Category: 2023

On February 6, 2023, two earthquakes with magnitudes 7.8 and 7.5—the deadliest in Turkey’s history—hit the Syrian-Turkish border. At least 45,000 people died in Turkey. Another 6,000 lives were lost in Syria. The fallout of the catastrophic earthquake came as President Erdogan faces his toughest re-election campaign yet. Despite speculation that Erdogan may postpone the elections, he declared that presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the agreed-upon date, May 14th of this year.

Turkey is a central power in the Middle East. After the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, its influence increased in the South Caucasus. Thus, any political shift will have an impact on the political landscape of the region. The Turkish President is known for exploiting crises; how he will be able to manage this current crisis and use it to his advantage is still questionable. This article will analyze the impact of the earthquake on Turkey’s domestic politics amid the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections as Turkey prepares to celebrate the centennial of its foundation as a republic in October 2023. 

From Natural to Political Earthquake

An earthquake in 1999 killed nearly 19,000 people in Turkey and exposed the limitations of the social contract between Turkey’s citizens and their paternalistic state. Soner Cagaptay, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of A Sultan in Autumn: Erdogan Faces Turkey’s Uncontainable Forces, writes, “The natural disaster, coupled with an ensuing economic crisis, stoked deep dissatisfaction and spurred the toppling of the secular and often illiberal regimes that had prevailed since the country emerged from the wreck of the Ottoman Empire, in 1922.” Out of the rubble of the earthquake, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist AKP took advantage of the failed crisis response of the government and scored victories in the municipal and parliamentary elections. Will the current earthquake have the same effect as that of 1999 and this time oust President Erdogan and his party?

The recent earthquake impacted a poor and conservative population with mixed Sunni, Alevi and Kurdish backgrounds, which may further reduce support for AKP. Thousands of buildings collapsed. The head of the local chamber of architects was even surprised and observed that the buildings were not reinforced with steel.

In 2022, the Turkish President, while commemorating the anniversary of the 1999 earthquake that destroyed parts of the country, hailed his government’s “urban transformation projects” that would shield his people from future earthquakes. “As humans, it is not in our hands to prevent disasters; yet, it is in our hands to take measures against their destructive impacts,” said Erdogan. The Turkish President is now contradicting his own words. Many Turks are complaining that the government was late in sending humanitarian aid to the damaged zones. The Financial Times reports that the AKP loosened tender rules by awarding lucrative public tenders to businessmen close to the party or relatives to senior AKP officials in exchange for media services or funds in social foundations linked to the President’s family. These activities encouraged illegal construction projects and careless building constructions. The public was also angry at the army for failing to mobilize and assist in the search and rescue operations. In response to these criticisms, the Turkish Defense Minister argued that most of the troops are deployed in Syria and Iraq, hence they cannot leave their posts.

Economically speaking, some experts argue that the total cost of the destruction caused by the earthquakes would even reach $84 billion (around 10 percent of the GDP). So far, the Turkish government has allocated a small portion for disaster relief. The government bets that more financial support may arrive from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The question is whether the opposition is able to organize its ranks and take advantage of Erdogan’s vulnerabilities.

The Road to Elections

In 2018, an opposition alliance formed with the goal to oust AKP. The “Nation Alliance” later expanded to include the participation of two AKP breakaway parties. However, its inability to find common ground with the Kurds boosted the “Peoples’ Alliance” formed between AKP and the far-right MHP in the previous elections. On February 28, 2022, Kemal Kilicdaroglu of the Kemalist Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP) and his long-standing ally Meral Aksener of the center-right Good (Iyi) Party were joined by former AKP and foreign minister Ali Babacan of the DEVA (Democracy and Progress) Party, Ahmet Davutoglu (former AKP Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Future Party) Gultekin Uysal of the Democrat Party and Temel Karamollaoglu of the Saadet Party to sign an interparty agreement. Despite clear ideological divides and differences on issues such as secularism, LGBT rights and the Kurdish issue, the “Table of Six” (as called later) coordinated steps against AKP’s rule and called for the restoration of parliamentary democracy. The country’s third-largest political party, the left-wing and pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP), due to Iyi’s opposition, was noticeably absent from the joint declaration.

