Category: 2023

In corporate life, when a company experiences performance issues relative to shareholder expectations, there are usually a plethora of reasons offered for their failure. It could be the general market condition, the national economy, not executing the sales forecast or unpredictable expenses. Regardless of the labeling offered, accountability belongs with those designated to produce results. They are the appointed or elected leaders of the company, and often poor results are referred to simply as a “management problem.” Depending on the environmental circumstances, the management may be afforded an opportunity to correct the problems and improve performance before a management change is considered. The same concept is applied in governments, institutions and non-profits in our Armenian community, although the accountability and the change process is quite different. These three pillars are the drivers of the Armenian global nation today. 

The government of the Republic of Armenia is our primary reference to sovereign governments. Some democracies, such as the United States, elect their leader (president) for four years. The primary mechanism for accountability is the checks and balances provided by the three branches of the government. The ultimate process is, of course, the election itself where the citizens have the final say. There are rare circumstances of impeachment within a term. To date a sitting President has never been removed. In a parliamentary system, many nations have a “no confidence” provision where a prime minister can be removed forcing the majority party to offer a new candidate or call for new parliamentary elections. In the Armenian community, our most prominent institution is the church. The leader of the church, the Catholicos, is elected by an assembly of lay and clergy. This is a very unique process since Catholicoi remain in office usually until their earthly life concludes. The diaspora organizations are essentially a loose confederation of major international organizations (ARF, ARS, AGBU, etc.) and regional groups of nonprofits that may be active in one or more host countries. Cooperation and coordination is self-motivated only as there are no formal interorganizational mechanisms. There have been a few recent attempts organized by the High Commissioner of the Diaspora and also the Future Armenian initiative to integrate the global Armenian nation, particularly the diaspora and the homeland.

In my travels within our community, whether in the diaspora or the homeland, within the church or the secular arenas and particularly among volunteer-based organizations, we often hear of what many term the “leadership crisis.” I have participated in numerous panel discussions and focus groups on our challenges as a community, and the overwhelming consensus centers around leadership. The leadership crisis can take many forms – corruption, ineptness or simply a power motivation that neutralizes impact. The perception from the constituents becomes the reality. For example, when there is a financial accountability issue and the public trust is compromised, reconciliation may take years. Public views on leadership may be directed towards individual elected officials such as Prime Minister Pashinyan, someone indirectly elected by a representative forum such as Catholicos Karekin II or towards elected governing bodies such as the ARF Bureau, the AGBU BoD or numerous regional church bodies and nonprofit groups. Of course, being held accountable by the public can be a fickle process as it may be fed by fact, conjecture or rumors. We tend to focus on personalities rather than systemic causes. Regardless there is a definitive frustration with our leadership that is connected to the direction of our global nation. 

Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan pictured inside the National Assembly on the day opposition deputies demanded his resignation, May 4, 2022

