Azerbijan PPFA Leader Calls Karabakh Authorities Wild Separatists

PPFA LEADER CALLS KARABAKH AUTHORITIES WILD SEPARATISTS

YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. “Wild separatist has nothing to do with
the rights of ethnic minorities,” the leader of the Party of People’s
Front of Azerbaijan Ali Kerimli said at the conference “Azerbaijan and
Europe: Enlarging Cooperation” in Stockholm Jan 26.

He said that when asked “how the Armenian community of Karabakh can
live within Azerbaijan if human rights are not respected in that
country.” Kermili also said that “Armenia’s occupation of Azeri
territories and its consequences” is one of the key obstacles to the
deepening of Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU.

The Critical but Perilous Caucasus

TITLE: The Critical but Perilous Caucasus
SOURCE: Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.) 48 no1 105-16 Wint 2004

Kenneth Yalowitz and Svante E. Cornell
The war on terrorism has brought Afghanistan and the Central Asian
states into the spotlight of world politics, but the nearby region of the
Caucasus between the Black and Caspian Seas, made up of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia, is less well known. It is by no means less important to U.S.
foreign policy. In the military operations in Afghanistan after 9/11, the
three Caucasian states offered their support to the United States. All U.S.
and coalition aircraft transiting from America and Western Europe to Central
Asia flew in the South Caucasian states’ airspace. These two states offered
blanket overflight and basing rights, and their cooperation has been vital
in the war on terror. But the importance of the Caucasus does not stop at
this: the oil resources of the Caspian Sea, especially Azerbaijan and
Kazakstan, are one potential alternative to Middle Eastern oil, and Caspian
natural gas reserves are a possible future source of energy for Western
Europe and Turkey. The Caucasus is again the “Silk Road” linking Central
Asia and Europe. Its location, between Russia, Iran, and Turkey and near
Iraq and the Middle East, gives it great strategic value.
But the South Caucasus is also a troubled region. In the 1990s it was a
hotbed of ethnic conflicts, none of which have been resolved; just over the
Caucasus mountains to the north, Chechnya’s war for independence from Russia
rages on. The entire region has become a center for the illegal drug trade,
transnational crime, and trafficking in women and illegal migrants. Concerns
are also rising regarding the availability in the region of fissile
materials and other components useful for making “dirty bombs.” All of this
has led to “Caucasus fatigue” in the West–the sense that too much economic
assistance and political support has been tendered with too little to show
for it.
However, the strategic relevance of the Caucasus is growing, since
terrorists could gain serious footholds there unless current political and
economic trends are reversed. This is a situation ripe for cooperation among
the United States, the EU, and Russia to resolve the ethnic conflicts,
promote needed reforms, and protect the sovereignty of the three independent
states.

DEADLOCKED CONFLICTS
In addition to the war in Chechnya that destabilizes the entire region,
three other ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus–Georgia’s conflicts with its
South Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities and Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan
over the latter’s Nagorno-Karabakh region–remain deadlocked. The
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is by far the most threatening, since it
involves two independent states and could potentially have larger
humanitarian and regional ramifications.
Close to 1 million Azeris became refugees in 1992-94 as Armenia occupied
Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. The 1994
cease-fire has held, but a decade of negotiations has failed to lead to a
solution, and the refugees remain in refugee camps. The negotiations have
exhausted both Azeris and Armenians, and many in Baku are pressing for a
military solution to restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. As Ilham
Aliyev, who was since elected president of Azerbaijan, noted in an October
2002 speech in Washington, “Azerbaijan’s patience is running out.”(FN1)
While neither conflict has been resolved, the tensions over South
Ossetia have abated somewhat, whereas Abkhazia is still a major issue in
Georgian politics and a much more unstable situation. Tbilisi lost control
there after a 1992-93 war in which Russia supported Abkhazia. The
consequences of the conflict have been severe in human, material, and
political terms. The 250,000 refugees from the Abkhazia conflict form an
important pressure group. As in Azerbaijan, a cease-fire has been in place
for close to a decade, but negotiations have failed to bring the parties
closer to a solution. There have been returns to warfare in both 1998 and
2001, and low-intensity conflict is a constant in the border areas between
Georgia proper and areas controlled by the self-styled Abkhaz government.
The loss of territory was a major humiliation for the people of both
Azerbaijan and Georgia. At present, neither country has the military
capability to take back the lost lands, yet tensions are increasing in both,
and calls for a military solution are becoming ever more common. A political
solution to either conflict, as discussed below, would require a
substantially higher level of involvement on the part of the international
community. Substantial compromises from both sides will be necessary,
preceded by efforts to prepare public opinion on the respective sides of the
conflict.
The War in Chechnya. Just north of the Caucasus mountains, an estimated
100,000 Chechens–one tenth of the population–have been killed in the
ongoing war in Chechnya, and 300,000 to 400,000 have been forced to flee
their homes. The conflict had already spilled over to the independent
Caucasian states in 1999, when some 7,000 Chechen refugees and several
hundred fighters sought refuge in the Pankisi Gorge in northern Georgia.
This led to Russian threats of intervention against Georgia and Azerbaijan,
where some Chechen networks had also established a presence.
The war has also shifted in character. If the first war, in 1994-96, was
primarily an ethnic-based struggle for independence, many Chechen fighters
now are motivated primarily by their Islamic faith. (Russia itself has
cloaked the war in religious and civilizational terms ever since Chechnya
declared independence in 1991.) While Chechnya’s leadership is nationalist
and secular, this religious trend has helped regionalize the conflict and
bring in radical-minded fighters from other parts of the Islamic world, who
challenge the less radical Chechen groups.
Russia is clearly unable to either win the war or resolve the Chechen
problem politically. President Putin staged his 2000 presidential campaign
on restoring law and order there. He has repeatedly asserted that the war is
over: in his state of the union address in May 2003, referring to the war,
he pointedly noted, “All that has finished.” Yet this is far from the case.
Chechen fighters have acquired weapons that have enabled them to shoot down
a dozen Russian helicopters since fall 2002, challenging Russia’s command of
the skies. Russia has also been unable to prevent high-profile Chechen
terrorist acts, such as the bombing of the Russian central administrative
building in Chechnya in December 2002 and the hostage-taking in a Moscow
theater in October 2002, in which 120 hostages died when Russian special
services stormed the building.
These incidents staged by young Chechens (primarily women) illustrate
the ways the collapse of the social fabric in Chechnya is radicalizing the
country’s youth. Growing up with no hope for the future, many young Chechens
are drawn toward radical Islam. The state of war has drawn various radical
Islamic groups to Chechnya, where they propagate extremist ideologies and
jihad. The Middle Eastern funding sources of the radicals provides them with
better weapons than other fighters. That capital, coupled with their high
levels of motivation, enable them to perform daring raids on Russian forces.
This aura of resistance, along with constant Russian abuse of civilians,
pushes young Chechens to extremism.
A political solution to the Chechen conflict would require Moscow to
negotiate with the separatist authorities. Yet so far, Moscow has instead
pursued a policy of appointing the Chechen leadership, with which it then
negotiates. If Moscow called for the October 5 presidential elections in
Chechnya only to sideline the separatists and cement a loyal regime there,
the situation is unlikely to improve.
Weak States. The struggling economies, debilitating ethnic conflict, and
large refugee flows in the region’s three nations have severely hindered the
governments’ ability to create viable state bureaucracies, control and
police their territories, reform their economies, and establish the rule of
law and democracy. Progress has clearly been made in the last ten years: all
three countries have pluralist political systems with functioning opposition
parties, a relatively free print media, and economies that have been
liberalized to varying degrees. This progress has been recognized through
their admission to membership in the Council of Europe (in 1999 for Georgia
and in 2001 for Armenia and Azerbaijan). But on a political level, the
governments have not managed to build stable, let alone democratic, state
institutions.
In Georgia, the fragmented political system has produced no clear
successor to President Eduard Shevardnadze, who returned to Georgia to lead
the ruling State Council in early 1992 and was elected president in 1995 in
flawed elections. [Editor’s note: As this issue was going to press on Nov.
23 it was announced that President Shevardnadze had resigned.] Georgia is
ill prepared to organize free and fair elections and handle the succession.
Relationships among the multitude of parties and candidates are puzzling and
fluctuating. Even leaving aside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the government
barely controls large tracts of the country, such as the Armenian-populated
Javakheti region, the southwestern region of Adjara, or Svaneti and
Mingrelia in the west. Georgia’s very statehood is at risk. Should its
current downward trend continue, it risks either losing its independence
from Russia or simply state failure.
In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the situation is slightly better. While
corruption is widespread in both countries, neither has a government as weak
as Georgia’s, and they do exercise writ over their territories.
Azerbaijan faced its own succession crisis in the run-up to the October
15 presidential election this fall, with President Heydar Aliyev’s health in
decline. Aliyev, one of the Soviet Union’s most powerful men during the
Brezhnev and Andropov eras, had returned to power in 1993 after a brief
interlude of rule by the nationalist Popular Front in 1992-93. Aliyev
effectively safeguarded some stability, which permitted Western companies to
operate with reasonable security in the country’s booming oil industry. But
this came at the cost of the country’s initially positive democratic
development. In August 2003, 80-year-old Aliyev appointed his son, Ilham,
prime minister, putting him in line for the October 15 presidential
election. Ilham is an experienced politician who has held important
positions in the state oil company, headed the national Olympic committee,
and heads the Azerbaijani delegation to the Council of Europe. Aliyev Sr.
withdrew from the race two weeks before the election. With opposition
leaders failing to unite of offer an alternative strategy for the country,
Ilham won by a large majority in an election marred by intimidation and
allegations of fraud and followed by extensive rioting and reported police
brutality.
Armenia’s transfer of power came in the form of a palace coup in 1998
that ousted President Levon Ter-Petrossian. But President Robert Kocharyan,
who moved to Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh only in the late 1990s, has
become alienated from the people. The murder of both the prime minister and
the speaker of parliament during a parliamentary session in October 1999
shocked the country. Some Kocharyan aides were accused of conspiracy and
even taken into custody, and five key witnesses have been murdered or died
in mysterious circumstances. The case is ongoing, but few Armenians think it
will ever be resolved. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh left Armenia with no
economic links to either Azerbaijan or Turkey, which is Azerbaijan’s key
supporter and with which it shares strong cultural, linguistic, and economic
links. Armenia’s economy contracted in the early 1990s to less than 35
percent of its 1989 levels, forcing an estimated half of the country’s
population of 3 million to migrate to Russia, the United States, and Europe
in search of work. Yerevan is working constructively with the IMF, but
unless peace and economic stability are achieved soon, its statehood will be
further weakened due to simple demographic factors and it will become ever
more dependent on Russia for its economic survival and security.
Transnational Crime. One often-overlooked challenge to Caucasian
security is the region’s transnational crime. Situated along the Balkan and
“northern” smuggling routes, the region is an important international center
for narcotics and arms trafficking. Criminal organizations in the Caucasian
states as well as in the north Caucasus within Russia–especially Dagestan
and Chechnya–are active in these areas, in addition to their cigarette,
fuel, and alcohol smuggling. The fact that approximately 30 percent of
Georgia and 20 percent of Azerbaijan are outside effective government
control creates propitious conditions for transnational crime, which has
flourished in the Caucasus. With its proximity to Russia, Turkey, and the
Arab world, the Caucasus is a natural channel for arms smuggling. A flood of
weapons has poured into the region from Russia, Turkey, Iran, Greece and
Western states since 1989-90, when separatist and civil conflicts began.
Criminal organizations involved in the large-scale trafficking of arms and
drugs tend to be highly organized entities with influential leaders and
connections to key state institutions, and in some cases direct links to the
upper levels of government.(FN2) Abkhazia, on the Black Sea coast, is a
particular hub of the drug trade, as it offers easy access to Eastern and
Central Europe and, due to its unrecognized status, does not participate in
any international cooperation efforts that would provide oversight and
assistance. The Caucasus is located between Russia, the main source of
potential illegal WMD materials, and the Middle East, the main destination
of such materials. Unsafeguarded radiological material has been found in or
trafficked through Georgia, including in 2002 the then-largest seizure in
the world of enriched uranium.(FN3) Moreover, Abkhazia was a storage point
for enriched uranium and other radioactive materials during the Soviet
period, and it has been alleged that such materials may have been sold to
Iraq or terrorist groups.(FN4)

ECONOMIC RECESSION
The regional economic recession that began with ethnic conflicts in the
late 1980s was exacerbated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Poverty
and unemployment are rampant, and government officials’ salaries are
ridiculously low (a deputy minister makes $200 a month), creating a black
market economy and feeding corruption. The region’s health and education
systems, which functioned reasonably well in Soviet times, are decaying
rapidly. Income gaps are widening as a small wealthy class emerges, whose
income derives from both legitimate business and also from corruption and
crime. Meanwhile, the great majority of the population is left in poverty.
The major investments in the region have been in the oil and gas sector, and
then primarily in Azerbaijan; Armenia has been kept going to a large degree
by remittances from the Armenian diaspora in the West and in Russia, and
Georgia mainly by Western (especially American) aid. Oil and gas investments
have helped the macroeconomic stability of Azerbaijan, but this sector is
capital, not labor, intensive. The cease-fire lines of the deadlocked
conflicts keep investors wary and prevent legal trade across these lines,
which only encourages smuggling, especially in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.(FN5)