There are key factors that will determine peoples’ voting behavior in Turkey. Citizens of Turkey have a notably different political culture than that of other Middle Eastern countries. For example, some who voted for an X candidate in the presidential elections may not necessarily vote for the same candidate’s party in the parliamentary or municipality elections. Based on the results of the municipality or parliamentary elections, one cannot predict if party candidates have received the same percentage of the votes.

One factor is the frustration of the middle class with Erdogan’s economic mismanagement. A growing number of disgruntled middle-class AKP voters, who were the backbone of the party for the last two decades, may cast their vote for other parties. This middle class originated from the cities Malatya, Ainteb and Marash, known as Anatolian Tigers. Impacted by the earthquakes, these cities have displayed impressive growth records since the 1980s. Their middle-class own a number of key small and medium-sized enterprises in the country.
While foreign policy may not be a crucial factor, the Syrian crisis and the Kurdish issue may determine the votes of the Alevis and the Kurds in the country. The CHP usually enjoys the support of the secular Alevis; its party leader happens to be an Alevi. The CHP started its electoral campaign by vowing to send young Syrian refugees in Turkey back to their homeland. The party also calls for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the government of Bashar al-Assad. While some Turks have concerns about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation and its alienation from the West, others do support the country’s central role in balancing between the West and Russia.

Finally, there’s the issue of nationalism and religion. According to some observers, Turkey is witnessing a significant rise in nationalism, and religion continues to play a crucial role in shaping the public sphere. Even though the younger generation is becoming more secular, the bulk of the country in central Anatolia still is conservative, which is why nationalist parties also adhere to cultural nationalism, thus giving space for religious conservatives to support their political agenda.

From a Fractured to a Unified Opposition

On March 3, cracks emerged in the Turkish opposition when the six opposition parties met to discuss their joint presidential candidate. All except Iyi endorsed Kemal Kilincdaroglu, the leader of the largest opposition party (CHP). However, Aksener the leader of the Iyi Party rejected the endorsement and said that she proposed the names of the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, but none received enough support from the remaining five parties. In a meeting with her party delegates, she argued, “The Table of Six has lost its ability to reflect the will of the nation and its decision.” She said that her party “will not bow to this… and not be a bystander of a scavenger of an outdated policy produced for personal profit.” She accused the head of the CHP of putting his personal ambitions over Turkey and later broke ranks with the opposition.

Kilincdaroglu condemned Aksener’s remarks and said that “there is no room on their table for such language similar to Erdogan’s.” He mentioned that the opposition is seeking to “enlarge” and include other parties, hinting at the possibility of extending a hand to HDP and other leftist parties. Kilincdaroglu and the other opposition parties are well aware that without the Kurdish and the votes of the liberals, they will not have a chance to withstand Erdogan in the presidential elections. A common language should be found with the Kurds and the Kemalists to provide certain concessions and bring HDP to the table without alienating the other opposition parties.

This would be a golden opportunity for President Erdogan. However, on the evening of March 6, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara made a sudden visit to the Iyi Party’s leader and convinced her to come back. A few hours later, she attended the official ceremony of announcing the candidacy of the CHP leader. This was a positive development for those eager to put an end to Erdogan’s rule. 

Possible Scenarios as Outcome of Elections

Predicting the outcome of the elections is difficult, given the volatile political situation in Turkey, the political behavior of the people and the regional challenges that may shape or impact the opinion of a segment of the society.

AKP’s alliance with MHP will not guarantee Erdogan a win, given MHP’s weakness; hence, Erdogan may engage in flexibility to attract new votes. In this case, AKP has two choices: ally with Iyi or the HDP. Iyi has announced that it will support the opposition candidate. If AKP approaches the HDP, it will be risky as it will alienate the votes of the nationalists. In return, however, it will win over the votes of the Kurds. Of course, this can be a temporary electoral arrangement as any government in Turkey is not ready to provide concessions to the Kurdish demands. It is also unlikely to form a future coalition government with HDP, given the ideological and foreign policy orientation differences of both parties. However, politics can make the “impossible” possible. Last year, when two HDP MPs visited Beirut, one of the MPs confirmed that HDP is ready for dialogue with the government for purposes beyond elections, arguing that the opposition is also “nationalistic and authoritarian.”