The Prime Minister is unpopular currently based on his foreign policy “peace agenda.” He is addressing very sensitive subjects with our enemies. Some polls suggest a majority of the population in Armenia is opposed to the concessions and the direction of the negotiations. We know how the people of Artsakh feel as they have expressed their views consistently and publicly on the issues of self-determination. Based on the expressions of the diaspora press, public events and organizational statements, there seems to be general disappointment in the western diaspora. Frequently, disagreement is a reflection of a separation between leaders and those they have been elected to serve. Armenia’s government has been fairly isolated internally. They control the parliament and other sectors of the society. They don’t seem to be in a collaborative mood by avoiding the inviting of “opposition” leaders into the dialogue. Armenia has never really had a political opposition and this a major shortcoming in developing democratic institutions. Political groups opposed to the sitting government is not the definition of an opposition. The opposition parties have rarely had a critical mass of MPs sufficient to enable healthy tension in the legislative process. The current and previous administrations have controlled the Parliament with one party domination. In 2018 with the advent of the Pashinyan era, Armenia simply traded the Republican Party for the Civil Contract Party. There were a few exceptions, but by and large opposition parties either lose their legislative mandates or remain a substantial minority. This changes all the dynamics of checks and balances essential to a functioning democracy. In 2021, a little over six months after the devastating loss in the 44-day war, the Armenian people re-elected the administration most blamed for the loss with a substantial majority. Despite the humiliation of the war, most Armenians saw the choices as the current regime versus a return to the past. They chose the current administration as having less risks. Many at the time advised Pashinyan not to interpret this as a mandate given the limited choices. He has approached his term as a mandate which has only further heightened the political conflict. Now many Armenians who elected him are frustrated. We can blame Pashinyan, but we also need to understand the price we pay for systemic weaknesses. The majority of political parties in Armenia have no parliamentary mandate, so they are relegated to small public rallies and using the media. They have no role in the governing process. For a country with widespread opinions, there is little diversity in the government. Governments change as we learned in 2018, but the check and balances are essential to policies that connect common citizens to their leaders. The process today is too centered around personalities and not policies. Leadership comes from articulating a vision that connects people together in a productive direction. Compassion is a critical element of patriotism.

I am very disheartened by the duplicity of the thinking in our church. Our Catholicos in Holy Etchmiadzin is controversial in terms of his management and leadership. None of the exalted democratic forums in the church will touch the issue, but it is commonly discussed informally. A substantial number of Armenians will not send money to Etchmiadzin because they are concerned about accountability. Our people are anxious and fearful, yet the church leadership is reluctant to immerse itself in what they consider “internal” matters. Transparency is essential to garnering trust. In its absence, perception rules the day. These are issues of national importance not limited to “politics.” Recently, the church issued a clear statement on its opposition to the government’s Artsakh policy. Outstanding, but too little and way too late. Statements are great, but isn’t that what we are tired of getting from outsiders? Now we are supposed to be inspired by a ceremonial statement from the church. How about the clergy leading a peace march to the Artsakh border in the name of our Christian faith and heritage? Leadership is something people need to experience that impacts their lives. Our faithful in America have not received a pontifical visit from the Catholicos of All Armenians in many years – long enough that our young generation have no recollection. There have been numerous “private” visits with selective meetings with no public itinerary. Why? Our leaders have this responsibility to spiritually feed their flock. Sometimes leadership is just about being accessible and visible. Karekin I of blessed memory understood this superbly. If our leaders expect respect, support and followers, they need to be visible, accountable and compassionate to the needs of common Armenians.

We are all distraught over this scandal emerging at the Patriarchate in Jerusalem. Patriarch Nourhan has been complimented for his commitment to strengthening the Armenian Holy presence in Jerusalem. The news of the controversial leasing of strategic land to an outsider for development has sent shockwaves through the community. From a leadership standpoint you can’t have it both ways. You can’t defrock a priest for his role and not take responsibility for all decisions as the leader. This type of experience damages the trust of people in their leaders beyond our tolerance. Why do some leaders think they are above reproach? In the matters of the church we often confuse respect for the position of clergy with holding all leaders accountable. Most of the laity would rather discuss controversies in an informal capacity rather than confronting them in a transparent manner that could prevent problems. In communal life, most of us do not want to be relegated to a “troublemaker” that could disrupt our social standing. We are more comfortable on the periphery of known issues and as a result have to accept some of the responsibility.