RUSSIA AND OTHER REGIONAL PLAYERS
The international environment surrounding the Caucasus has made the
region a focal point for post-Cold War geopolitical rivalry. For much of
their history before Russia’s final conquest of the region in the early
nineteenth century, the Caucasian countries formed a zone of competition and
conflict among the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, all of which, in
their modern forms retain important interests in the region today. Turkey is
primarily interested in trade, commerce, Caspian oil and gas, preventing
Nagorno-Karabakh from flaring into a regional war, and ensuring the
sovereignty and independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, as a barrier to
possible future Russian expansionism in the Caucasus. Iran’s focus is
primarily on breaking out of its U.S.-imposed isolation. Not wanting to see
the region become an American bastion, Iran has maintained close ties to
Russia, which shares this concern, to help it promote its own influence
there. Iran, which has a substantial ethnic Azeri population in its north,
sided with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, while Turkey has been Azerbaijan’s
strongest supporter. All three powers keep a close watch on the activities
of the others and are keenly interested in the outcome of debates over the
direction of pipelines carrying Caspian energy; market, military, and
security arrangements in the area; and any resolution of the
ethnic-territorial conflicts.
For Russia, the Caucasus carries an especially significant geostrategic
and historical weight. Expanding into the region was the first step in
Russia’s efforts to expand its territory and its influence with Iran and
Turkey beginning in the eighteenth century. The region was later seen as a
gateway to the Middle East. Georgia in particular was essential to Russia’s
conquest of the North Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century, since it
formed the link between the North Caucasian peoples and the Islamic world,
especially Turkey. Control over Georgia allowed Moscow to isolate the North
Caucasus from the Islamic world–and Moscow still sees Georgia as crucial to
maintaining control of that restive region. The Caucasus is Russia’s soft
underbelly, through which unwelcome influences, ranging from radical Islamic
groups to Turkey or the United States, could make inroads into Russia. As
such, while Russia has accepted the placement of U.S. forces in Georgia in
the struggle against terrorism, for the most part Moscow still views the
Caucasus from the zero-sum game perspective and wishes to minimize U.S.
influence. President Putin has increasingly used economic levers to maintain
influence in the Caucasus. Russia’s traditional approach was
divide-and-conquer, exploiting ethnicterritorial conflicts and weak
governments. It still has military bases in Armenia and seeks to keep the
two bases it has left in Georgia until 2013, but Georgia is unwilling for
these to remain for more than three years.(FN6)
The key issue for Russia in the Caucasus (and perhaps in general) is the
war in Chechnya, which has made its already uneasy relations with Azerbaijan
even worse and almost brought it to war with bordering Georgia. The acrimony
began in late 1999, when the Georgians refused Russian requests to use their
bases in Georgia to attack into Chechnya. Russia countered with a harsh
propaganda campaign against Georgia, alleging that Pankisi Gorge (home to
the Kists, Georgians descended from Chechen refugees from earlier wars in
the North Caucasus, and some 7,000 Chechen refugees from the current war)
had become a major rear base of support and training for Chechen rebels.
Russia continually sought but was refused permission to conduct either their
own operations there or joint operations.
After 9/11, Moscow charged that terrorist elements had taken over the
Chechen struggle and that the Pankisi Gorge was the last holdout of the
Chechen fighters, making it the last barrier to a successful conclusion of
the war. The United States later concluded that there were likely some Al
Qaeda elements in Pankisi along with Chechen fighters, and in February 2002
agreed on a two-year program through which U.S. Special Forces would train
and equip the Georgian military in antiterrorism activities. President Putin
voiced no objections, but strong forces in the Russian military were and are
adamantly opposed to the American military presence in the Caucasus.(FN7)
When the United States announced its intentions to bring about regime change
in Iraq, the Russians argued that the Pankisi threat was just as serious a
threat to regional and international security.(FN8) On September 11, 2002,
President Putin said preemptive action in Pankisi would be required if
Georgia could not deal with the situation. When Russia renewed bombings of
Georgian territory, the United States urged it to respect Georgia’s borders
and work cooperatively with Georgia in dealing with the problem.(FN9) In
late summer 2002, Tbilisi finally sent security forces into the Gorge to
restore order, with some degree of success. Since then, the Gorge has
receded as an irritant in Georgian-Russian relations, but the concern
remains that a spread of the Chechen war into Georgia could set off a
conflict involving all of the Caucasus.
Russia is clearly a key player in the South Caucasus and has
considerable ability to block or undermine agreements it does not like and
destabilize governments if it chooses. A Russian policy supporting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Caucasus states and
recognizing the legitimate interests of all regional powers as well as the
United States and EU would be a significant step forward in assuring peace
and stability in this volatile region. Russia can be either part of the
problem or part of the solution in the future.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE EU
The United States and the EU are relatively new actors on the scene,
trying both to deal with the social and political complexities of these new
countries and agree on their place in the Eurasian geopolitical framework.
To date, the aim has mainly been to assure that the South Caucasus does not
become the sphere of influence of a hostile power and to open it to trade
and investment. Accordingly, both have provided significant amounts of
economic, technical, and humanitarian assistance to the Caucasian countries
and sought to promote democratization processes, especially via the Council
of Europe.
EU aid programs have focused on the Caucasus’ role as a link between
Central Asia and Europe. The EU has funded transportation infrastructure
improvements such as roads, bridges, and ports to improve the “new Silk
Road.” Individual European countries have also focused on economic and
commercial links, but some have special political ties. For example, Berlin
has a special relationship with Tbilisi dating back to when President
Shevardnadze was the Soviet foreign minister during the peaceful
reunification of Germany, and France with Armenia due to the large Armenian
population in France. The EU, however, is constrained in its policy in the
Caucasus by its members’ frequent inability to reach consensus, which often
results in the EU’s taking no position at all on issues. The EU also tends
to give priority to its relations with Russia, particularly in trade and
energy matters, and to avoid confrontation in an area of Russia’s strong
interest.
The United States’ initial disposition to the new countries was to defer
to Russia and avoid entering into security arrangements with the new states.
In the mid-1990s, as American firms’ interest in Caspian energy supplies and
U.S. concerns about Russia’s intentions in the Caucasus grew, Washington
began to play a more active role. Following its policy of containing Iran,
it sought from the very independence of the CIS in 1991 to prevent Iran from
making inroads for radical Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus. By 1998,
the United States was endorsing a multiple pipeline strategy to carry
Caspian energy to markets, focusing on the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, which would bypass Russia and Iran. Security arrangements were
initiated, mainly with Georgia, to build up the states’ border guard
capability and promote military modernization and downsizing. Georgia’s
military, like others in the region, was modeled on the manpower-heavy
Soviet model and therefore ill-suited to the military realities of small
nations like the Caucasian states.
Most recently, the United States has come to see the South Caucasus as
part of a larger strategic effort to create a zone of stability stretching
from the Balkans to Central Asia and buttressing NATO’s expansion into
Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. aid levels to Armenia and Georgia have been
among the highest per capita in the world, thanks in part to the efforts of
the influential Armenian lobby in Washington. The Bush administration
supports constructing east-west pipelines to carry Caspian oil and gas to
Turkey;(FN10) and since 9/11 has entered into potentially significant
security cooperation programs with all three Caucasus countries aimed at
antiterrorism and building up border guard capabilities. The latter was made
possible by the waiving of legislation prohibiting the provision of other
than humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan and the enactment of legislation
enabling increased security cooperation with Armenia. The key element of aid
to the Caucasus is the two-year antiterrorism train-and-equip program in
Georgia. It is not yet known what the longer term U.S. military presence in
the region will be.
With its global view and international responsibilities, especially in
Iraq, the United States’ interest and focus could easily be diverted from
the Caucasus to other regional hotspots. U.S. efforts on conflict resolution
in the Caucasus have historically been episodic and lacked continuing
high-level attention, and Western attention is questionable now given other
priorities.

U.S.-EU COOPERATION
The United States and the EU share virtually identical goals and
objectives in the Caucasus. With the many other issues threatening to weaken
U.S.-European ties, cooperation between the two in the Caucasus could
demonstrate the considerable scope for positive engagement as well. This
cooperation could be built around four elements: more fully involving the
Caucasus countries in the war on terror, given their location and
Azerbaijan’s being a moderate, secular Islamic country; encouraging the
development and export of Azerbaijani oil and gas to improve world energy
supplies; resolving deadlocked conflicts; and helping improve governance and
development of the rule of law.
The United States and EU should be holding regular high-level meetings,
in addition to the current discussions at the deputy assistant secretary
level. They should agree to use the opportunities presented by America’s new
dialogue with Russia and the war on terror to firm up a common interest and
approach to promote peace and stability in the Caucasus and respect for the
independence and territorial integrity of each of the three southern states.
This must include a significantly enhanced effort to look afresh at the
unresolved conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The two could also
agree to joint measures to help fight the corruption that saps popular
confidence in governments and deters new investment in the Caucasus. Work
needs to be done to ensure that revenues from new east-west pipelines are
used in Georgia and Azerbaijan for the public good and not the corrupt few.
And priority should be given to building legitimate state institutions and
ensuring free and fair elections.
The EU and United States could jointly study what economic assistance to
the Caucasus has worked and what constrains other efforts. Is more
assistance justified, and if so, how much and where? This would avoid
duplication of effort and the development of competing approaches for the
same project, which often becomes an excuse for the aid recipient to do
nothing.
Security cooperation in the Caucasus is problematic. Georgia and
Azerbaijan aspire to NATO membership, but this is not on the immediate
horizon given the current status of their militaries, as well as their
incomplete democratic institutions. Membership for these countries is
unlikely in the next five years, although this does not exclude bilateral
security arrangements short of membership. Armenia, on the other hand, has a
close military and security relationship with Russia. Russian efforts to
expand military cooperation within the CIS have foundered, in part due to
opposition from Georgia and Azerbaijan, which fear CIS cooperation as a
Russian tool to regain control over the former Soviet Union. Proposals by
Turkey and others for regional stability pacts can go nowhere as long as
Armenia and Azerbaijan are deadlocked over Nagorno-Karabakh. Nonetheless,
the United States and EU should also pursue a dialogue on security
cooperation in the Caucasus, although a continued deadlock on
Nagorno-Karabakh would make such steps harder. These could include building
up border guard forces, as is already being done in Georgia and currently in
Azerbaijan; assisting in antiterrorist training for the new pipelines;
encouraging greater participation in NATO Partnership for Peace activities;
and helping the militaries in all three countries with downsizing and
modernization.
Russia’s involvement, or at least its tacit approval, will be crucial.
This will not be easily won, given its historical proprietary views of the
Caucasus, but there is no more propitious time than now to try to achieve
it, in light of the common goals of fighting terrorism and providing
stability. Russia’s actions and attitudes in the South Caucasus will provide
a good measure of the depth of its commitment to closer integration with the
West. This dialogue with Russia could also become a vehicle for helping it
reach a political settlement of the Chechen war. By the same token, a
U.S.-EU dialogue with Turkey on the Caucasus aimed at enlisting Ankara in
the same set of initiatives would underscore that the region must be open to
all with legitimate interests and peaceful intentions. This could also have
the collateral effect of improving the Turkey-EU relationship.
The year 2004 will be a turning point for this region. If the region is
to be stabilized after the successions of 2003, the United States needs to
take the lead in an effort to resolve the conflicts of the region, beginning
with the most important one, which has the gravest potential regional
implications: the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In the past, direct
American involvement has brought the conflict close to a solution on two
occasions. This effort should be coordinated with the EU and also with the
Russian Federation to the extent possible. The South Caucasus constitutes a
region where American and European interests converge and where some success
is likely to come from a joint initiative.
ADDED MATERIAL
Kenneth Yalowitz served as U.S. ambassador to Georgia from 1998-2001 and
to Belarus from 1994-97. He is presently the Director of the Dickey Center
for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, and also teaches the
Caucasus at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. Svante
E. Cornell ([email protected]) is deputy director of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, editor of the
Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, and Research Director of the Silk Road
Studies Program at Uppsala University.

FOOTNOTES

Council of Europe resolution unacceptable to Karabakh – leader

Council of Europe resolution unacceptable to Karabakh – leader

Arminfo
28 Jan 05

YEREVAN

The resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PACE contains provisions that are unacceptable to Nagornyy Karabakh,
the president of the Nagornyy Karabakh Republic NKR , Arkadiy
Gukasyan, has told journalists in Yerevan.

The NKR president pointed out that he does not think that the
resolution can be of some fateful importance to Karabakh. At the same
time, Arkadiy Gukasyan said that the diplomacy of the Armenian side
should be more active in order to avoid such statements and
approaches.

“I think that David Atkinson’s speech was very subjective and
inconsistent with the current situation,” Gukasyan stressed, adding
that it is necessary to take political steps to neutralize such
approaches. He also said that he had appealed to the leadership of the
Council of Europe and David Atkinson, demanding that the presence of
Nagornyy Karabakh representatives be ensured when the report was
discussed.

Gukasyan said that the absence of NKR representatives from the
discussion of the Karabakh issue is absolutely not
understandable. “This was also a very subjective approach. There are
examples when the NKR leadership took part in sittings of the Council
of Europe in 1994 and 1998 and defended its approaches,” the president
recalled.

DPA will Urge Parliamentary Forces to Recognize NK’s Independence

DPA LEADER INTENDS TO URGE ALL PARLIAMENTARY FORCES TO RECOGNIZE
KARABAKH’S INDEPEDENCE

YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. The leader of the opposition Democratic
Party of Armenia Aram Sargsyan is going to call on all the
parliamentary forces to recognize Karabakh’s independence as soon as
possible.

He says that the Organizational Committing for Karabakh’s Protection
NGO comprising 25 political and public organizations including DPA is
starting a series of political actions in this direction. “Unless we
take urgent steps now Armenia will face the fate of Kosovo,” says
Sargsyan.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Aram Sargsyan: Extremely Necessary to Hold Early Elections

ARAM SARGSYAN: IT IS EXTREMELY NECESSARY TO HOLD EARLY ELECTIONS IN
ARMENIA TO FORM LEGITIMATE POWER IN ARMENIA

YEREVAN, JANUARY 29, ARMINFO. It is extremely necessary to hold early
elections in Armenia to form a legitimate power the international
community recons with, Leader of Armenia’s Democratic Party, Deputy of
Armenia’s Parliament from opposition “Justice” bloc Aram G. Sargsyan
stated today at the press-conference at the discussion club “Azdak.”

According to him, it was illegality of power that resulted in PACE’s
resolution on Nagorny Karabakh unfavourable for Armenia. DPA Leader
did not consider the opposition guilty in adoption of that
resolution. He disagreed with an opinion that the whole last year, the
opposition representatives in the Armenian delegation to PACE were
engaged in complaints at R. Kocharyan’s administration instead of
working on Karabakh problem. “The Europeans watched themselves upon
elections, fixed violations, asked the report and we gave it them. The
opposition repeatedly proposed various versions on Karabakh problem,
but no one listen to us”, Sargsyan stressed. -R-

Aliyev Hopes That OSCE Fact Finding Visit to Region Will Be Fruitful

AZERI PRESIDENT HOPES THAT OSCE FACT FINDING VISIT TO REGION WILL BE FRUITFUL

YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. Azeri President Ilham Aliev hopes that
the OSCE fact finding visit to the region will be fruitful.

Day.az reports that during his Friday meeting with the OSCE MG mission
for inquiring into “the facts of the occupied territories settlement”
Aliev stressed the importance of the current foreign ministerial level
stage of the talks for the Karabakh conflict settlement. He reiterated
that Azerbaijan’s position is based on the international principles of
territorial integrity and border inviolability. Pointing out that “the
illegal settlement of Armenians over the occupied Azeri territories”
is the most serious obstacle to long-term peace in the region Aliev
expressed conviction that the OSCE mission will put an end to this
illegal practice.

The Russian co-Chair of the OSCE MG Yuri Merzlyakov said that Aliev’s
ideas are very important. He thanked Aliev for the documents the Azeri
authorities professionally prepared for the mission. “All this is
essential for our work.” Noting that the MG will intensify its
efforts Merzlyakov expressed hope that the conflicting parties will
pool efforts for achieving results in the peace process.

Azeri Deputy FM Araz Azimov says that “the settlement of the occupied
Azeri territories is carried out with Armenia’s direct participation.”
He says that the Azeri side has provided the mission with video and
audio proofs of “the occupied territories settlement” and geographical
maps of the areas. Azimov says that some 23,000 people have illegally
been settled there. This is not good for the talks, he says.

Prevalence of Smoking in 8 Countries of the Former Soviet Union

Prevalence of Smoking in 8 Countries of the Former Soviet Union: Results
The Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health Study
SOURCE: American Journal of Public Health 94 no12 2177-87 December 2004

Anna Gilmore, MSc, MFPH
Joceline Pomerleau, PhD, MSc
Martin McKee, MD, FRCP
Richard Rose, DPhil, BA
Christian W. Haerpfer, PhD, MSc
David Rotman, PhD
Sergej Tumanov, PhD

ABSTRACT
Objectives. We sought to provide comparative data on smoking habits in
countries of the former Soviet Union. Methods. We conducted cross-sectional
surveys in 8 former Soviet countries with representative national samples of
the population 18 years or older. Results. Smoking rates varied among men,
from 43.3% to 65.3% among the countries examined. Results showed that
smoking among women remains uncommon in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and
Moldova (rates of 2.4%-6.3%). In Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia,
rates were higher (9.3%-15.5%). Men start smoking at significantly younger
ages than women, smoke more cigarettes per day, and are more likely to be
nicotine dependent. Conclusions. Smoking rates among men in these countries
have been high for some time and remain among the highest in the world.
Smoking rates among women have increased from previous years and appear to
reflect transnational tobacco company activity. (Am J Public Health.
2004;94:2177-2187)
In 1990, it was estimated that a 35-year-old man in the former Soviet
Union had twice the risk of dying from tobacco-related causes before the age
of 70 years as a man in the European Union (20% vs 10%).(FN1) In the former
Soviet Union, 56% of male cancer deaths and 40% of all deaths are attributed
to tobacco, compared with 47% and 35%, respectively, in the European
Union.(FN1) Rates of circulatory disease among both men and women are
approximately triple those in the European Union.(FN2) Moreover,
tobacco-related mortality continues to increase in the former Soviet Union,
while it has stabilized or declined in the European Union as a whole.(FN1)
Despite these deplorably high levels of tobacco-related mortality,
relatively little is known about smoking prevalence rates in the region.
Virtually no recent or reliable data exist for the central Asian countries
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan),(FN2,3)
and recent surveys conducted in Georgia have been limited to the capital,
Tbilisi.(FN4,5) Data from elsewhere in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan)
are scarce,(FN6) and historical figures(FN7) are inconsistent with later
findings, leading authors to rely on anecdotal reports of smoking
rates.(FN8).
Historical(FN3) and more recent data, derived largely from Russia,(FN9)
Ukraine,(FN10) Belarus,(FN11) and the Baltic states,(FN12) show-perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the mortality figures just described-that smoking
rates among men are high (45%-60%) while rates are far lower among women
(1%-20%).(FN2) The higher rates previously seen among Estonian women are now
being matched by rates among women in the other Baltic states (FN2,12,13)
and by women in other urban areas.(FN9,10) Unfortunately, other than the
Baltic states, few countries collect information using similar data
collection tools, thereby precluding accurate between-country comparisons.
These issues underlie the need in the former Soviet Union for comparable
and accurate data on smoking prevalence, given that such data are widely
recognized as a prerequisite for the development of effective public health
policies.(FN14-16) This need is made more urgent by the profound changes
occurring as a result of the former Soviet Union’s recent economic
transition and, more specifically, by the changes taking place in its
tobacco industry.(FN17) The latter were first felt as soon as these formerly
closed markets opened, with a rapid influx of cigarette imports and
advertising.(FN18-20) Later, as part of the large-scale privatization of
state assets, most of the newly independent states privatized their tobacco
industries, and the transnational tobacco companies established a local
manufacturing presence, investing more than $2.7 billion in 10 countries of
the former Soviet Union between 1991 and 2000.(FN21) Evidence from the
industry’s previous entry into Asia suggests that these changes are likely
to have a significant upward impact on cigarette consumption.(FN22,23)
In response to these and other health and social issues facing the
region, a major research project-the Living Conditions, Lifestyles and
Health Study-was commissioned as part of the European Union’s Copernicus
program. This investigation involved surveys conducted in 8 of the 15 newly
independent states: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.(FN24) We present data on smoking prevalence,
including age-and gender-specific smoking rates, age at initiation of
smoking, and indicators of nicotine dependence.