Meanwhile, Kilicdaroglu, who has vowed to end corruption and authoritarianism, is eager to win over the swing votes of the Iyi Party, which is now crucial for both the parliamentary and presidential elections. If Kilicdaroglu and CHP create an electoral alliance with HDP, Kurds would become the king-makers. But how would other parties in the opposition react? How would hardline Kemalists in the CHP and Iyi nationalists react? Will Kilicdaroglu provide any political concessions to the Kurds? Or will this be just a tactical move for electoral purposes? There are also risks that President Erdogan will extend the state of emergency in earthquake-hit states. Under such conditions, elections would be neither fair nor free in these states, handing Erdogan a competitive advantage at the polls. Though some would argue that the HDP will cast its votes for the CHP leader over Erdogan, Kilicdarogu must engage in a balancing act so as not to marginalize the Kemalists and nationalists in his alliance.

Although Turkey’s parliamentary system is not a shining star for democracy, it nevertheless has established a system of checks and balances for years, which Erdogan’s presidential system dismantled. Today, the opposition has a chance to restore the parliamentary system. To do that, it must unify its ranks and show tolerance toward the minorities, mainly the Kurds. Leaders of AKP and CHP will make their moves, but the kingmakers will be the Iyi and HDP. Their swing votes may not only have an impact on the outcome of the elections, but may also shape the future government’s foreign policy orientation toward the West, Russia, South Caucasus and the Middle East.

Stepanakert, December 25, 2022 (Photo: Vahagn Khachatrian)

The global Armenian nation is a simple phrase for an otherwise complicated and diverse community. Bonded by an ancient history and rich culture, we naturally feel an affinity for other Armenians. Who else would search out other Armenians or community infrastructure when visiting another locale? These intangibles are the ingredients of survival. Our diversity, however, can be a double-edged sword. We have the opportunity to learn from a wide array of cultures and strengthen our nation. Likewise, in the diaspora, we have adapted to our host nations, which has impacted our opinions and values. For example, a large portion of the diaspora has existed in western-style democracies that have influenced our views on nation building in the homeland. A significant portion of our people in the homeland and Russia (largest diaspora group) have not enjoyed that experience, and democratic values are either new or still anticipated. In many oligarchic or autocratic societies, what we may view as corruption is an accepted practice of doing business. This is Armenia’s past. As more modern values are integrated in their society, the rejection of corruption has continued. Those of us living in America have been graced with living in a free and powerful nation where its foreign policies are generally decided by its own interests. That has not been the case in Armenia, as it has evolved from total dependency in Soviet times and worked to essentially build a new society based on democratic principles and a free market structure. Our different experiences and impatience have strained our relations on certain issues and created challenges for global integration.

One could speculate that most of the Armenians in the diaspora, particularly in the West and Middle East, are puzzled by the evolving aloofness of Armenia toward Artsakh since the 2020 war. There has been a plethora of political commentary on the geo-political rationale for this dynamic. Perhaps viewing this from the perspective of rank-and-file Armenians will offer us important insight. Of equal importance to managing the political agenda of Armenia is how these decisions or policies may impact the long-term “interests” of the homeland. With the exception of the recent diplomatic barrage by Armenia on the Lachin blockade, Armenia has behaved since 2020 as a defeated nation. Instead of making significant changes in military capabilities and developing new partners, it seems that Armenia is still relying primarily on others to protect its interests. The lesson of the 2020 war is that Armenians must first and foremost rely on their own capabilities and build alliances as a supplement. When the reverse takes place, there are very few, if any, partners who will make that commitment. The Armenian government makes constant reference to the trilateral agreement of November 9, 2020 as the basis for its decisions. While in theory that is correct, Armenia seems to be the only party that adheres to that commitment. Russia, as the new “guarantor” of peace and security of Artsakh (a position relinquished by Armenia after 26 years), has failed to guarantee anything except continuous harassment and violations by the Azeris. Russia has tolerated the terror with reactive, not preventative positions. Russia’s responsibility is clearly outlined (and brokered by them), and Armenians in Artsakh are suffering as a result. 