It is essential to internalize that when we exit the dialogue due to distractions or not caring, we are enabling the leadership crisis. I recently read a post by digital journalist Wally Sarkeesian that 100,000 Armenians were enjoying the current wine festival but few would go to Republic Square to protest. My sense is that the political instability over the years has given way to ambivalence because most people feel they can’t change anything. This is very dangerous for a democracy. Pashinyan is a politician, and as such, when he sees limited public opposition, he would naturally take it as an endorsement or at least a cautionary green light. The crisis of leadership can emerge anywhere in our global nation. How many times have we seen leaders in our diaspora motivated by power and egos versus compassion for our people? We hear the rhetoric but we have seen too many good minds exit the scene due to a lack of compassion by our leaders to bring our people together. Power and authority can be great enablers or can be tragic distractions. When retaining power becomes the main objective, the people are usually on the short end. We are all citizens of the Armenian nation: diaspora, homeland, secular, spiritual, organizational and individuals. As such, we each have a responsibility to encourage, mentor and nurture each other for the betterment of our global community. We also have the responsibility to, with a pure heart, speak up when leadership and authority are estranged from the mission. Focusing on individuals feeds our need for gossip, but the mission is the only variable that counts. Don’t turn your back on our challenges.

Svante Cornell (center) visits Shushi on a tour organized by the government of Azerbaijan (Twitter)

In the summer of 2000, Svante Cornell drove a motorcycle from Azerbaijan to Turkey to deliver the first barrel of Caspian Sea oil along the newly inaugurated Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. His motorcycle was sponsored by Azercell, Azerbaijan’s chief telecommunications company. A photo from the trip features a smiling Cornell carrying a bright blue barrel of Azerbaijani crude in his sidecar through dry mountainous landscape. 

Pictures of the trip have since been deleted from the website of Cornell’s consulting firm. The photos, obtained through the Wayback Machine, also show Cornell standing at the center of a team of 12 in front of SOCAR, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic, and a shot of Azerbaijan’s former President Heydar Aliyev addressing the group as “great politicians.” 

Cornell is among the American scholars who has built a successful career writing about Azerbaijan’s politics while cultivating a relationship with its government. He is the chair and co-founder of the Central-Asia Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (CACI), a joint research center that encourages “Americans and Europeans to enter into an active and multi-faceted engagement with this region,” as stated on its website. The CACI was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University until 2017, when it joined the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), a think tank based in Washington, DC. 

Sources show that over the years, Cornell has received consistent communication from lobbyists who represent Azerbaijan. A review of over 200 pages of FARA filings reveals that Cornell and other key figures from the CACI and the AFPC for years were in close contact with lobbyists from the Podesta Group and the DCI Group, LLC. Cornell also directs a research center partly funded by companies with financial interests in the oil-rich South Caucasus nation. He has worked as a consultant to companies involved with security, energy and defense in the region.

The government of Azerbaijan spends hundreds of thousands of dollars every year to influence scholars at preeminent universities in the United States and shape public opinion of its image. Lobbyists meet and communicate regularly with scholars from institutions including Harvard, Georgetown, Tufts and Boston University about US-Azerbaijan ties and Azerbaijani public relations. Between February and June of 2016 alone, the Podesta Group received $379,325.73 for its work on behalf of the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, according to a document filed with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). FARA requires agents hired by foreign entities, including foreign governments, to disclose their activities. 

Among the funders of the CACI are oil, gas, mining and tobacco companies with economic interests in the South Caucasus. An archived brochure from the CACI website from 2006, which has since been deleted, states, “Over the years, many corporations active in the region have also provided open-ended support, including Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Newmont Mining, Phillip Morris, and Unocal.” At the time, both Exxon-Mobil and Chevron were invested in Azerbaijani oil fields. 

In turn, Cornell’s academic writing shows a bias in favor of Azerbaijan. He has published articles celebrating Azerbaijan’s reforms and anti-corruption efforts, blaming Armenia for its war with Azerbaijan in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) in 2020, and encouraging cooperation between Azerbaijan and the United States.  