METHODS

Study Population and Sampling Procedures
In autumn 2001, quantitative cross-sectional surveys were conducted in
each country by organizations with expertise in survey research using
standardized methods(FN25) (described in detail elsewhere(FN26)). In brief,
each survey sought to include representative samples of the national adult
population 18 years or older, although a few small regions had to be
excluded as a result of geographic inaccessibility, sociopolitical
situation, or prevailing military action: Abkhazia and Ossetia in Georgia,
the Transdniester region and the municipality of Bender in Moldova, the
Chechen and Ingush republics, and autonomous districts located in the far
north of the Russian Federation.
Samples were selected via multistage random sampling with stratification
by region and area. Within each primary sampling unit, households were
selected according to standardized random route procedures; the exception
was Armenia, where household lists were used to provide a random sample.
Within each household, the adult with the birthday nearest to the date of
the survey was selected to be interviewed. At least 2000 respondents were
included in each country; 4006 residents of the Russian Federation and 2400
residents of Ukraine were interviewed, reflecting the larger and more
diverse populations of these countries.

Questionnaire Design
The first draft of the questionnaire was created, in consultation with
country representatives, from preexisting surveys conducted in other
transition countries(FN9,10,12) and from New Russia Barometer surveys(FN27)
adjusted to national contexts. It was developed in English, translated into
national languages, back-translated to ensure consistency, and pilot tested
in each country. Trained interviewers administered the questionnair in
respondents’ homes.

Statistical Analyses
Stata (Version 6; Stata Corp, College Station, Tex) was used to analyze
the data. As a means of reducing the skewness of their distribution, the
continuous variables of age at smoking initiation and smoking duration were
transformed, via log-normal transformations, before analyses were conducted;
however, they were returned to their original units in computing results.
Current smokers were defined as respondents reporting currently smoking
at least 1 cigarette per day. We calculated age-and gender-specific smoking
prevalence rates for each country. Given the negative health effects of
early initiation, we examined age at smoking initiation among current
smokers, as well as number of cigarettes smoked. We assessed level of
nicotine dependence, an indication of smokers’ ability or inability to quit,
by identifying the percentage of current smokers who smoked more than 20
cigarettes per day and smoked within an hour of waking. This level of use is
equivalent to a score of 3 or more on the abbreviated Fager-strom dependency
scale(FN28,29) and indicates moderate (score of 3 or 4) to severe (score of
5 or above) dependency.
Within each country, gender differences in smoking habits were assessed
with x[sup2] tests and 2-sample t tests; variations according to age group
were estimated via logistic regression analyses in which the 18-to 29-year
age group was the reference category. Logistic regression analyses with
Russia as the baseline were used in making between-country comparisons in
likelihood of smoking, while analyses of variance combined with Bonferroni
multiple comparison tests were used in comparing geometric mean ages at
smoking initiation. To allow for the large number of comparisons, we used
99% confidence intervals and set the significance level at .01.

RESULTS

Response Rates
A total of 18428 individuals were surveyed. Response rates (calculated
from the total number of households for which an eligible person could be
identified) varied from 71% to 88% among the countries included. Rates of
nonresponse for individual items were very low (e.g., 0.03% for current
smoking and 0.5% for education level).

Sample Characteristics and Representativeness
The samples clearly reflected the diversity of the region and were
broadly representative of their overall populations (Table 1). Comparisons
of the present data and official data are potentially limited by the failure
of some of the country data to fully capture posttransition migration and
other factors,(FN30) but they suggest slight underrepresentations of men in
Armenia and Ukraine, of the urban population in Armenia, and of the rural
population in Kyrgyzstan. Age group comparisons among the respondents 20
years or older suggested a tendency for the oldest age group to be
overrepresented at the expense of the youngest age group, particularly in
Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Smoking Prevalence
Rates of male smoking were high. In many of the countries surveyed,
almost 80% of male respondents reported a history of smoking (Table 2).
Rates of current smoking were lowest in Moldova (43.3%) and Kyrgyzstan
(51.0%) and highest in Kazakhstan (65.3%), Armenia (61.8%), and Russia
(60.4%). Smoking rates in Russia were not distinguishable from those in
Kazakhstan, Armenia, or Belarus but were significantly higher than those
observed in Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Georgia (P<.01; data not
shown).
Rates among women were far lower (gender comparisons were significant at
the .001 level in all countries) and somewhat more variable, ranging from
2.4% to 15.5%; the lowest rates were seen in Armenia, Moldova, and
Kyrgyzstan and the highest in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Smoking among
women in Russia was significantly more prevalent than among women in all of
the other countries under study (P<.01) although adjusting for age removed
the difference between Russia and Belarus (data not shown).
The relationship between smoking and age varied by gender. Among men,
with the exception of those residing in Moldova, smoking prevalence rates
varied little between the ages of 18 and 59 years but then declined more
markedly in men above the age of 60 years (Table 2, Figure 1). This decline
with age was accounted for by increases in the older groups in terms of
percentages of former smolers and never smokers. Among women, the overall
trend was a decrease in reports of both current and former smoking with
increasing age; very low smoking rates were observed in the oldest age group
(rates of reported lifetime smoking varied from 0.8%-3.9%). However, closer
inspection of the data suggested that the countries could be divided into 2
groups. In the first group (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), rates
of current and ever smoking implied that initiation of smoking had increased
rapidly between generations, especially in the youngest age group (Table 2,
Figure 1). In the second group (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova),
the age trends were less obvious and were nonsignificant (with the exception
of the comparison of the oldest and youngest age groups in Moldova).
TABLE 1-Characteristics of Samples and Countries in the Living
Conditions, Lifestyles and Health Study: 8 Countries of the Former Soviet
Union, 2001

Characteristic AR BY GE KZ
KG MD RU UA
Simple
Response rate, % 88 73 88 82
71 81 73 76
Gender
Male, % 40.3 44.1 45.7
44.4 45.0 45.1 43.5 38.8
Men aged [greater or equal] 20 y, 40.7 43.9
45.6 44.1 45.6 44.9 43.2 38.6
No. 2000 2000 2022 2000
2000 2000 4006 2400
Age group, y, %
20-29 15.4 16.9 13.9
21.9 26.7 14.5 16.5 14.6
30-39 21.6 19.2 20.3
25.8 26.0 20.1 19.3 16.4
40-49 24.0 21.6 21.9
21.5 21.4 23.1 20.9 17.9
50-59 11.1 14.5 16.3
12.0 10.1 16.4 15.4 15.5
[greater or equal]60 28.0 27.9
27.6 18.8 15.9 26.0 27.9 35.5
No. aged [greater or equal]20 1940 1922
1975 1890 1899 1945 3828 2324
No. aged 18-19 60 78 47 110
101 55 178 76
Interview location, %
State/regional capital 44.0 33.9 41.4
27.0 27.5 30.4 35.7 31.5
Other city/small town 17.0 34.8 15.6
25.4 13.5 11.6 37.1 36.4
Village 39.0 31.4 43.0
47.6 59.0 58.1 27.3 32.1
No. 2000 2000 2022 1850
2000 2000 4006 2400
Reported nationality, %
Nationality of country[supa] 97.3 80.1 90.2
36.3 68.6 76.7 82.4 77.7
Russian 0.8 12.1 1.3
41.5 18.0 7.7 … 16.5
Other 1.9 7.8 8.5
22.1 13.5 15.7 17.6 5.8
No. 2000 1979 2021 1979
1997 1980 3967 2371
Education, %
Secondary education or less 49.1 49.4 33.8
35.7 48.3 52.2 43.2 44.2
Secondary vocational or some college 30.4 34.2 32.7
43.5 32.7 32.7 35.7 36.1
College 20.5 16.4 33.6
20.8 19.0 15.2 21.1 19.7
No. 1996 1984 1996 1995
1996 1984 4004 2381
Country data
Midyear population, 2001, thousands 3788 9971 5238 14821
4927 4254 144387 49111
Gross national product per capita, 2001, $ 560 1190 620 1360
280 380 1750 720
Men aged [greater or equal]20 y, 2000, % 47.5 45.4
46.4 46.6 47.9 46.3 45.3 44.8
Urban population, 2001, % 67.3 69.6 56.5
55.9 34.4 41.7 72.9 68.0
Age group, y, % of total [greater or equal] 20
20-29 23.2 19.3 20.6
26.0 30.5 23.1 19.6 19.4
30-39 24.2 20.3 21.1
23.7 24.7 20.3 19.6 19.0
40-49 22.5 21.5 19.5
21.4 19.6 22.7 22.4 19.8
50-59 10.3 12.6 12.7
10.9 9.0 13.6 13.3 14.2
[greater or equal]60 19.7 26.4
26.2 18.0 16.2 20.3 25.1 27.6
Unemployment rate, % [supc] 11.7 2.3 11.1
2.9 3.2 2.0 13.4 5.8
Tobacco industry state owned (SO) P SO P
P P SO P P
or privatized (P)
Foreign direct investment in tobacco 8 0 0
440 … 0 1719 152.9
industry, end of 2000, $ millions[supd]
Foreign direct investment in tobacco 0.002 0.000 0.000
0.030 … 0.000 0.012 0.003
industry per capita x 1000[supd]

Note AR=Armenia; BY=Belarus; GE=Georgia; KZ=Kazakhstan; KG=Kyrgyzstan;
MD=Moldova; RU=Russia; UA=Ukraine.
[supa]Mean Armenians in Armenia, Belarussians in Belarus, Georgians in
Georgia, Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Kirghiz in Kyrgyzstan, Moldovans/Romanians
in Moldova, Russians in Russia, and Ukrainians in Ukraine.
[supb]Data sources were European Health for All Database, January 2003;
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat.
[supc]In 1999 for Russia, 2000 for Armenia and Ukraine, and 2001 for the
other countries.
[supd]Data from Gilmore and McKee(FN21); these are minimum investment
figures.
[Table Omitted]

Age at Initiation
The majority of male smokers reported that they began smoking before the
age of 20 years, and, on average, a quarter reported that they began in
childhood (Table 3). Far fewer women reported beginning in childhood, and
sizable percentages began after the age of 20 years; for example, 86% of
women residing in Armenia and more than 40% of women residing in Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova reported that they initiated smoking after this age.
These gender differences were significant in all of the countries under
study.
Differences also were observed between countries; in Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, geometric mean ages at smoking initiation
were younger than 18 years among men and younger than 20 years among women,
compared with older ages at smoking initiation elsewhere. Overall,
between-country differences were significant for both women and men (P<.
001); however, Bonferroni multiple comparisons showed that there were
significant differences among women only in comparisons involving Armenia
and countries other than Georgia and Moldova (P< 01; data not shown). Among
men, significantly younger ages at initiation were observed in Russia and
Ukraine versus Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova; in Belarus versus
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan; and in Kazakhstan versus Kyrgyzstan (all P< 01; data
not shown).

Amount Smoked and Nicotine Dependence
Men were found to smoke more cigarettes than women, the majority of men
smoked 10 or more cigarettes per day, while most women smoked fewer than 10
per day.
Between-gender differences in percentages of respondents smoking more
than 20 cigarettes per day were significant only in the case of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine (P< 001).
The majority of smokers reported smoking their first cigarette within an
hour of waking, although, in all countries other than Georgia, a far higher
proportion of men than women did so (P< 01). Thus, men were more likely to
be moderately to severely dependent on nicotine, although gender differences
were significant only for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

DISCUSSION
The surveys conducted in this study provide important new data on the
prevalence of yin in 8 countries representing more than four fifths of the
population of the former Soviet Union. In the case of some of these
countries, these data represent the first accurate, countrywide smoking
prevalence data reported. In addition, they provide some of the first truly
comparative data for countries of the former Soviet Union other than the
Baltic states,(FN31,32) and, because of the focus on obtaining accurate
information on sample characteristics, they offer advantages over data
available in public databases. Response rates were relatively high, and the
samples were broadly representative of the overall country populations.
TABLE 3-Smoking Characteristics of Current Smokers in 8 Countries of the
Former Soviet Union, 2001

