Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette

Global Security Review

The Republic of Armenia has been under attack by Azerbaijan. Baku may not halt its aggression any time soon. If matters worsen for Armenia, Russia may offer the ultimate trade of sovereignty for security.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Emerging Eurasian Partnership: Armenia, Iran, and India Forge Ties

The changing global order poses significant challenges for nations worldwide, with growing competition and instability emerging as key features of the coming years. The situation in Eurasia is a prime example of this transformation, with the war in Ukraine, growing tensions between China and the US, and upheaval in Afghanistan, among other events, leading to uncertainty and potential conflict in the region.

Small states like Armenia are particularly vulnerable to these changes, as demonstrated by their recent defeat in the Nagorno Karabakh war. Armenia had previously prioritized an alliance with Russia but failed to account for shifting geopolitics in the area, resulting in a military loss to Azerbaijan and subsequent incursions into Armenian territory.

Armenia now faces multiple challenges as it seeks to defend its borders and maintain its independence. In this context, the country must reassess its foreign, defense, and security policy and seek new partners and alliances. One potential opportunity lies in developing closer ties with Iran and India, as both nations share Armenia’s interest in countering Turkish dominance in the region.

These partnerships could offer a much-needed strategic advantage for Armenia, with Iran’s recent military drills along the Azerbaijan border serving as a reminder that verbal statements alone may not be sufficient to deter aggression. As the global order continues to shift, Armenia must adapt quickly to ensure its future security and stability.

https://gvwire.com/2023/04/28/emerging-eurasian-partnership-armenia-iran-and-india-forge-ties/

Armenia Is Ready to Relinquish Nagorno-Karabakh: What Next?

Kirill
Krivosheev
Relations with Russia will have to be overhauled, since the main subject of discussion—Karabakh—will disappear. For most Armenians, the Kremlin will be seen as an unreliable ally that abandoned them in their hour of need.

A turning point has been reached in the long-running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Last week, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia could only achieve peace on one condition: that it limit its territorial ambitions to the borders of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In other words, it must relinquish its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, having fought multiple wars with Azerbaijan for control of the mountainous region. 

A few days later, on April 23, Azerbaijan set up a checkpoint in the Lachin Corridor, the so-called “road of life” between Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. It seems that Yerevan is ready to decisively surrender Karabakh.

Pashinyan’s announcement was widely publicized and stunned many with its bluntness, though in essence there was nothing new in it. For several years, beginning with defeat in the 2020 war, the Armenian government has tried to find a formula for Karabakh’s future that would satisfy Baku and wouldn’t result in widespread dissatisfaction in Armenia.

As early as April of last year, Pashinyan spoke of a change in priorities. The key issue for Yerevan was not Karabakh’s status, but “security and rights guarantees” for those living there. In other words, Karabakh would be a part of Azerbaijan, but there would be tough negotiations on specific issues such as the status of the Armenian language. The prime minister also tried to avoid responsibility by saying that Yerevan’s decision had been made at the request of international partners “near and far.”

In September, Pashinyan announced that he was ready to sign a peace deal with Baku: and yes, many Armenians would regard him as a traitor, but the main thing was “long-term peace and security for Armenia, with a territory of 29,800 square kilometers”—i.e., the borders of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, without Karabakh. 

Against the backdrop of these statements, Baku has been gradually expanding the area it controls in Karabakh. Yerevan’s international partners didn’t get involved, and the Armenian government decided not to respond, as it would have inevitably angered not only Baku but also international mediators.

Azerbaijan didn’t even face any consequences when it blockaded the Lachin Corridor linking Armenia and Karabakh in December 2022 (Baku maintained that there was no blockade on its part). Armenia’s response was limited to using an alternative route that had opened up in the spring: a dirt track that even off-road vehicles could barely navigate. Even that was soon off limits, however, with the Azerbaijanis shooting at Armenian police using this route and later setting up a checkpoint.