Azerbaijani Presidnet Ilham Aliyev leads conference with academics from around the world (President of Azerbaijan)

“A long overdue generational change is taking place in Azerbaijan’s political system, accompanied by what appears to be a serious effort to wean the country off its dependence on oil and to make its state institutions more responsive to the population’s needs,” Cornell writes in a 2019 article published in The American Interest titled “Azerbaijan: Reform Behind a Static Façade.” “The reform effort in Azerbaijan provides an opportunity for the U.S.-Azerbaijan political dialogue to be centered on positive cooperation.” Cornell’s favorable depiction is entirely at odds with any objective account of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan is an oil-wealthy dictatorship whose ongoing widespread corruption and systemic human rights violations are well-documented by Western journalists and human rights groups. The country has remained in the bottom third of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index since 2012, and received a score of 23 out of a 100 in 2022, 0 being highly corrupt. 

The Podesta Group represented the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the United States from 2009-2017. The firm sends “informational materials” on behalf of the Azerbaijani Embassy to public officials and media outlets, according to its FARA filings. It also counsels the embassy on US policy, informs nonprofit organizations about global energy security and regional stability in the South Caucasus, and provides the embassy with public relations support.  

A former lobbyist with the Podesta Group who represented Azerbaijan during this time period did not return several phone calls.  

The reputation of the Podesta Group, formerly a lobbying powerhouse in Washington, was damaged when it was subpoenaed during special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election. The investigation alleged that former President Donald Trump’s campaign chairman Paul Manafort hired the firm to influence American media and public officials on behalf of pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians. Charges brought against the firm were dropped in 2019. 

From 2014 to 2016, the year that the Podesta Group suspended its operations, the firm contacted Cornell 19 times by email, according to numerous FARA filings. The firm also emailed S. Frederick Starr, co-founder of the CACI, nine times and held several meetings with Ilan Berman, senior vice president at AFPC, and Stephen Blank, senior fellow for Russia at AFPC. The subjects of the emails and meetings were either Azerbaijani public relations or US-Azerbaijan relations.

Cornell initially denied that he had ever been approached by or had any interaction with lobbying firms like the Podesta Group. He said that in his opinion Azerbaijan does not work very actively with lobbying groups in the US.

“What I know about them is mostly what I read in the media, but I personally think their role has been overhyped,” Cornell said in an email. “With some exceptions, it seems to me these public relations firms try to maximize the money they get and minimize the work they actually do.”

In a follow-up email, Cornell admitted that he had been approached by the Podesta Group before 2017, when there was a “more concerted effort by PR firms working with the Azerbaijani embassy or other Azerbaijani organizations reaching out to think tanks including ours” than there has been in the past five years, according to Cornell. 

He said the emails consisted of either “invitations to Embassy events and the like, some of which I responded to and attended, and mailings trying to promote the Azerbaijani position on events relating to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, and possibly some domestic issues, which I largely ignored.” 

Svante Cornell (bottom left) joins an academic conference led by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (President of Azerbaijan)

Among the events Cornell has accepted invitations to include government-sponsored conferences in Azerbaijan and Artsakh, where Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has also been in attendance. On April 28, 2022, he participated in a visit organized by the government of Azerbaijan to the city of Shushi, a strategic city in Artsakh with cultural significance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan that was captured by Azerbaijani forces during the 2020 war. American and French ambassadors have refused to visit Shushi in order to avoid the appearance of taking sides in the conflict. 

He also attended a conference on April 13, 2021 hosted by Azerbaijan’s government during which academics from around the world posted questions to President Aliyev. 

“Let me congratulate you and the people of Azerbaijan on the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” Cornell said during the conference, in reference to Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war with Armenia. Azerbaijan launched a full-scale attack on Artsakh and captured most of the disputed territory. 

“It is clear that this historic achievement has changed the politics of the Caucasus region and far beyond. Most importantly, I think it has shown to the world the capabilities of Azerbaijan and the resolve of Azerbaijani statehood,” Cornell said during the conference. 

Among the academics who attended the conference was Brenda Shaffer. Shaffer regularly publishes scholarly articles on the CACI website, including several she penned jointly with Cornell. 

A 2015 investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project uncovered that the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard led by Shaffer was set up with funding from the US Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, a pro-Azerbaijan pressure group whose Board of Directors includes a vice president of SOCAR. 