AR,% BY,% GE,% KZ,% KG,% MO,%
RU,% UA,% All,[supa]% Between-Country

Compadson, p[supb]
Age at smoking initiation, y
Men
Mean age 18.5 17.4 18.2 17.6 19.1 18.2
17.0 17.2 17.9
Geometric mean age 17.8 16.6 17.7 17.1 18.6 17.6
16.2 16.2 17.2 <.001
<16 22.2 32.8 18.0 27.9 14.7 22.8
36.4 35.2 26.2
16-20 56.8 54.2 66.0 57.0 61.8 59.9
49.8 48.5 56.7 <.001
>20 21.0 13.0 16.0 15.1 23.5 17.3
13.9 16.3 17.0
No 447 430 400 502 408 347
993 435 3962
Women
Mean age 28.0 18.9 22.7 20.7 21.5 23.0
20.9 21.2 22.1 <.001
Geometric mean age 27.0 18.5 21.3 19.9 20.7 21.5
19.8 19.9 21.1
<16 0.0 20.0 18.5 15.4 12.5 22.9
13.1 15.1 14.7 <.001
16-20 14.3 56.7 38.5 50.6 43.8 22.9
52.6 57.2 42.1
>20 85.7 23.3 43.1 34.1 43.8 54.3
34.4 27.6 43.3
No 28 120 65 91 28 35
329 152 868
Between gender comparison <.001 .002 <.001 <.001 .002
<.001 <.001 <.001
in geometric mean age[supc]
Number of cigarettes
smoked daily
Men
1-2 1.8 3.4 1.9 4.5 15.4 8.2
2.4 4.6 5.3
Up to 10 18.7 32.3 12.7 30.9 50.1 43.3
24.6 25.4 29.8 <.001
10-20 51.4 50.5 63.3 48.0 28.7 37.4
52.2 53.5 48.1
>20 28.1 13.7 22.2 16.6 5.8 11.0
20.8 16.5 16.9
Odds ratio for likelihood 1.487 0.606 1.085 0.756 0.234
0.471 1.00 0.753
of smoking >20
cigarettes per day
P .002 .001 .539 .038 <.001
<.001 .049
No 498 495 482 579 449 390
1052 484 4429
Women
1-2 32.1 23.7 11.9 19.4 36.2 37.2
18.7 22.2 25.2
Up to 10 28.6 48.9 29.9 53.4 46.8 41.9
56.6 45.7 44.0 .065
10-20 32.1 25.2 46.3 23.3 17.0 18.6
19.8 26.5 26.1
>20 7.1 2.2 11.9 3.9 0.0 2.3
4.9 5.6 4.7
Odds ratio for likelihood 1.50 0.44 2.64 0.79 …
0.46 1.00 1.15
of smoking > 20
cigarettes per day
P 0.602 0.199 0.032 0.672 …
0.461 0.749
No. 28 135 67 103 47 43
348 162 933
Between gender comparison .015 .000 .053 .001 .090
.073 <.001 <.001
of % smoking >20
cigarettes per day[supd]
Time when usually smoke first
cigarette
Men
First 30 minutes 63.5 47.9 52.9 42.8 39.0 44.1
56.5 55.8 50.3
after awakening
First hour 24.9 40.4 34.0 46.6 39.4 38.2
34.3 33.3 36.4 <.001
after awakening
Before midday meal 4.6 6.9 5.0 5.0 7.1 6.7
4.7 6.0 5.7
After midday meal or 7.0 4.9 8.1 5.5 14.5 11.0
4.6 5.0 7.6
in the evening
Odds ratio for likelihood 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.86 0.37
0.47 1.00 0.83
of smoking in first hour
P .140 .129 .021 .394 <.001
<.001 .292
No. 498 495 480 579 449 390
1051 484 4426
Women
First 30 minutes 50.0 31.9 44.6 35.0 27.7 14.3
33.7 27.8 33.1
after awakening
First hour 14.3 28.9 30.8 27.2 31.9 38.1
32.0 32.1 29.4 .278
after awakening
Before midday meal 3.6 19.3 12.3 13.6 12.8 11.9
13.5 17.3 13
After midday meal 32.1 20.0 12.3 24.3 27.7 35.7
20.8 22.8 24.5
or in the evening
Odds ratio for 0.94 0.81 1.60 0.86 0.77
0.57 1.00 0.78
likelihood of smoking
in first hour
P .879 .307 .129 .505 .409
.092 .203
No. 28 135 65 103 47 42
347 162 929
Between gender comparison <.001 <.001 .014 <.001 .004
<.001 <.001 <.001
in % smoking in
first hour[supd]
Moderate to heavy nicotine
dependence (> 20 cigarettes
per day and smoking within
first hour of awakening)
Men 26.9 13.7 21.4 16.6 5.6 10.5
20.6 16.2 16.4 .000
Odds ratio for likelihood 1.42 0.62 1.05 0.77 0.23
0.45 1.00 0.74 0.8
of moderate to severe
dependency
P .005 .093 .142 .104 .000
.000 .042 .00
No. 498 495 477 579 449 390
1051 483 4422
Women 7.1 2.2 10.8 3.9 0.0 1.0
17.0 9.0 6.4 .139
Odds ratio for likelihood 1.49 0.44 2.34 0.78 …
0.47 1.00 1.14 1.0
of moderate to severe
dependency
P .605 .197 .071 .669 …
.473 .754 .3
No 28 135 65 103 47 42
347 162 929
Between gender .020 <.001 .045 .001 .097
.091 <.001 .001
dependency comparison[supd]

Note. AR = Armenia; BY = Belarus; GE = Georgia; KZ = Kazakhstan; KG
Kyrgyzstan; MD = Moldova; RU = Russia; UA = Ukraine.
[supa]Average, assuming the same number of respondents in each country.
[supb]Results of analyses of variance (geometric mean) and x[sup2] tests
(categorical variable) for mean age at smoking initiation; x[sup2] test for
no. of cigarettes smoked, time to first cigarette, and dependency.
[supc]Results of tests.
[supd]Results of x[sup2] tests.

Study Limitations
The underrepresentation of men in Armenia and Ukraine should not have
affected the gender-specific rates observed, but, as a result of the
urban/rural differences in the composition of the sample, prevalence rates
in Kyrgyzstan (where urban areas were overrepresented) may have been
overestimated, and prevalence rates in Armenia (where urban areas were
underrepresented) may have been underestimated. However, these discrepancies
were likely to affect only the data relating to female respondents.(FN9-11)
The age group disparities noted were minor but would tend to lead to
underestimates of smoking prevalence.
In addition, the surveys were based on self-reported smoking status;
there was no independent biochemical validation, and thus the smoking rates
observed may have been affected by reporting bias. Although there is concern
on the part of some that self-reports of smoking status may produce
underestimates of smoking levels, studies conducted in Western countries
suggest that this technique is sensitive and specific; they also suggest
that more accurate responses are provided in interviewer-administered
questionnaires than in self-completed questionnaires (FN33) The only study
conducted in the former Soviet Union that has addressed this issue showed
that among individuals claiming to be nonsmokers, 13% (48/368) of women and
17% (12/375) of men in rural northwestern Russia were in fact, according to
blood cotinine levels, likely to be smokers, compared with only 2% of men
and women in Finland (FN34) Given the far lower prevalence of smoking among
women, this had disproportionately large effects on reported rates of
smoking among women. Although our questionnaires were administered by
interviewers in respondents’ homes, potentially making it more difficult for
respondents who smoked to deny doing so, we may have underestimated smoking
prevalence rates, particularly in the case of women residing m areas where
smoking re mains culturally unacceptable.
A final shortfall of the present study was the failure to measure
smokeless tobacco use, which is relatively common in parts of the former
Soviet Union, mainly Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. However,
although chewing tobacco is used in some of the southern regions of
Kyrgyzstan, cigarettes are the main form of tobacco used there as well as in
all of the other countries in which surveys were conducted.(FN8,35)

Findings
The results of our study confirm that smoking rates among men in this
region are among the highest in the world and higher than the maximum rates
recorded in the United States at the peak of its epidemic; rates above 50%
were observed in all countries other than Moldova and reached 60% or more in
Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia Elsewhere in Europe, rates above 50% are
seen only in Turkey (51%) and Slovakia (56%), and worldwide fewer than 20
countries report rates of more than 60%.(FN6)
In the case of men, the lower prevalence of current smokers and higher
prevalence of never and former smokers among those 60 years or older
probably reflect the disproportionate number of premature deaths among
current smokers relative to never and former smokers However, a cohort
effect has been shown in the former Soviet Union, with those who were
teenagers between 1945 and 1953 carrying forward lower smoking rates because
cigarettes, like other consumer goods, were in short supply in the period of
postwar austerity under Stalin.(FN36,37) This cohort effect is also thought
to account for the unexpected current decline in male lung cancer deaths,
(FN36) which must be set against the overall rise in male tobacco-related
mortality(FN1) and, in particular increases in the already staggeringly high
number of cardiovascular deaths.(FN2)
In comparison with male smoking patterns, smoking among women is far
less common, vanes more between countries, and exhibits a different
age-specific pattern Although rates of lifetime smoking are below 4% among
individuals older than 60 years in all 8 countries, in the 4 countries with
the highest smoking rates among women (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Ukraine), smoking is now significantly more common among members of the
younger generations, risk ratios between the youngest and oldest age groups
range from 12.2 to 37.3, compared with a range to 1.0 to 5.5 in the other 4
countries.
Lopez et al.(FN38) outlined a 4-stage model of the patterns of a smoking
epidemic based on observations from Western countries In this model, such an
epidemic is described as involving an initial rise in male smoking followed
by a rise in female smoking 1 to 2 decades later, after which each plateaus
and then falls as a result of tobacco-related mortality, finally rising to a
peak decades later Our findings suggest that the former Soviet Union’s
tobacco epidemic may have developed differently Male smoking has a long
history in this region The first accounts of tobacco smoking in Russia date
from the 17th century, (FN39) papirossi (a type of cigarette, popular in the
former Soviet Union, characterized by a long, hollow mouthpiece that can be
twisted before smoking) were first mentioned in 1844, (FN39) and cigarette
factories were first constructed later in the 19th century. (FN40,41)
Historical data on smoking(FN3) and high male tobacco-related mortality
rates(FN1) suggest that smoking among men has been at a high level for some
time and, contrary to the predictions of the 4-stage model just mentioned,
has failed to exhibit a postpeak decline.
Smoking among women remains relatively uncommon, and rates have been far
slower to rise than would be expected given male rates in the former Soviet
Union and trends observed in the West. Indeed, it appears that female rates
began to increase only in the mid-to late 1990s, when transnational tobacco
companies arrived with their carefully targeted marketing strategies
(FN18-20) Therefore, although the exact stage of the epidemic varies
slightly between the countries of the former Soviet Union, overall we
suggest that men have remained between stages 3 and 4, with high rates of
both smoking and mortality, while women in some countries are at stage 1 and
others at stage 2, the latter with more rapidly rising smoking rates
Although rates of cardiovascular disease have been increasing, this can
largely be explained by risk factors other than tobacco (including diet and
stress), and female lung cancer rates have yet to increase.
Comparisons between our results and previous data are problematic given
that much of the information that exists is fragmentary, of uncertain
quality, and rarely nationally representative This is particularly the case
in the central Asian and Caucasian states, although limited data from
Armenia and Moldova gathered between 1998 and 2001 suggest few changes in
smoking prevalence rates (FN2,6); data from Kazakhstan suggest small
increases from the 60% male and 7% female prevalence rates; recorded in
1996.(FN2) More data are available for Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine These
data suggest that smoking rates m men have changed little, (FN2,10,11,42)
although m Russia they appeared to rise between the 1970s and 1980s(FN2,3,7)
and into the mid-1990s, with little subsequent change Among women, rates
appear to have increased in all 3 countries, (FN2,11) and Russian data
suggest that although rates have been rising since the 1970s, increases were
most notable during the 1990s. (FN3,7,9,43)
Between-gender and intercountry differences in smoking prevalence rates
are relater in other smoking indicators as well; for example, men are more
likely than women to start smoking when they are young, to smoke more
heavily, and to be nicotine dependent. Two separate groupings of countries
appeared to emerge from the between-country comparisons Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine, on one hand, and Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and
Moldova, on the other. In addition to exhibiting higher smoking rates among
women and more pronounced age-specific trends, the former group tended to
show lower ages at smoking initiation (particularly in comparison with
Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) along with more marked gender differences in
regard to number of cigarettes smoked per day and level of nicotine
dependency.
The differences observed in this study suggest that smoking patterns in
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan are more traditional than those in
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine This situation can be explained by
the differing degree of transnational tobacco company penetration.(FN21,44)
Industry in Moldova continues to be in the form of a state-owned monopoly,
industry in Georgia and Armenia has been privatized, but this change was
rather recent (occurring after 1997), and none of the major transnational
tobacco companies invested directly in those countries.(FN21) Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine, by contrast, saw major investments from most major
transnational tobacco companies beginning in the early 1990s Belarus, which
retains a state-owned monopoly system, and Kyrgyzstan, where the German
cigarette manufacturer Reemtsma has invested would therefore appear to be
exceptions, with Belarus more typical of the countries with transnational
tobacco company investments and Kyrgyzstan more typical of the countries
without such investments. In Belarus, however, the state tobacco
manufacturer has only a 40% market share, with smuggled and counterfeit
brands accounting for an additional 40% of this share. The importance the
transnational tobacco companies attach to the illegal market in Belarus can
be seen in the fact that, despite having little official market share,
(FN44) British American Tobacco and Philip Morris have the highest outdoor
advertising budgets and the 9th and 10th highest television advertising
budgets of all companies operating in that country (FN45) In Belarus, as in
Ukraine and Russia tobacco is the product most heavily advertised outdoors
and the fourth most ad vertised product on television (there are now
restrictions on television advertising in Ukraine and Russia). (FN45,46)
Thus, it appears that with the continuing (if so far fruitless) discussions
of possible reunification with Russia, the transnational tobacco companies
treat Belarus as an important extension of the Russian market.
Kyrgyzstan differs from the other countries in which there have been
transnational tobacco company investments in that these investments occurred
later (in 1998) and one company, Reemtsma, achieved a manufacturing monopoly
(FN44) However, Kyrgyzstan also differs from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
and Russia in regard to its lower levels of development and
industrialization and its larger rural and Muslim populations Other
potential explanations for the between country differences observed cannot
be excluded here, and such possibilities are explored in a separate article
(FN48) Whatever reasons emerge, the rising rates of smoking among women and
the younger ages of smoking initiation are cause for concern in all of these
countries.
Meanwhile, the present findings, combined with earlier data on disease
burden,(FN1,37) confirm that high smoking rates among men continue unabated
Smoking among women in Armenia Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova remains
relatively uncommon and does not appear to have increased significantly, as
can be seen in rates among the younger relative to older generations and in
limited comparisons with previous data By contrast, smoking rates among
women in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia showed an increase from
previous surveys, and age-specific rates suggest an ongoing increase in
tobacco use among members of the younger generations It is probably not a
coincidence that these higher rates were observed in the countries with the
most active transnational tobacco company presence.

Conclusions
Concerted and urgent efforts to improve tobacco control must be made
throughout the former Soviet Union to curtail current smoking and prevent
further rises in smoking among women Such efforts will require enactment and
effective enforcement of comprehensive tobacco control policies, including a
total ban on tobacco advertising and sponsor ship adequate taxation of both
imported and domestic cigarettes, controls on smuggling, and restrictions on
smoking in public places The barriers to achieving these goals are
considerable given the powerful influence of transnational tobacco companies
and the limited development of democracy and civil society groups in much of
the region.(FN21) The international community cognizant of the role that
international companies play in pushing the tobacco epidemic should build on
the work of the Open Society Institute (R. Bonnell, oral communication,
September 2003) in strengthening the policy response to this threat.
ADDED MATERIAL

About the Authors
Anna Gilmore Joceline Pomerleau, and Martin McKee are with the European
Centre on Health of Societies in Transition London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine London England Richard Rose is with the Centre for the
Study of Public Policy University of Strathclyde, Glasgow Scotland. At the
time of the study Christian W. Haerpfer was with the Institute for Advanced
Studies Vienna Austria David Rotman is with the Center of Sociological and
Political Studies Belarus State University Minsk Belarus Sergej Tumanov is
with the Centre for Sociological Studies Moscow State University Moscow
Russia.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Anna Gilmore MSc MFPH European
Centre on Health of Societies in Transition London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine Keppel Street London WC1E 7HT, England (e mail:
[email protected]).
This article was accepted December 29 2003.

Contributors
A Gilmore contributed to questionnaire design and data analysis and
drafted the article J. Pomerleau and M. McKee contributed to questionnaire
design data analysis and revisions of the article R. Rose contributed to
questionnaire design and generation of hypotheses C.W. Haerpfer D. Rotman
and S Tumanov designed and supervised the conduct of the surveys. M McKee
C.W. Haerpfer D. Rotman and S. Tumanov originated and supervised the overall
study.

Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the members of the Living Conditions Lifestyles and
Health Study teams who participated in the coordination and organization of
data collection for this study The Living Conditions Lifestyles and Health
Study is funded by the European Community (contract ICA2-2000-10031) Support
for A Gilmore’s and M McKee’s work on tobacco was also provided by the
National Cancer Institute (grant 1 R01 CA91021 01).
Note The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the European Community.

Human Participant Protection
This study was approved by the ethics committee of the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Verbal informed consent was obtained from all
study participants at the beginning of the interviews.