After that, it was only a matter of time before Azerbaijan set up a checkpoint on the main road to Stepanakert, the capital of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. That happened on April 23. Russian peacekeepers didn’t get involved, even though according to the tripartite agreements of 2020, the Lachin Corridor was supposed to be under their control. 

The checkpoint poses numerous new and difficult problems for the Armenians. What documents will Azeri border guards demand? Can they detain Armenians for simply looking suspicious? Will they only allow entry into Armenia, but maintain that there are no grounds to return to Karabakh?

The answers to these questions largely depend on whether the Armenians will accept this new reality. Right now, it seems they already have. Yerevan has realized that, ultimately, neither mass protests nor international partners who do nothing except “express concern” can make a difference to the fate of Karabakh. 

Last summer, the Karabakh Armenians agreed to direct talks with Baku. Officially, the aim of the negotiations is merely to provide electricity and gas to the unrecognized republic, but it’s clear that the talks are covering more than that. Yerevan agrees that the Karabakh Armenians have to make their own deals: this is a concession to Baku that also allows Yerevan to avoid responsibility. 

So what lies ahead for Karabakh? There are no grounds to expect the ethnic cleansing that has been spoken of in Yerevan or the partisan war that Baku could fear. Judging by the comments of the Azerbaijani authorities, they intend to treat the Karabakh Armenians as they do other national minorities, such as the Lezgins, the Talysh, and the Tats. There will be no special autonomous areas or adaptation programs. Still, it won’t be easy for the remaining Armenians in Karabakh to get an Azerbaijani passport. Confronted with the new, brutal reality, they may decide after all to move to Armenia. 

That will give rise to another question: whether ethnic Armenians will be able to sell their property in Karabakh, or whether it will be appropriated. The Azerbaijani authorities will likely take different approaches to the region’s native inhabitants and settlers from Armenia.

Given these circumstances, the most realistic outcome appears to be the mass emigration of Karabakh Armenians. Only elderly residents with strong attachments to their homes will remain. They don’t take part in political life or create problems for the authorities. 

All of this will no doubt anger Armenian society. It’s not just a matter of national pride, but also of material difficulties: it won’t be easy to house around 100,000 immigrants in a country of under 3 million. But these problems are nothing compared with the threat of a permanent, low-level war along the entire length of its border. 

A recent event in the village of Tegh in the Armenian border region of Syunik was a sobering reminder of the reality of that threat. The Azerbaijanis took offense to the fact that the Armenians were building a new guard post there. There was a shootout, and soldiers on both sides—seven in total—were killed. 

The Armenian authorities now know that the EU observation mission that they invited in for the next two years won’t miraculously save them. When the shooting began, the European observers weren’t on site. Their report merely noted that “in the absence of a demarcated border, the border of 1991 should be observed and the forces of both parties should move back to a safe distance from that line.” Yerevan was so disappointed that Pashinyan again spoke of a readiness to place a competing mission from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization on the border. 

There are fears in Yerevan that tensions on the border could continue even after the conclusion of the Karabakh conflict. There is also, for example, the issue of the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, which according to the 2020 tripartite agreement should be linked by road to the rest of Azerbaijan. Disputes on its status risk new escalations. 

The Armenians have already been through the denial and anger stages of grief, and now they are in the process of bargaining. Before they can reach the final stage of acceptance, they will have to go through depression, which will be softened by talk in Yerevan of peaceful development through, for example, the opening of a land border with Turkey and revitalizing economic ties with it. Statements on the widening of cooperation with the United States and EU further the same ends. 

Relations with Russia, meanwhile, will have to be overhauled, since the main subject of discussion—Karabakh—will disappear. For the majority of Armenians, the Kremlin will be seen as an unreliable ally that abandoned them in their hour of need. Only a few opposition figures from the old elites will maintain that this is all Pashinyan’s fault, and that if he had only recognized Crimea as Russian territory, everything would have been different. In all other respects, Moscow’s influence will be on par with that of Ankara, Brussels, and Washington.