The infamous blockade is approaching three months. This past week, three Artsakh policemen were murdered by Azeri ambushers. Russia has replaced Armenia as a security player for Artsakh with objectives to serve its self-interest of control. Instability in Artsakh is in Russia’s interest because it creates a pretense of manipulation. Despite consistent failures, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov continues to insist that the Russian mediation is the best solution. After outmaneuvering the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia has been the sole direct mediation player. Azerbaijan, for its part, has never abided by any agreements. Shortly after the 1994 ceasefire that they pleaded for, the Azeris began their almost 30-year reign of terror. Although Armenians are rightfully appalled by the barbaric nature of Azerbaijan, we should keep in mind that although defeated in 1994, they have never behaved like a defeated nation throughout this period. They have continued aggressive diplomacy and military investments. Azerbaijan has never been punished for its constant lack of good faith and criminal behavior (violating borders, illegally holding POWs and murdering at will). Given the values of this rogue dictatorship, why would they not continue this behavior? Even the decision of the highest court on this planet, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that ordered Azerbaijan to open the Lachin Corridor, has been ignored. The UN Security Council has the enforcement responsibility of ICJ rulings, subject to permanent member vetoes. Clearly, Azerbaijan is testing the enforcement will of the United Nations. In order to create another distraction, members of the Azerbaijani government and Artsakh met this past week to discuss the Lachin blockage under the sponsorship of Russian “peacekeepers.” In a sign of arrogance and disrespect, the head of the Azeri delegation made opening comments that the meeting should focus on the “reintegration of the Karabakh Armenians” into Azerbaijan. Such brazen behavior has been enabled by the inaction of others.

The current situation has produced no surprises. The Armenian case at the ICJ was strong and principled, but the Azeris feel no need to change their approach given the meek responses from global authorities. The Russians are focused on their sphere of influence and care little about the lives of Artsakh Armenians. This isolation is what upsets Armenians in the western diaspora. The Armenian government claims it had no real choice in the aftermath of defeat in 2020. While they were in a challenging position, leaving the Artsakh Armenians to singularly address the dynamics described earlier is ominous. As Armenians, we live with the value of defending other Armenians. The irony of this unfortunate matter is that in the long history of the Artsakh negotiations, it began with both Artsakh and Armenia as participants. During previous administrations, it changed to Armenia only, but we must keep in mind that the President was a native of Artsakh. After the 2020 war, the current dynamic was put in place, but Azerbaijan has chosen to ignore the rights of the duly elected Artsakh government. Armenia’s active diplomatic work is essentially for a humanitarian crisis created by the blockade. It is not intended to be a political solutions process. In fact, key members of the Pashinyan government, such as National Assembly president Alen Simonyan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, have repeatedly stated that Armenia supports Artsakh’s direct negotiations with Azerbaijan. In the absence of a legal status, Artsakh is at a significant disadvantage. We must remember that no outside nation came to the assistance of Artsakh when it was brutally attacked by NATO Turkey and Azerbaijan. While there are many nations now demanding the re-opening of the Lachin Corridor, it is primarily based on humanitarian concerns, not political settlements. The OSCE Minsk Group, the EU and the United States are hampered by the diplomatic freeze with Russia over the war in Ukraine. The resulting parallel processes with the West have angered Russia and put Armenia and Artsakh in an even more precarious position. Does anyone expect the “normalization” talks with Turkey to proceed unless Armenia agrees to pre-conditions? What are those conditions? Backing away from Artsakh or removing genocide recognition/reparation? What is the price of an open border?

Armenia must reject this naïve notion that with the decoupling of the political settlement of Artsakh and Armenia (two separate processes), Armenia will find peace. In a recent public commentary, President Ilham Aliyev stated that “Western Azerbaijan (their term for Armenia) is our historical land, and the primary objective is our return. Now the Great Return…for Karabakh is being implemented…there will be a time for a Second Great Return…” There are clear messages to draw from this statement. Artsakh will be emptied of Armenians if Aliyev is successful, and he will attack Armenia not for the “Zangezur Corridor” but for the destruction of the nation we call our homeland. We have heard reactive statements from Yerevan that we should not interpret this current reality as an abandonment of Artsakh. I welcome these comments, but how can Artsakh succeed when we separate our paths and leave Artsakh to negotiate without good faith partners? If Artsakh is lost because we, as a nation, do not fully extend our collective resources, then what impact will the aftermath have on the relations between the diaspora and Armenia? How can Armenia be the center of the global Armenian nation if pieces of that nation are at a distance? If all we worry about are the short-term reactive moves, then our vision is blurred.