“Supported by an overseas regime and an assorted network of overt and undercover lobbyists, [Shaffer] used oil money to build her academic credentials, then in turn used those credentials to promote Azerbaijan’s agendas through Congressional testimony, dozens of newspaper op-eds and media appearances, countless think tank events, and even scholarly publications,” the article says. 

Shaffer and Cornell both also serve on the board of advisors of Caucasus International, a foreign policy journal based in Baku. 

Brenda Shaffer and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (Twitter)

Alex Galitsky, program director at the Armenian National Committee for America in Washington, says that attending government-sponsored academic conferences in Azerbaijan and having direct ties with think tanks and academic institutions in the country are two key indicators that scholars have a close connection to the government of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan relies on these scholars to influence public perception around the world in favor of its political interests. 

“They are shaping the public opinion of an elite group of thought leaders, scholars, policymakers and academics in the way they engage on these issues,” Galitsky said in an interview. 

In turn, such scholars publish writings promoting cooperation between Azerbaijan and the United States.

“They say it’s in the interest of US stability and power projection that countries like Azerbaijan are propped up, and in the same breath dismiss the significance of Azerbaijani human rights abuses and autocratic conduct, saying these things are irrelevant in the calculation of how the United States should engage with a country like Azerbaijan,” Galitsky said. 

In addition to his contacts with the Podesta Group, Cornell also attended a meeting with representatives from the DCI Group, LLC. The DCI Group represented the Embassy of Azerbaijan in the United States from 2012-2013. On October 14, 2013, a representative from the DCI Group met with Cornell for breakfast, according to the organization’s FARA filings. A year earlier, on October 9, 2012, the DCI Group emailed Cornell “regarding his book Azerbaijan Since Independence, his relationship with the Ambassador and his insights and future collaboration on Azerbaijan issues.” The purpose of the email was to “influence US policies on behalf of the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

A review of Azerbaijan Since Independence by Joshua Kucera, the former Caucasus editor at EurasiaNet, calls Cornell “generally pretty pro-Azerbaijan.”

Several lobbyists at DCI Group either did not return several emails or declined to participate in an interview. 

Cornell said that the meeting was set up by a former student of his from Johns Hopkins who worked at DCI Group and wanted to learn more about Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. He said the student and her colleague from the firm “showed up with copies of my book with post-it notes sticking out of the book, points on which they wanted to ask questions.” 

“I remember being slightly miffed by this rather crass attempt by a well-paid for-profit company getting educated for free, but I obliged as a favor to a former student,” Cornell said in an email. 

While teaching at Johns Hopkins, Cornell also led a consulting group he co-founded called Cornell Caspian Consulting, LLC. The company “provides counsel to private or public contractors” on security issues, energy development, defense and military matters, and business matters, as well as “contacts with regional firms, organizations, or governments” in the Caucasus, Central and Southwest Asia, according to its website. 

Cornell Caspian Consulting “encourages its staff to keep a close relationship with institutions engaging in policy-relevant academic research.” “Most CCC staff keep a part-time position in universities, think tanks or research institutes,” its website reads. 

Cornell participated in the launch of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in 2000 as a representative of Cornell Caspian Consulting. 

Galitsky says it can be difficult to identify the financial ties between the government of Azerbaijan and its network of scholars promoting its interests around the world. 

“It’s so behind the scenes and non-transparent that it allows people with direct overt relationships with Azerbaijani officials to get off scot-free and not be seen as tainted by Azerbaijan’s oil money and bribery. It allows them to maintain legitimacy and continue to promote the Azerbaijani regime’s propaganda in these circles with full credibility,” Galitsky said.  

However, the covert nature of Azerbaijan’s lobbying to academia allows it to carry on without scrutiny.

