Martirosyan married Mercedes Khachatryan and the couple had two children, a son named Arman and a daughter named Ani. They lived in Yerevan before eventually settling in Los Angeles, California.

In 1998, Ara Martirosyan entered the music industry by joining the musical group Song State Theatre. The year 1999 marked a significant milestone in his career with the release of his first single, “Arevik,” which quickly became a hit in Armenia. Over the years, Ara released several popular tracks with the album “Nerir” standing out as a fan favorite.

Ara Martirosyan’s contributions to Armenian music were widely recognized, earning him prestigious awards such as the Golden Lyre Award for Best Male Singer in Armenia in 2001, 2003, and 2005. His versatility as an artist was reflected in winning awards at the Armenian Music Awards for Best Pop Album and Best Pop Song.

Apart from his solo career, Ara Martirosyan made significant contributions to the industry by composing songs for other singers, including Anush Petrosyan, Arsen Safaryan, and Nune Yesayan. His involvement in the music department of the 2011 film “The Fiancé From Circus” showcased his diverse talents.

The singer’s sudden passing left a void in the hearts of fans, fellow artists, and the Armenian music community. His influence will undoubtedly continue to resonate through his timeless tracks, including “Hayastan,” “Siro Ashun,” “Du Es,” “Yes U Do,” and “Imn Es,” among others.

Ara Martirosyan’s funeral took place on December 18, 2023, at the St. Mary Armenian Apostolic Church, and he was laid to rest at the Forest Lawn Memorial Park in Hollywood Hills, California.

Ara Martirosyan was estimated to have a net worth close to $5-10 million.

https://thesportsgrail.com/armenia-singer-ara-martirosyan-cause-of-death-reason-biography-age-wife-songs-net-worth/

What happened to Ara Martirosyan? Tributes pour in as popular Armenian singer dies aged 46

Kevo Kalantarian
Dec 16 2023
ByKarishma Rao

Popular Armenian singer Ara Martirosyan passed away on , at the age of 46. News of the singer's death was confirmed by fellow singer Lilit Galstyan's manager. Ara Martirosyan reportedly suffered from cardiac arrest and was taken to the hospital. Netizens have since flooded social media with tributary messages.

As mentioned earlier, the Arevik singer was just 46 years old at the time of his passing. Cardiac arrests occur when the heart unexpectedly stops pumping blood, leading to a lack of blood circulation toward the brain and other vital organs.

News reports revealed that Ara was found unresponsive by his wife before being taken to the hospital. His funeral was held on December 18, 2023, at the St. Mary Armenian Apostolic Church. He was reportedly buried at the Forest Lawn Memorial Park in Hollywood Hills, California.

According to News Unzip, the renowned singer was born on June 3, 1976, in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. After expressing a keen interest in music by learning how to play the piano and guitar at a young age, he went on to join the choir at an Armenian Apostolic Church. He graduated from the Yerevan State Conservatory with a degree in music theory and composition.

The singer entered the music industry in 1998 when he joined the musical group Song State Theatre. In 1999, he released his first single Arevik which went on to become a hit track in the country. Since then, he has released several popular tracks with Nerir being his most popular album, which helped him get multiple awards.

A few of Ara Martirosyan's other popular tracks include Hayastan, Siro Ashun, Du Es, Yes U Do, and Imn Es amongst others. Apart from being a sensational artist, he has also composed songs for singers like Anush Petrosyan, Arsen Safaryan, and Nune Yesayan. The musician has also been credited for working in the music department of the film The Fiancé From Circus which was released in 2011.

The musician won the Golden Lyre Award for the Best Male Singer in Armenia in 2001, 2003, and 2005. He has also won several other awards including the Armenian Music Awards’ Best Pop Album and Best Pop Song.

Ara Martirosyan married Mercedes Khachatryan in 2002 and the couple have two children together, a son, Arman, and a daughter Ani. They lived in Yerevan before settling in Los Angeles, California.