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Democratic Prospects in Central Asia

Democratic Prospects in Central Asia
SOURCE: World Affairs (Washington, D.C.) 166 no3 133-47 Wint 2004

Talk of prospects for democratization in Central Asia seemingly
represents the triumph of hope over experience. Nowhere in this region will
the requirements for and understanding of genuine democracy materialize
anytime soon, either in elite or mass practice. Moreover, both here and in
the Muslim world generally (and in Russia as well), the transplantation of
‘Western and democratic institutions paradoxically often has strengthened
authoritarian rule, not liberalism or democracy.(n1) Furthermore, if we are
honest with ourselves, we must realize that the demand to democratize the
former Soviet Union as a whole, and Central Asia in particular, amounts to a
call for a revolutionary transformation of those areas, especially when
perceived from local capitals. That transformation will probably not be a
quick nonviolent one unless its advocates and leaders take special care.
These bleak conclusions apply equally to issues of either economic or
political democracy. Arguably, one also plausibly could contend that
whatever impetus for democratization, or at least for liberalization that
ultimately concludes with some recognizable form of democratization, must
inevitably come from outside the region, as internal forces are too weak to
make the necessary transition without foreign assistance. But whatever
external impetus might develop, it cannot offer genuine democracy on its
own. It only can stimulate, support, or at best galvanize existing, even
latent, domestic impulses for reform in politics and economics.
Neither is this assessment confined to Central Asia, for nowhere in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia, do we see
genuine democracy or its imminent advent upon the scene.(n2) Moreover,
Russia’s democratic deficits in Russia relate strongly to Central Asia. They
impel Russia’s elites to support Central Asian dictators for classic reasons
of state, not least the idea that this will somehow strengthen hopes of a
return to hegemony, if not empire.(n3) In turn, those rulers look to Russia
for support against pressures for reform.
Sadly, Russia, the most advanced of the CIS governments, manifests
disquieting and regressive efforts to restore the outlines of a police
capitalism, or it moves to frustrate such essential democratic rights as
free press, meaningful elections, and civilian democratic control of the
instruments of violence.(n4) Thus Russia resembles what Max Weber long ago
called pseudoconstitutionalism, hardly the same thing as
pseudodemocracy.(n5) Elsewhere, the situation is correspondingly worse. Thus
throughout the CIS the road to democracy will necessarily be long, winding,
and often tortuous. Indeed, Turkmenistan has deteriorated to a tragic and
yet farcical restaging of Stalinism’s worst excesses, representing almost a
paradigm, if not a caricature, of Weber’s category of sultanism.(n6)
But this well-founded pessimism does not render discussion of prospects
for democracy in Central Asia wholly futile. After all, it is never too soon
to think about how we may work toward democracy, practically or conceptually
or both. It is always appropriate to attempt to lay the foundations for
successful democratization, because only through that process can genuine
democracy eventually be consolidated at minimal civic cost, rather than
through intense civic violence. Moreover, discussion rather than
pronouncements from on high as to what those foundations are is essential,
because we ourselves are still debating the meaning of democracy. Some
writers even deny that the West has the skill, knowledge, or means to foster
democracy abroad or that it acts to promote authoritarian regimes in places
such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the West cannot and should not discuss
democratization of Central Asia and instead should leave it to Russia as a
sphere of influence.(n7) At the same time, some analysts of democracy and
comparative politics argue that either or both of those entities suffer from
various “democratic deficits” or else are perhaps excessively
democratic.(n8)
Similarly, despite the strong current of opinion that proclaims a
Western and American mission to be an evangel of democracy abroad, or at
least a force for democratization, there exists a powerful current of
opinion that criticizes equally strongly the efforts to bring Western
democracy to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.(n9) This line of argument
forcefully contends that efforts to bring the Western model of economic
liberalism and political democracy to the Third World ironically become a
force for destabilization, violence, and more anti-democratic
manifestations, or “illiberal democracy.”(n10)

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES OF DEMOCRACY
Precisely because debate epitomizes democratic politics, an open
discussion about the prospects for democracy throughout the former Soviet
Union remains topical. Therefore, as it regards Central Asia, we should
inquire into the conditions needed to undergird and sustain the perpetual
and open-ended process of democratization. Although arguments still rage
over the requirements of democratic politics, certain attributes seem to be
held in common. Lincoln’s famous epigrammatic definition appears to be
widely accepted as a necessary attribute of a democratic government. So too
are the notions of a government subject to regular, free, and fair
elections; the rule of law; parliamentary control of the purse through
democratic and transparent means; official accountability to the legislative
branch; separation of powers; limits on the executive; democratic control of
all of the means of violence; full civil rights of speech, religion, press,
assembly, and petition; freedom from arbitrary police power (how to define
arbitrary power does need to be clarified, but the general idea that we need
a category of defenses against it seems to be well established); legal
equality of all citizens without reference to race, sex, ethnicity, creed,
and so on.
Furthermore, it also has been clear since Aristotle, if not more
recently Tocqueville, that a balance of economic power where there is a
strong middle class, civil society, and thus a sphere of social and economic
life free from state control, is essential. Unrelieved mass poverty and
democracy are ultimately incompatible. The prospect and reality of
broad-based sustainable growth must be visible to society at large for it to
sustain its own belief in building democracy and in liberal politics and
economics more generally. Thus a government whose policies consist of one or
another form of rent-seeking and of misappropriation of the nation’s wealth
cannot be considered a democracy. This principle also mandates the existence
of what used to be called intermediary orders or civil society, a body of
social associations and civic groups, free of state penetration, that offer
the individual a legally protected sphere of privacy and freedom. This is
because an inevitable corollary of economic growth is ever greater
specialization and division of labor, which creates new needs, roles, and
functions for citizens and encourages them to form associations with
like-minded citizens.
Equally obvious, what Henry Adams called the systematic organization of
hatred, whether directed at other religions, peoples, nationalities, or
races, is an unreliable foundation upon which to build democracy. America’s
experience testifies that racism and ethnic discrimination are ultimately
incompatible with genuine democratization and are sources of internal
violence. As Lincoln reminded us, a house divided against itself cannot
stand.
Ideologically as well, the polity and its elites must internalize the
need for political figures to desist from attempts to promulgate or impose
their own vision of moral or ideological truth on the populace for the state
to be considered democratic. Ideological monism and democracy, in both
thought and practice, are incompatible. Church and state, even if the
religion is a civil religion like communism, or a cult of personality as in
Turkmenistan or, to a lesser degree, Uzbekistan, must be separated
institutionally and cognitively. Whatever citizens hold about the extent and
nature of divine revelation of truth, democracy is founded on the
probability of human error, not theological, scientific, or any other
certainty. As democracy arose from the Enlightenment’s critique of revealed
religion that challenged the teachings and power of the church, such
philosophical pluralism is absolutely essential for civil and human rights
to be established. Today as well, debate over the proper place of religion
in a democracy continues throughout Western democracies such as America,
Israel, Poland, Russia, Serbia, France, and other states with a strong
religious foundation to their nationhood.
In many of these cases, we see recognized political figures advocating a
state and social order based on a religious vision of political truth that
expressly articulates a coherent hostility to other religions.(n11)
Consequently, it is not altogether surprising that in countries where large
Islamic populations live, even as minorities, the determination of critical
clericopolitical elites and of societal sectors to impose their version of
Islam as law and truth shows the lack of democracy or a willingness to
entertain its requirements. Likewise, this insistence on an uncompromising
Islamic truth, even where Islamic communities are in a minority, reflects an
absolutism that then evokes a corresponding response.(n12) Even in a Muslim
state as secular as Kazakhstan, Islam’s historical intolerance of pluralism
will make demands for separating church and state and for dismantling all
institutional bases for ideological monism, both religious and civic, highly
contentious, if not violent, issues.

THE ROLE OF WOMEN
More recently, feminist thinkers also have argued that the emancipation
of women, as a category beyond mere citizenship and thus as a class of
citizens in their own right, is an essential attribute of democratic
polities. As Bernard
Lewis wrote:
The emancipation of women, more than any other single issue, is the
touchstone of difference between modernization and Westernization. Even the
most extreme and most anti-Western fundamentalist nowadays accepts the need
to modernize and indeed to make the fullest use of modern technology,
especially the technologies of warfare and propaganda. This is seen as
modernization, and though the methods and even the artifacts come from the
West, it is accepted as necessary and even as useful. The emancipation of
women is Westernization, both for traditional conservatives and radical
fundamentalists it neither is necessary nor useful but noxious, a betrayal
of true Islamic values. It must be kept from entering the body of Islam, and
where it has already entered, it must be ruthlessly excised.(n13)
This emancipation goes beyond according women all of the rights commonly
enjoyed by all citizens of the state to undertaking what Americans call
“affirmative action” to equalize their status in critical ways. Whether or
not female emancipation is an essential component of democracy, women’s more
emancipated role in the West long has been one of the most salient points of
difference between Western and Islamic civilizations. As Lewis noted, it
always has been one of the phenomena of Western civilization that has struck
Muslim observers most forcefully and negatively, and it is the touchstone of
the difference between modernization and Westernization.(n14) To the extent
that female emancipation is now seen as an essential attribute of democracy,
we must admit that when we advocate democratization, we are advocating a
revolutionary transformation of Islam and Muslim societies.
This tension between Western and Islamic societies’ views of women’s
roles suggests that the struggle for female emancipation is a critical and
wrenching barrier for Muslim societies to overcome if they are to resemble
democracies as understood by the West. The salience of this issue in Turkey,
the most progressive Muslim state, suggests the dynamite implicit in this
issue. Indeed, one way in which efforts to initiate a social revolution in
Central Asia historically took place was through the violent and
authoritarian imposition of female emancipation, a campaign whose results
were very limited. Still, this does not dissuade activists from urging
foreign support for a campaign pitched at the emancipation of women
today.(n15)
But equally important, to bring women more fully into society and
political life means reordering economic priorities to restore the social
safety net that has been shredded since 1991 throughout Central Asia. It
means redirecting real resources and money away from self-gratifying
rent-seeking for the elite to investments in urgent social, economic,
educational, public health, and ecological institutions to repair that
shattered network and to provide a basis for a better allocation of
resources throughout the country. That also entails pressures for
legislative accountability and oversight over even more areas of the state’s
economic policy, an indispensable prerequisite of democracy.

NATIONALISM, WAR, AND PEACE
The broader triumph of democracy in Central Asia must therefore go
beyond establishing its institutional prerequisites. Those societies also
must, and probably simultaneously will, undergo what inevitably will be a
wrenching institutional and ideological transformation. Western history
suggests that these transformations entail a prolonged and generally violent
crisis. This is especially tree when there has been no prior preparation for
liberalization or democratization and the old order suddenly collapses,
largely because of its own internal contradictions.
Consequently, to avert violence, a democratic or democratizing polity
has the added burden of shunning what Henry Adams described. His description
of modern nationalism also may be applied to attempts to suppress female
emancipation, which have themselves often been violent. Instead, the
democratizing state, not to mention the democratic one, must accept not only
the points listed previously but also the plurality of religious and moral
troths, and it must refrain from promulgating its own religion. A state
where ideological monism reigns or can be catapulted to power is a state
that will turn on those who are “alienated,” that is, made alien. Since all
states and societies today are multicultural and multiconfessional entities,
wherever we have a state church, whether civil or otherwise, there are by
definition outsiders, class enemies, racial enemies, or “unbelievers.”
Moreover, such a state must be an intrinsically intolerant one whose
intolerance easily becomes translated into militancy in word and deed
against all “others.”
This militancy is not accidental. Ideological monism only can be
enforced at the point of the sword. The state that proclaims an ideological
and hence political monism proclaims itself at war with itself and with
others. Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s prevailing tendency to shun
cooperation with their neighbors reflects some of this tendency and
strengthens the obstacles to liberalization across Central Asia. But the
monistic state does not only entail a refusal to cooperate with neighbors.
Indeed, it defines the world as being composed of enemies and supporters,
whether it does so according to ideological or philosophical categories
derived from anti-democratic thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Lenin, or
radical Islam.(n16) This monism was an essential point of Communism,
Fascism, and Nazism, with their imperial and racial cults and various forms
of “fuehrerprinzip” that have decisively influenced the modern Middle East’s
political parties. It is also the essence of radical Islam. All of these
anti-democratic trends come together in the Moslem world’s authoritarian
one-party states that are the most successful Arab and perhaps Muslim
borrowing from the West.
For Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, and others, their states were threatened
not only by capitalist encirclement, imperialism, and so on but also by
domestic enemies. The internal enemies and the external ones were
confederates or allies, thereby making the former enemies of the state, or
racial or class enemies. Thus the monistic state is by definition a
mobilizational or at least mobilized state whose raison d’&ecirc;tre is war
against both internal and external enemies. War and the ensuing
aggrandizement of state power is a permanent project, the state’s Telos and
justification. Whether the enemy be another people, race, religion, or
social class, the monistic state cannot be secure until the other is
exterminated or can no longer defend itself. Such defenselessness inherently
entails a condition of oppression of those so situated. Hence the monistic
state is perpetually engaged in warfare against its own citizens, not to
mention against outsiders. In this respect, the monistic state ranges itself
against one of the cardinal points of the democratic project, namely that
the citizen inherently can defend himself against the state. Should
authoritarian projects persist in Central Asia or neighboring areas, war is
therefore the inevitable, not just likely, outcome.(n17)
Lenin “introduced a state of siege into Russian democracy” and then
globalized it. As Central Asian leaders have inherited those traditions,
they often have incorporated communist as well as other traditional
authoritarian forms of rule into their arsenal. Turkmenistan is the extreme
example of that incorporation. But it is not alone, as Uzbekistan and
Armenia indicate. These states exist in a permanent state of war, or at
least controlled tension, with all others and with key elements of their own
society. Internal and external enemies abound, along with permanent war
scares or heightened tension, and are permanent and necessary lodestars of
the state’s formation and development, whether they are real or imagined
enemies.
In such states, the armed forces and police are generally arrayed in
multiple organizations, each spying on the other to defend the regime in
power and its various cultic phenomena. Thus a reliable guide to the level
of liberalization or democratization achieved by new states is the extent to
which there is only one regular army, police force, and intelligence
apparatus, with each having carefully delineated functions and transparent
systems of real accountability to democratic authorities under law. Where
these organizations have overlapping functions and are primarily tasked with
internal security, we can be reasonably certain that we are dealing with an
authoritarian and intrinsically unstable state. Given post-communist
regimes’ abundant failures in this domain, these are not only incompletely
democratized states, they also are tempted constantly, because of the
failure to exercise democratic controls on their “multiple militaries,” to
launch unending military adventures. Chechnya epitomizes the point both for
itself and for Russia.(n18) But any sober assessment of Central Asia and the
Caucasus locates this adventurism in Armenia and Georgia, as well as farther
afield in Pakistan.(n19) Nor is it surprising that this military adventurism
and absence of democratic controls is tied to an inflamed nationalism among
leaders of these states and to some degree their secessionist “others.” This
analysis would also discern all of the indices of rising militarization and
domestic repression in the last decade even before September 11, 2001.(n20)
Consequently, prolonged peace is essential to the inauguration of a
democratization process that will eventually culminate in what we could
recognize as democracy. This does not mean that pacifism is the only answer
if we want democracy. That assertion is absurd on its face. Rather, the
democratizing state, to consummate its long march to democracy as perceived
by itself and other states, must not be drawn into wars or initiate them.
Avoidance of the monism trap delineated above is therefore both an essential
aspect of this gradual pacification of the undemocratic state and of its
equally gradual democratization. But the avoidance of monism is not in and
of itself a sufficient guarantee that the state will escape either
initiating or being drawn into wars. This leads us to conclude that without
external and internal security–and not the security provided by
authoritarian police forces–these societies are permanently at risk, and
the experiences of the last five years confirm that.
This requirement for avoiding war also most certainly includes prolonged
civil wars. The relationship of war to democracy is not a linear one, but in
the early period of democracy building–a process often related to the
process of state building–the democratizing but incompletely realized
democracy is prone to conflicts that can derail it or provide ways for
atavistic elites to deflect or corrupt democratic possibilities.(n21) The
tendency of incompletely democratized polities to go to war has been
discerned for states as disparate as Hohenzollern Germany and Yeltsin’s
Russia, whose two wars in Chechnya undoubtedly served and were intended to
prevent democratizing trends from prevailing.(n22) The fact that many
functioning democracies have had to overcome internal civil wars as well as
make a revolution (which incorporated elements of such wars as well as
revolutionary wars against foreigners) suggests that such strife may be, or
at least was, a necessary phase of the democratizing process if the first
stages either fail to create a solid basis for progress or go too far and
lead to anarchy.
If this last observation is correct, then these states that have not
become completely democratic must undergo the trials of domestic or foreign
war to become democratic if their regimes fail to evolve. Therefore, to
avoid war we must contribute an impetus for continuing democratization.
Otherwise the accumulated tensions that arise due to blocked democratization
will explode into war. History suggests that it is then unlikely that only
one war then suffices for democracy to ensue.
For Central Asia, these observations point in two directions. On the one
hand, if democracy is to emerge from indigenous democratizing processes,
then to the greatest degree possible, wars, either external or internal,
must be avoided. The requirement for internal and external peace also
signifies that democracy cannot issue out of the ruins of a failed state by
the efforts of that state alone or by its citizens’ exclusive efforts. A
“society” entrapped in a Hobbesian universe of a failed or failing state
cannot begin to fashion a process of democratization, let alone a democracy
and even more urgently a functioning government, that is, a state.
Alternatively, if we are to follow the advice of the American radical
Randolph Bourne, who observed that “war is the health of the state,” we
should try to act and counsel others to act in such a way as to prevent the
undue strengthening of these authoritarian states. Thus, for Central Asia,
two indispensable prerequisites of a future democratic evolution are the
avoidance of either internal or interstate wars and the continuing external
pressure for reform to reinforce the efforts of domestic reformers and to
achieve a more broadly based, transparent, and legitimate basis for domestic
security. All of this must also take place while external security is
guaranteed as well.
Without continuing and combined internal and external pressure for
reform and more stable bases for security, it may only be possible for
democracy to develop because of a war or series of wars culminating in the
discrediting of the old order. However, as we want to spare societies the
terrors of war and the hardships of what might be war’s functional
equivalent, for example, cold wars, we must find or devise alternatives or
create an international environment that mitigates the possibility of war
and that also reduces the scope for local “bad actors” to start them. Thus
the paradoxical relationship between war and democratization provides no
easy answers, but it does seem to point to certain guidelines for action
that are at once moral and strategic in nature.
Specifically, the requirement for beginning a liberalization process
that will end in something recognizable as democracy, in part or in whole,
probably must be sparked by a deus ex machina, an external actor or actors
who reinforce and strengthen domestic trends within those societies. One
existing possibility is that the guarantees of security provided by the
presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia, specifically
NATO and U.S. forces, can provide a respite for terrorism and opportunities
for building security that also could contribute to the general pacification
and democratization of the entire area. Moreover, they are the only
effective barriers to either Russian or Chinese aspirations to hegemony.
Certainly, it is true that without security in Afghanistan, Central Asia is
at risk.(n23) But the converse also holds true, and therefore both ends of
this chain must be grasped simultaneously.
Thus the task of initiating a democratic process in Central Asia
equates, at least in some measure, to the perennial and ever difficult
business of making an existing political order a legitimate one beyond
simply using force. Subsumed in that issue is also the question of how to
use force that is already being deployed in ways that are legitimate and
that can bring about more positive outcomes than has hitherto been the case.
For democracy to evolve–and there is no other way known to us, short of
divine intervention–viable and secure states must precede it. For democracy
to emerge from the unfavorable conditions of Central Asia, those states must
not only avoid violence but also must form effective and viable states
amidst strong international rivalries and even violence. We cannot postulate
a halcyon state of nature from which democracy may evolve, because political
order is always contextual. States exist in a temporal and spatial, that is,
historical, context, a fact that is especially relevant to states that
emerged out of the Soviet collapse and whose nationality was in many ways an
invented or fabricated one.(n24)
Just as continental Europe underwent a long, historical, often
interrupted, and complex evolution before it could actually become
democratic, to begin democratization, Central Asian states probably also
must undergo long-term processes by which their evolving political orders
can attain true legitimacy beyond the simple coercion or bribery of elites.
There are no shortcuts to democracy, and the effort to devise or impose one
will inevitably lead to a catastrophe. Our responsibility is to create the
most auspicious conditions for that strengthening of societal capacity and
the evolution of conditions facilitating a legitimization of a political
process that steadily widens opportunity for economic and political
participation under law. In short, we must simultaneously concern ourselves
with both the internal and external conditions leading to security in these
states while preventing the international competition for influence in the
region from getting out of control.