 

Azerbaijani “environmentalists” stop protest action in the Lachin corridor

TASS reports that they met with representatives of the Azerbaijani government.

 “Given the partial fulfillment of our demands, as well as the calls of the state representatives, we decided to temporarily stop the protest action,” the statement of the participants of the action says.

 On April 23, Azerbaijan closed the Hakari bridge on the Artsakh-Armenia border and set up a checkpoint at the beginning of the road leading to Stepanakert.

Azerbaijan rebukes France in dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh


By Mark Armstrong  with AFP 28/04/2023 - 13:36

As French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna visits the South Caucasus, Paris is accused of not using its influence on Armenia in the ongoing dispute with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Azerbaijan has accused France of not doing enough to calm tensions in the South Caucasus. 

The rebuke comes as French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna arrived in the region on Wednesday amid renewed arguments between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the long-disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The two countries have fought two wars over the mountainous enclave of Karabakh, and after the latest bout of fighting in 2020, Moscow brokered a ceasefire. 

France has a large Armenian minority, and President Emmanuel Macron has sought to retain Paris's influence over resolving the decades-long Karabakh conflict.

But in the Azeri capital Baku on Thursday, Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov spoke to reporters alongside Colonna claiming that France has not used its influence with Armenia.

 "Over these past years, France has never appealed to Armenia," said Bayramov.

Although France is one of the international mediators in the conflict, Baku and Moscow have recently accused Paris of undermining the peace process.

However, the French foreign minister said that while she believed peace is still possible, Azerbaijan and Armenia could do better in trying to end the conflict.

"Progress towards peace requires the renunciation of the use of force and even the threat of force," said Colonna, "and this is a message that applies to both parties. I could also refer to rhetoric that feeds distrustful behaviours where we need to find the path of trust."

The latest tensions between the two countries flared up last weekend when Azerbaijan set up a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, the only land link between Armenia and Azerbaijan's Armenian-majority region. 

On Thursday, Bayramov said that Azerbaijan had every right to set up the checkpoint on "its territory" and the move was in line with its constitution.

He accused Armenia of using the land link to bring in "arms and ammunition" to Karabakh.

Earlier in the day Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for "a wider international presence" in Karabakh and the Lachin corridor.

He has repeatedly accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to protect ethnic Armenians living in the breakaway region.

https://www.euronews.com/2023/04/28/azerbaijan-rebukes-france-in-dispute-with-armenia-over-nagorno-karabakh 


As Armenia seeks allies in the West, its economic dependence on Russia grows

Arshaluis Mgdesyan Apr 28, 2023

Economic factors arising from the Ukraine war are binding Armenia ever tighter to its longtime strategic partner and patron, Russia. 

Armenia's trade with Russia nearly doubled in 2022, but that growth was mostly re-exports necessitated by the Western sanctions against Moscow.

Armenian producers therefore see little benefit from the increased turnover and instead face growing uncertainty because business is being conducted in the weak and unstable Russian currency. 

The trend threatens to undermine Armenia's cautious efforts to reduce its political and security dependence on Russia and build stronger ties with the West.

Ruble trade hurts Armenian exporters

According to Armenian Economy Minister Vahan Kerobyan, as of March 16 Armenia and Russia are using only rubles in mutual trade, and have abandoned the dollar and euro. 

Gradual de-dollarization of trade has long been on the agenda of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which Armenia joined in 2013, but the sanctions against Moscow over the Ukraine war lent urgency to the switch. 

The Armenian Central Bank has officially welcomed the move. "The implementation of trade without the intermediation of the currencies of third countries is positive, as it protects trading partners and entrepreneurs from the risks arising from fluctuations in the exchange rates of these third countries," the bank's press service told Eurasianet, while acknowledging that ruble-only trade does entail some "risks."

Those risks to Armenian exporters are substantial, Vardan Aramyan, former Armenian finance minister and current public finance management consultant, told Eurasianet. "This is disturbing news for them."