I would encourage the Armenian government to utilize its resources and influence with the renewed level of international visibility to ensure a safe landing for Artsakh’s rights. The Turkic nations in the east and the west are bent on our destruction. The world is witnessing the dangerous behavior of the aggressors. Our collective legal teams secured excellent results at the ICJ. That work must continue, but the legal, humanitarian and political paths must be connected. Our enemies and our potential partners are looking at our conviction and commitment. If we don’t collectively stand with Artsakh, then why should anyone else? What would stop Aliyev from overrunning Armenia? The CSTO? EU resolutions? “Expressions of outrage?” The time is now, and Armenia must be a player. We must prevent the depopulation of Artsakh. No one wants to see refugees settle in Armenia and establish a “Nor Artsakh” neighborhood. We already have names such as “Nor Sepastia” and “Nor Malatia” that remind us of our tragic past. The fact that one is a disputed region and the other is a sovereign state is of no concern to Aliyev. We must internalize that idea. It matters little what we think but rather anticipating what he and his band of criminals are thinking. These are difficult but essential concepts for our communities to digest and act upon. I am reminded of something a great patriot who I deeply respect once told me, “In democratic society, we can have different views and still love the same nation.”

WASHINGTON, DC – With Azerbaijan’s blockade against Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) entering its third month and amid Aliyev’s escalating attacks on Armenian civilians, the ANCA is rallying community and coalition support for a Congressional Armenian Caucus request to stop US military aid to Azerbaijan and send at least $150 million in assistance to Artsakh and Armenia, reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA). The request comes in the form of a letter to Appropriations Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations Chairman Mario Diaz Balart (R-FL) and Ranking Member Barbara Lee (D-CA), who have already begun crafting the US House version of the Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) foreign aid bill.

“Well over a hundred thousand Armenians and allied Americans have already asked their US Representatives to stop US military aid to oil-rich Azerbaijan and send American humanitarian assistance to at-risk Artsakh – a powerful groundswell of grassroots activism from all fifty US states and across the American political spectrum,” said ANCA executive director Aram Hamparian. “With Azerbaijan’s blockade now well into its third month and Aliyev steadily escalating his deadly aggression, we all need to step up – meeting with legislators, leveraging coalitions, and relentlessly writing, calling and tweeting to demand concrete action from the elected officials who come asking for our votes every election.”

In a “Dear Colleague” letter sent to Members of Congress, Congressional Armenian Caucus founding co-chair Frank Pallone (D-NJ) noted, “Meaningful increases in assistance to Armenia for important priorities – including supporting populations displaced as a result of Azerbaijan’s aggression and impacted by the blockade of the Lachin Corridor – are essential to ensuring the stabilization of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and paving a pathway towards lasting peace and security in the region.”

The letter includes the following budgetary requests:

— $100 million for security, economic, governance and rule of law assistance to Armenia

— $50 million for Artsakh to provide a comprehensive assistance strategy and support the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh in their rebuilding and resettlement efforts – along with an additional $2 million for humanitarian demining and UXO clearance.

— The suspension of all US military and security aid to Azerbaijan and a State Department assessment of potential sanctions against Azeri officials found to have supported human rights abuses and war crimes.

— Language supporting the Administration’s efforts to secure the release of Armenian POWs illegally held by Azerbaijan.

The ANCA has launched an action platform through which pro-Armenian advocates can write, tweet and call their US Representative to cosign the Congressional letter.

The full text of the Armenian Caucus letter is provided below.