THE PROBLEM OF STATE ORDER
Any assessment of prospects for democracy or democratization in Central
Asia must duly start from the problems of state order and of constructing
viable and legitimate states. Although this may be unpalatable because it
implies our seeming acceptance of the deformed regimes that presently exist
there, we have no choice. Certainly we cannot build democracy based on a
thoroughgoing rejection of reality. Since democracy only can arise as the
culmination of a democratizing process in the real world, that process only
can take place within a state, that is, a genuine political community,
however presently constituted. And it must be a political process from
within, not one imposed from without. Although there cannot be democracy
unless these states’ sovereignty and independence are consolidated, we can
then insist that this sovereignty must be consolidated legitimately.
Thus the domestic and external circumstances of Central Asia’s birth and
recent development oblige us to focus on both the domestic and international
context within which those states have evolved and are evolving. There is
much cause for anxiety concerning Central Asia, but it has avoided the wars
that have torn apart the Caucasus, Central Africa, and the former
Yugoslavia. Although troubled, these states still function; although we
cannot blithely assume that this sequence will continue uninterrupted, as
the prospects for stable domestic order in these states are under severe
challenge, without peace there would be no debate.
Many of those challenges are well-known. Apart from the dangers of
terrorist or otherwise incited insurgencies, these states must overcome
immature, authoritarian state apparatuses, which all bear to varying degree
the marks of their birth from a profoundly repressive, deformed, and
corrupting Soviet order. Moreover, there is reason to believe that their
level of competence has, if anything, declined since independence, often
because of capricious or misguided state policies.(n25) These strictures
apply not only to political issues and to the quality of the state
administration at the central and local levels but also to the profound
challenges of widespread poverty, some of the most severe environmental
challenges in the world, the lack of basic social infrastructures of all
kinds, geographic isolation from global markets, and potential internal and
external ethnopolitical challenges.
Even before September 11, 2001, these states had become central objects
of immense international competition and internal rivalry, for example, the
widespread fears of Uzbekistan’s potential for seeking to dominate the
region. Accordingly, Central Asia, and for that matter all post-Soviet
governments, confront enduring, dynamic, and difficult internal and external
challenges without any history of cooperation among them or of spontaneous
regional cooperation under the Soviets. Rather, they were parts of a
centralized administration that often deliberately strove to keep them from
being able to play complementary roles for each other. Therefore it is
hardly surprising that mutual cooperation has come only with difficulty or
that they also have found it difficult and often against their interests to
cooperate with Russian objectives, even if the latter were not specifically
aimed at curtailing their sovereignty and independence.(n26) But the absence
of regional cooperation also inhibits the growth among them and within them
of the division of labor that could facilitate demands for democracy within
them and in their interstate relationships. It also weakens their ability to
resist challenges to their security from within or without.
We also can follow other scholars’ assessments that the exigencies of
what the Soviets called state-building, under inauspicious and unexpected
conditions, is a major factor in facilitating the movement toward oil- and
gas-dominated rentier economies and authoritarian polities. Lacking much
else in the way of economic capability, and in many cases being under
immense pressure from neighbors, the short-term benefits, both tangible and
intangible, generated by playing the energy card seemed to many political
figures as perhaps the best or even only game in town, and they chose it.
Since then they have embraced the consequences and have built states based
on short-term, self-interested, rent-seeking policies.(n27)
Thus the situation in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus conforms to
Mohammed Ayoob’s penetrating observations that these states, like other
Third World states, simultaneously face the exigencies of both domestic and
external security without sufficient means or time to democratize or the
resources to compete successfully with other, more established states.(n28)
Not surprisingly, their primary concern is internal security, hence the
appearance of multiple militaries and their governments’ recourse to
rent-seeking, authoritarian, and clientilistic policies. Beyond the
foregoing observation, however, there is one more fact or perspective that
merits our analysis before passing on to prescriptive remedies. Bjorn
Moeller observes that
While in modernity the inside of a state was supposed to be orderly,
thanks to the workings of the state as a Hobbesian “Leviathan,” the outside
remained anarchic. For many states in the Third World, the opposite seems
closer to reality–with fairly orderly relations to the outside in the form
of diplomatic representations, but total anarchy within.(n29)
Yet, as contemporary events in Central Asia and the Caucasus indicate,
local governments cannot take foreign relations for granted. Too many of
their neighbors are more than willing to try and subvert them using force or
external agents who are supported from Moscow, Islamabad, or Kabul.(n30)
Therefore these states face the constant danger of either internal collapse
or externally induced pressure that can align with those internal forces.
Furthermore, their external relations are not confined to diplomatic
representations abroad, but they also embrace an ever wider network of
international financial institutions (IFIs) or supranational bodies such as
the UN, OSCE, or the EU. On top of that, they also have large and growing
NGO communities that are active within them and that are highly articulate
in their critical assessments of internal trends within those countries.
Consequently, for many post-Soviet states, foreign policy’s purpose is to
protect the internal regime from the domestic anarchy that lies inside of it
and that can be stimulated by the pressures of the outside world.(n31) As
described by Mikhail Alekseev, this is reversed anarchy, where the
international state system is not nearly as anarchic as the domestic
political scene is perceived to be.(n32)
If international relations are perceived by post-Soviet leaders to be
threatening to their internal capability to hold and wield power, then more
isolation will be likely. Interdependence or cooperative actions may well be
seen as a threat to domestic security, because in today’s world, where
processes described by James Rosenau as “fragmegration,” or what others call
globalization, are commonplace, greater foreign involvement reduces the
domestic government’s capacity to control events and trends.(n33) External
pressures for reform are resisted if they appear to contribute to pressures
for devolution or deconcentration of powers. If, on the other hand, foreign
support allows governments to suppress threats to their power, then it will
be welcomed.(n34) Uzbekistan’s efforts to extend Islam Karimov’s rule using
U.S. support exemplify this pattern, and we can find other examples
throughout the region where the sad state of democratization has led some
observers to claim that the situation has changed marginally, if at all,
since 1991.(n35)
We may fairly expect that under such conditions as reversed anarchy or
the picture painted by Ayoob and other similar theorists, these governments
will constantly seek to evade foreign relations that entangle them in a
perceived web of dependency that prevents the unbounded exercise of powers
at home. Personal, if not sectoral or factional, interest will thus tend to
supersede any concept of a national interest. Under those circumstances, and
given the obstacles to democracy that we now see, what can be done?

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite many rulers’ best efforts, Central Asia cannot escape from the
world, particularly in today’s system of international economics and
security. This fact provides opportunities for external and internal
pressures for reform and for their synchronization, not unlike the efforts
of the Reagan administration to support changes in both foreign and internal
Soviet policy. However, we are not only speaking of state policies.
Certainly all manners of NGOs will continue to cast a harsh spotlight on all
manners of abuse in the post-Soviet world and finally will not be deprived
of the information necessary to publicize them or the means of doing so.
Private and public alliances, states, and institutions working separately
must continue to support those activities, and pressure must be placed on
governments to validate or actualize their claims that they are pressuring
Central Asian governments to reform.
Second, governments, IFIs, and private businesses seeking to invest in
Central Asia, whether the investment be an economic one or one of more
military instruments of power to achieve security, now can leverage their
influence and widen the sphere through which foreign and liberalizing
influences and social forces may enter these countries. But they must do so
intelligently. We must avoid the trap whereby institutions of reform in our
world, when transplanted abroad, become facades for more effective
authoritarianism. Two examples bear mentioning here, the expansion of
Western bilateral military programs and reform of laws so that foreign
direct investment (FDI) can flow more freely to these states. These do not
by any means exhaust the repertoire of instruments available to the West.
Certainly international organizations should try, wherever possible, to
promote regional cooperation among these states. But IFIs or NGOs illustrate
or could exemplify intelligent approaches to the problem of foreign
promotion of reform.
Obviously, the main purpose of bilateral military or mil-mil programs in
American parlance is to train forces in working with the United States and
NATO so that they are reasonably interoperable with those forces and can
augment U.S. and NATO capabilities for power projection and military
operations, including so-called stability or humanitarian operations, not
just war.(n36) But the other major purpose of such programs, as expressed
during NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), to which all of
these states belong, is to provide a living and successful model of
democratic civilian control over the armed forces. In many of these
programs, too, most strikingly the PfP and European programs, the other
major purpose besides upgrading quality of performance and interoperability
is to create the basis for more democratic structures and behaviors with
regard to civil-military relationships.
In its military action programs (MAP), NATO guaranteed a continuing
process of close monitoring to ensure that aspiring members met its
conditions. Essentially, NATO and these governments entered into a
continuing process whereby NATO reviews their progress in all areas and
works with them to improve shortcomings or encourage further progress along
desirable lines. Aspirants must conform to the basic principles of
democracy, liberty, and so on as set out in the 1949 Washington Treaty, the
original documents of the 1994 NATO summit on the creation of the
Partnership for Peace (PfP), the 1995 NATO study on enlargement, and the
1999 NATO summit in Washington. They also must commit themselves to the
peaceful resolution of disputes; civilian democratic control of their armed
forces; desisting from using force in ways inconsistent with the purposes of
the UN; and being able to contribute to the development of peaceful
international relations and democracy and the various institutions of the
NATO alliance. They would commit to continuing participation in the PfP and
its planning and annual review processes (PARP) to maximize their ability to
contribute to their own and the alliance’s security and missions.(n37)
Although Central Asia’s programs are not nearly so advanced, they do
resemble the PfP programs. These programs should now become part of what the
United States professes to be its larger program of commitment to democratic
reform in post-Soviet states.(n38) We should advocate that both the U.S.
bilateral programs and the PfP therefore be broadened to obtain a more
pronounced democratic component with regard to Central Asia. Moreover, they
should aspire to create the basis for genuine security cooperation among
Central Asian states from the bottom up on the basis of perceived mutual
interest among local governments in marginalizing security competition and
fostering cooperation.(n39)
The current security situation and the unsettled regional security
situation, made worse by Russia’s efforts to obtain its own military bases
and to inject more rivalry into the area, ensure that U.S. and NATO
facilities and bases will remain much longer than anticipated. Indeed, it
would be counterproductive for them to leave unilaterally, as that would
consign the area to Russian military protection that is at once
insufficiently effective, supportive of reactionary domestic tendencies, and
prone to both adventurism and the fomenting of coups d’&eacute;tat against
local rulers. As S. Frederick Starr, director of Johns Hopkins University’s
Central Asia Institute, notes, a new Russian empire or hegemony’s
opportunity cost is CIS members’ modernization.(n40) Furthermore, Russian
suzerainty over the area consigns it to perpetual backwardness,
underdevelopment, and hence authoritarianism and conflict. If Washington and
Brussels are willing to stand their ground on this point, real progress
could be made regarding democratization and regional cooperation. Thus
pressure along such lines should be applied to Washington and Brussels along
with continuing pressure on Central Asian states.

The Impact of U.S. Policy and Presence
The American presence in Central Asia constitutes an opportunity for
radical movements in Central Asia. Still, this has not yet happened, and
many elites seem to welcome the U.S. presence because it not only prevents
terrorism but also is a check on Russian and Chinese designs and elevates
the importance of the region, making these elites feel that their countries
are key players at the center of world politics, rather than on its
periphery.(n41)
At the same time, America has incurred a responsibility due to its
enhanced presence in Central Asia. That presence has obligated U.S.
representatives to call more often and more publicly for further democracy
and reforms.(n42) But it also has obligated them to balance those calls with
an emphasis on the defense of the host state against terrorism and
insurgency, because this presence in some sense represents a defense of
local governments against terrorism. Because the first priority appears to
be the war, progress on getting dictators to democratize has been limited.
They clearly do not want to do so and see no reason or incentive for doing
so. It also must be said that the NGO community pushing for the use of U.S.
power to reform Central Asia all too often fails to realize how difficult it
is for anyone to persuade these governments to behave differently,
especially when they have nearby options of would-be protectors such as
Russia and China who are happy to have them continue in their established
ways. Very often major coercion is ultimately the only answer such dictators
understand, as with Milosevic or Charles Taylor. Although there are many
brave, courageous, attractive, and distinguished personages among the
opposition movements to these regimes, their future success or commitment to
democratic politics is by no means certain. We cannot teach the Central
Asians to elect good men or have democracy fall from the sky, especially in
current international conditions. Nevertheless, the United States is obliged
for reasons of interest and conscience to keep advocating reform.
The twin responsibilities of defense and arguing for reform are
facilitated by the opportunities for doing so that U.S. presence gives to
America. It also offers these regimes a chance to pursue options other than
that of being Russian or Chinese satellites, an option that consigns them to
perpetual backwardness. To be sure, that American presence also facilitates
opportunities for U.S. access to Caspian energy and other raw materials, a
major interest of the U.S. government.