According to Idol Networth, the Armenian singer boasts a net-worth ranging between $100K to $1M.

Internet users were incredibly saddened by the unexpected loss and took to social media to share their tributary messages.

Ara Martirosyan has amassed over 145K followers on Instagram. At the time of writing this article, no statements about his passing made it on his social media page. His last social media upload was five weeks ago, where he had written in the caption – “MAM Jan Tox Astvac Hogid Lusavori!!!”

https://www.sportskeeda.com/pop-culture/news-what-happened-ara-martirosyan-tributes-pour-popular-armenian-singer-dies-aged-46

Greek Security Minister Holds Productive Meeting with Armenian Counterpart, Strengthening Bilateral Relations

Mary Lazarian
Dec 16 2023

During the meeting, Minister Dendias highlighted the strong bond and friendship between Greece and Armenia, which is based on shared tragic experiences and the presence of significant Armenian communities in Greece.

Minister Dendias acknowledged the regional instability in the Caucasus region, Ukraine, and the Middle East, and Greece expressed its support for dialogue based on UN Charter principles and international law.

Greece stands for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states and opposes any violent changes to borders. Dendias briefed the Armenian Defense Minister on recent developments between Greece and Turkey, emphasizing that complex issues require more than a single meeting to resolve.

The ministers also discussed a military-technical agreement between Armenia and Greece, which is seen as important for fostering innovation and strengthening Greece’s defense industry. Greece expressed its willingness to collaborate with allied countries like Armenia to enhance mutual cooperation.

The Armenian Defense Minister expressed gratitude for the invitation and highlighted the longstanding defense cooperation between Armenia and Greece. The military-technical agreement was seen as a strong legal framework for further improving bilateral relations in this area.

The meeting focused on the outcomes and future prospects of bilateral defense cooperation. Both countries believe in the high quality of their cooperation, which covers various capabilities such as training, exercises, and education across their respective armed forces.

https://greekcitytimes.com/2023/12/16/greek-security-minister-holds-productive-meeting-with-armenian-counterpart-strengthening-bilateral-relations/

Mass exodus from the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Two stories of flight from Nagorno-Karabakh

Meline Chalian
Dec 16 2023
ELISA BERNAL / ACCIÓN CONTRA EL HAMBRE
DEC 16, 2023 – 18:48 CET

Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were forced to flee their homes last September, following the rapidly escalating conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over control of this Caucasus region. After three decades of hostilities that have left some 40,000 people dead, the authorities of the self-proclaimed republic agreed to dissolve its government and armed forces. That decision was made 24 hours after the start of Azerbaijan’s bombing of Nagorno Karabakh when they realized that they did not have any international support.

Most of the population of Nagorno Karabakh moved to the Armenian border province of Syunik. It was a long and exhausting journey, especially since the military offensive was preceded by a nine-month blockade of the Lachin corridor, during which virtually no supplies or humanitarian aid entered, leaving many families without resources. There was only one way out of Nagorno Karabakh: a winding mountain road. After three days of travel by car with very little food and water, the mass exodus exacerbated diseases and caused malnutrition; some even had to make the trek on foot.

“These refugees had nothing when they arrived,” explains Marcella Maxfield, Action Against Hunger’s Regional Director for the South Caucasus. “Facing an uncertain future, they now desperately need emergency aid, both for urgent needs such as food and water, and for necessities like bedding, medicine, mental health care and psychosocial support.”

Below are two stories of the exodus from Nagorno Karabakh.

On September 25, Nora —who does not want to reveal her identity— fled the conflict with her entire family: her grandmother, aunt, niece, newborn cousin, mother, father, husband, sisters and brother. Three days later, they arrived in Goris, Armenia. On the last two days of the journey, they had nothing to eat. They were forced to drink water from lakes and rivers in the surrounding mountains. “We couldn’t even sleep for an hour,” Nora says.

