ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
April 3, 2004 Saturday

Karabakh problem should be solved by peaceful means – DM

By Tigran Liloyan

YEREVAN

Armenian Defence Minister Serzh Sarkisyan said it is necessary to
solve the Karabakh problem by peaceful and political means.

Sarkisyan told Russian journalists on Saturday, “I believe that the
main thing is to prevent the resumption of armed actions” in the area
of the Karabakh conflict.

“There were no winners,” the minister stressed.

“We believe that the Karabakh problem should be solved by peaceful,
political means and it is necessary to hold talks and reach a
compromise,” Sarkisyan pointed out.

The defence minister said Armenia considers military cooperation with
Russia “part of the country’s national security and believes that the
presence of the Russian military base in the Armenian territory is
right and essential for Armenia.”

He explained that Russia’s military presence promoted stability in
the region.

Armenia is interested in military cooperation with Russia because its
armed forces are equipped with the Soviet or Russian weapons,
Sarkisyan said.

The minister noted that Armenia purchased spare parts for military
hardware in Russia and added that many problems in this area had been
solved as a result of favourable conditions created for Armenia
within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

Sarkisyan said 700 Armenian citizens studied in Russian military
schools and academies.

On Armenia’s air defence, Sarkisyan said the CIS Joint Air Defence
System is capable of fulfilling any task. The minister said he would
like that system to be armed with state-of-the-art combat means.

He stressed, “Armenian air defence troops are mission capable and
they have proved it in the course of joint exercises at the Russian
air defence test range Ashuluk.”

“The armed forces are the main guarantor of the country’s security.
They have all the necessary means to protect the borders of their
homeland,” the minister said. Mechanised units led by career officers
with vast combat experience form the bulk of the Armenian armed
forces, the minister said.

“The important component of Armenia’s national security is the
Russian military base,” Sarkisyan pointed out.

Hellenic Resources Network
Saturday, 3 April 2004

Armenian Genocide Quotes

Mustafa “Ataturk” Kemal

Founder of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 and revered throughout
Turkey, in an interview published on August 1, 1926 in The Los Angeles
Examiner, talking about former Young Turks in his country…
These left-overs from the former Young Turk Party, who should have been made
to account for the millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly
driven en masse, from their homes and massacred, have been restive under the
Republican rule.

Adolf Hitler

While persuading his associates that a Jewish holocaust would be tolerated
by the west stated…
Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?

Yossi Beilin

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister. April 27, 1994 on the floor of the Knesset
in response to a TV interview of the Turkish Ambassador
It was not war. It was most certainly massacre and genocide, something the
world must remember… We will always reject any attempt to erase its
record, even for some political advantage.

Gerald Ford

Addressing the US House of Representatives.
Mr. Speaker, with mixed emotions we mark the 50th anniversary of the Turkish
genocide of the Armenian people. In taking notice of the shocking events in
1915, we observe this anniversary with sorrow in recalling the massacres of
Armenians and with pride in saluting those brave patriots who survived to
fight on the side of freedom during World War I. – Congressional Record, pg.
8890

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
02 April 2004

NATO Expansion: More Muscle for U.S. To Flex

Summary

On March 29, NATO took in seven new member states. The
enlargement ensures that the NATO of the future will work as a
reliable arm of U.S. policy.

Analysis

At a 1999 summit in Washington, D.C., the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization welcomed its first new members of the post-Cold War
era: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The expansion was
broadly hailed in Europe and the United States as a bridge-
building effort to seal the Cold War rift. Moscow did not agree,
and the expansion condemned Russian-Western relations to the deep
freeze for three years.

Once the brouhaha of the summit died away, however, there were
some uncomfortable questions that NATO’s supporters had to deal
with. The alliance was formed to defend Europe from the Soviet
Union; what would it do, now that the Soviet threat no longer
existed? The answer from the new members was simple: Soviet =
Russian. The answer from the Russians was equally simple: Disband
NATO. Others felt that NATO should evolve into a political talk-
shop, a peacekeeping force, a military adjunct to the European
Union or some other nebulous confidence-building organization.