That's because the ruble has been especially volatile since the start of the war and more recently has been on a downward trajectory against the Armenian dram. 

As a rule, an appreciating national currency is bad for a country's exports. And Armenian exporters have already been reeling for the past year because of the dram's surge against the dollar. (That depreciation of the dollar, interestingly, has to a large extent been caused by the influx of dollars from Russians moving their capital to Armenia amid the war and sanctions.)

Businessman Vahe Ghazaryan has been running Noyan, a company that produces soft drinks, jams and canned foods, for more than 20 years. Russia is his company's biggest export market.

He is not happy about the transition to rubles and plans to take measures to protect against its effects. 

"It will certainly create discomfort. In any case, our costs are dollar-dependent. We buy part of the raw materials in dollars, we take long-term loans in dollars, so the dollar still looms behind our transactions," he told Eurasianet.

The transition to ruble transactions and the parallel weakening of the Russian currency come at the peak of economic cooperation between Armenia and Russia. Last year, Russia's share in Armenia's trade turnover almost doubled to exceed $5 billion, which is 35 percent of the total. Russia is also the main export market for Armenia. Forty-five percent of Armenia's exports go to Russia.

This growth is a result of the exodus of Western businesses from the Russian market. But while some Armenian suppliers have managed to expand their business in Russia, most Armenian exports to Russia these days are in fact re-exports of goods from Western countries. 

Aramyan, the ex-finance minister, said that while there are no precise figures for re-exports, it is clear that the minimal growth in Armenian production is not commensurate with a doubling of exports. 

"In 2022 and the first two months of 2023, according to official data, exports from Armenia to Russia increased by two-to-three times. At the same time, agriculture and industry are growing very modestly – by 0.5 percent and 8 percent [in 2022], respectively," said Aramyan.

And Ghazaryan of the Noyan food company is one of many exporters not seeing the benefits of the growth.

"In the current conditions it is very difficult to develop a business. Our main problem is the exchange rate of the Armenian dram, which has greatly increased since last year," he said, adding that he and others in his industry are planning to appeal to the government for help.

Political reverberations

Growing economic dependence on Russia also creates political risks for Armenia, which has recently sought closer ties with the West, in particular the EU.

And Moscow has already signaled its willingness to punish Armenia economically for political ends. 

After Armenia moved towards ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia warned of "extremely negative consequences" for engaging with the ICC. 

Days later, Russia's agriculture regulator, Rosselkhoznadzor, suspended dairy imports from Armenia citing safety concerns. 

This particular ban narrowly hits Armenia's dairy farmers and is only a hint of the pain Russia could theoretically inflict.

In addition to being the main market for Armenian goods, it is the monopoly supplier of gas and other energy resources, including nuclear fuel for the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, which provides 40 percent of domestic electricity generation

Also, many thousands of Armenian migrant workers reside in Russia; Russia accounts for 70 percent of money transfers from abroad to Armenia, which reached a record $3.5 billion last year.

Economist Armen Ktoyan is among many who say Armenia must reduce its dependence on Russia or face political costs. 

"Such an increase in economic dependence, which we have seen over the past year, cannot but affect the politics and the sovereignty of a country. It's natural. In this regard, there is no need to be indignant or fight against it. We must work hard, create alternatives and open other markets for Armenian finished products," Ktoyan said in an interview.

Arshaluis Mgdesyan is a journalist based in Yerevan.

 

Armenpress: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s message on Citizen’s Day

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 10:01,

YEREVAN, APRIL 29, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan issued a message on the occasion of the Citizen’s Day. As ARMENPRESS was informed from the Office of the Prime Minister, the message reads as follows,

“Dear people, proud citizens of the Republic of Armenia,

Today we celebrate Citizen's Day, and what does it mean? We emphasize the democratic nature of the Republic of Armenia, where the people, the collectiveness of citizens, are the only source and bearer of power.