During the blockade, Nora was pregnant, but she miscarried due to acute stress and malnutrition. Access to health services was limited and it took more than an hour and a half to walk to work. They relied mainly on the potatoes they grew themselves. She now lives with some of her family in a town called Parakar in Armenia. Their apartment lacks electricity, gas and water. They have a small amount of savings to buy food, but it is already running low. Nora is especially worried about her seven-year-old brother. “He needs psychological support,” she says. “He can’t sleep because he still hears the bombing.”

Nora has only one wish: to return home. “I want to go back to Nagorno Karabakh,” she says.

In the image on the left, Nora’s younger sister poses in her current apartment in Parakar, Armenia, to show a photograph she took before fleeing. It shows the bread the family baked to take with them on their way to Syunik, the Armenian province closest to the border crossing. The journey took three days, but there was only enough bread to eat on the first day. They also brought medicine for their grandmother. In the picture on the right, the cell phone photo shows their last meal, a few boiled potatoes the family prepared before leaving Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the picture on the left, Nora’s younger sister shows a photograph she took after the September 2023 bombings. She explains that, before fleeing to Armenia, one of her relatives threw away a cupboard full of cans of food out of anger over the conflict and being forced to flee. In the image on the right, the photograph on the cell phone shows the moment when the family bolted the door of their apartment in Nagorno Karabakh just before fleeing to Armenia.

In the picture on the left, Nora’s younger sister shows the family’s garden in their apartment in Nagorno Karabakh. The image on the right shows a photograph she took with her cell phone during the nine-month blockade of Lachin. The image shows two neighbors riding the horse that Nora’s family also used to travel to health centers 20 to 40 kilometers (12.4 to 25 miles) away. Many families had to travel on foot or on horseback because of the lack of fuel due to the blockade of the corridor.

In the image on the left, Nora poses in her bedroom in Parakar. The image on the right shows the stove with which Nora’s family cooks their food, as they have no electricity.

Armine and Sasun, 44, who prefer to remain anonymous, have supported each other for over two decades. They knew each other in childhood. They grew up as neighbors and even went to the same kindergarten. They have been together for 23 years and have a son and a daughter.

In 2009, they met a woman living in the Armenian town of Goris, and over the years they forged a close friendship with her. She was the one who offered them a house when the family was forced to flee Nagorno Karabakh on September 26. The apartment where they lived was destroyed.

In the months prior to the conflict, Armine and Sasun had already been living on meager food rations as a result of the blockade of the Lachin corridor. The authorities gave them vouchers to buy food, but the quantities were barely sufficient: three kilos of vegetables, two kilos of fruit, two kilos of potatoes and a small amount of bread. Armine and Sasun had to divide this ration among the whole family. If they didn’t use the vouchers to buy food within two weeks, they lost the opportunity, and there was no telling when the next batch of vouchers would arrive. Buying food was very expensive: a single cabbage could cost around €15 euros ($16.35).

Armine explains that they took care of “each other.” She says that her son once went to the nearest bakery, several kilometers away, and had to wait in line until five in the morning. On the way home, he gave the bread to a disabled man he encountered who was in a very bad way.

In the picture on the left, Sasun holds the pink ration card they were given in Nagorno Karabakh with which they were allowed to buy two kilos of fruit between February 23 and March 7. Armine and Sasun explain that a cabbage costs about 6,500 drams (about €15/$16.35) and an egg cost 1,000 drams (about €3/ $3.27). All four members of the family (Armine, Sasun, their son and daughter) were working, but Sasun explains that they saw many others starving: “People helped each other as much as possible, but we saw many cases of pregnant women who lost their babies due to malnutrition,” Armine adds. In the picture on the right, Sasun holds the green ration card they were given in Nagorno Karabakh, which allowed them to buy three kilos of vegetables between March 8 and 22.