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Dear Chairman Diaz-Balart and Ranking Member Lee:

We write to thank the Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for your longstanding support of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). This includes the important language you incorporated into the Fiscal Year 2023 bill, providing $60 million in funding for Armenia, $2 million in demining assistance for Artsakh, and an assistance strategy for addressing the humanitarian needs from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We ask that you build on these historic investments by considering the inclusion of the below provisions that will help strengthen America’s standing with partner countries in the region and hold Azerbaijan accountable for its ongoing hostilities in Artsakh and Armenia, including the ongoing blockade of the Lachin Corridor. The blockade has intentionally deprived Artsakh’s 120,000 Armenians of essential good, including food, fuel, medical supplies, electricity, and internet access.

Robust U.S. Assistance in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)

Azerbaijan’s inhumane blockade of Artsakh has left the region’s Armenian population on the brink of a humanitarian crisis and threatens to have lasting consequences on the region’s security. These cruel actions are taking place as the people of Artsakh continue to face severe hardships caused by the deadly 44-day war Azerbaijani forces launched in 2020. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 88 percent of the approximately 90,000 refugees displaced to Armenia were women, children, and the elderly. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also acknowledges that an “acute humanitarian crisis” continues for many of these families, including those who have been able to return to Artsakh. Unfortunately, the assistance provided to date by the U.S. government is wholly insufficient to address the overwhelming needs of these people.

The U.S. has historically promoted peace in Artsakh through U.S. government-funded landmine and unexploded ordnance clearance efforts and enabled rebuilding by investing in humanitarian assistance initiatives. We are requesting the State Department and USAID to deliver on the humanitarian assistance strategy mandated in the FY23 Appropriations Bill that lives up to our American humanitarian commitments. This vital package would help provide Armenian refugees with the aid, housing, food security, water and sanitation, health care, rehabilitation, and demining/UXO clearance they need to reconstruct their communities, rebuild their lives, and resettle their homes.

We urge you to include the following provisions in the body of the foreign aid bill:

·     Of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than $2,000,000 shall be made available for assistance in Nagorno-Karabakh to provide humanitarian demining and UXO clearance and $50,000,000 shall be made available to support rebuilding and resettlement efforts by Armenian victims in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as address the long-term consequences of Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor. Such assistance will help to meet basic human needs, including maternal healthcare, drinking water programs, as well as food and energy security and access to internet.

Security, Economic, and Governance Assistance for Armenia

The United States remains uniquely positioned to make important diplomatic advances in the South Caucasus. This is especially true in Armenia, an ancient nation with a modern democracy that continues to make democratic reforms in a region dominated by autocratic leaders. Providing significant assistance to Armenia will help make it more secure, bolster its democracy, sustain economic development, and stabilize its civil society. Providing security assistance to Armenia at this time is especially important as the Armenian people seek international assistance in protecting their sovereignty in the face of a constant Azerbaijani expansionism and authoritarianism.

This critical investment will build on past support for Armenia and Artsakh by the Subcommittee and will help strengthen the U.S.-Armenia strategic partnership, solidify our presence, and grow our influence in the region. We request the following language be included in this legislation:

·     Of the funds appropriated by this Act, not less than $100 million shall be made available for Armenia prioritizing security assistance, economic development, private sector productivity, energy independence, democracy and the rule of law, and other purposes.

Prohibition on U.S. Military Aid to Azerbaijan and Sanctions

Despite assurances by the State Department that U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan has not materially aided aggression against Armenia and Artsakh, it is abundantly clear that the continued waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, amidst Azerbaijan’s unabated policy of aggression, has emboldened this violent pattern of behavior.

President Ilham Aliyev began his brutal 2020 assault on Artsakh not long after receiving over $100 million in security assistance through the Section 333 Building Partner Capacity Program in Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019. Azerbaijani forces used advanced Turkish drones, cluster munitions, and white phosphorus to indiscriminately attack homes, churches, and hospitals that killed thousands during the 44-day war. While a ceasefire halting the war was signed in November 2020, Azerbaijani forces continue their aggressive behavior in the region. This includes an assault on Armenia’s sovereign territory in September 2022, which saw Azerbaijani forces occupy over 50 square miles of territory and perpetrate horrific war crimes such as the execution of unarmed Armenian prisoners of war.

The blockade of the Lachin Corridor that Azerbaijan imposed on December 12, 2022, is designed to deny the region’s Armenian population access to essential humanitarian goods and clearly highlights the Aliyev regime’s unwillingness to seriously negotiate a fair, lasting peace deal. It is imperative that our government stops rewarding behavior that undermines our interests in ensuring a negotiated settlement for this crisis and that we respect the fundamental rights of Artsakh’s vulnerable Armenian population.