“They don’t want the perception that their strongest advocates and allies in academia and scholarship are on their payroll, because that would invalidate a lot of the work they’re doing,” Galitsky said. “People would see it as what it is—a ploy by Azerbaijan to influence American public opinion.”

The International Armenian Literary Alliance (IALA) is proud to launch three grants for creative writing and translation—each worth $2,500—to one writer and two translators. Applications will be open from September 1-30, 2023, and the winners will be announced in December 2023.

IALA’s Creative Writing Grant will award $2,500 annually to one Armenian writer whose work-in-progress shows exceptional literary and creative ability. In 2023, the grant will be awarded for a collection of poetry, and in the coming years, to works of creative nonfiction and fiction, as well as other mixed genre forms. The grant will be judged by Gregory Djanikian and Raffi Wartanian.

IALA’s Creative Writing Grant, made possible by a generous donation from the Armenian Allied Arts Association, is meant to foster the development of contemporary Armenian literature in English through an annual monetary award and support Armenian writers who have historically lacked resources in the publishing world. 

The Israelyan Armenian Translation Grant from IALA will award $2,500 to one translator  working from an English source text into Eastern Armenian, whose work-in-progress shows exceptional literary and creative ability. In 2023, the grant will be awarded for a work of literature (in any form) that stimulates the imagination of young adults at a formative time in their development. In the coming years, the grant will also be awarded to translators working from English source texts into Western Armenian. The 2023 grant will be judged by Anna Davtyan, Armen Ohanyan and Zaven Boyajyan.

Despite the growing number of translated works from English to Eastern Armenian in recent years, translated literature remains an area that needs further attention and development. IALA’s Israelyan Armenian Translation Grant, made possible by a generous donation from Souren A. Israelyan, supports translators working with literature written in the English language through a monetary award. 

The Israelyan English Translation Grant from IALA will award $2,500 to one translator working from Eastern Armenian source texts into English, whose work-in-progress shows exceptional literary and creative ability. In 2023, the grant will be awarded for a work of literature (in any form) written in Eastern Armenian and published any time after 1900, and in the coming years, to works written in Western Armenian. The judges for this grant will be announced later.

Given the traumatic history of the Armenian diaspora, many readers are unable to read works in the original Armenian, and therefore, have centuries of literature inaccessible to them. Translators working with Armenian texts have traditionally lacked resources in the publishing world, as well as access to other funding, due to the overwhelming influence of so-called “majority languages.” IALA’s Israelyan English Translation Grant, made possible by a generous donation from Souren A. Israelyan, supports translators working with contemporary Armenian literature through a monetary award. 

IALA will support all grant recipients in promoting their publications through marketing on our website and social media channels, book reviews, readings and discussions.

For more details, full eligibility criteria and more information on past grant recipients, please visit IALA’s website  or contact IALA’s program manager Hovsep Markarian at [email protected]. 

LYNCHBURG, Va — An online campaign is calling upon the National Association of Christian Lawmakers (NACL) to cancel a planned speech by Azerbaijani Ambassador Khazar Ibrahim in solidarity with the Christians of Armenia – the world’s first Christian nation – facing existential threats from Turkey and its oil-rich ally Azerbaijan.

Ambassador Ibraham is listed as a speaker at NACL’s 2023 policy conference scheduled for June 8 through 10 at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia. This invitation only event is “for Christian lawmakers, faith leaders, policymakers, believers, pastors, NACL members and supporters from around the United States.” Azerbaijan has attacked and ethnically cleansed vast areas of Artsakh – a Christian land and democratic state on the frontiers of global faith and freedom – executing armed and bound Armenian prisoners of war, using prohibited munitions and recruiting jihadist, ISIS-aligned mercenaries from Syria.

The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) has called upon NACL to withdraw its invitation to Ambassador Ibrahim, tweeting: “Armenians – sons and daughters of the 1st #Christian nation (301), fellow brothers & sisters in Christ – call upon @ChristLawmakers  to cancel plans to platform the ambassador of Azerbaijan, a cruel oil-rich dictatorship ethnically cleansing 120,000 indigenous #Artsakh Christians.”