Since the Popular, non-violent, velvet revolution of 2018, no election at any level have been rigged in the Republic of Armenia and the Citizen had the opportunity to make decisions: to elect the Council of Elders, the heads of the communities, the National Assembly and the Prime Minister by free will. The free _expression_ of the voters has become the only formula for the formation of the Government.

This was one of the primary and key goals of the 2018 Revolution, which has been fully realized. There are no political prisoners in the Republic of Armenia, there is no idea or information that cannot be conveyed to the public through television or mass media, social networks, political, public and economic activities are completely free.

Our opponents say that it would be better not have democracy, and not have the disastrous failures we had, particularly in the 44-day war and after, either.

But at least today I will have the courage to say: those disasters came as a result of many years of not having democracy, legality, free civil debate, because of the taboos, stereotypes and "truths" that were created under favorable headlines, but not for the sake of statehood. We failed to overcome these taboos and stereotypes in a timely manner and that was perhaps our greatest failure.

With the use of these taboos, an attempt is still being made today to prevent the development of political, civic and political thought, but our responsibility towards the future will compel us to say: the motherland is the state, which must be concrete, love for the motherland is the legality, citizenship is the identity, the guarantor of security is peace and the Future must be built on these pillars.

And is the citizen of the Republic of Armenia proud?

He or she should and must be proud, because facing epoch-making challenges in this way, developing the country and the economy, not betraying the essence and values of democracy, is the real source of pride.

And hence,

Long Live Freedom

Long live the Republic of Armenia

Long live our children who will live in Free and Happy Armenia.

I love you all, I am proud of you all and I bow to you all”.

The Azerbaijani side stopped the vehicles of peacekeepers delivering humanitarian goods for 14 hours

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 12:30,

YEREVAN, APRIL 29, ARMENPRESS. From April 28, from around 21:00 to April 29, around 11:10, the Azerbaijani security forces blocked the movement of vehicles of the Russian peacekeeping troops delivering humanitarian cargo from Armenia to Artsakh near Shushi, stopping them on the road for about 14 hours.

As ARMENPRESS was informed by Artsakh's information headquarters, a little while ago, as a result of negotiations between the command of the peacekeeping troops and the Azerbaijani side, the movement of vehicles was allowed and they moved to Stepanakert. The trucks contained mainly food and household items, which were loaded in the prescribed manner in the city of Goris of the Republic of Armenia in order to meet the basic needs of the people of Artsakh under siege.

"Actually, the blockade of Artsakh continues at two points: the checkpoint installed near the Hakari bridge on April 23 and near Shushi, with the section blocked since December 12, 2022, where yesterday the agents in civilian clothes of the government of Azerbaijan were already openly replaced by the employees of the law enforcement agencies.

This proves that Azerbaijan is deepening the blockade of the people of Artsakh and worsening the security and humanitarian situation day by day, despite its obligations assumed by the tripartite declaration of November 9, 2020 and other international documents, as well as the decision of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations and numerous calls of the international community," Artsakh's information headquarters said.

Armenian refugees adopt a declaration

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 14:32,

YEREVAN, APRIL 29, ARMENPRESS. In order to make the voice of Armenian refugees, their expectations and demands heard, the conference "Old and new refugees of Azerbaijani aggression: the past, the present, the future" was launched at the K. Demirchyan Sports and Concert Complex, within the framework of which the authorized representatives of the non-governmental organizations that initiated the conference adopted a declaration.

ARMENPRESS presents the text of the declaration.