The Section 333 funding, along with other U.S. funding to Azerbaijan through the IMET and FMF programs breaks with an over two-decades long policy of parity in security assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan, significantly increasing American support for the authoritarian Aliyev regime. In fact, according to a January 31, 2022, report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the State Department likely violated Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act in sending this and other assistance to Azerbaijan from 2014 to 2021. They did so by not properly consulting and communicating with Congress on what processes they used to determine whether U.S. aid to Azerbaijan could be used for offensive purposes against Armenia.

Holding Azerbaijan accountable is long overdue and must begin with Congress encouraging the Administration to fully enforce Section 907, restricting the Administration’s authority to waive this law, and enacting statutory prohibitions on any new or pending U.S. military or security aid to Azerbaijan. Congress must also urge the Administration to provide a report on Azerbaijan’s eligibility for military assistance under the Leahy Laws. We request that the following language be included in the final SFOPs bill:

·     None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan through U.S. military or security assistance programs. To inform the reevaluation of any future security assistance to Azerbaijan, the Secretary of State is directed to provide a report on Azerbaijan’s eligibility for military assistance programs under existing statutes. Additionally, the Secretary of State is directed to develop and submit to the Committee on Appropriations an assessment of the eligibility of Azerbaijani officials involved in the commissioning of human rights abuses and war crimes under existing statutes.

Armenian Prisoners of War and Captured Civilians

On November 9, 2020, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia signed a tripartite statement to end the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, also known as Artsakh, where all parties agreed that the ‘‘exchange of prisoners of war, hostages, and other detainees as well as the remains of the fatalities shall be carried out.” However, the Government of Azerbaijan continues to detain an estimated 130 Armenian prisoners of war, hostages, and detained persons, misrepresenting their status to justify their continued captivity. We request that the following language be included in the final SFOPs bill:

·     The Committee is concerned by Azerbaijan’s failure to immediately return all Armenian prisoners of war and captured civilians and, thus, (2) urges the Secretary of State to continue engaging at all levels with Azerbaijani authorities, including through the OSCE Minsk Group process, to make clear the importance of adhering to their obligations, under the November 9 statement and international law, to immediately release all prisoners of war and captured civilians.

Again, thank you for your leadership on the Subcommittee. We appreciate your consideration of these requests.

ARS Norian Youth Connect, Columbia University, March 4, 2023

NEW YORK, NY — Students, scholars, young professionals and presenters gathered on Saturday at Columbia University for the 2023 ARS Norian Youth Connect Program. This is the first time in three years that the program has been run in-person.

The program began with introductions by Armenian Relief Society (ARS) of Eastern US board member Barbara-Seda Aghamianz and Dr. Khatchig Mouradian, who has been organizing and leading this program for over a decade. Aghamianz shared a brief history of the ARS, as well as information about its many relief programs to support Armenia, Artsakh, Syria, Lebanon and other communities. She noted that the Youth Connect program began in 1971 and used to be a four-week summertime intensive Armenian educational program. The current model successfully facilitates connection for today’s students and young professionals. She also announced the ARS’ virtual Western Armenian classes for beginners starting on March 14, 2023. They will be held every Tuesday at 7 p.m. 

The first scholar to present was Whitney Adana Kite. Kite is a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University in the Art History and Archaeology Department specializing in medieval Armenian art and architecture. She holds an M.A. in art history from Tufts University and a B.A. in biological anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania. Her dissertation, “The Lay of the Land: Armenian Monasteries in their Local Landscapes,” explores three medieval monasteries (Horomos, Geghard and Tatev) in the context of their topography. Last summer, Kite was a Lily Residential Scholar at the Library of Congress in the African and Middle Eastern Division (AMED).