Toward Economic Reform
That success in achieving a substantial economic foothold in the region
does, however, open up constructive opportunities for urging greater
economic liberalization to create conditions that work against an ultimate
explosion due to misrule and lack of opportunity. Specifically, that
economic success gives us opportunities to argue for property rights and
economic liberalization, without which no progress toward democracy is
sustainable.(n43) Beyond that, economic liberalization and the promotion of
more open trading regimes, leading to greater economic interdependence, may
be the key to unlocking the door to greater stability in Central Asia.
Although economic liberalization is indispensable and is indeed a necessary
condition for democracy, it is insufficient. Although international
experience shows that democracy is inconceivable without property rights,
establishing them is only a major step toward democracy, not the culmination
of the journey.
Similarly we must understand that to attract desperately needed FDI, it
is not necessary to have a big bang effect that legislates an end to the
obstacles to it or that imposes democracy in one fell swoop. FDI will enter
even authoritarian regimes if conditions for making money are improved to
the point of worthwhile risk. Although calculation of that point varies by
country, anyone familiar with the realities of legislation knows it comes
about only one step at a time and after a long legislative process that is
anything but direct.(n44) FDI’s liberalizing effects are inherently gradual,
but we can see how it has dramatically improved conditions inside China and
how it has forced considerable devolution of state power and even a more
liberalized regime compared with what existed in 1978.(n45)
But for FDI to take root, legislation must ensure the security and
sanctity of real property rights, without which no true middle class of an
independent civil society can grow. Even if FDI is not intended as a
democracy or liberalization project, the requirements for getting it, a
proclaimed goal of all of these governments, are profoundly subversive of
the status quo. Therefore, we must encourage these governments to pass the
necessary laws and then to promote the ensuing foreign investment.
As part of the recommended broader program of continuing pressure on
governments and supporting NGOS and other activities such as those in the
defense or security sector, we must re-adjust our horizons and support
realistic efforts to ameliorate economic conditions by encouraging FDI,
especially investment that contributes to growth without despoiling the
population or the ecology. Doing so is obviously difficult, but not
impossible, as environmental and growth issues have been addressed elsewhere
with positive results. But this only can be done incrementally over time to
create a climate that leads to favorable conditions for investment. In turn,
once that investment enters, it stimulates further pressures for economic
liberalization and ensuing social change that must then be exploited to
widen the breach in the authoritarian wall. But again this must be done in
ways that channel the resulting dynamism into constructive nonviolent change
whose end point is a cumulative pressure for reform that cannot be resisted.
Nevertheless, recent research suggests that it is essential. One recent
study showed that not only is such openness more likely to work to prevent
ethnic cleansing and even genocide–clearly a risk in Central Asia–but it
also can work to forestall state failure.
The State Failure studies have consistently shown that countries with a
high degree of trade openness indexed by exports plus imports as a
percentage of the GDP–have been less likely to experience state failures.
The relationship holds when controlling for population size and density and
for productivity indicators. It also has the same effect at the global and
regional level. Moreover, trade openness is weakly correlated with other
economic and trade variables. The interpretation is that trade openness
serves as a highly sensitive indicator of state and elite willingness to
maintain the rules of law and fair practices in the economic sphere. In the
political sphere a high degree of trade openness implies that a country has
more resources for averting and managing political crises.(n46)
Fostering such strategic interdependence through expanded trade and
investment openness has, from the American standpoint, two other worthwhile
objectives, which have proven their utility since 1945 in Europe and Asia.
The first is to help activate and reward internal groups and factions
within the economy and society and strengthen their domestic position,
thereby giving a boost to political forces that favor democracy and a
pluralistic political system. The other objective of strategic
interdependence is to create within the country dependencies and “vested
interests” that favor stable and continuous relations. This is often seen
most clearly in the economic realm: International business leaders grow in
number and importance in the target country and raise their collective
voices in favor of political and economic openness and friendly
relations.(n47)
Such policies create formal institutional links between countries and
thus reduce incentives for future conflicts between them or within them.
Similarly, these programs create open and working channels of communication
that allow the United States to influence their policies.(n48) Thus,
These tactics and strategies work together. The more that trade,
investment, and political exchange work to open a country up to the outside,
the more opportunities there are to tie them down and bind them with other
states. This observation follows from a rather simple argument: the more
open a state is–democratic, liberal, pluralist, decentralized–the more
points of contact that a state can have with the outside world. Private
actors in society can directly connect to international organizations and
build extensive non-governmental relationships with similar actors in other
states. The more connecting points and institutionalized relationship, the
less arbitrary and sudden shifts in state policy are likely or possible.
Webs of interdependence are created that mitigate the security dilemmas,
lower the incentives to balance [against the United States] and render
shifts in power more tolerable.(n49)
Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin conclude that,
[r]egarding prevention, our analysis suggests that while economic growth
may correlate with fewer civil wars, the causal mechanism is more likely a
well-financed and administratively competent government. In specific terms,
international and nongovernmental organizations should develop programs that
improve legal accountability within developing world militaries and police,
and make aid to governments fighting civil wars conditional on the state
observing counterinsurgency practices that do not help rebels recruit
militias.(n50)
These recommendations certainly track with each other and, if
implemented, might produce virtuous circles to strengthen state capacity,
economic openness, and liberalization in a host of areas. But we should have
no illusions that this will happen soon. Rather, this is a long-term
strategy that must begin now to avert what could otherwise be many cases of
state failure within a relatively short period of time. Clearly, domestic
forces in Central Asia are too weak to convince local regimes to launch the
necessary transformative measures to set this process in motion. Arguably,
whatever impetus there is for democratization, or at least for
liberalization that ultimately concludes in some recognizable form of
democratization, it must inevitably come from abroad, as internal forces
cannot launch the process without foreign assistance. But whatever external
impetus might develop cannot offer genuine democracy of its own. It only can
stimulate, support, or at best galvanize existing, even latent, domestic
impulses for reform. However, we must also grasp that the opportunities to
pursue the U.S. agenda of open markets, open polities, and security against
terrorism, not least through domestic reform, for which American
organizations consistently argue, also bring dangers in their wake.
Many of these dangers are well-known. First, a large and visible
American presence can be a target for and a goad to insurgents who can then
ratchet up the violence in the belief that U.S. leadership and the public
cannot stand the casualties and costs of what is admittedly a somewhat
peripheral theater. This belief that the United States has no stomach for
war and casualties dies hard among authoritarians even though there is no
evidence for it. We can be sure that radicals will try to derail any sign of
progress lest it undermine their hopes for power. Paradoxically, successful
reform that is then blocked from further consummation may initially create
more violence in areas that America has taken it upon itself to defend. A
second danger is that the United States, even if it tries valiantly to
impose reforms, will be seen as a pillar of an increasingly despised and
decrepit regime, as in Iran in 1978-79. If a Central Asian or Transcaucasian
ruler spurns U.S. pleas and arguments for reform, yet his country fails
further and further, radical insurgents, Islamist or others, will exploit
that situation against the United States and the government in power. After
all, if America is seen as the exemplar and driving force of the forces of
globalization and of a cultural invasion of the world beyond its shores,
then the perceived failure of globalization or the reaction against it–not
necessarily the same thing–will drive opposition to America and to the
ruling regime as a symbol of corruption, degradation, and so on.
This transformative presence of American culture, mores, sexual
standards, and economics is not something that is under any government’s
control. Certainly Washington cannot and will not try to prevent it. But it
clearly stimulates diverse, ambivalent, but often strong reactions in host
countries, and not only in Muslim ones. But to the extent that the
manifestations of that economic-social-sexual-cultural presence arouse
passions in already overly stressed societies, then all things American
could serve as a negative antipode for the entrepreneurs of identity-based
politics such as political Islam. Thus good governance is ultimately a
security issue, because it reduces the likelihood that the transforming
American presence will place excessive stresses upon a society that cannot
bear them.
To some degree, these risks are unavoidable. Nobody can control
globalization or its manifestations, and it simultaneously generates new
social patterns of both integration and fragmentation within and between
states and societies.(n51) But those who represent America in countries so
different from it must realize that they are constantly under a rather large
magnifying glass with more than enough observers on the other side of that
glass to make a real difference in local politics. Thus the conduct of
troops abroad also plays into this process if there are reasons for
unhappiness over their behavior among their hosts.
The American presence can serve to impel societies and states to
undertake the kind of reforms that Americans believe will avert failing
states and civil violence. The American presence also can ensure defense of
the realm against foreign insurgents, terrorists, and so on. Yet, on the
other hand, and particularly if the regime refuses to grasp the need for
reforms, that presence can become simultaneously a symbol of oppression, or
support for it, and a symbol of all of those forces that have brought about
a social situation where “all that is solid melts into air.” We have long
known that the whirlpool that is contemporary capitalism and globalization
is disorienting in the extreme. When vulnerable personalities are caught up
in it, the results are often tragic and their behavior often becomes anomic,
rootless, and even violent.
The Trans-Caspian states as a whole are experiencing that disorienting
process, and we can see the results in all of the myriad pathologies of
socio-economic-political life there now. But even if the United States might
be blamed for the disappointments of freedom and globalization, it cannot
and ultimately will not stand aside from the effort to bring both security
and liberty to the area. Ultimately, not only its values but also its
interests demand this. And although it will undoubtedly make mistakes and
even frequently fail to rise to the occasion or to understand it, that
failure does not absolve local governments from their obligations to their
peoples. Ultimately, America cannot be more of the Uzbek or Kazakh regime
than those leaders are now. Although it can pressure, cajole, and try to
persuade, it must first secure those regimes against violence from the
outside before it can persuade the leaders of those states to secure their
people, if not themselves, against violence from within.
Finally, one last item that our governments and NGOs can and should do
to encourage democratization in Central Asia and the broader post-Soviet
world is to increase pressure on Russia by our governments, the media, and
other institutions active in these fields. Despite its relative weakness,
Russia will always be a point of reference in Central Asia. There also is
little doubt that the support of dictators in the CIS is seen from the point
of view of strengthening Russia’s great power aspirations there and thus the
interests of the most unregenerate and antireform elements inside Russia.
And in fact, President Vladimir Putin has made clear his aversion to
“exporting democracy.”(n52)
To the extent that we are successful in fostering democratic reform in
Russian politics, that will promote democratization beyond Russia, for
example, in Central Asia, and will force rulers in both sets of states to
move away from the present undemocratic policies. It also will produce
greater security and fewer Russian efforts to impose neo-colonialist and
imperial policies there for empire and autocracy to go together. This also
will create strong incentives for local regimes to reform, as they will be
unable to hide behind Moscow and will have to reckon with the positive rise
in Russian economic power and stability that reform should stimulate. But it
also will reduce both Moscow’s ability to derail Central Asian reform and
its interest in doing so by situating Russian power in more globalized,
transparent, democratic, and international institutions.
Right now, international and domestic developments apparently are
pushing Moscow to strengthen its military-economic hold on the area.(n53)
But that policy embodies a paradox. Its result would be to encourage the
option of perpetual backwardness, misrule, and violence in the misbegotten
belief that this brings security to both Moscow and Central Asia. It also
strengthens the hand of antireform elements in Moscow and Central Asia,
which is contrary to the interests, security, and prosperity of those
states’ peoples. Consequently, Russian support for democratization at home
and abroad must be enlisted if the long-term project of Central Asian
democratization is to succeed.
The picture portrayed here and the steps recommended may seem too bleak
in the first case and too modest in the second. We may be accused of not
doing enough or of being too pessimistic and accepting of the realities that
now dominate Central Asia. However, to realize the dream of a democratic
progressive Central Asia, we must will it strongly enough through persistent
efforts so that it will not be forever a dream. Therefore we must start from
current realities and act intelligently and purposefully to transform them
so that this dream is realized and not deferred. In Central Asia, as we can
see all too plainly today, if we fail to act to translate the dream into
reality, if the dream is indeed too long deferred, it will soon become a
real nightmare.