"Accepted by the refugees of Azerbaijan, Artsakh and Nakhichevan during the conference "Old and new refugees of Azerbaijani aggression: the past, the present, the future" held on in Yerevan, we, the authorized representatives of the non-governmental organizations that initiated the conference,

Noting that since the foundation of 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, Azerbaijan SSR and the current Republic of Azerbaijan have been conducting and are conducting a xenophobic, especially anti-Armenian, racist policy, which aimed and has the goal of expelling from their ancestral homelands or eliminating hundreds of thousands of our compatriots,

Considering that in 1988-1991 in Azerbaijani SSR, and in 1992 in the Republic of Azerbaijan the genocidal actions encouraged by the state (Armenian pogroms in Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad, forced deportation of Armenians from Northern Karabakh accompanied by pogroms) have not been subjected to any legal investigation,

As a result of the genocidal actions of Azerbaijan, hundreds of thousands of our compatriots immigrated to Armenia, were recognized as refugees, or sought asylum by fleeing to other countries.

Over the past thirty years, numerous complaints addressed to the UN Human Rights Committee regarding the return of Armenian refugees and forcibly displaced persons to their homeland and compensation for their property losses have not received a legal solution and remained unanswered.

Bearing in mind that refugees and forcibly displaced persons have the right to voluntary return to their homeland or the part of the homeland in which their physical security, political and civil rights can be ensured according to a number of international treaties, and the danger for Armenian refugees and displaced persons have not only not disappeared, but also after 1988, hatred against Armenians and threats of reprisals were strengthened by state policy in Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan,

Considering that in 1988-1992 then, during the thirty years, Azerbaijan's anti-Armenian, racist policy only strengthened, and, as a result of the 44-day war unleashed by Azerbaijan against Artsakh on September 27, 2020, thousands of Armenians were forcibly displaced from Artsakh and found refuge in Armenia and other countries, and internally displaced persons accumulated in Artsakh, which caused enormous problems related to refugees in the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh,

Considering that the Artsakh refugees of 2020 still do not have a clear legal status, as a result of which they may be excluded from the scope and protection of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

Taking into account that our compatriots who were forcibly displaced from Azerbaijan and Artsakh and temporarily or permanently lost their permanent home are in serious need of political, legal, social, economic and humanitarian support, and the remaining Armenians in Artsakh are under serious threat of Azerbaijani use of force,

Finding that the authorities of the Republic of Armenia, despite the many requests and demands of refugees from the territories under the control of Azerbaijan and forcibly displaced persons who have taken refuge in Armenia and the public organizations representing their interests, a/ during the 35 years, have conducted an exclusively humanitarian-social policy towards them, b/ did not plan and pursue a legal investigation process for the obviously anti-Armenian, racist policy of Azerbaijan, in our opinion, did not even have a strategy for the issues of the return of refugees to the territory of Azerbaijan's control and compensation for property losses, c/ did not take into account the political interests and prospects of the refugees sheltered in Armenia, d/ have been very passive, especially in the fight against the falsification of our history and our national identity, the destruction of our cultural heritage, which has intensified in Azerbaijan in the last 35 years,

Seeing that even the agreement in point 7 of the declaration of November 9, 2020 signed between the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and the Prime Minister of Armenia on the new refugees resulted by the aggressive, criminal war of 2020, which says that "Internally displaced persons and refugees return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring regions under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees" is not being implemented, while the Azerbaijani authorities are unilaterally implementing it, they are already settling the places abandoned by Armenian refugees with people of unknown identity and origin without any supervision,

We announce:

The Governments of the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh should initiate an international political and legal process (including an international judicial process) to call Azerbaijan responsible and demand compensation for the genocidal actions carried out in Azerbaijan (including the Armenian pogroms in the cities of Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad encouraged and organized by the Azerbaijani state).

The protection of violated rights and interests of our compatriots who fled from Azerbaijan and Artsakh and were forcibly displaced should be recognized as a priority of the Republics of Armenia and Artsakh.

All damage inflicted on refugees and forcibly displaced persons shall be subject to adequate, just compensation. The amount and forms of compensation for damages to refugees and forcibly displaced persons should be determined according to internationally recognized principles.

All Armenian refugees and displaced persons, at least those who want to, should be given the opportunity to return to their homeland, a place of their choice, and there should be all guarantees for their physical, political and civil security, including security for their identity.

We propose to the UN Security Council to discuss the policy of Azerbaijan, which constantly gives birth to refugees, and the threats arising from it.