Five years later — 15 years after the Berlin Wall fell — it is
a different world and a different NATO. On March 29, the alliance
admitted the three remaining former Soviet satellites (Bulgaria,
Romania and Slovakia) and three former Soviet republics (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania), as well as a piece of the former
Yugoslavia (Slovenia).
But the expansion did more than add 50 million people and
rationalize NATO’s eastern border.

For the most part, the confusion of 1999 is gone; with the 2004
expansion, NATO knows exactly what it is — even if some members
are not happy with the outcome. NATO is an instrument for Western
(read: U.S.) influence globally. The alliance now has troops
operating in long-term missions in Afghanistan, and soon will
have troops in Iraq. Because the United States remains the pre-
eminent power in the alliance — and in the world — it is
Washington that calls the shots.

Core NATO members such as France and Germany certainly disagree
with this turn of events, but have lacked the influence to stop
it. That has become — and will continue to be — the case
because of the admittance of NATO’s newest members. All of the
fresh blood can be safely grouped into the “new Europe” that U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld so charmingly coined in the
lead-up to the Iraq war. These states all share historical
experience in betrayal by France and domination by Germany and
Russia. It is only natural that such states would search further
abroad for allies to help guarantee their security. In the 1999
Kosovo war, the United States was able to use NATO to generate a
veneer of international respectability for actions that it could
not get the United Nations to sanction. From Estonia to Bulgaria,
the United States now has 10 new — or newish — states within
NATO that Washington can count on for support when such a state
of affairs surfaces in the future. The 2003 Iraq war is a prime
example; Bulgaria practically led the charge at the United
Nations for Washington.

Russia might not be thrilled with this development, but it is
certainly glad NATO’s eyes are casting about the planet and are
not riveted solely on the East. Further smoothing Russian-NATO
relations is the fact that — although U.S. influence over the
alliance is stronger than ever — NATO forces in Europe are
weaker than ever and are only expected to be further downsized.
Germany, long the European bugaboo, has cut its military forces
to the point that it has next-to-zero power projection capacity,
while the United States is openly discussing pulling troops out
of bases across Europe (much to the Berlin’s chagrin, we might
add).

NATO’s home front is not merely secure, it is not even a front
anymore. The only spot on the European continent that requires
forces is the Balkans, and even this is child’s play compared to
the tasks of NATO’s past. Places such as Kosovo will be a
headache for at least a generation, but such brushfires do not
threaten NATO’s core — or even new — members. That has changed
the very nature of NATO from a defensive (or offensive, depending
on your politics) military alliance to a tool of global
influence.

NATO’s Neighbors

On the surface, Russia’s strategic situation is miserable. All
its former satellites — plus three of its former republics —
are in an alliance with a nuclear first-strike policy that was
formed to counter the Red Army. Its only reliable allies are an
incompetently led Belarus and militarily insignificant Armenia.
Russian military spending is well up from its late 1990s lows,
but failed nuclear exercises earlier this year and the 2000 Kursk
submarine sinking are real reminders that even the once-feared
Soviet nuclear arsenal is only a shadow of its former self. The
question at the top levels of the Russian government is how to
manage the military decline; they are not yet to the point of
asking how they can reverse it.

In this regard, NATO’s 2004 expansion is a symptom of a much
deeper issue: Russia’s endemic decline. Putin spent the bulk of
his first term simply asserting control over the levers of power.
Now, with a tame Duma and a relatively loyal government at his
beck and call, Putin is focusing Russia’s energies on halting
(and hopefully reversing) Russia’s not-so-slow-motion collapse.
Attempting such a Herculean task will take nothing less than 200
percent of the Russian government’s time and attention, assuming
everything goes perfectly — and in Russia things rarely proceed
perfectly.