A national ANCA call-in campaign – engaging Christian, Jewish, Muslim and other faith-based communities – is asking concerned citizens to ask former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, “consistent with the Christian values that guide NACL, to withdraw the invitation to the Ambassador of Azerbaijan, a country hell-bent on eradicating #Armenia – the first Christian nation (301 AD).”

The submission deadline for the International Armenian Literary Alliance’s annual Young Armenian Poets Awards (YAPA) has been extended until June 14, 2023. YAPA, organized in partnership with h-pem, is a contest for exceptional Armenian writers between the ages of 14 and 18.

Over the past two years, YAPA has provided a space for young Armenian writers from all over the world to express themselves and have their voices heard on the global stage. This year is no exception.

This year’s entrants are asked to submit work that grapples with the notion of visibility as it relates to Armenian identity and experience. How visible are Armenia and Armenian issues on the world stage? What is the extent to which we feel visible as Armenians in our respective communities outside of Armenia?

Submissions – to be read by IALA board members and judges Gregory Djanikian, Armine Iknadossian and Raffi Wartanian – are encouraged from any young writer who identifies as Armenian, regardless of gender identity and _expression_, sexual orientation, disability, creed, national origin, socio-economic class, educational background, personal style/appearance, citizenship and immigration status or political affiliation.

Monetary prizes will be granted for the top three poems, which will be published online on the h-pem website and shared on IALA’s social media platforms in the fall. Winning authors will be invited to read their work at IALA’s annual Emerging Writers Showcase.

“Literature is a vital element of a people and a culture⎯we are our stories,” says founder Olivia Katrandjian. “As writers, we must support each other if we want to thrive not only as individuals, but as a literary community. As a people, Armenians must support our writers if we want the world to listen to our stories. IALA will provide a platform through which young Armenian writers can be heard.”

“We continue to honor and create a platform for the next generation of exciting Armenian poets who have so much to teach us,” says contest director Alan Semerdjian, “and we’re thankful for those who will spread the word about this fantastic opportunity.”

“Being involved in the Young Armenian Poets contest gave me a way to put the feelings I had been struggling to understand for years into flowing sentences and share them with the world, enabling me to see how my words can truly affect others and touch their hearts,” says 2022 YAPA winner Ani Apresyan. “Winning recognition and hearing what other like-minded Armenian youth have to say fills me with indescribable hope for the future that Armenia is taking steps towards fostering.”

For more details, full submission guidelines, and more information on past winners, please visit IALA’s website or contact Young Armenian Poets Awards founder and director Alan Semerdjian at [email protected].

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan (RA Prime Minister)

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the inauguration of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who extended his two-decade rule by another five years.

Pashinyan was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on his electoral victory. “Looking forward to continuing working together towards full normalization of relations between our countries,” Pashinyan tweeted on May 28, the day of the runoff elections in Turkey.

Erdoğan won with 52-percent of the vote, defeating Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of an opposition coalition, who earned 48-percent of the vote. The newly reelected president did not secure a majority vote in the first round of election on May 14, triggering a runoff. Erdoğan’s faction, which includes the Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party, won a majority of seats in parliament, securing 322 of 600 seats. 

Erdoğan’s swearing-in ceremony was held in Ankara on June 3. It was also attended by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Pashinyan was joined by Ruben Rubinyan, special envoy for the ongoing negotiations on normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey. 

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (front row) and Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan (second row) at Turkish President Erdogan’s inauguration (Twitter)

Pashinyan’s attendance was met with mixed appraisal. Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian criticized Pashinyan’s presence and said Armenia had “nothing to lose” by not attending the swearing-in ceremony. 

“Pashinyan does not understand that he cannot woo Turkey on the matter of the settlement of Armenia-Turkey relations by providing aid after the earthquake in Turkey and attending Erdogan’s swearing-in ceremony,” Oskanian wrote. 