We request and suggest that the international institutions, to which both the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan are members, act as mediators to solve the problem of refugees,

demand the restoration of the Armenian historical-cultural and architectural buildings, churches, the cemeteries at least with historical-cultural value, sacred areas destroyed by Azerbaijan, to restore their falsified identities,

All Artsakh citizens and internally displaced persons who became refugees as a result of the military aggression of the war unleashed by Azerbaijan in 2020 should be given the opportunity to return to their native places, receiving the real long-term guarantees.

That process can start only after implementing point 6 of the statement of November 9, 2020, signed between the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and the Prime Minister of Armenia, according to which "the Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees the safety of movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions through the Lachin Corridor". In fact, it is already the 6th month that the connection between Artsakh and Armenia through that corridor has been disrupted, which leads to the danger of a humanitarian disaster. At the moment, the population of Artsakh is a hostage of Azerbaijan, and the road for returning of Artsakh refugees and forcibly displaced persons is practically closed.

According to point 7 of the same statement, "Internally displaced persons and refugees return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring regions under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees." We ask the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees if they are aware of the actions of unilateral resettlement of internally displaced persons from Azerbaijan and do they supervise it, do they know who they are resettling, and finally why did Azerbaijan start this process unilaterally?

We ask and suggest to the authorities of the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh to start an international legal process, including in relation to the vandalism of our cultural heritage in areas that used to be inhabited by Armenians until 1988, which are currently depopulated.

We request and suggest to the National Academy of Sciences and universities of Armenia to publicize the facts of falsification of books, articles and sources published under the name of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan in one common package, to inform the scientific community, scientific academies and universities of other countries about the facts of the large-scale use of science in Azerbaijan for racist and political goals and ethnophobia. In this matter, we are talking not only about the falsification of the history of the Armenian people, but also about the falsification of the history of the indigenous Caucasian and Iranian-speaking peoples of Azerbaijan and the history of all countries neighboring Azerbaijan, thereby also about the falsification of the history of the same Azerbaijanis.

At the same time we insist that

– without the direct participation of the Republic of Armenia and international support, only through non-governmental and civil initiatives and activities, it is impossible to ensure the protection of the political and civil rights of Armenian refugees and our compatriots who were forcibly displaced from the territory of Artsakh as a result of Azerbaijan's aggression, and the restoration of their violated rights and interests.

In this context, we urge

The Government of the Republic of Armenia, represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, to form a competent state body, organization or a structural unit of the state body dealing with "Refugee Issues", with the help of which a draft national or state policy strategy or concept on the problems of Armenian refugees will be developed and presented to the interested public for discussion. In the future, that strategy or concept will become part of the state policy conducted by the Republic of Armenia and will be a guideline not only for the Armenian diplomatic bodies, but also for non-governmental organizations and civil initiatives on refugee issues.

We also appeal to the authorities of the Republic of Artsakh with a separate call

to assume full political responsibility for the protection of the interests and rights of not only the refugees who have taken refuge in Artsakh or the citizens of Artsakh expelled from their homeland as a result of the Azerbaijani occupation, but also the interests and rights of all our compatriots who have been deported from Azerbaijan and are de facto refugees.

We appeal to international organizations, in particular the UN Security Council, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the authorities of the OSCE Minsk Co-chair countries, the heads of accredited diplomatic missions in Armenia, to contribute to the solution of the issues raised by us and to involve us in effective cooperation in that context.

With a special appeal, we call on our compatriots who emigrated from Azerbaijan, Artsakh and Nakhichevan at different times and took refuge in different countries of the world, their descendants, as well as to non-governmental organizations that have been dealing with Armenian refugee issues for years, suggesting to unite on one platform and consolidate our efforts and resources to ensure the effective struggle for the protection of the rights and interests of our compatriot refugees and displaced persons.

We hereby announce the goal of creating a common platform for the realization of this idea."