In the meantime, Moscow simply lacks the bandwidth to seriously
address anything going on in its neighborhood, much less farther
abroad. Attempts to counter what it considers unfriendly
developments will be flimsy and fleeting. Witness the recent
violence against Serbs in Kosovo: Russia sent a few harshly
worded press releases and some humanitarian aid, and that was the
end of it. The fact that the Baltics made it into NATO with so
little Russian snarling — or that Georgia transitioned to such
an anti-Russian government so easily — is testament to Moscow’s
distraction.

It is also a harbinger of things to come as Russia’s
introspection creates opportunities for power groups far more
aggressive than NATO:
* Uzbekistan hopes to become a regional hegemon, and will
capitalize on its indirect U.S. backing to extend its influence
throughout eastern Central Asia, particularly vis-a-vis Russian
allies Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
* Militant Islamist groups will deepen their influence in the
southern former Soviet Union, particularly in the Caucasus.
* China will continue quietly encouraging its citizens to
populate eastern Siberia while working to lash Kazakhstan,
traditionally Russia’s playground, to it economically.
* India is planting flags in the energy-rich Caspian basin,
particularly in Kazakhstan, while its intelligence services flow
anywhere Kashmiri militants might travel.
* Turkey is deepening its political, economic and military ties
with Georgia and particularly with Azerbaijan where Turkish
military forces often patrol the Azerbaijani skies.
* Japan is looking to carve out the resources of Siberia for
itself and is steadily expanding its economic interests in the
Russian Far East.
* The European Union is pressing its economic weight across the
breadth of Russia’s western periphery. As it brings the former
Soviet satellites into its own membership, Russian interests will
find them cut off from their old partners and markets.
* The United States is making inroads whenever and wherever it
can.

The question is not whether Russian influence can be rolled back
in the years ahead, or even where — it is by how much.

NATO’s Future

Diplomatically, the second post-Cold War expansion was not as
loud an affair as the first. The 1999 expansion also occurred
during the run-up to the Kosovo war. Within a two-month period
Russia saw the three most militarily powerful of its former
satellites join an opposing alliance with a nuclear first-strike
policy, while its most loyal European ally suffered a bombing
campaign, courtesy of that same alliance. Russia fought tooth and
nail in diplomatic circles to prevent the expansion, and quite
rightly felt betrayed. One of the deals made by the
administration of former U.S. President George H.W. Bush in the
last days of the Cold War was that Moscow would allow Germany to
reunite and remain completely in NATO, so long as the alliance
did not expand eastward.

Stratfor does not expect NATO’s next enlargement, likely within
the next five years, to be particularly troublesome. If Russia
had a red line, it drew it at the Baltics — three of its own
former republics — or Kaliningrad, a Russian Baltic enclave that
NATO’s new borders seal off from direct resupply. The next
enlargement is likely to take in the Balkan states of Albania,
Croatia, Macedonia and perhaps Bosnia. All fall behind NATO’s new
eastern “front line” and would not threaten Russia at all.

The only expansion in the near future that might elicit a rise
would be one that included Finland — which considered submitting
an application in the late 1990s — but even this would not be as
traumatic to the Russians as the now-official Baltic entries.
There is even the possibility that Austria, another of Europe’s
traditional neutrals, might someday join NATO. Vienna is already
more active in NATO exercises than are several full members. Any
serious discussion of a second across-the-Russian-red-line
expansion will be put off until well after 2010, although by that
point Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine could shape up as
possibilities.

NATO certainly has challenges ahead of it. The strain and
political arm-twisting that are likely to precede the expected
Iraq deployment could well reopen wounds that only recently
closed, and competing visions of what NATO should be will
certainly hound it for years. Ironically, this divergence of
perception is part of what will keep NATO powerful, present and
relevant to U.S. policymakers.

While several Western states — and Stratfor — no longer view
NATO as a true military alliance, that view is not shared
uniformly. It is a simple fact that many European countries feel
threatened by the political or military strength of Germany or
Russia. The age-old adage of NATO that it existed “to keep the
Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down” was always
far more than a clever turn of phrase. Many European states still
see this as a core NATO raison d’etre. Such belief is not an
issue of wealth — Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway are just
as pro-NATO and pro-American as Latvia, Hungary and Bulgaria —
it is an issue of place. These countries, by virtue of their
proximity to large neighbors with a past predilection for
domination, want a counterbalance.

So long as that is the case, a majority of NATO’s membership will
be enthusiastic about the alliance as an alliance. Even the
dullest of U.S. administrations will be able to translate that
energy into international influence in Europe — and beyond.
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Hellenic Resources Network
Saturday, 3 April 2004

Various Western Quotes [on the Armenian Genocide]

Henry Morgenthau, Sr.
U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, 1919

When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they
were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this
well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt
to conceal the fact. . . . I am confident that the whole history of the
human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great massacres
and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the
sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915.

British Viscount James Bryce
October 6, 1915, speech

The massacres are the result of a policy which, as far as can be
ascertained, has been entertained for some considerable time by the gang of
unscrupulous adventurers who are now in possession of the Government of the
Turkish Empire. They hesitated to put it in practice until they thought the
favorable moment had come, and that moment seems to have arrived about the
month of April.

Count Wolff-Metternich
German Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire July 10, 1916, cable to the German
Chancellor

In its attempt to carry out its purpose to resolve the Armenian question by
the destruction of the Armenian race, the Turkish government has refused to
be deterred neither by our representations, nor by those of the American
Embassy, nor by the delegate of the Pope, nor by the threats of the Allied
Powers, nor in deference to the public opinion of the West representing
one-half of the world.

Theodore Roosevelt
May 11, 1918, letter to Cleveland Hoadley Dodge

. . . the Armenian massacre was the greatest crime of the war, and the
failure to act against Turkey is to condone it . . . the failure to deal
radically with the Turkish horror means that all talk of guaranteeing the
future peace of the world is mischievous nonsense.

Herbert Hoover
The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 1952

The association of Mount Ararat and Noah, the staunch Christians who were
massacred periodically by the Mohammedan Turks, and the Sunday School
collections over fifty years for alleviating their miseries – all cumulate to
impress the name Armenia on the front of the American mind.

Jimmy Carter
May 16, 1978, White House ceremony

It is generally not known in the world that, in the years preceding 1916,
there was a concerted effort made to eliminate all the Armenian people,
probably one of the greatest tragedies that ever befell any group. And there
weren’t any Nuremberg trials.

Ronald Reagan
April 22, 1981, proclamation

Like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the
Cambodians which followed it, . . . the lessons of the Holocaust must never
be forgotten.

George Bush
April 20, 1990, speech in Orlando, Florida

[We join] Armenians around the world [as we remember] the terrible massacres
suffered in 1915-1923 at the hands of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire. The
United States responded to this crime against humanity by leading diplomatic
and private relief efforts.

Hellenic Resources Network
Saturday, 3 April 2004

Various Turkish Quotes, beginning with multiple quotes from the 3 rulers of
wartime Turkey, Cemal Pasha, Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha.

Enver Pasha
One of the triumvirate rulers publicly declared on 19 May 1916…

The Ottoman Empire should be cleaned up of the Armenians and the Lebanese.
We have destroyed the former by the sword, we shall destroy the latter
through starvation.

In reply to US Ambassador Morgenthau who was deploring the massacres against
Armenians and attributing them to irresponsible subalterns and underlings in
the distant provinces, Enver’s reply was…

You are greatly mistaken. We have this country absolutely under our control.
I have no desire to shift the blame onto our underlings and I am entirely
willing to accept the responsibility myself for everything that has taken
place.

Talat Pasha
In a conversation with Dr. Mordtmann of the German Embassy in June 1915…

Turkey is taking advantage of the war in order to thoroughly liquidate
(grundlich aufzaumen) its internal foes, i.e., the indigenous Christians,
without being thereby disturbed by foreign intervention.
After the German Ambassador persistently brought up the Armenian question in
1918, Talat said “with a smile”…
What on earth do you want? The question is settled. There are no more
Armenians.

Cemal Pasha
To a German officer upon seeing the deportations in Mamure said…

I am ashamed of my nation (Ich schame mich fur meine Nation)

Cemal
Minister of the Interior of Turkey publicly declared on March 15 that on the
basis of computations undertaken by Ministry Experts…

800,000 Armenian deportees were actually killed…by holding the guilty
accountable the government is intent on cleansing the bloody past.

Prince Abdul Mecid
Heir-Apparent to the Ottoman Throne, during an interview…

I refer to those awful massacres. They are the greatest stain that has ever
disgraced our nation and race. They were entirely the work of Talat and
Enver. I heard some days before they began that they were intended. I went
to Istanbul and insisted on seeing Enver. I asked him if it was true that
they intended to recommence the massacres which had been our shame and
disgrace under Abdul Hamid. The only reply I could get from him was: ‘It is
decided. It is the program.’

Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Pasha
Equivalent rank in the US would be head of the cabinet I think. He described
the treatment of the Armenians as…

A crime that drew the revulsion of the entire humankind.

Mustafa Arif
Minister of Interior stated on 13 December 1918…

Surely a few Armenians aided and abetted our enemy, and a few Armenian
Deputies committed crimes against the Turkish nation… it is incumbent upon
a government to pursue the guilty ones. Unfortunately, our wartime leaders,
imbued with a spirit of brigandage, carried out the law of deportation in a
manner that could surpass the proclivities of the most bloodthirsty bandits.
They decided to exterminate the Armenians, and they did exterminate them.

Russian military presence guarantees Armenia’s security – defence boss

ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow
3 Apr 04

YEREVAN

The Armenian authorities regard Russian-Armenian military cooperation
as “a component of the republic’s national security and therefore,
believe that the presence of the Russian military base on the
republic’s territory is very correct and necessary for the country”.
The Armenian defence minister and secretary of the National Security
Council, Serzh Sarkisyan, said this at a meeting with a group of
Russian journalists today. “The Russian military presence promotes the
calm situation in the region,” Sarkisyan said.

Armenian opposition members face charges of disrespecting court

Arminfo
3 Apr 04

YEREVAN

Criminal proceedings have been instituted against members of the
political council of the opposition Anrapetutyun (Republic) Party,
Smbat Ayvazyan, Leva Yegiazaryan and Aramazd Zakaryan.

Ayvazyan told Arminfo today that he was summoned to the prosecutor’s
office of Yerevan’s Centre community yesterday. He was surprised to
learn there that he and his colleagues from the party’s political
council made critical remarks on the judge when the verdict was
announced on the case related to the murder of the chairman of the
Council of Public Television and Radio, Tigran Nagdalyan, on 20
January.

The criminal proceedings against them have been instituted under the
article on “showing disrespect for the court”, Ayvazyan said.

Azeri MPs sceptical about opening of Turkish-Armenian border

ANS TV, Baku
2 Apr 04

Presenter Azerbaijani MPs do not want to believe that Turkey may open
its border with Armenia.

Correspondent over footage of Istanbul, Yerevan Reports on the opening
of the border and the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Turkey and Armenia have caused serious anxiety by the Azerbaijani
public. MPs are divided over this issue. Some assess the opening of
the border with Armenia as an attempt to justify the Armenian
aggression, while others do not believe that this may happen. The MPs
also spoke about the damage that the opening of the border could
inflict on Azerbaijan.

MP Alimammad Nuriyev This may have negative repercussions for
Azerbaijan. In fact, Armenia will get a second life, considerably
improve its economy and continue its aggression. This will hinder the
settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

MP Qudrat Hasanquliyev This may considerably hinder the settlement of
the Karabakh conflict. If the Turkish government adopts such a
decision, this government will not be able to stay in power in Turkey.

MP Mais Safarli The opening of the border with Armenia runs counter to
the interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey in the first place. Regardless
of who is in power in Turkey, no government will take such a step.

MP Fazail Ibrahimli If Turkey opens its border, Azerbaijan will lose
the chance to solve the problem peacefully.

Correspondent However, some MPs believe that Turkey will not yield to
the pressure of international organizations and some countries. Thus,
the idea of opening the border will not materialize.

MP Zahid Oruc I believe that the idea of opening the border is a
provocation, although Turkish officials have also expressed such an
idea. But I am confident that this will not happen.

MP Mikayil Mirza They will not influence the Turkish government. This
idea has been simply put forward in order to keep the issue in the
focus of attention and to revitalize it.

MP Mubariz Qurbanli I do not believe in the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish border.

MP Baxtiyar Aliyev Armenia has territorial claims to Turkey, there is
also the issue of the so-called Armenian genocide. I do not believe
that the Armenian-Turkish border may open until these issues are
resolved.

Correspondent The final conclusion drawn by the MPs is that fraternal
Turkey will not remain indifferent to Azerbaijan’s fate.

Armenian education minister not to visit Baku

Arminfo
3 Apr 04

YEREVAN

Armenian Education Minister Sergo Yeritsyan does not intend to go to
Baku to attend a session of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation on
15-16 April, a source at the ministry has told Arminfo. The source,
however, refused to give the reason for the minister’s decision.

Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Liberation Organization KLO had earlier declared
its intention to prevent the Armenian minister from attending the
session. The KLO said that they would stage protests outside the
buildings of state bodies that organize the session, as well as
outside the hotel that will host the meeting.

Belarusian leader cancels meeting with Azeri premier

Ekho, Baku
2 Apr 04

The Belarusian president’s failure to meet the visiting Azerbaijani
premier is a “political demarche”, according to a Belarusian
commentator. In an interview with Azeri daily Ekho, he said that the
internal affairs of Belarus were more important for Alyaksandr
Lukashenka than his country’s relations with Azerbaijan. However, the
Azerbaijani ambassador in Minsk played down talk of political
manoeuvres. He said that Lukashenka had had to deal with pressing
problems in Brest Region and so could not meet the Azerbaijani
premier. The following is an excerpt from R. Orucov and N. Aliyev’s
report in Ekho on 2 April headlined “April fool’s ‘joke’ by
Lukashenka”, subheaded ” Belarusian president declines to meet
Azerbaijani Prime Minister Artur Rasizada … because of fight against
corruption”, subheadings inserted editorially:

A three-day visit to Belarus by an Azerbaijani government delegation,
headed by Prime Minister Artur Rasizada, ended yesterday [1
April]. The Azerbaijani ambassador to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,
Talat Aliyev, told Ekho that Rasizada had already left Minsk for an
official visit to Lithuania.

Belarusian leader declines to meet Azeri premier

As is known, the prime ministers of the two countries signed numerous
intergovernmental documents during the Azerbaijani delegation’s visit
to Minsk. They are agreements on free trade, air communications,
cooperation in geodesy, cartography, land development and land
registry and a protocol on cooperation between the foreign ministries
of the two countries. But the most remarkable aspect of the visit was
the agreements not reached. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka
made a very unusual gesture in terms of normal diplomatic relations –
he declined to meet Artur Rasizada. The Belarusian presidential
administration naturally gave the Azerbaijani side their official
excuses, but it was done too late – on 1 April – when the meeting
ought to have taken place. All this seems very strange, since the
Azerbaijani premier’s visit to Belarus had been scheduled and endorsed
a long time before. In any case, the Belarusian news agency MiK quoted
the country’s Foreign Ministry as saying that the Azerbaijani prime
minister’s visit was expected in March. Thus, Lukashenka could have
reconsidered his plans long before 1 April.

“We do not have special details why the previously scheduled meeting
between Azerbaijani Prime Minister Artur Rasizada and Belarusian
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka did not take place,” the Belarusian
political expert and employee of the Minsk office of Radio Liberty,
Valeryy Karbalevich, said.

[Correspondent] Does President Lukashenka often decline to have
prearranged meetings?

[Karbalevich] Yes. This happens from time to time. This has happened
with some Western delegations. It is known that Belarus has quite
difficult relations with Western countries and, therefore, Lukashenka
has declined to receive delegations if talks have been difficult and
not yielded the results expected by Minsk. I can remember such
incidents with representatives of the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund etc. He declined to meet them, despite agreements
reached on this beforehand.

Cancelled meeting a political manoeuvre

This kind of act by Lukashenka is a political demarche. What is behind
the refusal to meet the Azerbaijani prime minister? It’s difficult to
say. You need to ask Lukashenka himself.

[Correspondent] Relations between Belarus and Azerbaijan are quite
cool, in view of the close military cooperation between Minsk and
Yerevan.

[Karbalevich] If this is the reason, then the meeting would not have
been scheduled beforehand. As far as Belarusian-Azerbaijani relations
are concerned in general, then they are insignificant, minimum, or
simply zero. Meanwhile, Lukashenka is known to have a high opinion
about the CIS states. One should bear in mind that Belarus has been
internationally isolated and not many states are ready to receive
Lukashenka at home.

[Correspondent] Lukashenka could not meet the Azerbaijani premier,
since he was in Brest [southwestern Belarus] apparently on important
business. What could have been happening place in Brest to urge the
president to postpone important state issues?

[Karbalevich] Lukashenka has been in Brest Region for two days. His
visit is being widely broadcast on TV. But the situation is really
quite strange. Large-scale corruption and misappropriation were
suddenly revealed in Brest. A new governor was appointed, although
nothing extraordinary has ever happened in the region. That region is
neither worse nor better than any other regions of Belarus. The point
is that Lukashenka is launching a new political campaign under the
motto of establishing order and discipline. All this has started from
Brest Region.

[Passage omitted: more details of the campaign]

Avoiding a meeting with Rasizada shows that for Lukashenka the
campaign is more important than relations with Azerbaijan.

Azeri officials play down talk of political manoeuvres

The press services of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet
of Ministers did not know about this yesterday [1 April]. The Foreign
Ministry said that Rasizada was part of their department, while the
Cabinet of Ministers offered to phone the next day.

Ekho managed to get in touch with a representative of the Azerbaijani
diplomatic office in Belarus, Ayar Huseynov.

“According to the information from Belarus, Lukashenka attended an
extraordinary session in Brest,” the diplomat said to explain the
reason for the incident. Then we spoke to ambassador Talat
Aliyev. Asked if it President Lukashenka’s step should be seen as a
political demarche by the Belarusian side, the ambassador said: “I
resolutely disagree with that assessment, since Mr Lukashenka had to
deal with urgent and pressing issues in Brest Region. He had to hold
an extraordinary session there and for this reason, had to visit the
region.”

The ambassador did not agree that Lukashenka’s gesture showed that the
resolution of internal political problems (linked to prolonging the
term of the presidency) was more important than the development of
relations with Azerbaijan.

“I think the Belarusian political expert is mistaken here,” Aliyev
said.

[Passage omitted: every state figure interested in improving ties with
other states]

In turn, independent diplomatic expert Tamerlan Qarayev said that “the
Minsk incident might not lead to damaging consequences, if Belarus
gives an appropriate explanation and Azerbaijan accepts it. If the
explanation is not satisfactory, then this will affect the mutual
relations between the two countries.”

[Passage omitted: Qarayev thinks this was not a political demarche,
details of Rasizada’s visit to Lithuania]