“Pashinyan did not represent the Armenian people in Ankara, but rather himself,” he continued. 

Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Turkish journalist and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute, called Pashinyan’s attendance a “very bold and smart move by the Armenian leader, who is trying to preserve the fragile peace with Azerbaijan and keep the momentum on normalization with Turkey.” 

Armenia and Turkey have been engaged in talks to establish bilateral relations since December 2021. On July 1, 2022, special envoys appointed for the normalization process announced the first major breakthrough in negotiations. The envoys agreed to “enable the crossing of the land border between Armenia and Turkey by third-country citizens.” They also agreed to commence direct air cargo trade between the two countries. 

Pashinyan and Erdoğan had their first ever phone call that month and three months later held their first meeting in Prague on October 6 on the sidelines of a pan-European summit.

Negotiations seemed to gain new momentum after the Armenia-Turkey border reopened briefly in February this year for the first time in three decades. Armenia sent several trucks of humanitarian aid and rescue workers to Turkey following the devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake on February 6. 

Former Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said at the time that the humanitarian assistance would bolster negotiations on restoring diplomatic ties and opening the shared border. Çavuşoğlu and his Armenian counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan announced an agreement to jointly repair the Ani bridge and restore other infrastructure along the Armenia-Turkey border. 

Yet progress stalled when Turkey closed its airspace to Armenian flights after a monument was unveiled in Yerevan commemorating Operation Nemesis.

Operation Nemesis was a mission organized in the 1910s and 1920s by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation to assassinate the Ottoman leaders who orchestrated the Armenian Genocide. Deputy mayor of Yerevan Tigran Avinyan called the monument “a clear record of the fact that the crimes of history do not go unpunished, regardless of how the international community reacts,” during its unveiling ceremony on April 24, the annual day of remembrance of the Armenian Genocide. 

The Turkish Foreign Ministry released a statement condemning the monument and warning that it would “negatively affect the normalization process.” 

“Such provocative steps, which are incompatible with the spirit of the normalization process between Türkiye and Armenia, will in no way contribute to the efforts for establishment of lasting and sustainable peace and stability in the region,” the statement reads.

Çavuşoğlu later announced that Turkey had closed its airspace to Armenia in response to the monument. Chair of FlyOne Armenia Aram Ananyan said that Turkish aviation authorities had prohibited the airline from operating flights to Europe through Turkish airspace. A FlyOne Armenia plane operating a flight from Paris to Yerevan was forced to land in Moldova. 

Pashinyan called the erection of the monument a “wrong decision.” 

“The government did not make that decision, and one of the biggest flaws of democracy is that the government or head of government doesn’t control everything and everyone, including our team,” Pashinyan said during an interview with RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. 

The Armenia-Turkey border has been closed since 1993, when Turkey closed its border with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the first Artsakh War. In 2009, the countries signed two bilateral protocols brokered by France, Russia and the United States. The Zurich Protocols would have opened the border, established diplomatic relations and created a joint historical commission to study the Armenian Genocide. However, the protocols were never ratified or implemented under pressure from Azerbaijan, which opposed normalization of relations without a resolution of the Artsakh conflict.

Armenian authorities have insisted that the current normalization process must remain separate from ongoing talks with Azerbaijan on the Artsakh conflict. However, Turkish authorities have said that Turkey is coordinating its decisions with its close ally Azerbaijan.

According to Turkologist Ruben Safrastyan, Erdoğan will likely strengthen Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan and “seek to resolve the Karabakh conflict in accordance with the interests of Azerbaijan” during his new presidential term. He will also set further preconditions on normalizing relations, including “demand that Armenia renounce seeking international recognition of the Armenian Genocide” and “open communication through the Syunik region of Armenia, which is called the ‘Zangezur corridor’ in Azerbaijan and Turkey,” Safrastyan told Eurasianet.