In the picture on the left, Sasun holds the white ration card they were given in Nagorno Karabakh that allowed them to buy two kilos of potatoes. In the image on the right, Armine holds up her cell phone showing a photograph of the apartment where they lived in Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh.

For all photos, click on the link below


Turkish Press: Seven investigations, three lawsuits launched on Diyarbakır Bar for Armenian Genocide Remembrance in last six years

Ara Felekian
 duvaR.english 
Turkey – Dec 15 2023
Friday 08:43 pm

Turkish prosecutors have launched seven investigations and filed three lawsuits against the Diyarbakır Bar Association administration since 2017 for Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), “Insulting the Turkish nation, state, government, Parliament, and its judicial bodiesi” for statements made during Armenian Genocide Remembrance Events.

The Media and Legal Studies Organization (MLSA) documented the Turkish state’s legal battle with the Bar Association of the southeastern Diyarbakır province over its stance on the Armenian genocide. 

A Diyarbakır prosecutor’s office most recently launched an investigation into chair Nahit Eren and ten executive board members of the Diyarbakır Bar Association regarding the statement “Confrontation and reconciliation must begin from 24 April 1915” published on the Bar Association website. 

The investigations for the TCK 301 require approval by the Justice Ministry. The ministry found that the remarks “Hundreds of thousands of Armenians were torn from their lands and were killed or left to die through the relocation supported and controlled by the Committee of Union and Progress,” warranted an investigation. 

The ministry however looked over the 2014 remarks by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan included in the statement: “We wish that the Armenians who died due to conditions of the early 20th century rest in peace, and extend our condolences to their grandchildren.” 

The Bar Association interpreted the President’s remarks as “an important step to confront this dark history,” in their statement that is now subject to an investigation.

Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor's Office called in the Bar Association executives for defense statements. The 11 bar officials rejected to give defenses and claimed that their statement fell under freedom of _expression_.

Deputy head of the Diyarbakır Bar Association Mehdi Özdemir said that the Justice Ministry allowed six investigations so far, four of which turned into lawsuits. The various Bar Association executives were acquitted in two of these cases. One case and two investigations are still ongoing. Özdemir stated another application to investigate the Bar Association’s 2023 Armenian Genocide statement had reached the Justice Ministry. 

Özdemir stated that the Penal Code Article 301 was infamously used to threaten everyone who voiced an opinion opposite to the official ideology of the government. He added, “We believe the enforced disappearances beginning with the 1915 Armenian Genocide and continuing with the 1937-38 Dersim Massacre are realities Turkey needs to face.”

“Unless we confront the truth, we cannot talk of real justice. We will continue defending this struggle for human rights as we honor our values and historical legacy,” said Özdemir.  

Opposition MP: Armenian authorities now ‘secretly commemorate’ Armenian Genocide

Emil Lazarian
Panorama
Armenia – Dec 16 2023

Opposition MP Gegham Manukyan has accused the Armenian leaders of “secretly commemorating" the Armenian Genocide in line with preconditions put forward by Turkey.

In a social media post on Saturday, the MP said on December 9 designated by the UN as International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of this Crime, Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan and Secretary General Boris Sahakyan visited the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex to pay tribute to the Armenian Genocide victims.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry did not report the visit, refrained from using the words “Armenian Genocide” and “Tsitsernakaberd”, as well as made no mention of the genocide perpetrator, Ottoman Turkey, it its December 9 statement.

"Back in 2022, I warned that the term "Armenian Genocide" was being smoothly removed from official discourse. Now they are even trying to keep quiet about our diplomatic achievements so as not to anger Ankara," stated Manukyan, who represents the opposition Hayastan faction.

“It’s worth noting that after the launch of talks between [Armenian and Turkish envoys] Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kilic and assurances about the absence of preconditions, the opposition argued that the Armenian authorities were going to make concessions although no preconditions were in place. It’s best evidenced by the secret “commemoration” on December 9,” the MP added.