Whitney Adana Kite

Kite’s presentation for Youth Connect was titled “The Mystery of the Menologium.” A Menologium is a calendar that also documents the lives of saints. Kite recounted her process for identifying six folios that were found at the Library of Congress with no context or information. As an art historian, Kite is trained to look at details in art and manuscripts, such as pigment colors, stylization of letters and form that may provide clues to identify the work of art. After photographing the folios from many angles to document these details accurately, she then looked through hundreds of images that have already been cataloged online and in books to find those with a similar style to the ones she is trying to identify. Through this process, she was able to find the manuscript that these folios were from and tracked down further information about it in Dublin that included sales records and who the scribe would have been. Kite’s findings are important because they can be “in dialogue” with other images of the time and can also contribute to understanding immigration patterns, trade circumstances and even the impact of politics on art at the time. 

Dr. Nareg Seferian

Next, Dr. Nareg Seferian presented “Where is the US? Where is Armenia? A Glimpse into Geographical Imagination.” This was Dr. Seferian’s first presentation since completing his Ph.D. at the School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Tech. Between 2013 and 2016, Seferian served on the faculty of the American University of Armenia after receiving his higher education at Yerevan State University, St. John’s College, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. His doctoral research, supervised by Professor Gerard Toal, investigated the province of Syunik in Armenia in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War. 

Dr. Seferian’s presentation addressed the definition and impact of “geographical imagination,” which is how we perceive or think about a place from our experiences and education. Components include territory and borders, location and relationships and visual discourse (such as maps). Dr. Seferian utilized a hands-on approach to engage attendees by displaying different outlines and images of maps and asking what thoughts and feelings were evoked when looking at each image. As he showed maps of the United States and then Armenia, discourse on the topic evolved into a conversation on identity and geography (with a discussion about terms such as Caucasus, West Asia, Eurasia, Trans Caucasus, South Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Near East and Middle East). The overarching theme was how topographical representation combined with certain labels and education can influence how groups perceive themselves, as well as how others perceive them. These details can impact how disputes and resolutions are handled.

Tatevik Khatchatryan

After lunch, Tatevik Khatchatryan provided an overview of the internships and educational programs offered by the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA). 

Dr. Vatche Isahagian

Then, Dr. Vatche Isahagian, senior research scientist and manager at IBM, began his presentation about artificial intelligence (AI). At least 25 percent of the program at Youth Connect each year has had a focus in the sciences in order to provide well-rounded programming. Dr. Isahagian is a senior member of both the IEEE and the ACM. His research spans a broad set of disciplines across distributed systems, machine learning and business processes. This presentation defined the facets of artificial intelligence, which include thinking and acting both humanly and rationally. Dr. Isahagian shared the history of AI and the numerous ways in which human beings utilize it, from machines that operate automatically to conversations with ChatGPT. Upon examining the benefits of AI, such as education, and the negative aspects of AI, such as a lack of filtering information, attendees began discussing the implications of AI for Armenian issues. Concerns were raised about how to prevent the spread of misinformation through chat bots that are unable to critically examine information they collect.

Dr. Henry Theriault

The final discussion on activism, education and justice was facilitated by Dr. Henry Theriault, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs at Worcester State University, and Dr. Lalai Manjikian, Humanities Professor at Vanier College in Montreal. Dr. Theriault’s research focuses on genocide denial, genocide prevention, post-genocide victim-perpetrator relations, reparations and mass violence against women and girls. He served two terms as president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and is founding co-editor of the peer-reviewed journal Genocide Studies International. Dr. Manjikian holds a Ph.D. in communication studies from McGill University (2013). Her primary teaching and research interests are in the areas of immigration and refugee studies, media representations of migration, the ethics of migration and migrant narratives. Dr. Manjikian also serves as a board member for the Foundation for Genocide Education.

Dr. Lalai Manjikian

During this session, attendees discussed how to effectively engage in activism for current Armenian issues, specifically through the lens of healing trauma in order to not only survive but thrive. Attendees and facilitators tackled questions of how to create global cohesion for Armenians, how to best listen and learn from each other, how to remain focused on the work long-term, even if results are not immediately seen, and where individual and collective efforts are best utilized. The overarching theme is that Armenians should be working toward a sense of security for ourselves and the region as a whole to live in peace. 

At the end of the day, attendees were able to provide feedback about the program and continue to learn from each other and build connections over dinner. These young adults leave the program with new information and inspiration to return to their home communities and contribute to the work being done to help Armenians around the globe.