NOTES
(n1.) Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern
Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
(n2.) Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2003); Taras Kuzio, “Back to the USSR?
Ukraine Holds Soviet-Style ‘Discussion’ of Political Reform,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 28 April 2003.
(n3.) Igor Torbakov, “Moscow Seeks to Take Advantage of Iraq Conflict to
Reassert Its Leadership in CIS,” <Eurasianet.org> 9 April 2003; Igor
Torbakov, “Russian-Turkmen Pacts Mark Strategic Shift for Moscow in Central
Asia,” <Eurasianet.org> 15 April 2003.
(n4.) Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, passim.
(n5.) Max Weber, The Russian Revolutions, ed. Gordon Wells and Peter R.
Baehr (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
(n6.) Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed.
Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), 62-63, 347-48; Juan J. Linz
and H. E. Chehabi, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998).
(n7.) Anatol Lieven, “The Not So Great Game,” National Interest 49
(winter 1999-2000): 69-80; Anatol Lieven, “Bobbing for Rotten Apples:
Geopolitical Agendas in Ukraine and the Western NIS” (paper presented to the
Project on Systemic Change and International Security in Russia and the New
States of Eurasia, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 2000); Richard Sokolsky and Tanya
Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far? (Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1999); Eugene Rumer, “Fear and Loathing in the
‘Stans,'” Christian Science Monitor, 2 August 2001; Ira Straus, “Wisdom or
Temptation in Central Asia?,” The Russia Journal, 22-28 February 2002.
(n8.) Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution ? (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001); Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft:
Strategies for a Changing World (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).
(n9.) Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy
Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Doubleday, 2003);
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and
Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).
(n10.) Ibidem.
(n11.) For example, Michele Cottle, “Bible Brigade: Franklin Graham v.
Iraq,” New Republic, <; 15 April 2003, discusses how Christian
evangelists in America view Islam and their influence on policy there.
(n12.) Thus France’s minister of interior, Nicholas Sarkozy, was forced
to state that “Imams who propagate views that run counter to French values
will be expelled” and that “Islamic law will be applied nowhere because it
is not the law of the (French) Republic,” Kim Housego, “France Threatens to
Expel Extremist Islamic Leaders,” Associated Press, 16 April 2003, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis, Lewis, passim.
(n13.) Ibid., 73.
(n14.) Ibid.
(n15.) Belinda Cooper and Isabel Traugott, “Women’s Rights and Security
in Central Asia;’ World Policy Journal 20, no. 1 (spring 2003): 59-68;
Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974).
(n16.) Whereas Lenin’s views are well-known, for an introduction to Carl
Schmitt, see Mark Lilla, “The Enemy of Liberalism” New York Review of Books,
<; XLIV, no. 8, 15 May 1997, and the books cited there. Schmitt
was a major theorist and justifier of an approach to politics that
postulated politics as a struggle between enemies.
(n17.) Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
(n18.) Miriam Lanskoi, “War of the Russian Succession: Russia and
Chechnya between the Wars” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 2003); Dmitry
Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko, Vremya Iuga: Rossiya v Chechne, Chechnya v
Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 2002).
(n19.) Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The
Price of Strategic Myopia (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2003);
Stephen Blank, “Central Asia’s Strategic Revolution” (paper presented to the
Conference on Caspian Sea Basin Security, Seattle, Wash., April 2003).
(n20.) Mark Eaton, “Major Trends in Military Expenditure and Arms
Acquisition by the States of the Caspian Region, in The Security of the
Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press and
SIPRI, 2001), 83-118; Stephen Blank, “Central Asia’s Strategic Revolution”
(paper presented at the NBR Asia/U.S. Army War College Conference on Caspian
Sea Basin Security, Seattle, Wash., April 2003).
(n21.) Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger
of War,” International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 5-38; Jack L.
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jack L. Snyder, From Voting
to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Violence (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2000).
(n22.) Lanskoi, passim., Malashenko and Trenin, passim.
(n23.) Central Asia and the Post-Conflict Stabilization of Afghanistan
(London: International Institute for Security Studies, 2002).
(n24.) Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Foreign Policy
and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).
(n25.) For example, Robert C. Rickards, “Business, Bureaucrats, and the
EU in Turkmenistan,” in Asian Economic and Political Issues, ed. Frank
Columbus (Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), II, 212.
(n26.) Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Aslund, and Sherman W. Garnett,
Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
(n27.) See the essays in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., Energy and
Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1999).
(n28.) Mohammad Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society:
Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order” Australian
Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 247-60; Idem.,
“Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for
Subaltern Realism,” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 127-48,
and the works cited therein.
(n29.) Bjorn Moeller’s quote is located in Mikhail Alekseev, Regionalism
of Russia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: A Case of “Reversed Anarchy,”
Donald W. Treadgold Papers, University of Washington, Henry M. Jackson
School of International Studies, no. 37 (2003): 12.
(n30.) See Faruqui, 2003; Blank, 2003.
(n31.) Alekseev, passim.
(n32.) Ibid.
(n33.) James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, Governance
in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and
Idem., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
(n34.) Alekseev, 12-19.
(n35.) Bruce Pannier, “State Department Sees Little Improvement in
Rights Situation,” <Eurasianet.org> 5 April 2003; Ibragim Alibekov,
“Nazarbayev Embraces Reform, Seeks to Undermine Support for Political
Opposition in Kazakstan,” <Eurasianet.org> 15 April 2003.
(n36.) Roger W. Barnett, Extraordinary Power Projection: An Operational
Concept for the U.S. Navy, Strategic Research Development Report 5-96, U.S.
Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Occasional Papers,
Newport, R.I., 1996, 7-8.
(n37.) “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” Press Release NAC-S (99) 66, 24
April 1999, <;. See also Ambassador
Klaus-Peter Kleiber, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs,
“The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s Door Open” NATO Review Web
Edition 47, no. 2 (summer 1999) <;.
(n38.) Speech by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, Beth Jones, “U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Staying Our Course Along the Silk Road,” University of Montana, Missoula,
Montana, 10 April 2003, U.S. Department of State Washington File.
(n39.) General (Ret.) Sir Garry Johnson, “Security Cooperation in
Central Asia Post-11 September,” Central Asia and the Post-Conflict
Stabilization of Afghanistan (London: International Institute for Security
Studies, 2002): 19.
(n40.) S. Frederick Starr, “Russia and the Neighboring Countries,”
Presentation to the Kennan Roundtable at The Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C., 24 January 2001.
(n41.) Ravshan M. Alimov, “Central Asian Security and Geopolitical
Interests,” Marco Polo Magazine no. 1 (2003): 3-9.
(n42.) Speech by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, Beth Jones, “U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Staying Our Course Along the Silk Road;’ University of Montana, Missoula,
Montana, 10 April 2003, U.S. Department of State Washington File.
(n43.) Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Random House,
2000).
(n44.) John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law
Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of
Law Project Working Paper no. 26, 2002).
(n45.) Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political
Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1994); Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).
(n46.) Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned From the Holocaust? Assessing
Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,” American Political
Science Review 93, no. 1 (February 2003): 65.
(n47.) G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of
Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (2002):
77-78.
(n48.) Ibid., 78.
(n49.) Ibid., 79.
(n50.) James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (February 2003): 88.
(n51.) James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Governance
in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and
Idem., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
(n52.) “Putin Speaks Out Against ‘Exporting Capitalist Democracy,'”
ITAR-TASS News Agency, 11 April 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
(n53.) Torbakov, Ops. Cits.
ADDED MATERIAL
Stephen Blank is a professor of national security affairs at the
Strategic Studies Institute, at the U.S. Army War College. This is a revised
and expanded version of a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the
Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Istanbul, 1-3 June 2003.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

www.tnr.com&gt
www.nyr.org&gt
www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm&gt
www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-05.htm&gt

Misinformation From a Finnish Immigration Official

Assyrian International News Agency
Guest Editorial
Misinformation From a Finnish Immigration Official
Dr. Eden Naby
Posted 01-28-2005, 13:01:32

(AINA) — A member of the Finnish Directorate of Immigration, Antero
Leitzinger published an article called Kurds and the Kurdistans, which
appeared on 1/23/05 at GlobalPolitician.com. The article appeared so
outrageous to a Kurdish supporter that this person called it to the
attention of Dr. Eden Naby, Academic Advisor to the Assyrian Academic
Society. The article below is Dr. Naby’s editorial for AINA
critiquing the misinformation that the author has knowingly or
unwittingly passed into the public domain about Assyrians (ed.).

I am truly appalled at the shallowness of the analysis, lack of
comparative data, and simple (mischievous?) twisting of facts in the
article on Kurds and the Kurdistans, which appeared on 1/23/05 by
Antero Leitzinger at GlobalPolitician.com. In the age of the Internet,
thankfully, one cannot get away with such low quality work. Facts are
easy to check, and propaganda cannot so easily pass for expert
knowledge.

Not only does this author persist on weighing “oranges” against
“apples” and coming up with useless analogies (Scandinavians, divided
into several countries, cannot be equated with Kurds, nor can Turks be
equated with the distant Uighurs of Central Asia, whatever the
language affinities may be), but he treats lightly areas of cultural
history that are very complex

But this is not his most egregious mistake. No, in his references to
Assyrians your editors should not have let pass the absolute
historical and linguistic misinformation being passed along by Kurdish
extremists to unsuspecting western sources: Can Global Politician
maintain its integrity if it presents such appallingly unbalanced
material?

Assyrians have never been “Kurds.” Nor are Jews who lived in northern
Iraq “Kurds.” From reliable Israeli accounts, there are no more than
100 Jews left in all of Iraq, and most of those are in Baghdad and
Basra. The Jewish religious and cultural facilities in places like
Mosul and especially the large village of Alqosh on the Nineveh Plain
have been looked after by the local ChaldoAssyrians once the Jews
finally got permission to flee to Israel after 1949. Assyrians and
Jews in Iraq, because they shared religious status as dhimmis – barely
tolerated non-Muslims – and a common Aramaic speaking heritage,
maintained a close relationship. One of the earliest books published
about Jews in Iraq is by an Assyrian (Ghanima, 1927).

Whatever the new strategic relationship between Iraq’s Kurds and the
Israelis and Americans may be, let us not gloss over the fact that
most Jews living in northern Iraq are today in Israel or somewhere out
of Iraq. Just because they spoke Kurdish does not mean that they were
Kurds. Many minorities speak multiple languages of necessity, even as
a mother language, of necessity. Look at the Uzbek elites or the
Kazakhs who still are more comfortable in Russian than in their own
written languages. Imagine the situation in northern Iraq where Jews
and Assyrians spoke modern forms of Aramaic but of necessity also
communicated in Kurdish, Arabic and in some cases Turkish and
Persian. That is the state of minorities. It is an injustice to parlay
multilingualism into Kurdish ethnicity and deny the existence of
special ethnic minorities who already suffer enough physically and
culturally.

In terms of religion therefore, Kurds do not include many religions.
Absolutely not. They are Muslims of several stripes. Assyrians are
Christians separated into several denominations. The language of
Assyrian church liturgy is Syriac, and sometimes the modern Aramaic
vernacular. If in some churches the knowledge of Aramaic has decreased
due to its suppression in schools, and Arabic, Turkish and even
Kurdish are adopted to carry on the Christian tradition, this does not
make these people Kurds. Aramaic is the oldest continuously written
and spoken language of the Middle East and second only to Chinese in
the entire world. It is on the verge of joining the dead languages of
the world like Latin precisely because of the kinds of persecution
that Christians in parts of the Muslim world have experienced.

In Iraq, northwest Iran and in eastern Turkey, the biggest direct
physical pressure on the Assyrians came from the Kurds, historically
and today. Antero Leitzinger should have reflected a bit more, and
read a great deal more about the First World War in the Middle East
before repeating Kurdish propaganda about who persecuted whom. Written
records alone, of Kurdish attacks on Assyrian villages, go back to the
mid-19th century. They culminated in World War I when Kurds
persistently attacked Urmiyah at a time when the Iranian government
was too weak (caught up in the Constitutional Revolution) to resist
either the Tsarist or Ottoman armies. Kurds took advantage of this
weakness to kill off Assyrians and Armenians in persistent pulses
sweeping down from the Zagros foothills onto the plains of Urmiyah. In
1914, just as the Ottomans joined the Central Powers, their Kurdish
allies launched an attack on Margawar and Targawar, killing all who
could not flee east to relative shelter. In 1915 when the Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP) launched its jihad in earnest against the
Armenians, Assyrians and Pontic Greeks, driving who they could not
kill into the Syrian desert, due to the Kurdish Hamidiya paramilitary
units, very few, less than 50,000 Assyrians managed to reach Urmiyah
since the mountain passes were held by Kurds who had taken over
Margawar and Targawar already. The events of WWI culminated in the
assassination of the Kurdish Shakkak tribe’s honored dinner guest, the
Assyrian Patriarch, titled Mar Shim’un at that time, in 1918; about
130 of Mar Shim’un’s bodyguards were also murdered. Some allege the
after dinner assassination took place because the Kurdish chieftain
Isma’el Agha (Simku) coveted this Assyrian leader’s ring. (Anzali,
1999)

Kurds have also coveted Assyrian and Armenian women, and being in a
more religiously powerful position as Muslims, they have taken these
women and girls as household servants or second wives with little that
their Christian neighbors could do to prevent it, although trying to
get the women back periodically occurred and as late as the 1960s got
whole Christian villages destroyed (August Thiery, 2003). The
offspring of such forced unions may be partly Assyrian, but ethnically
and culturally they grew up Kurds. And Muslims. Forget racial purity
in that part of the Middle East: what matters for identity is
language, religion and heritage.

Due to the polygamous marriages so popular among peasant and
non-peasant Kurds, the rate of population increase among Kurds is one
of the highest in the world although population figures are
notoriously unreliable and we only have the sample Soviet censuses to
provide some evidence. One recent New Yorker article (October 2004)
noted that among the Kurds moving into Kirkuk was a man with two wives
and 21 children! He was interviewed at random. The upshot of all this
is that the villages in Iran identified as Assyrian in 1927 were
reduced drastically in number by the time of the official Iranian
census published in the early 1950s (Razmara). And take a guess as to
who had replaced the Assyrian Christians in and around Urmiyah? Mainly
Kurds, not Azaris. Maybe Antero Leitzinger should have read a little
more about why the Mahabad Republic was located where it was in WWII,
instead of simply wondering why it was not in “Kordestan.”

The same displacement process occurred in southeast Turkey, in
northeast Syria and now with help from misinformation like that
provided in Global Politician, on the Nineveh Plains in northern
Iraq. These replacements are genuine Kurds, not of the variety your
author is presenting as “Christian Kurds” and “Jewish Kurds.”

These ethnic and religious matters in the Middle East are not
simple. To try to deal with them from a biased perspective, or to
create untenable analogies, only leads to disastrously tragic policy
decisions. Global political astuteness requires far greater diligence
and care.

Ethnic cleansing is no joking matter. Careless words can wipe out the
Assyrians, one of the oldest surviving communities in the world. The
culture of the Assyrians of the Middle East is precious in all the
senses of that word: it is old, rich, increasingly fragile, and has
made many contributions to world culture from medicine (Le Coz, 2004)
to agriculture (Abdalla 1980s, 1990s articles) and all the fields of
human knowledge between them. To relegate the Assyrians to a branch of
Kurds, who, for whatever reason, have a low prestige culture and
little written history, is a cultural crime. At the least your author
and you [globalpolitician.com] need to make a retraction.


Dr. Eden Naby is a cultural historian on the modern Middle East with a
concentration on the area from Iraq to Central Asia. She has published
extensively on Assyrians, as well as the Afghans, Turkmens, Uighurs
and Kurds. Dr. Nab y’s book Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx And Mujahid
(Westview Press, rpt. 2002), co-authored with the Prof. Ralph
H. Magnus, is a seminal source on modern Afghanistan and particularly
useful for its analysis of that country’s ethnic and religious
minorities. Her most recent writing about Assyrians is From Lingua
Franca to Endangered Language: The Legal Aspects of the Preservation
of Aramaic in Iraq, a paper in On The Margins Of Nations: Endangered
Languages And Language Rights (Joan A. Argenter and R. McKenna Brown,
ed., 2004).

Views and opinions expressed in guest editorials do not necessarily
reflect the views and opinions of AINA. Guest Editorial Policy

Copyright (C) 2005, Assyrian International News Agency. All Rights
Reserved.

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Pope Urges Resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

GLOBAL CATHOLIC NEWS
Rome’s Zenit News

Pope Urges Resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

VATICAN CITY, JAN. 28, 2005 (Zenit.org).- John Paul II encouraged a solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict when he received Armenian President Robert
Kocharian in audience.

In his address delivered today in Russian, the Pope spoke about the
president’s concern in regard to the long conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh, a primarily Armenian-populated region, assigned to
Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1920s by Moscow.

Armenia, a country with some 3 million inhabitants, and Azerbaijan began
fighting over the area in 1988. The struggle escalated after both countries
attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

By May 1994, when a cease-fire took hold, Armenian forces held not only
Nagorno-Karabakh but also a significant portion of Azerbaijan proper.

The economies of both sides have been hurt by their inability to make
substantial progress toward a peaceful resolution.

“I hope that true and lasting peace comes to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh
where you, President Kocharian, come from,” the Holy Father said. “This will
come about by a decisive rejection of violence and a patient dialogue
between the parties, and also to active international mediation.”

The Holy See “which over the centuries has not failed to denounce violence
and defend the rights of the weak, will continue to support all efforts
aimed at building a solid and lasting peace,” the Pope continued.

John Paul II promoted the solution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh when
he visited Armenia in September 2001 for the celebration of the 1,700
anniversary of the Armenian people’s conversion to the Christian faith.

Armenia prides itself on being the first nation to formally adopt
Christianity, in the year 301.

Jan. 19 the Pope blessed a statue of St. Gregory the Illuminator (or the
Armenian), apostle of Armenia and founder of the Armenian Church, which has
been placed among the founding saints that surround the exterior of St.
Peter’s Basilica.

During today’s audience, the Pope expressed to the Armenian president, who
was accompanied by his wife, his “sincere appreciation for the good
relations between the Holy See and the government of your country.”

“I know that the Catholic community is welcomed and respected, and that its
various activities contribute to the well-being of the entire nation,” added
John Paul II. “Everyone earnestly hopes that the collaboration between the
Holy See and the Armenian government will continue to grow and, where the
situation calls for it, that eventual improvements to the status of the
Catholic Church will be made.”

The Holy Father then referred to the “friendly and respectful relations
between the Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church.”

“This understanding,” he said, “which is even more active thanks to the
initiative of the Catholicos Karekin II, will certainly have positive
repercussions for the peaceful coexistence of the entire Armenian people,
who are called to face no small number of social and economic challenges.”

Around 90% of Armenian Catholics obey the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate,
which separated from Rome after the Council of Chalcedon in 451. A decisive
step to overcome this division was taken in 1996, when the Pope and the
previous Catholicos Karekin I signed a joint declaration that resolved
misunderstandings on the nature of Jesus.

The patriarch of Cilicia of the Armenians, His Beatitude Nerses Bedros XIX
— whose see is in Lebanon, and who leads around 10% of Armenian Christians
living in their homeland and in the diaspora, and who are in communion with
Rome — has been visiting Rome in recent days to participate in the blessing
of the statue of St. Gregory the Illuminator.

After his visit with the Pope, President Kocharian went to see the statue of
St. Gregory the Illuminator that now stands in the Vatican.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress