NASA Space Station On-Orbit Status

Space Ref
March 29 2004

NASA Space Station On-Orbit Status

All ISS systems continue to function nominally, except those noted
previously or below. Underway: Week 23 for Increment 8.

Before breakfast, both crewmembers completed their first session of
the periodic Russian medical experiment protocols PZEh-MO-7 (calf
volume measurement) and PZEh-MO-8 (body mass measurement). FE Alex
Kaleri set up the MO-8 “scales” equipment and subsequently broke it
down and stowed it away.

Later, Kaleri was to perform a major 5-hr. IFM (in-flight
maintenance) inside the Soyuz TMA-3/7S, to repair the V1 fan of the
KhSA cooler/dryer unit in the crew return vehicle’s Descent Module
(SA), but the activity was deferred after a tagup with ground
specialists when Alex encountered a problem with the fan. [The
planned R&R is in response to the finding of the investigation &
status check done by Kaleri on the KhSA fans on 11/1/03, which in
turn was prompted by higher-than-expected humidity (18 mmHg)
encountered in the Soyuz cabin during the stand-alone Expedition 8
crew flight to the ISS (10/18-10/20/03). To repair or, if necessary,
replace the fan, Sasha had to gain access to the fan outlets by
reconfiguring the SA, disassembling the air duct between DC-1 and
Soyuz, relocating the Sokol spacesuits, flipping back the foot rests
on the three couches, and using a local light in the confined work
space.]

CDR Michael Foale completed another session on the new BCAT-3 (Binary
Colloidal Alloy Test-3) experiment for NASA GRC (Glenn Research
Center)’s microgravity research program. Today’s activities focused
on BCAT-3 sample homogenizing and the first two photography runs.
The images were to be downlinked for review by the ground team, which
then will provide feedback in tomorrow’s BCAT conference. Foale was
also asked to document his activities on videotape. [BCAT-3 is a
Small Payload for ISS using the Kodak DCS760 digital camera with
MagLite at the MWA. Experiment hardware for homogenizing samples in
micro-G include a Slow Growth Sample Module with sample couvettes and
the BCAT Magnet for homogenizing the alloy samples (toxicity level 1)
to initiate growth of colloidal structures. Forerunners were the
glovebox investigations BCAT & BCAT-2 launched on STS-79 & STS-86 to
the Russian space station Mir during the fall of ’96 and ’97. BCAT-3
is a precursor for the LMM (Light Microscopy Module) scheduled to fly
in 2006. BCAT-3 is also a follow-on experiment to CGEL (Colloidal
Gelation) operated by Mike Foale on Mir/Increment 5. Possible future
applications of the colloidal alloy experiments are photonic crystals
for telecommunications and computer applications (e.g., optical
switches and waveguides, “computing with light”), extremely low
threshold lasers, and improved use of supercritical fluids (e.g. CO2
for food extractions, pharmaceuticals, dry cleaning, etc.)]

Afterwards, Mike Foale reinstalled four DZUS fasteners on a panel in
the Lab module.

After yesterday’s task-listed Diatomeya work on Service Module
windows, Alex Kaleri conducted more activities today for the Russian
ocean research program, performing observation, photo and video
imagery of bio-productive aquatic areas of the South Atlantic Ocean
and of cloud formations above them. [He used the Nikon F5 with f/80
mm lens and the DVCAM 150 digital camcorder (minimum zoom mode) for
recording of video and voice-over audio of color-contrasting
formations on the open aquatic areas, local anomalies in the cloud
field structure, and manifestations of water dynamics on the ocean
surface.]

Sasha also continued yesterday’s task-listed session of the Russian
Uragan earth imaging program, today focusing the Kodak DCS760 digital
camera with 800-mm and 400mm lenses on new targets of nature and
industry environment conditions. [They included the southern coast
of Cyprus, the shoreline of the Bay of Gulf of Iskenderun, volcanoes
in Turkey and Armenia, the Koura river valley, the Chirkeiskoe water
reservoir, the shoreline of the Caspian Sea, and panoramic imagery of
the western Caspian shore from the Volga estuary to Apsheron.]

The FE performed his regular maintenance/inspection of the BIO-5
Rasteniya-2 (“Plants-2”) greenhouse. [Rasteniya studies growth and
development of plants (peas) under spaceflight conditions in the
Lada-4 greenhouse. Regular maintenance involves monitoring of
seedling growth, humidity measurements, watering to moisten the
substrate if necessary, and photo/video recording.] Mike conducted
the daily routine maintenance of the SM’s SOZh life support system
(including ASU toilet facilities), and he also prepared the daily IMS
inventory “delta” file for automated updating the IMS databases.

Both crewmembers completed their daily physical exercise program.
They also performed the weekly maintenance of the TVIS treadmill (a
five-minute task for each treadmill user, usually done just prior to
power-down or end of exercise session).

Starting at 9:00am EST, MCC-Houston began a remote-commanded checkout
of software for the two TRRJs (thermal radiator rotary joints) of the
U.S. segment that will run for the next several days. [The TRRJs
are needed to support the ETCS (external thermal control system) when
it is activated during the 12A.1 mission (NET 12/1/05), and this test
is the first of several in support of that activation. Both TRRJs
have had a full hardware checkout in previous expeditions (Loop A on
the S1 truss during 9A, Loop B on P1 during Increment 6), but this is
the first time that the automated software algorithms will be used
for checking out the flight hardware. The C/O includes several
orbits of Autotrack mode for the BGAs (Beta gimbal assemblies)
andseveral orbits in each of two configurations of Blind mode.]

Today’s CEO (Crew Earth Observations) targets, in the current LVLH
attitude no longer limited by flight rule constraints on the use of
the Lab nadir/science window, except for the shutter closure and
condensation-prevention plan (limited to 90 min. in 24 hours), were
Ganges River Delta (looking left for a mapping pass of land use in
the delta. The major visual is the protected outer islands where
native forests still appear dark green, with a sharp boundary on the
inshore side where agriculture begins), Dhaka, Bangladesh (nadir pass
over this city), Cape Town, South Africa (good pass just south of
Table Mountain. Looking nadir and left), Johannesburg, South Africa
(looking left towards the center of the Witwatersrand region. Crews
ask about the numerous white patches scattered throughout the city
[bigger further out from the center]. These are “mine dumps,” or
spoil tips from the gold mines, older dumps being re-mined for their
remnant gold content), Karachi, Pakistan (looking a touch left),
Tashkent, Uzbekistan (looking right at the foot of the mountains),
Tropical storm, Brazil (Dynamic event. This unusual storm went
ashore last evening and started breaking up. Documenting the
evolution of the storm, whether well formed offshore or breaking up
over land, is of great interest. Looking left towards the Brazilian
coastline), Lima, Peru (nadir pass), Mexico City, Mexico (nadir
pass), and Albuquerque, New Mexico (nadir pass).

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12366

Old Friends Dukakis, Ayvazian Are a Clash Act

Washington Post, DC
March 30 2004

Old Friends Dukakis, Ayvazian Are a Clash Act

By Jane Horwitz
Special to The Washington Post
Tuesday, March 30, 2004; Page C05

Olympia Dukakis and Leslie Ayvazian have been friends and colleagues
for more than 20 years. At the moment they’re in Alexandria, where
Ayvazian’s “Rosemary and I” will have its world premiere. It opens
Sunday at MetroStage and runs through May 9.

Ayvazian, whose plays include “Nine Armenians” and “Lovely Day,”
performed her solo show “High Dive” at MetroStage last season. She
will also act in “Rosemary and I,” a four-character memory piece
partly inspired by her mother’s childhood. Dukakis is directing with
Nancy Robillard, who will continue rehearsals when the busy
Oscar-winning actress has to be away for a day or two.

Dukakis is known for her honored 1987 turn in “Moonstruck” and other
film and TV roles, but she also has been steeped in classical and
experimental theater. She founded and ran the Whole Theatre Company
in Montclair, N.J., for 19 years.

“It’s very collaborative, actually, very collaborative,” says Dukakis
of the process underway at MetroStage. “Sometimes the play is taking
new turns that Leslie didn’t expect. . . . We disagree sometimes, we
try this, we try a compromise. . . . I think the trick is to let go
of things.”

One day last week, raised voices thundered through the closed doors
of the theater just after the day’s rehearsals had begun. The
outburst was not part of the script. It was Dukakis and Ayvazian
having words. Moments later, they were pals again.

“We got very excited and then all of a sudden we were differing on
one point and it escalated to this top level,” recalls Ayvazian. “It
was like a storm blew through, and in many ways both of us were both
rocked by it and cleared by it and . . . ended up feeling closer than
ever.

“There are not many people you can come to pitched emotion with,”
says Ayvazian of her son’s godmother. “We’re remarkable friends.”

In “Rosemary and I,” a woman, Julia (played by Ayvazian), tries to
conjure memories of her childhood and to understand the vague sense
of neglect she always felt because her mother, Rosemary, a concert
singer, traveled constantly. Julia also muses about Rosemary’s
accompanist, a woman with whom the singer shared an unexplored
passion.

Ayvazian’s maternal grandmother was a singer, and she believes “there
was some feeling about my mother missing her mother.” The rest of the
play is Ayvazian’s invention.

“The play comes from the work that Olympia and I have done together,
which is the investigation of ancient mythology and . . . what it is
for a woman to try to find her voice, even if her voice isn’t within
the normal spectrum of what is correct for a woman,” Ayvazian says.

She and Dukakis did a series of workshops that explored the duality
of the female psyche through the mythology of two ancient Sumerian
goddesses. They represent “the two aspects of the feminine. . . .
It’s usually the sexually aggressive part, the rage, the pain that
somehow women are not supposed to walk around with,” Dukakis says.

The question in “Rosemary and I,” Ayvazian says, is “can women live
fully and can men live fully and can we help each other do that by
not denying aspects of ourselves?”

A Real ‘Homebody’

For a year or more, Brigid Cleary was “perfectly happy” just making
people laugh in the farce “Shear Madness” at the Kennedy Center. A
few months ago, she and her family were in the middle of a move to a
part of Calvert County that she calls “as close to Mayberry as I
think exists.” Her phone wasn’t installed yet.

Then one night stage manager Jeanette Buck told Cleary that Howard
Shalwitz of Woolly Mammoth had been trying to reach her. They needed
an actress to perform the daunting monologue “Homebody,” the first
half of Tony Kushner’s “Homebody/Kabul.”

Shalwitz faxed Cleary a few pages of the script; she read it and
thought, “Oh my Lord.” But a fellow “Madness” cast member prodded her
— “Are you an actor or not?” — and she took the plunge into
Kushner’s “incredible, lush . . . kaleidoscope” of words.

The “Homebody” is a middle-class London housewife who shares with the
audience her utter fascination with the ancient city of Kabul, her
estrangement from her family and her near-psychotic obsession with
words. “She is telling a couple of stories at once, but all leading
to making a decision,” Cleary says.

“I’m more of a patter-song type person, and this is an aria,” Cleary
observes. “There are sentences that are half a page long.” She began
practicing the monologue on her long commutes and credits director
John Vreeke with guiding her through the thicket in rehearsals.

Woolly Mammoth’s production with Theater J runs through April 11 at
the D.C. Jewish Community Center.

Cleary has been acting on Washington area stages for about 25 years.
Frequent theatergoers will remember her perfectly timed delivery in
productions of “The Women” at Studio Theatre and Arena Stage, where
she also did “Expecting Isabel.” She’s become known for comic roles.

“I think I kind of become whatever I need to become in a role,”
Cleary says. “I never thought of myself as a comic actress, and I was
always amazed that people didn’t think there was a matching flipside
to that.”

In May she will appear in “The Cripple of Inishmaan” at Studio and
may rejoin “Shear Madness” after that. “I am going to treat my career
like I do my yoga classes,” Cleary says. “. . . I’m going to keep
becoming more and more limber, more and more able — until I can’t.”

UN official fired over Iraq bomb

BBC news
March 30 2004

UN official fired over Iraq bomb

The UN’s headquarters were gutted by the blast last August
The United Nations secretary general sacked security co-ordinator Tun
Myat after a scathing report on last year’s bomb attack on the UN’s
HQ in Baghdad.
But Kofi Annan refused an offer to resign from his deputy Louise
Frechette, his spokesman Fred Eckhard told reporters at the United
Nations.

Mr Eckhard said the failures had been “collective”, except in the
case of Tun Myat, who had specific responsibility.

UN special envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello was among the 22 people
killed.

More than 100 others were hurt as suicide bombers apparently drove a
truck laden with explosives into the compound on 19 August.

In other developments in Iraq:

A roadside bomb kills a US soldier near the flashpoint town of
Falluja, west of Baghdad, the US military says

The US Army admits responsibility for the deaths of two Iraqi
journalists working for the Arab al-Arabiya satellite television on
18 March in Baghdad. It says it regrets what it describes as the
accidental shooting
‘Delusion’ of security

A 30-page summary of the report – circulated internally within the UN
at the beginning of March – was released to journalists on Monday.

The report suggests that UN officials failed to ask searching
questions before deciding to return UN staff to Baghdad, under heavy
international pressure.

The report was particularly critical of two UN officials in Baghdad,
accusing them of “a dereliction of duty” and “a lethargy that is
bordering on gross negligence” for failing to shield the office
windows with blast-resistant film.

The two – Jordan’s Paul Aghadjanian and Pa Momodou Sinyan of Gambia –
were charged with misconduct and will face disciplinary proceedings.

The report also suggests that Mr Vieira de Mello was among other
senior managers who failed to appreciate a building security threat
against them.

“They were living under the delusion the UN would not be attacked,”
Mr Eckhard said on Monday.

Mr Vieira de Mello’s deputy Ramiro Lopes da Silva – who was
responsible for security on site at the Baghdad hotel where the UN
staff were based – will be reassigned elsewhere with no security
duties, Mr Eckhard said.

Conference to examine history of Armenian church

Michigan Daily
March 30 2004

Campus News

Conference to examine history of Armenian church

The Armenian Studies Program will host a three-day international
conference on the history of the Church of Armenia, beginning at 9
a.m. Thursday in the School of Education’s Schorling Auditorium on
East University Street.

On the same day, Oxford University Prof. Robert Thomson will give the
keynote lecture at 7 p.m. in the Michigan Union Ballroom. Thomson
will speak about the Armenian tradition of biblical commentary. This
event is also the fifth event in the Michigan Lectures in Early
Judaism and Christianity series.

International election observation mission (Georgia)

Civil Georgia, UK
March 30 2004

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
Repeat Parliamentary Election, Georgia – 28 March 2004

Tbilisi, 29 March 2004 – The International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM) for the 28 March partial repeat parliamentary election
in Georgia is a co-operative undertaking of the OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament (EP).

This preliminary statement is issued prior to the tabulation and
announcement of official election results and before election day
complaints and appeals have been addressed. A complete and final
analysis of the election process will be offered in the OSCE/ODIHR
Final Report.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

The 28 March 2004 repeat parliamentary election in Georgia
demonstrated commendable progress in relation to previous elections.
The Georgian authorities have seized the opportunity, since the 4
January presidential election, to further bring Georgia’s election
process in closer alignment with European standards for democratic
elections, including OSCE commitments and Council of Europe
standards.

However, in the wake of the events of November 2003, the political
life of Georgia, as reflected in the election process, is not yet
fully normalized. The consolidation of the democratic election
process will only be fully tested in a more competitive environment,
once a genuine level of political pluralism is reestablished.

The conditions in the autonomous Republic of Adjara were once again
not conducive to democratic elections. Intimidation and physical
abuse targeted at opposition supporters and journalists underlined
the serious democratic deficit in Adjara. This situation overshadowed
the progress made in the democratic election process in the rest of
the country where the election took place, and created a
double-standard for elections in Georgia.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) made commendable efforts to
administer this election in a credible and professional manner. Some
previous recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR and
PACE were taken into account by the CEC, noticeably improving the
election process.

However, some recommendations of a more political nature, such as the
lowering of the 7% threshold for allocation of parliamentary
mandates, were not acted upon. The CEC at times appeared to exceed
its authority, for example, extending legally established deadlines
or modifying other legal provisions through decrees.

President Mikheil Saakashvili’s offer to reduce from five to three
the number of his appointees on some District Election Commissions
(DECs) and Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) addressed concerns
regarding the lack of political balance on election commissions.

However, the President’s concession and consequent changes to the
composition of election commissions came late in the electoral
process, are not yet regulated by law, and should have also been
extended to the CEC.

Of serious concern remained the failure of DECs and PECs to maintain
appropriate distance from the ruling parties, and the interference of
some local authorities in the lower-level commissions. A significant
challenge to be addressed is the strengthening of the independence of
the election authorities at all levels.

Although the dominant position of the National Movement – Democrats
has led to a less pluralistic environment for this election, a total
of 16 political parties and electoral blocs did contest these
elections, representing a wide political spectrum and a degree of
choice. With the exception of Adjara, contestants were free to
campaign. However, most political parties took a passive approach,
which resulted in a very low-key campaign. It was only during the
final week of the campaign that parties became more active.

A wide and diverse range of media could freely cover the campaign and
electoral preparations; however State TV news broadcasts focused
overwhelmingly on the authorities and the parties supporting them,
and failed to provide sufficient airtime for political debate and
exchange of views. Adjara TV once again displayed a clear bias in
favor of the Adjarian authorities. Media coverage of the election
process was further constrained by the lack of visible and effective
campaigns on the part of most parties.

The IEOM notes the following positive elements in this election:

– Improvements to the administration of the election process;

– Enhanced professionalism and openness of the CEC;

– Commendable efforts to improve, computerize and consolidate the
voter lists, although they remain incomplete;

– With exception of Adjara, a peaceful and free pre-election period,
although there was a late and very limited campaign;

– Freedom of expression enjoyed by the media, with the exception of
Adjara;

– Efforts made to increase the participation of national minorities
in the elections, including the printing of bilingual ballot papers
and voter information material;

– Improved training for lower-level election officials;

– Increased secrecy of the ballot; and

– Less police presence in and around polling stations.

However, issues of concern remain:

– A complete lack of commitment by the authorities of Adjara to
guarantee sufficient conditions for the conduct of a meaningful
democratic election in that area;

– The continuing lack of a clear separation between State
administration and political party structures, and the ongoing
potential for misuse of State administrative resources;

– Inability to ensure the balanced composition of election
commissions at all levels;

– The interference by some local authorities in the functioning of a
number of lower-level commissions, thereby lessening their
independence;

– The failure of the State TV to provide a balanced coverage of the
election campaign, and a forum for political debates with exchange of
views;

– The unwillingness to lower the 7% threshold for seat allocation
when constitutional amendments were recently adopted; and

– In contrast to the 2 November Parliamentary elections, a reduced
scrutiny by domestic observers in the pre-election period.

However, on election day domestic observers were present in
substantially more polling stations than in the previous election. On
election day, voting was conducted in a calm and peaceful atmosphere.

PECs generally operated in a collegial manner and had benefited from
the additional training provided by the CEC. Observers evaluated 80%
of PECs visited as having good or excellent organization of the poll
and understanding of the process.

Election day registration occurred in about 90% of polling stations
visited. In Adjara, there appears to have been less systematic
irregularities, although isolated violations have been reported. Once
again, problems were particularly noticeable in Marneuli, Gardabani
and Tkibuli, where observers reported cases of multiple voting and
ballot stuffing as well as suspiciously high turnout figures.

The institutions represented in the IEOM stand ready to continue
their assistance to the Georgian authorities to address remaining
shortcomings in their electoral process, in order to hold genuinely
democratic elections that are fully compatible with Georgia’s
membership within the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and in
accordance with other European standards.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Background

The 28 March repeat parliamentary election concluded the election of
the fourth Parliament since independence. After the flawed 2 November
2003 parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court annulled the results
of the proportional component (150 of 235 seats). However,
inexplicably, the results of the majoritarian component were not
challenged, despite many of these being equally flawed. Therefore,
only the proportional component was repeated on 28 March, together
with two majoritarian contests.

Following the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze, Nino
Burjanadze, the Interim President, called an extraordinary
presidential election on 4 January, 2004 that demonstrated notable
progress over previous elections. Mikheil Saakashvili was elected
President with 96.2% of the vote.

He nominated Zurab Zhvania first as State Minister, and then as Prime
Minister in line with Constitutional amendments. As one of its first
measures, the government launched a highly publicized and vigorous
anti-corruption campaign leading to several arrests.

The political environment has changed dramatically since the November
elections. The parties that led the November events – the National
Movement and the Burjanadze-Democrats – consolidated their executive
power and joined forces. The Citizens Union of Georgia, the former
ruling party, disappeared from the political scene. The fragmented
opposition attempted to consolidate itself by creating electoral
blocs: the New Rights (NR) formed a coalition with Industry Will Save
Georgia (IWSG) while the National Democratic Party (NDP) united with
the Traditionalists.

On 6 February 2004, the Parliament passed substantial constitutional
amendments, inter alia strengthening the position of the executive
vis-à-vis Parliament and introducing the position of Prime Minister.
Criticism was raised over the lack of public discussions and
information on the amendments since the authorities ignored legal
provisions requiring a one-month public debate before the adoption of
amendments.

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe’s call for further
discussion, and the refinement of the proposed constitutional
amendments before their adoption, were not taken into account.
Subsequently, the European Parliament also raised concern on how the
amendments were adopted.

The situation in Adjara remained tense. Although the state of
emergency imposed since 23 November limited campaign opportunities,
parties in opposition to Adjaran leader Aslan Abashidze coalesced to
form the `Our Adjara’ movement. Relations between the Georgian
government and the Adjarian authorities have significantly
deteriorated in recent weeks. On 14 March, President Saakashvili was
denied entry into Adjara, where he intended to campaign. The Georgian
government reacted by imposing sanctions on Adjara, and tensions
mounted considerably. The situation was seemingly resolved after an
agreement was reached during a meeting between Saakashvili and
Abashidze on 18 March.

As in previous elections, voting did not take place in Abkhazia and
in Java and Tskhinvali districts (South Ossetia). The international
community provided significant funding and technical assistance for
the parliamentary election, mainly through the OSCE Election
Assistance Program, which provided a crucial contribution to
realizing this election.

Election System and Legal Framework

Parliament is elected for a four-year term and is composed of 235
deputies elected through a mixed election system, with 150 mandates
allocated proportionally through national election lists, and 85
mandates through plural-majoritarian constituencies. The proportional
component of the election takes place in a single constituency.

Parties/blocs must obtain at least 7% of the votes to obtain
mandates. In a welcome development, and in line with previous OSCE
recommendations, the CEC on 23 March adopted a decree defining the
calculation of the 7 % threshold. However, on the eve of the
election, the Tbilisi District Court overturned the CEC Decree, thus
leaving open-ended the fundamental question of how the calculation of
the 7% threshold will ultimately be determined.

The Unified Electoral Code (UEC), the principle legislation governing
elections, overall provides an adequate foundation for the conduct of
democratic elections. However, some significant recommendations
provided by international organizations have not been acted upon. The
CEC also proposed a number of amendments to the UEC focusing on
technical issues, but the outgoing Parliament failed to adopt them.

Election Administration

The election administration is a three-tiered structure: the Central
Election Commission (CEC), 75
District Election Commissions (DECs) and some 2,860 Precinct Election
Commissions (PECs).

Transitional legal provisions adopted in August 2003 concerning the
composition of election commissions remained in force. The greatest
challenge faced by the CEC was the holding of elections in Adjara,
where the election commissions were politically polarized and the
local authorities did not willingly cooperate. The tense pre-election
environment had a negative effect on electoral preparations. The CEC
attempted to exert its authority over the six DECs in Adjara, e.g.
the dismissal of two DEC chairs for failing to follow CEC
instructions. Nevertheless, many commission members, including
Chairpersons, were either loyal to the local authorities or unable to
assert their independence from them. Thus, the CEC could not fully
control the election process in Adjara.

In distinct contrast to the past, the authorities implemented a
number of recommendations, including those enumerated below, made by
the OSCE/ODIHR and PACE. For example, President Saakashvili offered
to reduce from five to three the number of his appointees on DECs and
PECs, but not on the CEC, thereby partly addressing concerns
regarding the lack of political balance in commissions. Ertoba
(Unity), the NDP-Traditionalists bloc and to a lesser extent the
Socialist Party, benefited from this `redistribution’ of commission
members. However, due to the lateness of the decision, the lack of
clarity about its implementation, and other ongoing changes of
commission’s personnel, a degree of confusion has resulted at DEC and
PEC levels. Notable improvements introduced within a short timeframe
included:

– The computerization and consolidation of voter lists into a central
database;

– A more streamlined and professional election apparatus at the
central level;

– A willingness to hold accountable those responsible for election
violations;

– The introduction of a DEC protocol that includes a matrix of PEC
results, thereby enabling parties to verify the calculation of
results at the district level. This may serve to deter fraud or
enable identification of fraud;

– A greater emphasis on training of lower-level election officials,
particularly regarding the procedures to complete results sheets
(protocols);

– The introduction of ballots and voter information materials in
minority languages. However, providing protocols in these languages
in future elections would also be also desirable;

– The adoption of a decision on the method of calculating the total
number of registered voters; and

– Improved procedures for filing complaints on election day.

The CEC met frequently, generally taking decisions in a transparent
manner. In many instances, the numerous decrees and other subordinate
legal acts adopted by the CEC constituted improvements necessary for
the proper implementation of the UEC. However, the CEC, on occasion,
adopted decrees conflicting with the UEC, and could be deemed to have
exceeded its authority. For example, it frequently amended legally
established deadlines. However, there have been few challenges to
this practice.

Apart from Adjara, prior to election day international observers
expressed general confidence in lower level commissions. Most DECs
functioned efficiently, but the transparency of their work remained
an issue. However, an imbalance in the nomination process existed,
and the National Movement-Democrats (NMD) enjoyed a strong majority
of senior positions in DECs and PECs. In 18 districts, observers
received credible allegations of bias in favor of the NMD or Revival
by the DEC Chairperson.

Furthermore, the failure to maintain a clear separation in the roles
and functioning of the election administration on the one hand and
party activists, senior local government officials and domestic
observers on the other, remained a significant obstacle to the
development of a professional, impartial, and independent election
administration. The new authorities should make a determined effort
to address this shortcoming in advance of future elections.

Voter Registration

After the 4 January presidential election, the CEC began the
consolidation of handwritten voter lists into a single computerized
database. The accuracy of this data was verified, and many of the
errors were eliminated. Observers expressed increased confidence in
the voter lists, although the number of registered voters
under-represents the number of eligible voters. Nevertheless,
shortcomings were observed, including a relatively large number of
entries lacking identity card numbers and concerns that some voters
are registered at polling stations in places other than their
official residence.

Further consolidation and correction of errors should be carried out,
and registers should be updated on an ongoing basis in order to
maintain and improve their quality and inclusiveness. The new printed
lists were displayed publicly for a two-week period, thereby enabling
citizens to recheck entries and to register to vote if they were not
on the list. The CEC produced voter lists according to the language
in which they were originally compiled, which increased the
transparency of the process for non Georgian speaking voters.
However, a shortage of staff with the appropriate skills, and
relatively poor data, challenged the CEC’s ability to prepare
accurate lists within the deadlines foreseen, and delays occurred.

During the re-registration period, observers reported that the
majority of PECs were open. However, in a significant minority of
districts, most PECs were closed or did not display lists publicly.
In general, procedures were followed correctly. During this period,
excluding Adjara, only 20,515 additional voters were registered, thus
demonstrating the passivity and lack of interest on the part of
voters. This attitude persisted despite the efforts of the CEC to
raise public awareness. The CEC announced 103,838 registered voters
in Adjara between 8 and 21 March. Despite the request of the Adjarian
authorities, the CEC decided not to extend the registration period.

Citizens were allowed to register on election day. Although not
foreseen in the Election Code, this practice is justified in the
current circumstances, but should not be repeated in future
elections. It became incumbent on PECs to ensure that the eligibility
of those citizens who registered on election day was checked properly
and to follow other procedures rigidly to ensure that no multiple
voting was possible. Observers noted that the residency requirement
was being less rigorously applied in this election.

The voter lists in Adjara remained one of the most contentious issues
of this election, with the potential to influence the outcome of the
election. Following an instruction from the CEC Chairman, five DECs
in Adjara transferred voter lists used for the January 2004
presidential election.

While entering these records into the central database of electors,
it became apparent that the quality of the data was generally very
poor. Frequently, vital information such as voters’ addresses was
omitted, making it impossible to produce meaningful printed voter
lists. This left the CEC with no option but to begin a complete
deregistration of voters. The uncertain and tense pre-election
environment in Adjara affected the voter registration process there.
Fearing for their security, some PEC members did not participate in
the work of PECs, and some voters were dissuaded from registering.

Candidate Registration and the Campaign

Although the dominant position of the National Movement – United
Democrats has led to a less pluralistic environment for this
election, a total of 14 political parties and 5 electoral blocs did
contest these elections, representing a wide political spectrum and a
degree of choice. However, 3 parties withdrew just before election
day.

The election campaign was very low-key. Although, with the notable
exception of Adjara, parties were free to campaign throughout most of
the country, there were few public meetings or party rallies. In
marked contrast to the campaign for the 2 November elections,
observers noted only a few billboards and posters, mostly put up
during the last week of the campaign. However, some degree of
door-to-door campaigning took place. In addition, opposition party
offices in many towns were not operating.

The lack of sufficient funds after the 2 November elections may
partly explain the passive approach of many opposition parties. In
contrast, the newly created Freedom Movement, headed by Konstantin
Gamsakhurdia, son of the first President of independent Georgia,
opened new branch offices, and ran an active and visible election
campaign during the last 10 days.

International observers noted instances where campaign material,
usually for the parties supporting the new authorities, was displayed
in the premises of lower-level election commissions or in local
government offices. For example, National Movement campaign material
was observed in several local authority offices in the Kvemo Kartli
region, and in DEC premises in Tianeti, Tkibuli, Gardabani, Liakhvi,
Khoni, Ambrolauri, and Dusheti.

Campaign material of the Labour Party and Ertoba were displayed in
the Dusheti Culture House. Local government officials were directly
involved in campaign activities as heads of campaign staff or
district party offices. Such cases include: the governor of Racha
Lekhumi and Kvemo Svaneti heading the regional National Movement
campaign staff; the gamgebelis (local executives) of Chugureti-Didube
and Chkhorotsku and the Ambrolauri deputy gamgebeli heading the local
National Movement branches; the Ambrolauri City gamgebeli holding
Rightist Opposition meetings in his office; and the Gori gamgebeli
being head of the Labour Party branch.

In Adjara, the situation differed significantly from the rest of
Georgia. Opposition gatherings were mostly forbidden or violently
suppressed and attacked by supporters of the Adjaran authorities,
including a public meeting on 20 February during the visit of the
Council of Europe’s Secretary General, Walter Schwimmer, to Batumi.

Offices of parties in opposition to the Adjaran authorities and of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were ransacked, journalists and
opposition activists were assaulted, and opposition members of
election commissions were intimidated. While incidents of violence
and intimidation also marred previous elections in Adjara, the
intensity and frequency with which they occurred this time was much
higher. Overall, the environment in Adjara was once gained not
conducive to a meaningful democratic election.

The Media

The media operate in a pluralistic environment and enjoy freedom of
expression. State TV-1 complied with the legal provisions for
allocation of free airtime (two hours every day), although these
spots were transmitted well out of prime time. However, the State TV
failed to provide a forum for political debates that are crucial to
inform the electorate about political parties’ platforms.

The transmission of political spots of the `Our Adjara’ movement
during the pre-election campaign, making clear reference to the
November events, raised concern about the impartiality of the State
TV. This was all the more of concern since it was broadcast free of
charge.

Outside the free airtime provided by State TV, media coverage was
generally dominated by representatives of State institutions and the
leading parties, while the opposition was largely ignored.

State TV provided extensive and overwhelmingly positive coverage of
the current authorities, allocating 46% of total airtime to the
President, and 20% to government officials. Together with the time
devoted to the National Movement-Democrats (14%), the
pro-governmental faction received 80% of the total airtime,
illustrating its lack of balanced coverage of the campaign.

Private electronic media showed a similar picture, with limited time
devoted to opposition parties.
Rustavi-2 devoted 38% of its news coverage to the President, about
19% to the government, and 14% to the National Movement-Democratic.

On Imedi TV, their share was 30%, 22%, and 12%, respectively. As in
previous elections, Adjara TV continued to provide positive and
exhaustive coverage of the Adjarian authorities and Revival, while
allocating mostly negative coverage to the President and Georgian
government officials.

Moreover, the outlet confirmed its bias during the standoff between
the Georgian government and the Adjarian authorities, addressing the
audience with alarmist propaganda.

The print media generally provided more balanced coverage than the
television stations monitored by the IEOM. With few exceptions,
criticism of the authorities, as well as of opposition parties, was
present. The distribution of space among political forces was more
balanced than on television.

The activity of some local media has reportedly been suffering from
undue pressure and restrictions, often by local government officials.
In Adjara, on several occasions journalists were impeded from
operating freely, and even intimidated and physically assaulted. As a
result of the low-key campaign and the failure of most political
parties to mount visible and effective campaigns, the media could not
provide the public with comprehensive information on all aspects of
the election process.

Election Disputes

Few formal complaints concerning the 28 March elections were filed
with either the election administration or the courts. At the central
level, the CEC received approximately a dozen complaints, two of
which raised issues relating to the 28 March elections. The Tbilisi
District Court, which has jurisdiction over the CEC, heard only eight
cases appealing CEC decisions, two of which were admitted.

The EOM monitoring of the case concerning the calculation of the 7%
threshold raised serious concerns on the independence of this
decision. Court cases continued in regard to the majoritarian seats
at both the appellate and the Supreme Court level, indicating the
continuing problems caused by second-round contests based on the
flawed 2 November elections.

While the absence of complaints could be an indication of an improved
process, a lack of competitiveness and the general apathy which
characterized the campaign, civil society organizations which in the
past had served as a check on both the administration and political
parties were less active and did not challenge a single action or
omission.

Participation of National Minorities

Georgia has two large minority populations – Azeris and Armenians –
and a variety of smaller national minorities; most minorities are
concentrated in certain regions. There are no relevant political
parties representing national minorities, but some parties included
representatives of national minorities on their candidate lists.
Overall, however, less than 3% of candidates belonged to national
minorities, and no candidate list reflected their share of the
population.

On election commissions in areas where national minorities reside,
they were significantly under-represented. In addition to providing
ballot papers in Azeri and Armenian in areas with a concentration of
national minorities, as well as protocols in Georgian and Russian,
the CEC also provided PEC manuals and voter education materials in
minority languages.

Some of these materials did not arrive in a timely manner, thereby
reducing effectiveness. Training of election commissions has been
provided in minority languages as well; however, in some instances,
training in Azeri-populated areas was conducted in Russian, and
commission members reportedly had comprehension difficulties.

Participation of Women in the Election Process

Georgian politics remain dominated by men, with limited
representation of women in the government and political party
leadership. The Speaker of the outgoing Parliament and former Interim
President, Nino Burjanadze, is the woman holding the highest public
office. Only 17 women (7.2%) were members of the outgoing Parliament.
Out of the 73 majoritarian candidates already elected, only two are
women (2.7%). In the newly created Cabinet of Ministers only four of
20 members are women, and none of the newly appointed regional
governors are women.

Of a total of 2,700 candidates registered for the 28 March elections,
849 were women (31.4%). Their share on individual lists varied
widely, however, between 13.3% on the National Movement-Democrats
list, and 62.8% on the list of the Party of Democratic Truth. Only
the list of the National Movement-Democrats list is headed by a
woman.

Following recent changes to the election commission composition, one
woman, nominated by the Sportive Union of Georgia, sits on the CEC.
Regarding the DECs visited by international observers, 79% of the
Chairpersons and 77% of the Deputy Chairs were male, while 63% of the
secretaries were women. In polling stations observed there were less
chairwomen than in the previous election.

Some 30 domestic observer organizations were registered to observe
this election. However, only four planned to have a large-scale
observation: the International Society for Fair Elections and
Democracy (ISFED), Fair Elections Foundation (FEF), and New
Generation New Initiative (NGNI, Taoba), while the Georgian Young
Lawyers Association (GYLA) concentrated on observing DECs and a
sample of PECs. ISFED conducted a parallel tabulation of votes (PVT)
enabling the public to compare it with the preliminary results
announced by the CEC.

After the presidential election, FEF split from ISFED, which
fragmented the domestic election observation effort and created
confusion among observers. A degree of competition was observed
between these two organizations in some regions. During election day,
in a positive development, they held joint press conferences. These
organizations had a solid reputation as impartial observers, although
a few allegations to the contrary were received. Overall, the
scrutiny of the election process remained limited during the
pre-election period.

Election Day, Vote Count, and Tabulation

Voting was conducted in a calm and peaceful atmosphere. PECs
generally operated in a collegial manner and had benefited from the
additional training provided by the CEC, with observers evaluating
80% of PECs visited as having good or excellent organization of the
poll and understanding of the process. However, observers noted that
in nearly half of all PECs visited not all members of the PEC were
present for the opening of the polling station. Observers also
recorded an increase in the number of polling stations where campaign
material was prominently on display compared with the previous
election.

Many PECs were unaware of the late withdrawal of three parties from
the election contest, and a large number of them had not received the
withdrawal stamp. This resulted in confusion and inconsistent
application of marking of the withdrawn parties on ballot papers in
many polling stations in most regions of the country.

Election day registration occurred in about 90% of polling stations
visited. Observers noted that the residency requirement was being
less rigorously applied in this election. In 48% of the polling
stations visited, citizens were refused the right to vote. Once
again, voter irregularities were particularly noticeable in Marneuli,
Gardabani and Tkibuli where observers reported cases of multiple
voting and ballot stuffing being observed as well as suspiciously
high turn out figures.

The application and verification of anti-fraud ink was once again
inconsistent in many regions of the country, particularly in Kvemo
Kartli (Marneuli and Rustavi), Samtskhe Javakheti, Samegrelo Zemo
Svaneti and Guria. In almost 10% of cases, observers noted that
inking was rarely or never checked and in nearly 7% of cases the ink
was not applied. The absence of ink reduced the effectiveness of an
important anti-fraud mechanism that is crucial when voters are
allowed to register on election day. Observers reported cases of
identical signatures on voters lists in Marneuli and Gardabani.

Despite the tense atmosphere in Adjara, the process was generally
well organized, except in Kobuleti. Voting was orderly with the
exception of some polling stations in Kelvachauri where bussing of
voters from one polling station to the other was directly observed.
Unusually high numbers of voters’ certificates as well as a lack of
uniform application and checking of inking were reported in Khulo and
Kobuleti.

The atmosphere at the count was generally positive with no violent
incidents reported by observers.

Observers noted a reduction in the number of unauthorized persons
present inside polling stations compared to the previous election but
they were more actively interfering in the process. The redesigned,
more user-friendly protocols allied to the additional training
provided to PECs significantly reduced the number of PECs who
experienced difficulty in completing protocols. Compared to the
previous election observers reported an increase in the presence and
diligence of domestic observers during both the voting and counting
processes.

MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mr. Bruce George, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA),
was appointed as Special Coordinator by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
to lead the short-term observers. Mr. Matyas Eorsi led the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) delegation,
and Mr. Demetrio Volcic led the European Parliament (EP) delegation.
Amb. Michael Wygant (U.S.A.) headed the OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission.

The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) opened in Tbilisi
on 15 February with 40 experts and long-term observers deployed in
the capital and 12 regional centers. On election day, the IEOM
deployed some 440 short-term observers from 43 OSCE participating
States, including 27 parliamentarians from the OSCE PA, 15 from PACE,
and four from the European Parliament. The Council of Europe deployed
an additional 21 observers. The IEOM observed voting throughout
Georgia in 1,400 polling stations out of a total of 2,860, and
counting was observed in some 130 polling stations.

The IEOM was also present in more than 40 district election
commissions to observe the tabulation of results. The OSCE/ODIHR will
issue a comprehensive report on these elections approximately one
month after the completion of the election process. The IEOM wishes
to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Election
Commission, and other national and local authorities for their
assistance and cooperation during the course of the observation. The
IEOM also wishes to express appreciation to the OSCE Mission to
Georgia and other international organizations and embassies
accredited in Tbilisi for their support throughout the duration of
the mission.

For further information, please contact:
– Amb. Michael Wygant, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, in Tbilisi
(+995-32-253 526);
– Urdur Gunnarsdottir, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson (+48 603 683 122); or
Nicolas Kaczorowski, OSCE/ODIHR
Election Adviser, in Warsaw (+48 603 793 780);
– Angus MacDonald, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
in Strasbourg (+33 630 496 820);
– Jan Jooren, Press Counsellor of the OSCE PA, in Copenhagen (+45
4041 1641);
– Tim Boden, European Parliament, in Brussels (+32 475 351 948)
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Kipshidze str. Block II,
Building I, Tbilisi, Georgia — Tel.: +995-32-253
526, 253 527; Fax: +995-32-253 523, E-mail: [email protected]

Never forget Armenian genocide

The Enquirer, Cincinnati
March 30 2004

Never forget Armenian genocide

Your voice: David Krikorian

Last week, the World Affairs Council of Greater Cincinnati held a
luncheon with the Turkish ambassador to the United States, Osman
Faruk Logoglu. Cincinnati Mayor Charlie Luken attended the lunch and
presented the ambassador with a key to the city. Both General
Electric Aircraft Engines and Procter & Gamble count Turkey as a
major customer.

The ambassador addressed the 40 attendees for about 20 minutes and
then took a few questions. I asked the ambassador when the government
of Turkey would officially recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915
and end its campaign of denial to suppress the truth.

For those who are not familiar with this event, the Armenian genocide
was a dark period in the lifeline of humanity. Under the cover of
World War I, the Turkish government – at that time known as the
Ottoman Empire – implemented its plan to eliminate the Armenian
population from the face of the earth.

More than 1.5 million (yes, million!) Armenian men, women and
children were butchered at the hands of the Turkish government. This
event is well chronicled by distinguished authors, historians and
statesmen from many countries including the United States, France,
Germany, Sweden and Great Britain, just to name a few.

The ambassador answered the question by saying that there was no
genocide and that the event was largely Armenian propaganda. The
ambassador needs to get his facts straight.

There are two resolutions before Congress, House Resolution 193 and
Senate 164, which cite the importance of remembering past crimes
against humanity, including the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and
the Cambodian and Rwandan genocides, in an effort to stop future
atrocities. H.R. 193 was adopted unanimously by the House Judiciary
Committee in May 2003 and has 111 cosponsors.

Despite broad bipartisan support, neither Senate Majority Leader Bill
Frist, R-Tenn., nor House Speaker Dennis Hastert, R-Ill. has
scheduled a vote on the genocide resolution.

President Bush pledged his support in 2000 to officially recognize
the Armenian genocide, which unfortunately looks like a broken
campaign promise. The 50,000 Armenians who live in Florida will
remember that broken promise this November.

For the record, neither Rep. Steve Chabot, R-Ohio nor Rob Portman,
R-Ohio, supports the House resolution. I wonder why not.


David Krikorian of Madeira is a small business owner who operates two
companies, DataSuites and Parody Productions.

US Mil. official visits Armenia for bilateral military discussions

ArmenPress
March 30 2004

US MILITARY OFFICIAL VISITS ARMENIA FOR BILATERAL MILITARY
DISCUSSIONS

YEREVAN, MARCH 30, ARMENPRESS: Major General Jeffrey Kohler, the
Director of Plans and Policy for US European Command, has arrived
today in Armenia for a two-day visit to discuss with Armenian
counterparts bilateral military issues.
During his visit General Kohler is scheduled to meet with defense
minister Serzh Sarkisian and chief of general staff, Colonel-General
Mikael Harutunian and visit also Armenian peacekeeping Battalion.
Major general Jeffrey Kohler, UN Air Force, assumed this position
in March 2002. The general is a 1973 graduate of the US Air Force
Academy. He commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and
served in staff assignments at the major command level and in NATO.
Prior to assuming his current position, the General served director
of operational plans, deputy chief of staff for Air and Space
Operations, headquarters, US Air Force, Washington, DC.

Iran-Armenia gas pipeline construction to start this year

ArmenPress
March 30 2004

IRAN-ARMENIA GAS PIPE-LINE CONSTRUCTION TO START THIS YEAR

YEREVAN, MARCH 30, ARMENPRESS: Negotiations on the construction of
Iran-Armenia gas pipe-line are in their final phase, Armenian Energy
Minister Armen Movsisyan said March 29. He noted that Gas Export
National Company will build the Iranian section of the pipe-line
Armenian will build its section. Initial estimates show that some 100
million USD will be spent to build the pipeline on the territory of
Armenia. A little more money is needed to build the pipe-line on the
Iranian side, the minister said.
The final agreement will be signed in April during when Iranian
Minister of Gas and Oil is expected to visit Armenia. The agreement
envisages that the construction will start later this year and is
expected to last 20 months.
The sides have agreed on the volume, price and other technical
issues of gas deliveries. These matters can be discussed after
signing the agreement. However the conditions are acceptable, the
minister noted.
In Armenia a new pipe-line will be built in Agarak-Kajaran. In all
other parts, capacities of old pipe-lines will be strengthened, A.
Movsisyan said.
Gas supplies to third countries was not officially negotiated.
Neither EU nor any other country has allocated financial means for
that. However, interested countries have expressed willingness to
participate in the construction. Presently, several Russian, Chinese,
Italian companies negotiate with the Armenian side.
Speaking on the importance of the pipe-line, the minister noted
that it facilitates the energy security in the country, provides with
stable sources of gas and is an energy guarantee for prospective
investors.
We can’t look at the gas pipe-line as a precondition for the
closure of ANPP, the minister said, as the gas pipe-line is not a
source of alternative energy.

NATO: Alliance reaches the Black Sea

ANSA English Media Service
March 30, 2004

NATO: ALLIANCE REACHES THE BLACK SEA

VIENNA

By Gaetano Stellacci

(ANSA) – VIENNA, March 30 – The enlargement of NATO to 26
states after the accession of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria has moved the
alliance’s eastern border hundreds of kilometres from the Baltic
to the Black Sea.

The thousand kilometre-long line between the 25th and 30th
meridians from the Baltic to the Black Sea, two thirds of which
now wash the shores of NATO physically separates western Europe
from the rest of the Eurasian continent.

Apart from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova on the east,
NATO’s southern borders reach the states of central Asia,
including Iran, Georgia, Armenia, Iraq and Syria. Italy is no
longer the western NATO border, which has moved southeast to
Slovenia. The former Yugoslav states have also shown their
interest in joining the North Atlantic Pact.

The new southern border means a border of poverty both for
NATO and the EU. Unemployment in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova
has reached 70 percent. Problems and despair more often force
people to drug abuse and alcoholism to whuich are added the
recurrence of tuberculosis and the growing problem of the
AIDS/HIV virus.

NATO will become responsible for the air security of the
Baltic states from Tuesday. Belgium has already sent its first
team of four patrol aircraft. Italy has taken over the
protection of the air space of Slovenia, which has remained
without an airforce since its separation from Yugoslavia.

The danger of increased tension with Russia which borders
Lithuania and Estonia will be diffused by NATO and was not a
subject for NATO’s new Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
despite alarms raised in Moscow.

NATO aircraft are capable of flying the distance between
Estonia and St Petersburg in seven minutes, Russian Defence
Minister Sergei Ivanov said.

Russian leaders seem to dislike even more the enlargement of
the EU which will include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary and the Baltic states in May, all of them former Soviet
satellites which have retained their economic relations with
Russia after the fall of communism.

Their accession to the common European market will make these
relations with Russia weaker. Economic experts in Moscow believe
this will cause damage worth 150 million euro a year.

Initially the seven new NATO members will contribute about
175,000 soldiers from their regular forces and 3,000 tanks, most
of them obsolete. The seven former communist states, however,
are also the most faithful adherents of the U.S. military
doctrine and when Europe split over the Iraqi crisis all of them
supported Washington. (ANSA)

Battle for Batumi

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
March 30, 2004, Tuesday

BATTLE FOR BATUMI

SOURCE: Kommersant, March 29, 2004, p. 10

by Gennady Sysoev

In fact, Moscow supported Adzharian authorities in the opposition
between Tbilisi and Batumi. It can be explained not only by Moscow’s
striving for confirmation of the role of guarantor of Adzharian
autonomy and for defense of Russian citizens, who live there. To all
appearances, Adzharia should play a key-role in the counter game,
which Russia tries to carry out in the region in order to resist the
growth of influence of the US.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined Russian position
concerning the opposition between Georgian and Adzharian authorities
at the very beginning of the present conflict. “There are some
grounds for supposing that Tbilisi plans to use force. Georgian
authorities should understand that it can have severe and
unpredictable consequences for Georgia. In case of the crisis,
Georgian authorities will bear the whole responsibility for it,” the
official representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated.

So, in fact, Moscow began to support Adzharian authorities in the
opposition between Tbilisi and Batumi. Moreover, this position hasn’t
been changed by yesterday’s parliamentary election in Georgia.

Besides, Adzharian leader Aslan Abashidze became a regular visitor at
Moscow. He was in Moscow for over a week last November during “the
rose revolution” and warned the Kremlin about guileful plans of new
Georgian authorities concerning Adzharia. Mr. Abashidze tried to
persuade Russia to support Adzharia in the probable armed conflict
between Tbilisi and Batumi during his visit to Moscow.

Moscow defended Adzharia and its leadership not because of its
special affection for the Georgian autonomy, but because of its
strategically important position in the region. Adzharia is the basic
exit to world for Tbilisi. Another way passes through Abkhazia, which
declared its independence, and it is practically inaccessible for
Georgian authorities. In fact, the loss of Adzharia will block the
entry to the Black Sea and connection with turkey for Tbilisi (a
small part of Georgian border near Poti is situated between Abkhazia
and Adzharia and that’s why it is vulnerable). So, Moscow can get a
powerful instrument of influence on Tbilisi if it establishes special
relations with Adzharia and its leader.

However, it isn’t the most important thing for Moscow. The main thing
is that, to all appearances, Adzharia should play a key-role in the
counter-game, which Russia tries to carry on in the region in order
to resist the growth of the influence of the US.

The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline should be
over by the end of next year. It is a thing of key-importance for
Washington in its strategy in the region. The oil pipeline should
become an axis of US military and strategic construction, which
includes Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Some Central Asian republics have already placed their territories at
the disposal of US military bases. As for Georgia, Americans don’t
intend to construct bases there. In any case, their official
representatives say so. However, it isn’t necessary for them. The US
has an opportunity for using Georgian territory for needs of its
armed forces if it is required. At that, one shouldn’t ask Tbilisi
for any special resolution, because the necessary infrastructure and
legislative basis already exists. The US would like to establish an
analogous scheme in Azerbaijan. The negotiations about it are being
carried out.

The strengthening of US military presence in the region is being
accompanied with cutting down of presence of Russia there. In
accordance with Istanbul agreements, Moscow has already removed its
two military bases in Georgia. As for other two bases in Akhalkali
and Batumi, Russia’s Western partners and Georgian authorities remind
Russian President Vladimir Putin of the necessity of their removal.
If this process is carried to its conclusion, Armenia, the key (to be
more precise, the last) ally of Russia in Transcaucasia, will blocked
and cut off from Russia. Moreover, Russian bases in Armenia will lose
their military significance and sense.

In this situation, Moscow should have started a search for any
counter-game. It seems that it found this variant.

When Yuri Luzhkov came to Batumi at the very height of the
opposition, his circle explained the sense of his unexpected visit by
the following fact: Yuri Mikhailovich decided to check how the
agreements about construction of several objects in Adzharia by
Moscow builders were being realized. A lot of people doubted those
explanations than.

Highway Batumi-Akhalkali (Georgia) – Gyumri (Armenia) is among other
objects, which Moscow builders intend to construct in the region. To
all appearances, it should become a shank of the construction, which
Moscow wanted to create as a counterbalance to US one. The highway
would allow Russia to avoid the cutting off of Armenia, provide an
entry to sea for Russia’s ally, cut oil pipe-line Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
and give the opportunity for the control of the latter.

There are Russian military bases in all three key-points of the
highway – in Batumi, Akhalkali and Gyumri. At that, the authorities
in Batumi are Gyumri are absolutely loyal to Moscow and Javakhetia,
an ethnically Armenian region in Georgia with administrative center
Akhalkali, is under the control of Armenia. In case of Tbilisi’s
total control of Adzharia, the strategic significance of highway
Batumi-Akhalkali-Gyumri would lose its sense.

That’s why the result of the struggle for Batumi is very important
for Moscow (however, for the US too). Of course, it isn’t so
important that it could plunge Russia and the US into a new
confrontation. The control of Adzharia will allow the US to construct
its system in the region for a long time. However, it will allow
Russia, at least, to participate in this construction.

Translated by Gregory Malyutin